Opinion
23-1684
03-06-2024
IN THE INTEREST OF J.B. and E.S., Minor Children, T.K., Mother, Appellant.
Donna M. Schauer of Schauer Law Office, Adel, for appellant mother. Brenna Bird, Attorney General, Mackenzie Moran, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee State. ConGarry D. Williams of the Juvenile Public Defender's Office, Des Moines, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor children.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Romonda Belcher, District Associate Judge.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to two children.
Donna M. Schauer of Schauer Law Office, Adel, for appellant mother. Brenna Bird, Attorney General, Mackenzie Moran, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee State.
ConGarry D. Williams of the Juvenile Public Defender's Office, Des Moines, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor children.
Considered by Tabor, P.J., and Badding and Buller, JJ.
TABOR, PRESIDING JUDGE.
A mother, Tanya, contests the termination of her parental rights to two sons-E.S. born in 2019 and J.B. born in 2022. She argues that the State did not prove a statutory ground for termination and contends the juvenile court should have applied an exception to save her connection to E.S. and J.B. Like the juvenile court, we find Tanya's struggle with methamphetamine addiction leaves her unable to safely parent. And neither the closeness of their bond nor the children's placement with relatives justifies preserving the parent-child relationships. For those reasons, we affirm the termination order.
The boys have different fathers. Neither father is a party to this appeal.
We review termination proceedings de novo. In re L.B., 970 N.W.2d 311, 313 (Iowa 2022). We respect the juvenile court's factual findings, but we reach our own conclusions based on a fresh view of the record. Id. The State must prove the grounds for termination in section 232.116(1) by clear and convincing evidence. Id.
I. Facts and Prior Proceedings
When Tanya gave birth to J.B., his umbilical cord tested positive for amphetamine and methamphetamine. A drug screen of her urine also tested positive for those substances. Tanya had been caring for E.S. before the delivery. The Iowa Department of Health and Human Services removed the children from her custody and placed them with grandparents. J.B. and E.S. have been in that placement since May 2022.
Neither father could take custody of the children. J.B.'s father tested positive for illegal drugs. And E.S.'s father was in federal prison. So the department placed E.S. and J.B. with J.B.'s paternal grandparents.
The removal of these children was not Tanya's first encounter with the department. Her rights were terminated to another child in June 2019 based on unresolved substance-use and mental-health issues. Although Tanya tried to engage in extensive outpatient treatment during this case, she did not have success in curtailing her addiction. As the juvenile court noted, "her longest period of abstinence from use was only about two weeks." Adding to the department's concern, she was unreliable in providing drug screens as requested. The department also reported that she was inconsistent in her supervised visits with the children. In late 2023, Tanya's house caught fire and she ended up living at a hotel while she looked for affordable housing. But Tanya did keep working at a fast-food restaurant.
The State petitioned to terminate Tanya's parental rights under Iowa Code section 232.116(1) (2023), paragraphs (g), (h), and (l). After a hearing, the juvenile court granted the petition on all three grounds and found it was in the children's best interests to terminate parental rights. The court also found that none of the exceptions in section 232.116(3) applied. Tanya appeals the termination order.
II. Analysis A. Statutory Ground
"When the juvenile court terminates parental rights on more than one statutory ground, we may affirm the juvenile court's order on any ground we find supported by the record." In re A.B., 815 N.W.2d 764, 774 (Iowa 2012). Today we focus on paragraph (h), which requires clear and convincing proof that (1) the children were three or younger; (2) they had been adjudicated as children in need of assistance under section 232.96; (3) they had been removed from the physical custody of their parents for at least six months of the last twelve months, or for the last six straight months and any trial period at home was less than thirty days; and (4) there is clear and convincing evidence that they could not be returned to the custody of their parents "as provided in section 232.102 at the present time." Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(h). Tanya concedes that the State's evidence met the first three elements. On the fourth element, she asserts that if she had been "given more time for rehabilitation" she could be a successful parent.
She also asserts in a single sentence that she "would have had more time with her boys" if the department had been "more diligent in providing reasonable efforts for visits." This passing reference is insufficient to raise a reasonable-efforts challenge. See State v. Mann, 602 N.W.2d 785, 788 n.1 (Iowa 1999) (declining to consider random mention of issue with no elaboration or supporting authority).
But the fourth element does not contemplate giving a parent more time. "Present time" means the date of the termination hearing. In re L.M., 904 N.W.2d 835, 839 (Iowa 2017). Tanya did not attend the hearing. And her counsel did not argue that the children could be returned to her care. Instead, counsel asked for six more months to allow Tanya to attend inpatient treatment. But on appeal, Tanya does not seek extra time to work toward reunification under Iowa Code section 232.104(2)(b). And even if she had, the evidence does not show it is likely that the need for the removal of the children from her custody would no longer exist at the end of another six months. See In re L.H., 949 N.W.2d 268, 272 (Iowa Ct. App. 2020). On this record, termination was proper under paragraph (h).
B. Statutory Exceptions
For her second argument, Tanya looks to Iowa Code section 232.116(3).When analyzing claims under that provision, our supreme court has decided that the burden shifts to the parent to prove an exception can save the legal relationship. In re A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467, 475 (Iowa 2018). Tanya emphasizes that section 232.116(3) provides the juvenile court with "discretion to not terminate where there is a close relationship between the parent and the child and a relative has legal custody." From there, she claims: "Up through the time of the termination hearing, the [children were] placed with family members, or fictive kin. There is no doubt that the mother and minor children have a loving bond and relationship."
Tanya's counsel complains in the same issue heading that the juvenile court "failed to consider the statutory factors under Iowa Code section 232.116(2) to determine if termination was in the best interests of the child." But counsel does not address the best-interests framework in the body of the petition, so we do not consider that issue. See State v. Davis, 971 N.W.2d 546, 554 (Iowa 2022). At any rate, the termination order does address the children's best interests under that subsection.
Section 232.116(3)(a) provides termination is not required when a relative has legal custody of the child. Section 232.116(3)(c) provides termination is not required where it would be detrimental to the child because of the closeness of the parent-child relationship.
But neither exception works here. First, on relative placement, this exception does not come into play when children are placed with a relative, but the department has "legal custody." In re A.B., 956 N.W.2d 162, 170 (Iowa 2021). Second, on the bond, we echo the sentiments of the juvenile court. Given the "decline in any secure, strong relationship" between Tanya and her sons, we do not find clear and convincing evidence that severing those legal ties would harm the children. We thus affirm the termination order.
AFFIRMED.