Opinion
11-10-2016
In re JAYDEN ISAIAH O., also known as Jayden O., A Dependent Child Under the Age of Eighteen Years., etc., Rossely R.-O., Respondent–Appellant, Catholic Guardian Services, Petitioner–Respondent.
Geoffrey P. Berman, Larchmont, for appellant. Magovern & Sclafani, Mineola (Joanna M. Roberson of counsel), for respondent. Tamara A. Steckler, The Legal Aid Society, New York (John A. Newbery of counsel), attorney for the child.
Geoffrey P. Berman, Larchmont, for appellant.
Magovern & Sclafani, Mineola (Joanna M. Roberson of counsel), for respondent.
Tamara A. Steckler, The Legal Aid Society, New York (John A. Newbery of counsel), attorney for the child.
TOM, J.P., SWEENY, RICHTER, MANZANET–DANIELS, WEBBER, JJ.
Order, Family Court, Bronx County (Robert D. Hettlemen, J.), entered on or about April 1, 2015, which, upon a fact-finding determination of permanent neglect, terminated respondent mother's parental rights and transferred custody and guardianship of the subject child to petitioner agency and the Commissioner of Social Services for the purpose of adoption, unanimously affirmed, without costs.
The finding of permanent neglect is supported by clear and convincing evidence (Social Services Law § 384–b[7][a] ; [3][g][i] ). The agency engaged in diligent efforts to encourage and strengthen the mother's relationship with the child by developing an individualized plan for the mother, which included, among other things, domestic violence counseling, a parenting skills program, individual counseling, visitation, and random drug testing (id. § 384–b[7][f] ; Matter of Adam Mike M. [Jeffrey M.], 104 A.D.3d 572, 573, 962 N.Y.S.2d 109 [1st Dept.2013] ). Despite these diligent efforts, the mother failed to attend or benefit from the services offered to her and continued to deny responsibility for the conditions that led to the child's removal from her care (104 A.D.3d at 573, 962 N.Y.S.2d 109 ; see also Matter of Samantha C., 305 A.D.2d 167, 168, 757 N.Y.S.2d 849 [1st Dept.2003], lv. denied 100 N.Y.2d 508, 764 N.Y.S.2d 235, 795 N.E.2d 1244 [2003] ). Moreover, the mother routinely failed to appear for visitation, including for an extended period of more than six months, despite her awareness of the visitation schedule and the emotional toll her absence was having on the child (Matter of Emily A., 216 A.D.2d 124, 124–125, 629 N.Y.S.2d 206 [1st Dept.1995] ).
The mother's purported excuses for her failure to comply with services or to visit the child—namely, that her Medicaid was inactive and that she feared that her older children's father would show up at the agency on the days of her scheduled visits—are unavailing. Family Court found these excuses to be incredible, and there is no basis to disturb that finding (Matter of Madeline S., 3 A.D.3d 13, 19, 769 N.Y.S.2d 22 [1st Dept.2003] ).
The preponderance of the evidence supports Family Court's determination that termination of the mother's parental rights is in the best interests of the child (see Matter of Star Leslie W., 63 N.Y.2d 136, 147–148, 481 N.Y.S.2d 26, 470 N.E.2d 824 [1984] ). The child has been in a stable and loving foster home for several years, all of his basic needs are being met, and his foster parents wish to adopt him (Matter of Jayvon Nathaniel L. [Natasha A.], 70 A.D.3d 580, 895 N.Y.S.2d 90 [1st Dept.2010] ). The circumstances do not warrant a suspended judgment (id. ). While the mother had completed her service plan at the time of the dispositional hearing, albeit belatedly, she testified that she had learned nothing from her parenting course, and the child displayed no interest in seeing her. In fact, the mother has not seen the child since August 2014 when her visits were suspended, and the record suggests that the child's well-being depends on not seeing her (compare Matter of Lorenda M. [Lorenzo McG.], 2 A.D.3d 370, 371, 770 N.Y.S.2d 70 [1st Dept.2003] [suspended judgment not warranted where, among other things, the mother had no feasible plan for the child], with Matter of Christian Lee R., 9 A.D.3d 275, 779 N.Y.S.2d 483 [1st Dept.2004] [suspended judgment warranted where, among other things, the mother had benefitted from treatment and had bonded with the child] ).