Opinion
D042348.
10-30-2003
In re JAMES M., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ROBIN B., Defendant and Appellant.
PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
We take judicial notice of Robins previous two appeals. (In re James M. (Nov. 8, 2002, D040309) [nonpub. opn.]; In re James M. (June 16, 2003, D041328) [nonpub. opn.].) (See Evid. Code § 459, subd. (a).)
In March 2002 the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) took 12-year-old James into custody because Robin was arrested for assaulting the girlfriend of Jamess father, Jeffrey M., and Jeffreys whereabouts were unknown. Robin asked the police to place James, who is a level one diabetic, in the Agencys custody while she was incarcerated. The two residences in which James had been living — his mothers and his fathers — were in a state of severe disrepair and filthiness. On April 25, Robin told a social worker that the day before Jeffrey had attempted to run over her with his car, and that in March he had threatened to kill her if she touched his motorcycle.
A social worker visited Robins residence on April 22 and found the home was clean.
On May 23, the court sustained an amended section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b) petition on behalf of James, alleging Jeffrey had exposed James to the risk of serious physical harm inflicted non-accidentally by a parent during an altercation with Robin, and the parents had not provided a suitable home for James. The court declared James a dependent, removed him from his parents custody and ordered him detained at the Polinsky Childrens Center pending placement in a foster home. Shortly after being placed in a foster home, James was returned to Polinsky because of behavioral problems. In June he left Polinsky without leave and returned five days later. James did not want to live in a group home or foster home but said he would like to live with his aunt in Michigan or his mother.
In October, Robin informed the social worker that she had been having grand-mal seizures and blackouts. Robin stopped taking her medication after her Medi-Cal benefits were discontinued because she did not fill out necessary papers in a timely manner while she was in a "blackout mode."
Robin testified at the contested six-month review hearing in December that she had nine grand-mal seizures in the previous year.
At the six-month review hearing, the court found returning James to parental custody would create a substantial risk of detriment to his physical and emotional well being. The court placed James with his aunt in Michigan and ordered Agency to continue providing reunification services. The court confirmed the case plan dated November 7, which required Robin, among other things, to participate in a neurological/psychological evaluation, follow the recommendations of the evaluator and take medications as prescribed. The court noted that Robin "desperately needs a neurological evaluation and until . . . that neurological [evaluation takes place] and we find out exactly what the problems are health-wise, and the mother is stabilized on medication, she is not going to be able to take advantage of the other services."
James adjusted well to his Michigan placement. His aunt reported James fit into the family, helping with chores and being respectful toward family members. No major concerns or problems were reported. On his first school report card, Jamess lowest grade was a "B-" and he was on the wrestling team. When Jamess grades dropped, he quit the wrestling team to concentrate on his academic studies. Jamess blood sugar levels were good and he did his own testing four times a day. James was resistant to therapy, saying he did not need it.
Robin did not participate in a neurological/psychological evaluation even though she had agreed to. The purpose of the evaluation was to determine her need for medication and a therapeutic plan. On January 8, 2003, Agency provided Robin with a referral to Dr. Phillip Kaushall. Robin made an appointment for March 4, but arrived late. Robin did not complete the evaluation process with Kaushall because she felt she could not work with him. Robins complaint was that Kaushall had given her only "some papers to fill out" and then left the room. Agency gave Robin a second referral to Dr. Deisy Boscan for a neuro-psychological examination. Robin telephoned Boscan on April 4 and said she had a headache. Boscan told Robin that she was not a medical doctor and suggested she telephone her primary physician or 911. At that point, Robin started screaming at Boscan, using obscene language. When Boscan tried to calm Robin down, she hung up the telephone.
At first, Robin was telephoning James on a consistent weekly basis but during April she telephoned only a couple times, once at 1:00 a.m. and another time at midnight.
At the 12-month review hearing, the court found there was a substantial probability that James could be returned home by the next review hearing based on Robin consistently staying in contact with James. The court also found reasonable services had been offered and Robins effort in alleviating the factors that led to the dependency had been minimal. The court ordered another six months of services.
DISCUSSION
Robin contends that because Agency did not assist her in obtaining medication to control her seizure problem the court erred by finding reasonable reunification services had been provided to her.
At every review hearing, the court is required to determine whether reasonable reunification services were provided to the parent. (See §§ 366.21, subds. (e), (f), 366.22, subd. (a).) At the 12-month review hearing the court "shall . . . determine whether reasonable services that were designed to aid the parent or guardian to overcome the problems that led to the initial removal and continued custody of the child have been provided or offered to the parent or legal guardian." (§ 366.21, subd. (f).)
A reunification plan must be tailored to the particular individual and family and address the unique facts of that family. (In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 545.) "[T]he focus of reunification services is to remedy those problems which led to the removal of the children." (In re Michael S. (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1448, 1464.) Thus, the social services agency should identify the problems that caused the minors detention, offer services designed to remedy the problems, maintain reasonable contact with the parents, and make reasonable efforts to assist when compliance with services proves difficult. (Mark N. v. Superior Court (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 996, 1011; In re Riva M. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 403, 414.) Reunification services are reasonable if Agency makes a good faith effort to address the parents problems that resulted in dependency. (See In re John B. (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 268, 275.) We recognize that in most cases "it will be true that more services could have been provided more frequently and that the services provided were imperfect. The standard is not whether the services provided were the best that might be provided in an ideal world, but whether the services were reasonable under the circumstances." (In re Misako R., supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at p. 547.)
We consider the record most favorably to the juvenile courts order, indulging in all reasonable and legitimate inferences to uphold the finding. (In re Misako R., supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at p. 545.) We do not reweigh the evidence and can determine only whether there is sufficient evidence to support the juvenile courts finding. (In re Jacqueline G. (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 582, 585.) When the facts support two or more interpretations, we do not substitute our interpretation for that of the juvenile court. (In re Misako R., supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at p. 545.)
There were three major reasons for Jamess dependency: his parents homes were in disrepair and filthy; his parents engaged in domestic violence in Jamess presence; and his parents were not properly monitoring Jamess diabetes. Robins initial case plan required her to participate in domestic violence and parenting education programs, with Agency providing a public health nurse for instruction on monitoring diabetes. The case plan provided services that directly dealt with the problems that caused the removal of James from Robins custody. Because of Robins health problems, the case plan was amended to require her to participate in a neurological/psychological evaluation and to participate in services recommended by the evaluator. These additional requirements addressed Robins health problems, which adversely affected her ability to participate in reunification services.
Substantial evidence supports the courts conclusion that the reunification services were reasonable and tailored to Robin and James and the problems causing the dependency. However, Robin did not take advantage of the services offered. (See Cheryl S. v. Superior Court (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1000, 1005.) Agency was required to offer reasonable services; it was not required to take Robin by the hand to ensure she complied with the case plan. (In re Michael S., supra, 188 Cal.App.3d at p. 1463, fn. 5.) "Reunification services are voluntary, and cannot be forced on an unwilling or indifferent parent." (In re Jonathan R. (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1214, 1220.) It was Robins responsibility to take advantage of the services offered but she was not inclined to do so. Robin told the social worker that she would participate in psychological or psychiatric services, but otherwise added: "I refuse to do what CPS [Child Protective Services] tells me to do."
At the contested six-month review hearing, Robin testified she was willing to participate in services.
Robin relies on In re Alvin R. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 962 in arguing that the Agency should be faulted for not helping her obtain medication to control her seizures, which were preventing her from complying with her case plan and reunifying with her son. In In re Alvin R., the Court of Appeal reversed the juvenile courts finding that reasonable services had been provided because the social services agency did not assist the minors grandmother with overcoming obstacles to individual counseling for the minor. (Id. at pp. 972-973.) The grandmother had been unable to arrange for counseling because of scheduling and transportation problems, and the agency did not assist with transportation to appointments or provide referrals to a therapist closer to the grandmothers home. (Ibid.) Counseling was necessary before visitation with the minors father could take place, and visitation was essential to reunification. (Id. at p. 973.) The father had done all that was required of him under the plan, and individual therapy was the one service that stood in the way of complying with all terms of the plan. (Ibid.) The inaction of the agency effectively precluded any chance of reunification. (Ibid.)
Unlike In re Alvin R., supra, 108 Cal.App.4th 962, this is not a case in which Agency did nothing to alleviate a parents problems in meeting the requirements of the case plan. After learning that Robin was having seizures, Agency sought to revise her case plan to include a neurological examination to determine treatment for this health problem. Agency further provided Robin with two referrals for the examination. Robin did not like the first of these referred evaluators and she became unreasonably furious at the second referred evaluator. As a result, six months after the neurological examination was added to the case plan, it had not been completed because of Robins conduct, not Agencys indifference. In In re Alvin R., supra, the parent had demonstrated a commitment to taking advantage of the reunification services that were offered and had shown substantial progress in complying with her case plan; here, Robin had not.
Moreover, if Robin believed the referrals for the examination were insufficient, she should have raised this issue below. (In re Christina L. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 404, 416.) Robin, who was represented by counsel, did not do so. " "The law cast upon the party the duty of looking after his legal rights and of calling the judges attention to any infringement on them . . . ." [Citation.] " (Ibid.)
We conclude that under the circumstances the court properly found reasonable services had been provided.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: McCONNELL, P. J., NARES, J.