Opinion
No. 2 CA-JV 2019-0069
12-05-2019
IN RE J.E.
COUNSEL Barbara LaWall, Pima County Attorney By Bunkye Chi, Deputy County Attorney, Tucson Counsel for State Law Office of Ransom Young P.L.L.C., Tucson By Ransom Young Counsel for Minor
THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c)(1); Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 28(a)(1), (f); Ariz. R. P. Juv. Ct. 103(G).
Appeal from the Superior Court in Pima County
No. JV20180524
The Honorable Dean C. Christoffel, Judge Pro Tempore
AFFIRMED
COUNSEL
Barbara LaWall, Pima County Attorney
By Bunkye Chi, Deputy County Attorney, Tucson
Counsel for State
Law Office of Ransom Young P.L.L.C., Tucson
By Ransom Young
Counsel for Minor
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Presiding Judge Eppich authored the decision of the Court, in which Judge Espinosa and Judge Eckerstrom concurred.
EPPICH, Presiding Judge:
¶1 J.E., born December 2004, was adjudicated delinquent after a contested adjudication hearing at which the juvenile court found he had committed child molestation. The court placed J.E. on probation for a period of eighteen months. On appeal, he contends the court erred in finding him delinquent because "no intent or knowledge was shown" and because the evidence was insufficient. Finding no error, we affirm.
¶2 "[W]e view the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the adjudication." In re John M., 201 Ariz. 424, ¶ 7 (App. 2001). C.E. and A.E., J.E.'s sisters, informed their grade-school counselor that J.E. had sexually abused C.E. During a forensic interview, C.E. explained that J.E. had "pulled his pants down," "pulled [her] pants down," and put his "private" in her "butt" and "was going up and down," despite her telling him to stop. A.E., who told the interviewer she had walked in on this incident, stated she saw both children with their pants down, and when she came in J.E. had "fastly put[] his underwear and pants back on."
¶3 "A person commits molestation of a child by intentionally or knowingly engaging in or causing a person to engage in sexual contact, except sexual contact with the female breast, with a child who is under fifteen years of age." A.R.S. § 13-1410(A). A person engages in "[s]exual contact" through "any direct or indirect touching, fondling or manipulating of any part of the genitals, anus or female breast by any part of the body or by any object or causing a person to engage in such contact." A.R.S. § 13-1401(A)(3). That conduct is intentional when "with respect . . . to conduct described by a statute defining an offense, that a person's objective is to . . . engage in that conduct." A.R.S. § 13-105(10)(a). Likewise, a person acts knowingly when "a person is aware or believes that the person's conduct is of that nature . . . . It does not require any knowledge of the unlawfulness of the act or omission." § 13-105(10)(b).
¶4 In this case, J.E. argues "the record is devoid of any circumstantial evidence about J.E.'s mental state" and "none of the evidence showed that J.E. engaged in an act of sexual contact intentionally or knowingly." But, a person's "mental state will rarely be provable by direct evidence and the [finder of fact] will usually have to infer it from his behaviors and other circumstances surrounding the event." State v. Noriega, 187 Ariz. 282, 286 (App. 1996). As detailed above, J.E. pulled down both his and C.E.'s pants, contacted C.E. with his genitals and continued to do so despite her telling him to stop, and quickly pulled up his pants upon being discovered. This is sufficient circumstantial evidence from which the juvenile court, as the trier of fact, could infer J.E. had acted intentionally or knowingly. Id.
¶5 J.E. also contends the evidence was insufficient to support the juvenile court's adjudication. But in making his argument J.E. relies on the girls' testimony at the adjudication hearing that they did not remember their statements or the events and had lied, and discredits the forensic interview cited by the court. We do not reweigh the evidence, Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, ¶ 12 (App. 2002), and will defer to the court's resolution of conflicting inferences if, as in this case, they are supported by the record, see In re Pima Cty. Adoption Nos. B-6355 & H-533, 118 Ariz. 111, 115 (1978); see also John M., 201 Ariz. 424, ¶ 7 ("[W]e will not re-weigh the evidence, and we will only reverse on the grounds of insufficient evidence if there is a complete absence of probative facts to support the judgment or if the judgment is contrary to any substantial evidence.").
¶6 For these reasons, we affirm the juvenile court's order adjudicating J.E. delinquent.