Opinion
NO. 02-18-00038-CV
06-05-2018
IN THE MATTER OF J.C.
FROM THE 323RD DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY
TRIAL COURT NO. 323-106222-17 MEMORANDUM OPINION
See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
A Tarrant County Grand Jury approved a determinate sentencing petition against Appellant J.C. for several offenses including the felony offense of aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon. J.C. stipulated that he committed aggravated robbery and entered into a stipulation of facts. After a disposition hearing, the trial court sentenced J.C. to a three-year commitment to the Texas Juvenile Justice Department (TJJD).
In a single issue, J.C. asserts that the juvenile court abused its discretion by committing him to TJJD because legally and factually insufficient evidence was presented at the disposition hearing to support the juvenile court's section 54.04(i) findings that reasonable efforts were made to prevent or eliminate the need for J.C.'s removal from his home and to make it possible to return to his home and that J.C., in his home, could not be provided the quality of care and level of support and supervision he needed to meet the conditions of probation. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.04(i) (West Supp. 2017). J.C. requests that we reverse the trial court's judgment and remand this case for a new disposition hearing.
In response to J.C.'s sole issue, the State's brief sets forth a thorough review of the stipulated facts and the evidence presented at the disposition hearing, and "concedes that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court's [section 54.04(i)] finding[s]," and joins J.C.'s request for a reversal and a remand to the juvenile court for a new disposition hearing.
In addition to the stipulated facts, the State presented the testimony of Dana Victorson, a Tarrant County probation officer who had prepared a social history report on J.C. Victorson recommended that J.C. participate in intensive supervision, with electronic monitoring, and functional family therapy in the community; she testified that she did not believe that J.C. needed to be incarcerated. The State also presented the psychological examination of J.C. performed by Marsa-Lysa Anthony, Psy.D. Anthony recommended that J.C. "reside in a safe and structured environment in which he can practice appropriate social and daily living skills" and opined that J.C. "and his family might benefit from ways to improve structure, discipline, and responsibility in the home." J.C. testified, stating that he had been incarcerated since committing the offense and had remained on level one, having infractions only for talking without permission and not participating in school work.
In a juvenile case, the trial court possesses broad discretion to determine a suitable disposition of a child who has been adjudicated to have engaged in delinquent conduct. In re J.R., 907 S.W.2d 107, 110 (Tex. App.—Austin 1995, no writ). Absent an abuse of discretion, we will not disturb the trial court's findings. In re A.S., 954 S.W.2d 855, 861 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1997, no pet.). We apply the civil standard of review to sufficiency of the evidence challenges regarding the trial court's findings of fact at the disposition phase of juvenile proceedings. In re J.D.P., 85 S.W.3d 420, 426 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2002, no pet.).
In performing a legal sufficiency review of a juvenile court disposition, an appellate court considers only the evidence and inferences tending to support the court's findings and sets aside the judgment only if there is no evidence of probative force to support the findings. In re H.R.C., 153 S.W.3d 266, 269 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2004, no pet.); In re C.J.H., 79 S.W.3d 698, 702-03 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2002, no pet.). We consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and indulge every reasonable inference that would support it. In re A.T.M., 281 S.W.3d 67, 71 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2008, no pet.). Anything more than a scintilla of evidence is legally sufficient to support the finding. C.J.H., 79 S.W.3d at 703. In a factual sufficiency review of a juvenile court's disposition, we consider and weigh all of the evidence in the case, and set aside the judgment only if the finding is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly unjust. A.T.M., 281 S.W.3d at 71; H.R.C., 153 S.W.3d at 269.
"Section 54.04(i) of the family code sets out the mandatory findings that the trial court must make to commit a child to [TJJD]." In re A.C., No. 02-09-00278-CV, 2010 WL 1730790, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 29, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.); see Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.04(i). "Merely reciting the statutory grounds for disposition is not sufficient to justify the trial court's ruling." In re K.E., 316 S.W.3d 776, 781 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.). Thus, the trial court abuses its discretion if it orders commitment without evidence to support section 54.04(i) findings. In re. E.K.G., 487 S.W.3d 670, 675-76 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2016, no pet.).
After thoroughly reviewing the appellate record before us and applying the required legal and factual sufficiency standards of review to the evidence presented at J.C.'s disposition hearing, we agree with J.C.'s assertion and the State's concession that the disposition-hearing evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court's section 54.04(i) findings. See In re A.D., 287 S.W.3d 356, 368 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2009, pet. denied) (reversing and remanding for new disposition hearing when there was "no evidence to show that reasonable efforts were made to prevent or eliminate removing [juvenile] from his home" and "no evidence any effort was made to avoid removing [juvenile]"); In re K.L.C., 972 S.W.2d 203, 206 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1998) (reversing and remanding for new disposition hearing when "[n]o evidence was introduced that any effort was made to find an alternative to committing [juvenile] to the custody of [TJJD]"). Accordingly, we sustain J.C.'s sole issue. See A.D., 287 S.W.3d at 368; K.L.C., 972 S.W.2d at 207.
Having sustained J.C.'s sole issue on appeal, we reverse the juvenile court's judgment and remand this cause for a new disposition hearing. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 56.01(i) (West Supp. 2017) (providing that "[t]he appellate court may affirm, reverse, or modify the judgment or order, including an order of disposition" and "remand an order that it reverses or modifies for further proceedings by the juvenile court").
/s/ Sue Walker
SUE WALKER
JUSTICE PANEL: WALKER, MEIER, and GABRIEL, JJ. DELIVERED: June 5, 2018