Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Patricia Nieto, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.) Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. FJ35655
Gloria C. Cohen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters and Dana M. Ali, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
SUZUKAWA, J.
Jamie S. appeals from an order continuing wardship (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602) upon a finding that he committed a second degree robbery in violation of Penal Code section 211. A previous order of home on probation was ordered to remain in effect. He contends the true finding must be reversed because the identification of appellant as the robber was unreliable. He also contends the court erred by imposing an overly broad condition of probation. For reasons stated in the opinion, we affirm the order continuing wardship and modify a condition of probation.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
On February 24, 2006 at approximately 3:45 p.m., Christian Francisco was with his friends at the Crenshaw mall at the intersection of Martin Luther King Boulevard and Crenshaw in the county of Los Angeles. They were about to go to a movie, when Mr. Francisco was “jumped.” Appellant and others approached Mr. Francisco, and appellant asked him if he “bang[s].” When Mr. Francisco said “no,” individuals in the group grabbed him from the back and ordered him to give appellant money. Mr. Francisco refused, but finally did give appellant money after appellant hit him in the back of the head several times. Appellant then ran away. Appellant took approximately 40 dollars.
Immediately thereafter, the police arrived and Mr. Francisco described the robber. Mr. Francisco was taken to a location and identified appellant as the robber. Thereafter at a line-up, Mr. Francisco was unable to identify the person who robbed him. Mr. Francisco admitted during cross-examination that he was able to identify appellant in court because appellant was not standing next to five other people. When the police took him to make an identification, they presented one person. They told him they thought this was the man who robbed him. During the robbery, Mr. Francisco was close to the robber’s stomach. The robber pulled Mr. Francisco’s head down and told him to give him the money. When Mr. Francisco’s head was down, he could not see the robber’s face but could see his body. Mr. Francisco described the robber as wearing a white and red jersey, blue pants and red Converse shoes. Mr. Francisco saw that his assailant was tall and big.
Joshua Ramirez was with Mr. Francisco when Mr. Francisco was robbed. In court, Mr. Ramirez could not identify appellant as the robber. Immediately after the robbery, however, he was taken to a location in a police car where he identified appellant as the person who robbed Mr. Francisco. At the time he made the identification, Mr. Ramirez was certain he was accurate because he had just seen the robber a couple of moments before. When he made the identification that day, he did it based on the clothing the person was wearing and on the suspect’s face because Mr. Ramirez still had “the imprint . . . of the face in [his] memory.” At the adjudication, which occurred almost 10 months after the robbery, he had forgotten what the suspect looked like because so much time had passed.
Los Angeles Police Officer Marc Vito Cruz responded to the radio call of a robbery in progress. He detained appellant approximately three blocks from the Crenshaw mall, the location from which the call originated. Appellant was standing at the corner of Santa Rosalia and Marlton, next to a barber shop, and his clothing matched the description of the robbery suspect. Officer Cruz recovered 40 dollars from appellant, consisting of one 20-dollar bill, one 10-dollar bill, one 5-dollar bill and five 1-dollar bills.
Los Angeles Police Officer Gerald Green was on foot patrol at the Crenshaw mall in the area of Martin Luther King Boulevard and Crenshaw Boulevard. Upon receiving a radio call regarding the robbery, he spoke with Mr. Francisco, who described the robber as wearing a red basketball jersey over a white shirt and red sneakers. Officer Green also spoke to Mr. Ramirez, who described what the robber was wearing with a description similar to that given by Mr. Francisco. Officer Green separately transported Mr. Francisco and Mr. Ramirez to the location where appellant had been detained. Officer Green told each of them that the person detained was a possible suspect. Mr. Francisco and Mr. Ramirez each identified appellant as the person who robbed Mr. Francisco.
Appellant’s mother testified she had given appellant 20 dollars to get a haircut.
Appellant testified that he did not rob anyone on February 24, 2006. He left his home between 3:30 and 4:00 to go to the barbershop to get a haircut. His mother gave him $20, and he already had $25 in his pocket. The barbershop was full and he was arrested while waiting outside the shop.
DISCUSSION
I
Appellant contends the true finding must be reversed because the identification of him as the robber was unreliable. Appellant contends the trial court based its true finding that appellant was the robber on tainted and suggestive testimony, which should have been excluded. We disagree.
“‘The standard of proof in juvenile proceedings involving criminal acts is the same as the standard in adult criminal trials. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] In considering the sufficiency of the evidence in a juvenile proceeding, the appellate court ‘must review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence--such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We must presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier of fact could reasonably deduce from the evidence [citation] and we must make all reasonable inferences that support the finding of the juvenile court. [Citation.]’ [Citations.]” (In re Babak S. (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 1077, 1088-1089.)
“This standard applies to cases based on circumstantial evidence. [Citation.] The testimony of just one witness is enough to sustain a conviction, so long as that testimony is not inherently incredible. [Citation.] The trier of fact determines the credibility of witnesses, weighs the evidence, and resolves factual conflicts. We cannot reject the testimony of a witness that the trier of fact chooses to believe unless the testimony is physically impossible or its falsity is apparent without resorting to inferences or deductions. As part of its task, the trier of fact may believe and accept as true only part of a witness’s testimony and disregard the rest. On appeal, we must accept that part of the testimony which supports the judgment. [Citation.]” (In re Daniel G. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 824, 830.)
Immediately after the robbery, Mr. Francisco and Mr. Ramirez described the robber and individually were taken to a location where they identified appellant. “‘The “single person showup” is not inherently unfair.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 413.) Further, Officer Green testified that he admonished both Mr. Francisco and Mr. Ramirez that the person detained was only a suspect.
While in court Mr. Ramirez could not identify appellant because of the passage of time, he testified that at the time he identified appellant, he was certain of the identification. The robbery had occurred just moments before and Mr. Ramirez identified appellant based on his clothing and facial features. Mr. Ramirez testified that when he made the identification, the “imprint” of appellant’s face was still in his memory. The identification of appellant as the robber was reliable.
II
At the dispositional hearing on January 17, 2007, the juvenile court declared that the conditions of probation imposed on March 23, 2005, with some additions, were to remain in full force and effect. On March 23, 2005, the court imposed the condition that appellant “not associate with anyone disapproved of by parents[,] Probation Officer[,] [or] school official[s].”
Appellant contends and respondent agrees the condition is unconstitutionally over broad and must be modified to add an explicit requirement that appellant not associate with anyone known by him to be disapproved by his parents, his probation officer or school officials. We agree. (See In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 878, 891-892.)
DISPOSITION
Probation condition number 15 is modified to read, “Do not associate with anyone known to you to be disapproved of by your parents, your Probation Officer, or school officials.” In all other respects, the order is affirmed.
We concur: EPSTEIN, P.J., MANELLA, J.