Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. YJ32871. Stephanie M. Davis, Judge.
Laini Millar Melnick, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and Idan Ivri, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
CHAVEZ, J.
Minor, Jason G. (minor), appeals from a judgment of the juvenile court, ordering camp-community placement after sustaining a petition filed pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 (petition or section 602 petition). We reject minor’s sole contention that the adjudication was not supported by substantial evidence, and we affirm the judgment.
An earlier petition based upon the same allegations had been filed and dismissed the month before.
BACKGROUND
On May 21, 2010, the People filed a section 602 petition to declare minor a ward of the juvenile court. The petition alleged in count 1 that minor committed misdemeanor vandalism by defacing another’s property with graffiti, in violation of Penal Code section 594, subdivision (a). Two other misdemeanor counts, resisting arrest and possession of a controlled substance, were dismissed prior to adjudication. Previous section 602 petitions had been filed, and minor was on home probation at the time of the current offense.
Minor denied the allegations of the petition, and a contested adjudication hearing went forward June 10, 2010. Deputy Sheriff Israel Gonzalez testified that at 9:15 p.m. on December 5, 2009, he and his partner, Deputy Jose Ovai, responded to a vandalism call at 111th Place and Buford Avenue in Lennox. When the deputies arrived they saw two juveniles standing in the middle of the street, facing east, where two other juveniles were painting graffiti on a wall. They had painted “Lennox, ” “LNX, ” “Droopy, ” and “Tiny.”
Deputy Gonzalez identified minor and Juan S. (Juan) for the court as the juveniles in the street. He testified that when he turned his spotlight on minor and Juan, they looked at the deputies with startled expressions, then turned toward the other juveniles, and yelled something in an apparent attempt to communicate with the other two. All four juveniles then ran away. The deputies pursued them and found them on another block. They found no paint or other graffiti materials.
Deputy Ovai was called by the defense and testified to essentially the same facts as had Deputy Gonzalez, although his estimates of distances differed. He testified that after the juveniles first ran away, he and Deputy Gonzalez reencountered them moments later on another block.
The defense also recalled Deputy Gonzalez, who testified that when he and Deputy Ovai caught sight of the juveniles again after they had run away, minor and Juan were standing on the north side of the street, as the other two juveniles walked toward them on the same side of the street from a distance of 8 to 10 feet.
Minor’s counsel moved to dismiss the petition due to insufficiency of the evidence, pursuant to Welfare & Institutions Code section 701.1. The motion was denied.
The juvenile court found the allegations of count 1 to be true, and sustained the petition. The court terminated minor’s home probation, and ordered minor into a camp-community placement program for six months, with a maximum possible confinement of four years, four months. The court ordered all previous probation conditions to remain in effect, and added additional conditions. Minor filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
Minor contends that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he aided and abetted the two actual graffiti painters (the perpetrators). In particular, minor contends that the evidence did not show that he knew the perpetrators’ unlawful purpose, or that he intended to encourage or facilitate their crime.
A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a juvenile court judgment sustaining criminal allegations is reviewed under the same standard of review applicable to any criminal appeal. (In re Ryan N. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1371.) Thus, we review the whole record in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether it discloses evidence that is “reasonable, credible, and of solid value -- such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578; see also Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 318-319; In re Ryan N., supra, at p. 1372.) “The same standard applies when the conviction rests primarily on circumstantial evidence. [Citation.]” (People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053.) We do not reweigh the evidence or resolve conflicts in the evidence. (People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1181.) “Before the judgment of the trial court can be set aside for insufficiency of the evidence..., it must clearly appear that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support it. [Citation.]” (People v. Redmond (1969) 71 Cal.2d 745, 755; see also In re Ryan N., at p. 1372.)
“[A] person aids and abets the commission of a crime when he or she, acting with (1) knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator; and [with] (2) the intent or purpose of committing, encouraging, or facilitating the commission of the offense, (3) by act or advice aids, promotes, encourages or instigates, the commission of the crime.” (People v. Beeman (1984) 35 Cal.3d 547, 561.)
Although mere presence at a crime scene, mere knowledge of the perpetrator’s criminal purpose, and failure to prevent a crime do not constitute aiding and abetting, these are all circumstances the trier of fact may consider in determining aiding and abetting liability. (People v. Nguyen (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 518, 529-530.) It need not be shown that the defendant personally participated in the crime, only that he was “concerned” in its commission. (Id. at p. 530.) Thus, the defendant’s conduct need not have been a substantial factor in the commission of the offense, and his concern in the crime may have been slight. (People v. Swanson-Birabent (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 733, 743.)
“It has been consistently held that one who was present for the purpose of diverting suspicion, or to serve as a lookout, or to give warning of approach of anyone seeking to interfere, ” is liable as an aider and abettor, and thus a principal in the crime committed. (People v. Silva (1956) 143 Cal.App.2d 162, 169; Pen. Code, § 31.) An unexplained presence at the scene of a crime suggests complicity. (People v. Wilson (1928) 93 Cal.App. 632, 636.) Further, conduct after the offense may support the juvenile court’s finding of aiding and abetting. (In re Juan G. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 1, 5.) In particular, flight implies a consciousness of guilt. (In re Lynette G. (1976) 54 Cal.App.3d 1087, 1094-1095.)
Here, substantial evidence supports a finding that minor was not merely present at the scene of the vandalism, but was a lookout. He was watching the perpetrators from the middle of the street, which might reasonably be considered a good vantage point to look out for police cars. He shouted something at the perpetrators when he saw the deputies’ car, and although the deputies could not hear the message he shouted, it was sufficient to provide a warning. Minor, Juan, and the perpetrators all ran away to the same area, and when the deputies found them, the perpetrators were approaching minor and Juan, who were apparently waiting for the perpetrators as they were standing together a short distance away.
Minor contends that the evidence was consistent with his having been no more than an accessory. He points out that the deputies did not hear what he shouted, and the perpetrators may have begun fleeing because of the spotlights. Minor also argues that even if he shouted a warning, intending to help the perpetrators escape, he may have formed the intent only after he saw the deputies. Minor points out that the graffiti was not shown to relate to him, and he argues that there was no showing that his flight was not due to fear unrelated to the graffiti. He concludes that finding him to be an aider and abettor under such circumstances was mere speculation.
We disagree. Merely because facts can be reconciled with a contrary finding does not justify reversal. (People v. Redmond, supra, 71 Cal.2d at p. 755; In re Ryan N., supra, 92 Cal.App.4th at p. 1372.) Further, minor has stated the facts in the light most favorable to his position, not in the light most favorable to the juvenile court’s findings, as we must. (See People v. Johnson, supra, 26 Cal.3d at p. 578; In re Ryan N., at p. 1372.) He has ignored his position in the middle of the street, and has downplayed his shout, his flight, and his apparent rendezvous with the perpetrators on the next block. In doing so, he has failed to show that “upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support” the judgment. (People v. Redmond, at p. 755.) We thus reject minor’s view of the circumstances and conclude that the evidence was sufficient.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: BOREN, P. J., DOI TODD, J.