In any event, the trial court was correct in (presumably) holding that the statute does not authorize such an order. In re J.C., 248 Ill. App.3d 905 (1993), on which petitioner relies, is clearly distinguishable. That case arose under the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 ( 705 ILCS 405/1-1 et seq. (West 1998)) rather than the dissolution of marriage statute.
The court further explained that it had ordered respondent to visit her children so that she could say, in effect, " 'I love you, I don't blame you for anything that has happened, I take responsibility for it, I want to see you, I want to help you through this, and I want to help you through the pain you're enduring.' " (Compare In re J.C. (1993), 248 Ill. App.3d 905, 911, 617 N.E.2d 1378, 1381 (affirming the trial court's requiring a parent to visit in the face of the parent's wish to give up parental rights).) The court concluded by finding respondent's conduct wilful and contumacious, holding that it constituted the indirect criminal contempt of court.