Opinion
No. 05-11-00969-CV
07-26-2012
IN THE INTEREST OF J.D.W., A CHILD
AFFIRM; Opinion Filed July 26, 2012.
On Appeal from the 255th Judicial District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 93-03178-S
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Moseley, Lang-Miers, and Murphy
Opinion By Justice Moseley
This appeal arises out of the trial court's order dissolving a child support lien and notice of levy filed by an attorney claiming unpaid attorney's fees under an order in a prior contempt proceeding. The background of the case and the evidence adduced at trial are well known to the parties; thus, we do not recite them here in detail. Because all dispositive issues are settled in law, we issue this memorandum opinion. Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(a), 47.4. We affirm the trial court's order.
Appellant W.K. Bo Brown represented the child-support guardian ad litem in this suit; in a 2004 agreed contempt order, Brown was awarded attorney's fees against appellee, Robert Williams, Jr. In February 2011, Brown served a notice of levy on a financial institution asserting Williams still owed him attorney's fees under that order. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 157.327 (West 2008). Williams filed a motion to vacate the notice of levy, arguing the attorney's fees had been paid and that Brown was not a claimant entitled to serve a notice of levy under the definitions in family code section 157.311. Id. § 157.311(2) (West Supp. 2011). After a hearing on special exceptions to the motion and a hearing on the merits, the trial court signed an order vacating the lien and notice of levy, finding Williams had paid the attorney's fees owed under the agreed contempt order and Brown was not a claimant under the family code definition, and ordering Brown to pay $2,220.00 as attorney's fees to Williams's attorney.
Brown raises three issues on appeal: (1) the trial court abused its discretion by ruling that he was not a claimant as defined by section 157.311; (2) the trial court incorrectly awarded attorney's fees to Williams's attorney; and (3) the trial court incorrectly relied on hearsay to find that the prior order had been paid.
We begin with the third issue because it will dispose of the first issue as well. Williams alleged in his motion to vacate that the attorney's fees Brown alleged were due and owing had been satisfied. The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the motion to vacate. Williams testified that his pastor paid the attorney's fees due under the contempt order and the pastor told Williams the fees were paid. The obligee testified she never received any of the $1500 and was told by the guardian ad litem that it was applied to pay the attorney fees. Brown never objected to any evidence of payment on hearsay grounds, therefore the complaint on appeal is not preserved. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a); Tex. R. Evid. 103(a). Hearsay admitted without an objection is sufficient to support a judgment. See Tex. R. Evid. 802. We overrule Brown's third issue.
The argument under Brown's third issue mentions the trial court's ruling on his special exceptions to the motion to vacate, but does not assign error to that ruling. Brown does state that the pleading failed to give him notice of the claim of satisfaction by payment by a third party. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion because pleadings are required only to contain a plain and concise statement of the claim or defense sufficient to give fair notice to the opponent. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 45, 47; Paramount Pipe & Supply Co. v. Muhr, 749 S.W.2d 491, 494-95 (Tex. 1988). Pleadings are not required to set out the evidence on which a party will rely to establish its claims. Muhr, 749 S.W.2d at 494-95.
Because the trial court's finding that the attorney's fees owed under the contempt order were satisfied supports the order vacating the child support lien, we need not address Brown's first issue. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.
Brown's second issue argues there is no statutory authority for awarding attorney's fees to the Williams's attorney in this proceeding. Williams contends fees are available under family code section 106.2. We agree. Section 106.2 specifically permits the trial court to award attorney's fees in suits under Title 5 of the family code. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 106.2(a) (West 2008) ("In a suit under this title, the court may render judgment for reasonable attorney's fees and expenses and order the judgment and postjudgment interest to be paid directly to an attorney."). The sections governing child support liens under sections 157.311-.331 are part of Title 5 of the family code. See id. §§ 157.311-.331. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by awarding attorney's fees to Williams's attorney. We overrule Brown's second issue.
We affirm the trial court's order.
JIM MOSELEY
JUSTICE
110969F.P05
Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT
IN THE INTEREST OF JORDAN D. WILLIAMS, A CHILD
No. 05-11-00969-CV
Appeal from the 255th Judicial District Court of Dallas County, Texas. (Tr.Ct.No. 93-03178-S).
Opinion delivered by Justice Moseley, Justices Lang-Miers and Murphy participating.
In accordance with this Court's opinion of this date, the trial court's April 28, 2011 Order Dissolving Child Support Lien is AFFIRMED. It is ORDERED that appellee Robert Williams, Jr. recover his costs of this appeal from appellant W.K. Bo Brown.
Judgment entered July 26, 2012.
JIM MOSELEY
JUSTICE