Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, No. CK56258, Steven Berman, Juvenile Court Referee..
Andre F. F. Toscano, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Raymond G. Fortner, Jr., County Counsel, James M. Owens and Kim Nemoy, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
John L. Dodd, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Minors.
ARMSTRONG, J.
T.G. appeals from orders terminating her parental rights to her four children, J., C., T., and S. We affirm.
Discussion
When this case was initiated, in July of 2004, the children ranged in age from 11 to 4 and were living with T. and S.'s paternal grandmother, who had been their legal guardian since January of 2003. (The guardianship was through the probate court.) The Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 petition alleged that the legal guardian's husband had molested one of the children, and that she herself had endangered the children by leaving them alone overnight without adult supervision, and in other ways. The petition was sustained in August 2004, under subdivisions (b), (d), and (j). Reunification services were ordered, but the guardian did not comply and in April 2005, the guardianship was terminated.
All further statutory references are to that code.
Initially, DCFS could not find appellant, but by September 2004, she had contacted DCFS and expressed a desire to reunify with her children. DCFS asked her to drug test, and monitored visits were arranged. Her compliance was partial. After the guardianship was terminated, DCFS filed a section 342 petition concerning appellant, with factual allegations concerning domestic violence and drug use. The petition was sustained in April 2005, under subdivisions (a) and (b).
Reunification services were ordered; drug testing, parent education, and individual counseling to address case issues. For periods of time, appellant complied with her case plan, but for periods of time she did not. Services were terminated in May 2006.
Between July of 2004 and April of 2007, the children were in various foster placements, and although DCFS sought to place them together, this did not always happen. In April of 2007, the children were placed with an aunt, E., who had helped care for the children when they were in guardianship, but who had moved to Oklahoma.
This placement was a success. At the end of May 2007, DCFS reported that the children were making good progress in their new home, doing well in school with the special services their new schools provided, and were building relationships with other relatives in Oklahoma. E. wished to adopt the children, but the children wanted legal guardianship, a plan which E. agreed to. DCFS was optimistic about the likelihood of E. becoming the children's legal guardian. In August 2007, there was more positive news. The Oklahoma social worker reported that the children were, in general, doing well, and had a close bond with their aunt and with her children, and with each other. By January 2008, the children and E. agreed that adoption was the best plan, and the children told DCFS that they wanted adoption. The Oklahoma social worker supported the plan.
At a June 2008 hearing, appellant sought a contested hearing on the issue of adoptability. Based on her conversations with the children during a recent visit, she believed that they did not truly wish to be adopted. Given the difficulties of arranging for the children to testify, the court arranged for all counsel to talk to the children by phone.
On August 8, 2008, counsel represented that in that conversation, all the children said that they wanted to be adopted by E. Appellant was not present at the hearing, but her lawyer represented that "The mother... although she's committed to the children, she is, I believe, acquiescent to that request and is not seeking any further contest." The court found by clear and convincing evidence that the children were adoptable, and terminated parental rights.
Appellant contends that there is no substantial evidence for that ruling. (In re Jennilee T. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 212, 224 [substantial evidence standard of review].) She also contends that she did not waive the issue when she acquiesced, arguing that she did not seek a contest because of her children's wishes, but that she never agreed to termination of parental rights and adoption. As far as we can tell, this is a distinction without a difference. Appellant acquiesced in the ruling, whether based on her respect for her children's wishes or for another reason. Having agreed to the ruling, she cannot contest it on appeal. (In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293.)
We would, in any event, affirm the ruling. The children's successful placement with E., and E.'s desire to adopt them, constituted substantial evidence that they were adoptable. (In re Sarah M. (1994)22 Cal.App.4th 1642, 1649.)
Appellant argues, however, that E.'s willingness to adopt was unclear, and that her ability to care for the children had not been fully assessed and was questionable, and that it was not clear that the children truly wished to be adopted.
First, the children's wishes were clear. Appellant's argument is that their statements might not have reflected their true wishes, but that is speculation.
On E.'s willingness to adopt, appellant argues that the record suggests that she wished to adopt for financial reasons. The record is to the contrary. Early in the placement, E. was having difficulties getting the funding she was entitled to, but those difficulties were resolved and seem to have played no part in her decision to adopt. Indeed, in July 2007, in a conversation with the social worker about finances and funding, in which the social worker informed E. that she would be qualified for certain financial assistance if she adopted, E. said that she would like to adopt, but not for financial reasons.
In support of her argument concerning E.'s ability to care for the children, appellant cites the evidence that E. did not timely arrange for the children's annual medical exams, and the evidence that the Oklahoma social worker at one point wrote that she was "flighty." What the social worker wrote was that E. "is flighty and not good at returning phone calls and following up with required information." Later, in January 2008, the DCFS social worker wrote that she did not find E. flighty, and that while she might sometimes be late in getting her paperwork in, paperwork was not always indicative of the quality of care, and that the children were well and happy.
Viewing the record as whole, these children had a prospective adoptive parent.
Appellant also argues that the children's ages mean that they were not adoptable, and that their many placements with foster parents who did not wish to adopt suggest the same thing. E.'s willingness to adopt refutes that argument. We say something similar about appellant's argument that the children's commitment to her means that they were not adoptable. The children's relationship with appellant did not pose a barrier to adoption, in their minds or in E.'s.
Finally, it is true that, as appellant argues, there was evidence that during their foster placements, the children exhibited behavioral and academic problems, but those problems were for the most part in the past, and do not mean that there was a failure of substantial evidence. As appellant suggests, the problems might not be fully resolved, but E. was committed to working with the children on any problems. A child need not be problem-free in order to be adoptable.
Disposition
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: TURNER, P. J., MOSK, J.