Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Super. Ct. No. JJ16524, Donna Groman, Judge.
Laini Millar Melnick, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Linda C. Johnson, and Carl N. Henry, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
ASHMANN-GERST, J.
Pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office filed a petition alleging that defendant and appellant J.C. committed attempted robbery in violation of Penal Code sections 664 and 211. Appellant denied the petition.
Following the presentation of evidence, the juvenile court sustained the petition and ordered that appellant be suitably placed. The order does not indicate the maximum physical confinement time. Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal. He contends: (1) There is insufficient evidence that he had the specific intent to steal from the victim. (2) The juvenile court erred in failing to calculate the maximum term of confinement.
We conclude that sufficient evidence supports the juvenile court’s attempted robbery finding. That said, the juvenile court erred in failing to set the maximum confinement time. Accordingly, we affirm the order and remand the matter to the juvenile court to set the maximum confinement time.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Prosecution Evidence
At 6:00 p.m. on December 24, 2009, holding a store bag, Edward Rodriguez (Rodriguez) stood at Main Street and 83rd Street waiting for a traffic light signal when appellant and a male ally walked toward him. There, appellant twice asked Rodriguez if Rodriguez had cash. Rodriguez replied “no, ” and did nothing else. The ally asked for money. After Rodriguez again said “no, ” appellant stabbed or hit Rodriguez in the jaw, resulting in blood. Rodriguez did not fall down. He instead ran to a store as appellant and his ally fled in an opposite direction.
Defense Evidence
From across the street, appellant’s friend (a minor) saw that after the man hit appellant in the arm with a bag, they fought and the man left. The female friend did not speak to appellant there, but after he discussed the event, she offered to give the foregoing testimony.
DISCUSSION
I. Sufficient evidence supports the juvenile court’s attempted robbery finding
A. Juvenile court order
After hearing testimony, the juvenile court ruled: “This was not a casual asking for spare change. This [was] two individuals in concert asking at least twice whether [the] victim had money and immediately thereafter [appellant] hit him. Wasn’t clear with his hand or an object causing significant injury. A hole in [the] man’s lip or cheek. It is wholly unbelievable that it was just a casual request for money, then a punch. [¶] This was [an] attempt to get money from him by force and they abandoned [the] attempt at some point. I found... Rodriguez to be very credible, very detailed with no motivation for fabrication. [Appellant’s friend] both through demeanor and substance, I didn’t believe anything that she said. The petition is sustained. [The] People met their burden beyond a reasonable doubt.”
B. Applicable law and standard of review
We review the juvenile court’s order for substantial evidence. (People v. Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1199, 1206.) That is, to determine the sufficiency of the evidence to support a true finding in a juvenile case, “‘an appellate court reviews the entire record in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether it contains evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value, from which a rational trier of fact’” could find that the juvenile committed the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Davis (2009) 46 Cal.4th 539, 606.) The reviewing court “presume[s] in support of the judgment the existence of every fact that could reasonably be deduced from the evidence.” (People v. Em (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 964, 970.) In so doing, “we do not judge the trustworthiness of witnesses, reweigh the evidence, or assess for ourselves which interpretation of the evidence is the ‘right’ one.” (People v. Letner and Tobin (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, 166.) In other words, reversal for insufficient evidence is not warranted unless it appears that under no hypothesis whatsoever is there substantial evidence to support the trier of fact’s verdict. (People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357.)
“[T]o be convicted of attempted robbery, the perpetrator must harbor a specific intent to commit robbery and commit a direct but ineffectual act toward the commission of the crime.” (People v. Lindberg (2008) 45 Cal.4th 1, 27.) “The [factfinder] may infer a defendant’s specific intent to commit a crime from all of the facts and circumstances shown by the evidence.” (Ibid.)
C. Analysis
Ample evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding of attempted robbery. Specifically, Rodriguez testified that appellant walked up to him and twice asked him if he had any money. When Rodriguez replied that he did not, appellant’s companion asked Rodriguez whether he had any money. After Rodriguez finished his answer, appellant struck Rodriguez. From this evidence, the lower court could infer that appellant had the requisite intent to commit attempted robbery. (People v. Logan (1967) 257 Cal.App.2d 267, 268.) Far more than speculation was proven. (People v. Perez (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1117, 1133.)
The cases cited in appellant’s appellate briefs are inapposite. People v. Logan, supra, 257 Cal.App.2d 267 does not require that a defendant set up a scene conducive to a crime. Rather, all that case recognizes is that “[t]he intent of a person to commit a crime at the time of an attempt may be inferred from the circumstances of the case.” (Id. at p. 269.) That is exactly what the juvenile court did here. (See also People v. Vizcarra (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 858, 862–863.) In People v. Bonner (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 759, the Court of Appeal confirmed that a defendant is “guilty of attempted robbery at the moment his acts in the furtherance of his intent went beyond mere preparation, i.e., when [he] preformed acts placing his plan in operation.” (Id. at p. 765.) Again, ample evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that appellant committed attempted robbery; he placed any plan to rob Rodriguez in operation when he approached him for money and then struck him.
People v. Harris (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1575 actually supports the trial court’s order. In that case, the defendant approached the victim at an ATM machine. When the victim’s ATM card did not work, the defendant punched him. The defendant then demanded that the victim give him all of his money and the victim’s gold chain; the victim complied. (Id. at p. 1579.)
The defendant was charged with second degree robbery, and a jury found him guilty. (People v. Harris, supra, 22 Cal.App.4th at p. 1580.) On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court erred in denying his request for instructions on the lesser offenses of theft and assault. (Id. at p. 1582.) The Court of Appeal concluded that there was no error, finding that the “threats and use of force were integral parts of the overall crime of robbery.... There is no rational way to view the evidence in this case as constituting discrete criminal acts as opposed to a single act of robbery, .... Consequently, on this record there is no basis, other than an unexplainable rejection of the prosecution evidence, on which the jury could have found the offense to be something other than robbery.” (Id. at p. 1583.) Thus, the trial court did not err in refusing the lesser instructions.
In the instant case, appellant’s act of striking Rodriguez, coupled with his repeated requests for money, was an integral part of a course of conduct indicating appellant’s intent to steal from Rodriguez. Unless we rejected the People’s evidence, we could not conclude otherwise.
II. The matter is remanded to the juvenile court to set the maximum confinement time
The juvenile court’s disposition order fails to indicate appellant’s maximum physical confinement time. As the parties appear to agree, this omission was erroneous. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 726, subd. (c); In re Eddie L. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 809, 812; In re George M. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 376, 382.) The matter is remanded for the limited purpose of allowing the juvenile court to set appellant’s maximum physical confinement time.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. The matter is remanded to the juvenile court to set the maximum confinement time.
We concur: BOREN, P. J., CHAVEZ, J.