Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County No. J223982-02 George W. Clarke, Judge.
McDONALD, J.
The trial court declared Jeffrey J. a ward of the court (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602) after entering true findings of burglary (count 5), vandalism (count 2), petty theft (counts 3 & 6), and trespassing (counts 4 & 7) and placed him on probation. He appeals the court's order to jointly and severally pay $43,000.33 in victim restitution to the San Diego Unified School District as a condition of his probation (§ 730.6, subd. (h).)
All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
FACTS
On August 20, 2009, a group of children, including Jeffrey, climbed over the fence and entered the grounds of Monroe Clark Middle School. One boy removed the window screen, climbed in through a window, opened the door, and let in the rest of the group. After entering, Jeffrey took some food, ate it, and skateboarded on the tables with the other children. Later in the afternoon after hearing about what happened at the school, a different group of children climbed over the fence, entered the school and vandalized the classrooms. The damage included books, flour, sugar, cleaning materials, and trash thrown to the ground. There was also chocolate syrup on the walls, carpet, and tops of computers. This break-in cost the school $38,924.55 to repair, including $30,028.40 to replace the carpet.
The next day, August 21, 2009, Jeffrey again entered the school with some of the same children. They broke into the music room, took some guitars, and destroyed them. This break-in cost the school $4,075.78. The total cost for repairing the damage caused on both days was $43,000.33.
At the restitution hearing the judge ordered that 10 minors, including Jeffrey, be jointly and severally liable for their share of the restitution, based on the days they participated. Jeffrey participated both days and was held jointly and severally liable for $43,000.33.
DISCUSSION
Jeffrey contends the trial court abused its discretion by holding him liable for damages, including the replacement of carpet, caused by the second break-in on August 20, 2009, because the evidence is insufficient to establish that he vandalized the carpet and he was not present at the time of the second break-in.
A
We review a trial court's restitution order for abuse of discretion. (People v. Giordano (2007) 42 Cal.4th 644, 663.) There is an abuse of discretion when the court's "determination is arbitrary or capricious or ' " 'exceeds the bounds of reason.' " ' " (People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1121 (Carbajal).)
Restitution is a valid condition of probation. (Carbajal, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 1121.) The juvenile court has broader discretion in formulating the terms of a minor's probation than an adult's probation. (In re Victor L. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 902, 910.) "There is no requirement the restitution order be limited to the exact amount of the loss in which the defendant is actually found culpable." (Carbajal, at p. 1121.) Under section 730, the juvenile court has broad discretion to order restitution that furthers the legislative objectives of " 'making the victim whole, rehabilitating the minor, and deterring future delinquent behavior.' " (In re Tommy A. (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1580, 1588.) The trial court must use a rational method of calculating the amount of restitution to make the victim whole and to be consistent with the purpose of rehabilitation. (In re Brittany L. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1381, 1391-1392.)
B
Jeffrey contends the trial court abused its discretion by ordering him to pay restitution for the damages incurred during the second break-in on August 20, 2009, in which he did not participate.
The two break-ins on August 20, 2009, occurred within a close time period. The People assert the two events occurred within minutes of each other, although Jeffrey contends the second break-in occurred about a half-hour later. Both incidents on August 20, 2009, occurred because one boy climbed through the same window and let everyone into the building on both occasions. Jeffrey understood the difference between right and wrong and knew it was wrong while he was performing the act. However, the following day, Jeffrey broke into the school again. Moreover, the probation report states Jeffrey was on probation for battery on a school employee at the time of the break-ins.
The juvenile court ordered 10 minors, including Jeffrey, jointly and severally liable for restitution in the amount of $43,000.33 to make San Diego Unified School District whole. This amount covered the damage from both days, August 20 and August 21, 2009. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by ordering Jeffrey to be liable for the costs associated with the second break-in on August 20, 2009. The court had broad discretion to order restitution to make the victim whole, rehabilitate the minor, and deter future delinquent behavior. (In re Tommy A., supra, 131 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1587-1588.) The evidence here showed Jeffrey was a minor in need of rehabilitation and deterrence of future delinquent behavior. Jeffrey knew it was wrong, yet went back to do the same wrongful act the following day despite the fact he was already on probation for a prior offense.
Jeffrey specifically contests liability for the cost of replacing the carpet, $30,028.40, because he was not present during the second break-in. However, the students involved in the second break-in decided to go to the school after they learned of the first break-in. Thus, the first break-in facilitated the second, during which most of the damage to the carpet occurred. Jeffrey was not physically present at the second break-in, but his participation in the first did facilitate the second, which occurred at most a half-hour after the first. We conclude the juvenile court's restitution order was not an arbitrary or capricious decision or exceeded the bounds of reason. (Carbajal, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 1121.)
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: McCONNELL, P. J., McINTYRE, J.