Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-4771-13T1
03-25-2015
IN THE MATTER OF J.B., Minor-Appellant.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian, attorney for minor-appellant (Jamie Vigneaux, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the brief). John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Andrea M. Silkowitz, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Jaime E. Stofa, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).
RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Fisher and Manahan. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Somerset County, Docket No. FC-18-130-12. Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian, attorney for minor-appellant (Jamie Vigneaux, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the brief). John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Andrea M. Silkowitz, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Jaime E. Stofa, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). PER CURIAM
J.B. appeals from an order denying a motion to compel the Division of Child Protection and Permanency (Division) to provide rental assistance pursuant to an independent living agreement, N.J.S.A. 30:4C-2.3. We are called upon to determine whether the Division's discretionary funding determination was in error. Since we conclude that it was not, we affirm.
J.B., now twenty-one years of age, has been involved with the Division in an independent living program since he turned eighteen in March 2012. Prior to his eighteenth birthday, J.B. was under the care, custody and supervision of the Division. In September 2012, J.B. commenced college at the College at Brockport, State University of New York (SUNY). At the time of the motion and appeal, J.B. continued his attendance at SUNY. J.B. resided on campus his first and second year of college. During that time, J.B.'s case was monitored periodically by the trial court under an FC docket.
In September 2013, after a case management review, the court entered an order directing the Division to provide the Law Guardian (Guardian) for J.B. with the required paperwork for J.B. to receive an independent living stipend. By that order, J.B. was to provide the Division with financial information, including scholarship and loan statements for the Division to assess his stipend. In furtherance of the order, the Guardian provided J.B.'s tuition statement to the Division.
Thereafter, in October 2013, the Division provided J.B. with an independent living agreement for his review and signature. According to the terms of the agreement, the Division would provide J.B. financial assistance in the amount of $240 every month for meals and $100 every month for miscellaneous funding. The agreement did not provide for a monthly rental stipend. The Division determined that a rental stipend was not applicable, as J.B. was living on campus, and his expenses were covered by loans, scholarships and other funding sources.
In response, the Guardian filed a motion seeking an order compelling the Division to provide J.B. with $600 per month in rental assistance through the age of twenty-one retroactive to September 1, 2013. The Division opposed the motion. After oral argument, the Family judge denied the Guardian's motion in an oral decision and entered an accompanying order.
The judge determined the Division had the discretion to decide how to "allocate its somewhat limited resources." The court reasoned that employment of a "best interest analysis" as the basis for granting J.B.'s request might adversely impact another qualified individual within the Division's care who would be denied resources. The judge deferred to the "rational basis" for the Division's decision to deny J.B. a rental stipend.
The Guardian filed a direct appeal from the order. After we determined the order was not final, we granted leave to appeal.
At the center of the appeal is the argument that J.B. should be granted a monetary stipend toward his housing from a government fund of acknowledged limited resources. We concede at the outset the argument presented on behalf of funding has its attraction. J.B. has demonstrated his industry and motivation to alter a life from a ward of the court to a life of independence through pursuit of a college education. In the ordinary course, such conduct should be encouraged and supported. Nonetheless, in reaching our decision, we may not ignore a "beaten path."
Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 30:4C-2.3, the Division shall provide services to qualified individuals between eighteen and twenty-one years of age. Upon attaining their eighteenth birthday an individual deemed statutorily eligible may receive services if the "commissioner determines that a continuation of services would be in the individual's best interest and would assist the individual to become an independent and productive adult." N.J.S.A. 30:4C-2.3(c).
The Division's Field Operations Casework Policy and Procedure's Manual 700.9, "Independent Living Rent, Food and Incidentals Stipends," cites the "policy" for financial assistance. The maximum financial assistance allowed is "$240 for food, $100 for incidentals . . . and $600 monthly for rent." The policy notes that the stipend(s) are not an entitlement, may be modified or discontinued in the discretion of the Department, and "are subject to the availability of funds."
The scope of our review of an administrative agency's final determination is limited. In re Carter, 191 N.J. 474, 482 (2007) (citing Aqua Beach Condo. Ass'n v. Dep't Cmty. Affairs, 186 N.J. 5, 15-16 (2006)). We accord to the agency's exercise of its statutorily delegated responsibilities a "strong presumption of reasonableness." City of Newark v. Natural Res. Council, 82 N.J. 530, 539, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 983, 101 S. Ct. 400, 66 L. Ed. 2d 245 (1980). The burden of showing the agency's action was "arbitrary, unreasonable, or capricious" rests upon the appellant. Barone v. Dep't of Human Servs., Div. of Med. Assistance & Health Servs., 210 N.J. Super. 276, 285 (App. Div. 1986), aff'd, 107 N.J. 355 (1987) (quoting Boyle v. Riti, 175 N.J. Super. 158, 166 (App. Div. 1980)).
The reviewing court "should not disturb an administrative agency's determinations or findings unless there is a clear showing that (1) the agency did not follow the law; (2) the decision was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable; or (3) the decision was not supported by substantial evidence." In re Virtua-West Jersey Hosp. Voorhees for a Certificate of Need, 194 N.J. 413, 422 (2008) (citations omitted); see also Circus Liquors, Inc. v. Governing Body of Middletown Twp., 199 N.J. 1, 9-10 (2009) (citations omitted).
The court "may not vacate an agency determination because of doubts as to its wisdom or because the record may support more than one result," but is "obliged to give due deference to the view of those charged with the responsibility of implementing legislative programs." In re N.J. Pinelands Comm'n Resolution PC4-00-89, 356 N.J. Super. 363, 372 (App. Div.) (citing Brady v. Bd. of Review, 152 N.J. 197, 210 (1997)), certif. denied, 176 N.J. 281 (2003).
Absent arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious action, or a lack of support in the record, "[a]n administrative agency's final quasi-judicial decision will be sustained[.]" In re Herrmann, 192 N.J. 19, 27-28 (2007); see Campbell v. Dep't of Civil Serv., 39 N.J. 556, 562 (1963).
Although an appellate court is "in no way bound by the agency's interpretation of a statute or its determination of a strictly legal issue[,]" Mayflower Sec. Co. v. Bureau of Sec, 64 N.J. 85, 93 (1973), if substantial evidence supports the agency's decision, "a court may not substitute its own judgment for the agency's even though the court might have reached a different result." Greenwood v. State Police Training Ctr., 127 N.J. 500, 513 (1992) (citations omitted).
The Division argues that due to the significant number of young adults that benefit from the Independent Living Program, it follows that availability of funds and Division discretion in the allocation of those funds is a legitimate factor. We agree.
In In re Civil Commitment of U.C., 423 N.J. Super. 601 (App. Div. 2012), this court determined that the trial court lacked the authority to order the New Jersey Division of Developmental Disabilities (DDD) to fund placement of a developmentally disabled individual in a particular facility that the trial court found appropriate. We recognized that the DDD undertakes its placement of developmental disabled individuals, within the limits of its funding. Id. at 609; see also, J.D. v. N.J. Div. of Developmental Disabilities, 329 N.J. Super. 516 (App. Div. 2000). In U.C. we noted, in accord with N.J.S.A. 30:4-25.6, the DDD is to provide an eligible person "with appropriate functional service to the extent available." The limiting language of that statute connotes contemplation of constraints on available funds.
Here, the applicable statute, N.J.S.A. 30:4C-2.3, does not contain "to the extent available" language. Notwithstanding, we conclude, as a matter of statutory interpretation and the Division's stated policy, all provided services are dependent upon the adequacy of funding; the province of the Legislature.
While we recognize J.B.'s efforts to seek betterment of his life's situation and to be afforded the available resources to support those efforts, we also recognize, as a prevailing interest, the Division's limited financial resources from which it "must achieve the greatest good for the greatest number of its clients." J.D. supra, 329 N.J. Super. at 527 (citing P.F. v. N.J. Div. of Disabilities, 139 N.J. 522, 531 (1995)).
Affirmed. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION