Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. JD224626
SIMS, Acting P.J.Appellant, the mother of the minor, appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdictional and dispositional orders. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 360, subd. (d), 395.) Appellant claims there was insufficient evidence to support jurisdiction or removal of the minor. Disagreeing, we shall affirm.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In July 2006, a juvenile dependency petition was filed by the Sacramento County Department of Health and Human Services (the Department) concerning the five-day-old minor under section 300, subdivisions (b) (failure to protect), and (j) (abuse of sibling). As later amended, the petition alleged that the minor’s two half-siblings had been made dependents of the juvenile court in 2003 after their sister’s death, which resulted from severe physical abuse inflicted by the half-siblings’ father (who had been appellant’s husband). The petition alleged that appellant knew or should have known the half-siblings’ father had violent tendencies but she continued to leave them in his care. According to the petition, appellant failed to complete reunification services and her parental rights were terminated in June 2005. The petition also alleged that another half-sibling, who was born in 2004, was declared a dependent of the juvenile court when she was three months old, that appellant was again ordered to participate in reunification services and that she failed to comply, resulting in the termination of her parental rights in March 2006.
The social worker’s report for the jurisdictional hearing contains conflicting information concerning the circumstances surrounding this dependency proceeding. The report states that the child was made a dependent in August 2005 and that appellant was denied services with regard to this child. In another section of the report, the social worker explained that services had been offered during the prior dependency proceeding. Elsewhere, the report states that a determination was made not to detain this child at birth, and that there was a referral (presumably concerning the same child) in December 2004 for general neglect because appellant violated a court order by allowing an unauthorized individual into the home.
According to the jurisdiction/disposition report, appellant, who was bi-polar and “mentally disabled,” had been “a victim of severe domestic violence during the half-sibling’s cases,” and she admitted there had been domestic violence in her relationship with the half-sibling’s father. Due to her pregnancy with the minor, appellant’s psychologist took her off medication at the time of the minor’s birth, but appellant began taking the medication prescribed for her after the minor was born and continued to be monitored monthly in this regard. Appellant’s case manager, who had assisted her in obtaining housing and other resources for her mental health needs, reported that appellant had been in special education as a child and had “severe learning disabilities.” However, the case manager believed that appellant could complete reunification services with assistance.
Appellant reported she received prenatal care prior to the minor’s birth. The minor was healthy at birth, and visits “were going extremely well.” Appellant was residing in a one-bedroom government housing apartment and was receiving SSI. Prior to obtaining housing, appellant lived in two transitional housing programs, where she completed numerous services addressing her mental health and developmental issues. Appellant provided documentation that, subsequent to the previous dependency case, she also completed the “WEAVE” program, parenting classes and anger management classes.
With regard to the previous dependency cases, appellant admitted she had not succeeded in completing reunification services. She explained that, with regard to the later case, the child had been placed with her and she allowed unauthorized people into her home, resulting in the child being removed. She became homeless and had difficulty getting to appointments and services but continued the services on her own and was successful in completing them.
Appellant told the social worker that she had “‘cut out’” the people in her life who were bad influences. She had not seen the minor’s father--who had a conviction that required him to register as a sexual offender and was currently serving a six-year prison sentence for robbery--since November 2005, and she was “no longer involved with him.” Appellant said she would never again have a relationship with someone who would pose a threat to her child or herself, and that she was returning to the WEAVE program to help her identify why she was attracted to “‘this type’ of men.” Appellant again began attending WEAVE, anger management and parenting classes.
Although the social worker’s report states in one section that the father was incarcerated for burglary, his record as reported by the “Jail Inmate Management System” reflects a conviction in 2006 for robbery with a six-year prison commitment.
The social worker noted that appellant had voluntarily completed various services since the previous dependency proceeding and that she was “thriv[ing]” with the assistance of her mental health case manager. Nonetheless, the social worker concluded that the minor “require[d] juvenile court intervention[] due to the fact that [she] cannot safely be maintained in the home of [appellant].” In support of this conclusion, the social worker listed appellant’s “significant history of failure to protect her children,” her failure to reunify with her other children and the fact that she had not been on medication for her bi-polar diagnosis when the minor was taken into custody. The social worker recommended that, due to appellant’s learning disabilities, she would benefit from repeat instruction through counseling and other programs. She recommended that the minor remain placed out of appellant’s care.
In addenda filed prior to the jurisdictional hearing, the social worker reported that appellant continued to engage in all services recommended. According to the social worker, appellant “appear[ed] to have support in place,” “ha[d] made significant progress in addressing the risk to [the minor]” and “ha[d] taken appropriate measures to ensure that she [wa]s able to provide a safe environment for [the minor].” Moreover, it appeared that appellant had established a bond with the minor during visits.
At the jurisdictional hearing in November 2006, appellant’s attorney argued there was insufficient evidence of a substantial risk of harm to the minor, as the allegations were based on appellant’s prior history and appellant had taken steps to make sure the minor would be protected in her care since that time. Appellant’s attorney also argued that out of home placement was unnecessary because appellant was not in a relationship and had made “reasonable efforts.” He contended that “dependent supervision” was appropriate.
The attorney for the Department argued that appellant’s “history of relationships” raised a concern that, although she had made progress, the progress was not sufficient for her to parent the minor without court supervision. The attorney noted that, after appellant’s relationship with the father of the minor’s half-siblings, she entered into a relationship with the minor’s father, who was “in custody for robbery and had a prior history of sexual assaults,” and contended that appellant’s “poor relationship choices” posed a current risk of harm to the minor.
The juvenile court found the evidence sufficient to sustain the allegations in the petition. The court stated it had “the same concerns regarding the past history” and that “because of the severity of the consequences of the conduct in the past” and the fact that parental rights as to one of the half-siblings had been terminated only eight months earlier, there remained a risk to the minor. The juvenile court also determined that the extent of appellant’s progress was not sufficient to ameliorate the risk of harm to the minor if placed with appellant. The court adopted the findings and orders recommended by the Department, which included a finding that there would be a substantial danger to the minor if returned to appellant’s care and there were no reasonable means to protect her other than removal.
DISCUSSION
I
Appellant contends there was insufficient evidence to support jurisdiction because it was not established that there was a substantial risk of harm to the minor at the time of the jurisdictional hearing. We do not agree.
The juvenile court took jurisdiction over the minor under section 300, subdivisions (b) and (j). As pertinent here, subdivision (b) provides that a child comes within the jurisdiction of the court if “[t]he child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of the failure or inability of his or her parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the child[] or the willful or negligent failure of the child’s parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the child from the conduct of the custodian with whom the child has been left.” (§ 300, subd. (b).) Similarly, under subdivision (j), dependency jurisdiction may be established over a child whose sibling has been abused or neglected as defined under other subdivisions of section 300, if there is a substantial risk that the child will also be abused or neglected under those subdivisions. (§ 300, subd. (j).)
A jurisdictional finding need not be based on an actual injury to the minor. (Cf. In re Eric B. (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 996, 1004; In re Diamond H. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1127, 1136.)
Although “the past infliction of physical harm by a caretaker, standing alone, does not establish a substantial risk of physical harm” (In re Rocco M. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 814, 824), the juvenile court may consider past events to determine whether the child is presently in need of juvenile court protection. (In re Petra B. (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 1163, 1169.)
A child must be at risk of harm at the time of the jurisdictional hearing in order to sustain jurisdiction over that child. (In re Janet T. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 377, 391; In re Nicholas B. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1126, 1134; In re Jasmine G. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 282, 289-290.)
Our review of the sufficiency of the evidence is limited to whether the judgment is supported by substantial evidence. “Issues of fact and credibility are questions for the trial court and not the reviewing court. The power of the appellate court begins and ends with a determination as to whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support the conclusion reached by the trier of fact.” (In re Christina T. (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 630, 638-639.)
Here, the juvenile court concluded that, despite appellant’s laudable efforts to address the problems that had led to the death of one child and the termination of her parental rights as to her other children, there remained a substantial risk of harm to the minor based on appellant’s history of relationships and the severity of the consequences of these relationships in the past. Substantial evidence supports this conclusion.
In 2003, appellant failed to take steps to protect the minor’s half-sibling from her husband, resulting in that child’s death from severe physical abuse. Appellant acknowledged that, during the previous reunification process, she allowed “unauthorized people,” including her boyfriend, into her home in violation of a court order, and a referral was received by the Department on this basis in December 2004.
The minor’s father has felony convictions for sexual battery, forgery, possession of cocaine for sale and robbery, as well as misdemeanor convictions for carrying a concealed firearm and driving under the influence. He reported that he met appellant in September 2005, 10 months before the minor’s birth. Although appellant stated that she had not seen the minor’s father since the previous November and was “no longer involved with him,” the father told a social worker that he “wants a relationship with [appellant] and he hopes to continue it upon his release from prison.”
In addition to this troubling history of relationships, appellant has mental health problems and severe learning disabilities, which in all likelihood render her more vulnerable to making poor relationship choices and pose challenges to absorbing information. As a result, the social worker felt appellant needed to repeat or reinforce the instruction she had already received with additional counseling and programs. Appellant’s case manager felt that appellant could complete reunification services but that she would need assistance. Even appellant felt the need to repeat the WEAVE program to help her identify the reasons underlying her poor relationship choices. In light of appellant’s prior relationships and her personal challenges, as well as the grave consequences of these factors in the past, the juvenile court was warranted in concluding there was a substantial risk that the minor would suffer serious physical harm as a result of appellant’s lack of adequate supervision or protection without juvenile court intervention.
Appellant analogizes her circumstances to those in In re David M. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 822 (David M.), in which there was evidence that the mother was diagnosed nearly four years earlier as being delusional and impaired by a history of marijuana use, she tested positive for marijuana metabolites at the recent birth of one of her children and the father had an anxiety disorder. In addition, the mother had allowed one of her friends, who smoked marijuana, to babysit on a few occasions, although the friend was not under the influence of marijuana when she watched the children. The social worker acknowledged that she had no current information regarding the mother’s mental condition and that there was no evidence that the mother was unable to care for or protect the children.
The appellate court found “two overarching problems” with the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings. (David M., supra, 134 Cal.App.4th at p. 829.) The first problem was that the parents’ mental health and substance abuse issues were never connected to any harm or risk of harm to the children. (Ibid.) The second problem was that the social services agency failed to conduct a current investigation, instead relying exclusively on information from dependency proceedings occurring several years earlier concerning another child. (Id. at p. 831.) Acknowledging that “past abuse or neglect can certainly be an indicator of future risk of harm,” the appellate court concluded that “the record of past neglect in this case [the children’s sibling had been made a dependent several years earlier because the mother used marijuana throughout her pregnancy and was incarcerated when the child was born] is not enough to declare a child a dependent of the juvenile court without something more current.” (Ibid.)
The circumstances in the present matter are readily distinguishable. Unlike the apparently benign consequences of the prior neglect in David M., the harm from appellant’s past conduct was the death of a child. Moreover, there was evidence that the conduct by appellant that had led to the half-sibling’s death--her involvement in relationships that posed a serious danger to her children--had continued until relatively shortly before the jurisdictional hearing. Furthermore, the social worker’s investigation in this matter was fairly exhaustive in terms of obtaining information about appellant’s current efforts to address the serious problems that had plagued her in the past.
In sum, substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that there remained a substantial risk of harm to the minor at the time of the jurisdictional hearing. Accordingly, we reject appellant’s claim to the contrary.
II
Appellant also claims the juvenile court erred by removing the minor from her care. Again, we disagree.
To remove a child from a parent’s physical custody, the juvenile court must find clear and convincing evidence that “[t]here is or would be a substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the minor if the minor were returned home, and there are no reasonable means by which the minor’s physical health can be protected without removing the minor from the minor’s parent’s . . . physical custody.” (§ 361, subd. (c)(1).) “The parent need not be dangerous and the minor need not have been actually harmed before removal is appropriate. The focus of the statute is on averting harm to the child.” (In re Diamond H. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1127, 1136, overruled on other grounds in In re Renee J. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 735, 748, fn. 6.)
Again, we review the juvenile court’s determination in this regard under the substantial evidence test, drawing all reasonable inferences to support the findings and recognizing that issues of credibility are matters for the juvenile court. (Sheila S. v. Superior Court (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 872; In re Basilio T. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 155, 170.)
We have already concluded there was substantial evidence to support the juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding that there existed a substantial risk to the minor in appellant’s care. We reach a similar conclusion with regard to removal of the minor. Appellant has a history of relationships with individuals who posed a danger to her children. In prior dependency proceedings, she had allowed unauthorized people into her home in violation of court orders. While appellant participated in various programs following the prior dependency proceedings, she has learning disabilities that raise concerns about her ability to retain information. Appellant acknowledged that she had yet to determine the reasons underlying her attraction to men who posed a danger to her children and herself. Consequently, the juvenile court’s determination was warranted that appellant had not made sufficient progress to ameliorate the risk of harm to the minor if left in appellant’s care.
In re Henry V. (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 522, 528 (Henry V.), on which appellant relies, is inapposite. In that case, the four-year-old child was discovered to have linear burn marks on his buttocks, apparently caused by a curling iron. The mother maintained that the burn occurred while she was in another room, and the pediatrician who examined the minor testified that the parents had been forthcoming and cooperative. The child had speech delays and concerns were raised about the child’s bond with his mother. The social worker testified that there would be a risk to the child if returned home because the mother did not believe the child had been abused and because she needed to form a stronger bond with the child. The social worker acknowledged that there were services available to support bonding in the home. The juvenile court ordered out of home placement, stating it would not be ready to order the child’s return until a bonding study had been completed.
The appellate court reversed the dispositional order, noting that the juvenile court had premised continued removal on the need for a bonding study, which could be performed while the child remained placed with the mother. (Henry V., supra, 119 Cal.App.4th at p. 529.) The court also noted there was ample evidence that in-home bonding services and other appropriate services were available that would mitigate any risk to the child. (Ibid.) Finally, the court noted it was not clear from the record that the juvenile court had applied a clear-and-convincing-evidence standard when ordering removal. (Id. at p. 530.)
Here, on the other hand, the record does not suggest that in-home services were available to mitigate the risk to the minor. And unlike the circumstances in Henry V., which appeared to involve a single incident of abuse or neglect, appellant had demonstrated a course of conduct over a period of years that posed a danger to the minor. Finally, the juvenile court in the present matter applied the proper standard in making its ruling.
DISPOSITION
The judgment and orders are affirmed.
We concur: HULL, J., BUTZ, J.