Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. Nos. 58981, J208749
ROBIE, J.
The Santa Clara County Juvenile Court (Santa Clara court) found beyond a reasonable doubt that the minor James L. committed the crime of carjacking while personally using a firearm, and therefore he came within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court within the meaning of Welfare and Institutions Code section 602.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
After being informed by the minor’s attorney that the case was a “transfer out,” the court held a brief hearing and ordered the case transferred to San Joaquin County for disposition. The San Joaquin County Juvenile Court (San Joaquin court) accepted the transfer, conducted a disposition hearing, and committed the minor to the Department of Juvenile Justice for a maximum period of confinement of 15 years.
On appeal, the minor contends: (1) the Santa Clara court failed to follow required procedures when it transferred the case to San Joaquin County for disposition without first determining that such transfer would be in the minor’s best interest; and (2) the Santa Clara court abused its discretion by transferring the case to San Joaquin County for disposition, and the San Joaquin court abused its discretion by holding the disposition hearing, because the San Joaquin court did not hold the jurisdictional hearing and therefore could not consider “the facts, the testimony, the demeanor of the witnesses, and other crucial factors which only the judge who presided at the jurisdictional hearing could experience.”
As will be explained more fully below, we conclude that the minor is precluded from challenging the validity of the transfer order and the San Joaquin County court did not abuse its discretion by holding the disposition hearing. We will affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On the night of July 4, 2007, Fernando Gonzalez was parked in his black Honda Civic outside a liquor store in San Jose. Gonzalez was there to purchase drugs, having arranged the transaction in a phone conversation with the minor. The minor and a man with gold teeth approached Gonzalez’s car. From inside the Civic, Gonzalez handed $60 to the man with gold teeth and then, changing his mind about buying the drugs, exited the vehicle and asked for his money back. The man with gold teeth pulled a gun. Gonzalez then got back inside the vehicle and told the minor, who was also standing outside the car, to “tell his friend to give [him] back [his] money.”
The minor opened the passenger door, entered the vehicle, and told Gonzalez to drive to a darker, more secluded part of the street. When Gonzalez refused, the minor pulled a black, semiautomatic handgun and pushed it into Gonzalez’s ribs. Gonzalez unsuccessfully tried to take the keys out of the ignition. The minor then grabbed Gonzalez’s jacket, pointed the gun at his head, and told Gonzalez to “get out of the car.” Gonzalez complied with the demand and ran to the liquor store to call police; the minor jumped into the driver’s seat and drove the car away.
DISCUSSION
I
The Law With Respect To Juvenile Court Transfer Orders
Section 750 provides in relevant part: “Whenever a petition is filed in the juvenile court of a county other than the residence of the person named in the petition, . . . the entire case may be transferred to the juvenile court of the county wherein such person then resides at any time after the court has made a finding of the facts upon which it has exercised its jurisdiction over such minor, and the juvenile court of the county wherein such person then resides shall take jurisdiction of the case upon the receipt and filing with it of such finding of the facts and an order transferring the case.” For purposes of this provision, “the residence of the minor is the residence of the person legally entitled to custody of the minor.” (In re Judson W. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 838, 843.)
Rules 5.610 and 5.612 of the California Rules of Court implement section 750. Rule 5.610 provides for the procedure and conduct of the transfer-out hearing. Subdivision (e) of that rule provides: “After the court determines the identity and residence of the child’s custodian, the court must consider whether transfer of the case would be in the child’s best interest. The court may not transfer the case unless it determines that the transfer will protect or further the child’s best interest.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.610(e); see also In re R.D. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 679, 687 [“At a transfer-out hearing, the transferring court is required to make findings not only as to the child’s residence, but also whether the transfer is in the child’s best interests”].) Rule 5.612 provides for the procedure and conduct of the transfer-in hearing. Subdivision (a)(1) of that rule provides that “the receiving court must accept jurisdiction of the case” and “may not reject the case.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.612(a)(1); see also In re R.D., at p. 684.)
II
The Minor Is Precluded From Challenging The Transfer Order
The minor’s challenge to the transfer order is twofold. First, he contends that the Santa Clara court failed to follow required procedures when it transferred the case to San Joaquin County for disposition because it did not first determine that such transfer would be in the minor’s best interest. Second, he asserts that the Santa Clara court abused its discretion by transferring the case because the San Joaquin court did not hold the jurisdictional hearing and therefore could not consider “the facts, the testimony, the demeanor of the witnesses, and other crucial factors which only the judge who presided at the jurisdictional hearing could experience.” However, there are two insurmountable obstacles precluding the minor from challenging the transfer order before this court.
First, the notice of appeal from an order of transfer “must be filed in the transferring county.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.610(i).) The rule speaks of the “transferring county” and the “receiving county.” (Id.) The transferring county is the county that transferred the case to the receiving county; the receiving county is the county that received the case from the transferring county. Here, the Santa Clara court transferred the minor’s case to San Joaquin County for disposition, making Santa Clara County the “transferring county” and San Joaquin County the “receiving county.” Accordingly, the minor’s challenge to the validity of the transfer order should have been filed in Santa Clara County.
We note that neither the minor nor the People raised the issue of whether the minor’s challenge to the transfer order should have been filed in Santa Clara County. Any party who feels aggrieved by the fact that we have included this analysis in the opinion may brief the issue and petition the court for rehearing. (Gov. Code, § 68081.) However, the fact that the minor has forfeited the transfer issue by acquiescing in the transfer (as we discuss next) independently and sufficiently precludes his ability to challenge the validity of the transfer on appeal.
Second, the minor has forfeited this claim of error by failing to object to the transfer. Indeed, not only did the minor fail to object to the transfer of the case to San Joaquin County, his attorney affirmatively reminded the court at the end of the jurisdictional hearing that the case was a “transfer out.”
The California Supreme Court has stated: “‘An appellate court will ordinarily not consider procedural defects or erroneous rulings, in connection with relief sought or defenses asserted, where an objection could have been but was not presented to the lower court by some appropriate method . . . . The circumstances may involve such intentional acts or acquiescence as to be appropriately classified under the headings of estoppel or waiver . . . . Often, however, the explanation is simply that it is unfair to the trial judge and to the adverse party to take advantage of an error on appeal when it could easily have been corrected at the trial.’” (Doers v. Golden Gate Bridge etc. Dist. (1979) 23 Cal.3d 180, 184-185, fn. 1.) “‘The purpose of the general doctrine of waiver is to encourage a defendant to bring errors to the attention of the trial court, so that they may be corrected or avoided and a fair trial had.’” (People v. Walker (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1013, 1023.) Accordingly, rights “‘“may be forfeited in criminal as well as civil cases by the failure to make timely assertion of the right before a tribunal having jurisdiction to determine it.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. Saunders (1993) 5 Cal.4th 580, 590; cf. In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293, fn. 2 [stating that the correct legal term for loss of right based on failure to assert it in a timely fashion is forfeiture, not waiver].)
Because the minor did not object to the transfer, and in fact affirmatively acquiesced in the decision to transfer the case, he has forfeited this claim of error. (See In re Carlos B. (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 50, 55-56 [where receiving county wrongfully refused a transfer from transferring county, and transferring county accepted return of the case and held disposition hearing, failure to object to either the refusal of the transfer and return of the matter to the transferring county or the transferring county’s disposition “constitute[d] acquiescence in those decisions”].)
Having found that the minor forfeited the issue of the validity of the transfer order by acquiescing in the transfer, we will not address his contention that the Santa Clara court failed to make the required finding that such transfer would be in his best interest. However, we must presume that the trial court made all factual findings necessary to support the judgment for which substantial evidence exists in the record. In other words, the necessary findings of ultimate facts will be implied and the only issue on appeal is whether the implied findings are supported by substantial evidence. (See Michael U. v. Jamie B. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 787, 792-793, superseded on other grounds by statute as stated in In re Zacharia D. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 435, 448-449; Fladeboe v. American Isuzu Motors, Inc. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 42, 58.) Here, there is an abundance of evidence in the record supporting the implied finding that the transfer was in the minor’s best interest.
III
San Joaquin County Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Conducting The Disposition Hearing
The minor contends that the San Joaquin court abused its discretion by conducting the disposition hearing because it did not hold the jurisdictional hearing and therefore could not consider “the facts, the testimony, the demeanor of the witnesses, and other crucial factors which only the judge who presided at the jurisdictional hearing could experience.” We disagree.
As a preliminary matter, we note that an order of acceptance of transfer is not an appealable order. (In re Judson W., supra, 185 Cal.App.3d at p. 839, fn. 1.) This is so because the receiving county has no discretion to refuse the case. (§ 750 [the receiving county “shall take jurisdiction of the case upon the receipt and filing with it of such finding of the facts and an order transferring the case” (italics added)]; In re Carlos B., supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at p. 55 [“Rejection of the case is prohibited regardless of whether the receiving court agrees with the residency finding of the transferring court”]; Lassen County v. Superior Court (1958) 158 Cal.App.2d 74, 75 [receiving county has a “mandatory duty to take jurisdiction of the case”].) Accordingly, the minor cannot challenge the decision of the San Joaquin court to accept the transfer of the case.
Even on the merits, the minor’s contention fails. Obligated as it was to accept transfer of the case for disposition, the San Joaquin court had but one option in light of the minor’s admission to residing with his mother in San Joaquin County -- hold the disposition hearing. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.610(c) which explains that the transferring court consider the jurisdictional question, not the disposition.) This is what the San Joaquin court did, and we cannot find this to have been an abuse of discretion. Indeed, every case of a transfer under section 750 results in a court conducting the disposition hearing that necessarily did not preside over the jurisdictional hearing. If the minor’s argument were to prevail, then every court that accepts a transfer from another county in accordance with section 750, and thereafter conducts the disposition hearing, abuses its discretion by doing so. This cannot be the law.
Finally, we note that the minor’s reliance on People v. Jacobs (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 728 and People v. Strunk (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 265 is misplaced. Those cases involve criminal sentencing and are therefore inapposite because this is a juvenile case for which the underlying policy concerns regarding transfer to the county in which the minor resides are simply not present.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: BLEASE, Acting P. J., RAYE, J.