Opinion
F042106.
10-8-2003
In re JAMES B., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JAMES B., Defendant and Appellant.
Alice C. Shotton, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Jo Graves, Assistant Attorney General, and Wanda Hill Rouzan, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
THE COURT
Before Vartabedian, Acting P.J., Buckley, J., and Wiseman, J.
James B. contends the juvenile court abused its discretion by placing him at the California Youth Authority (CYA) after he admitted committing a lewd or lascivious act with a child under the age of 14 years. (Pen. Code,[] § 288, subd. (a).) We will affirm the disposition.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
BACKGROUND[]
The relevant factual background is taken from Jamess probation report.
A Fresno County Sheriffs deputy interviewed a 13-year-old girl who stated that she returned home from a school dance on April 5, 2002, and found 16-year-old James playing a video game with her brother. The girl noticed James looked at her "weird" and began getting closer. She went to lie down and James began touching her leg. She told James to stop, but he continued as he watched out for her brother.
The girl went to her parents bedroom and returned to find James standing in the doorway. He closed the door and told her to be quiet. James then shoved her on the bed and crawled on top as he kissed her and initiated sexual intercourse. He told her to be quiet as she cried and tried unsuccessfully to keep him away.
The same sheriffs deputy also interviewed another girl regarding a rape on July 16, 2001, when she was 13 years old. The victim reported she went to Jamess house to watch a movie. When she refused Jamess invitation to go to his bedroom, he picked her up and said, "You are going to sleep with me" and threw her to the ground. James forced her into his bedroom, closed the door, and stated, "Whatever happens, Im gonna end you if you tell anybody." James lay on top of her and tied her wrist to a bedpost. She screamed for help and he told her to "shut-up." She struggled to no avail as he kissed her and forced her to have sexual intercourse for approximately 10 minutes.
The district attorney charged James with two counts of forcible rape (§ 261, subd. (a)), assault with intent to commit rape (& sect; 220), false imprisonment by violence (§ 236), lewd act upon a child under the age of 14 (§ 288, subd. (a)), and sexual penetration by force (§ 289, subd. (a)(1)). (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602.) Under a plea agreement, James admitted committing a lewd act upon a child under the age of 14 (§ 288, subd. (a)) with the prosecution reserving the right to comment on the dismissed counts. (People v. West (1970) 3 Cal.3d 595.)
On December 16, 2002, the juvenile court committed James to CYA for a maximum period of confinement of 9 years, consisting of 8 years for the current offense and one year from an August 2001 petition in which the juvenile court found James committed grand theft of an automobile (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)) which he knew had been stolen (§ 496d, subd. (a)).
DISCUSSION
James believes the juvenile court abused its discretion by ordering him to CYA. He argues the facts did not support the disposition and that the court failed to investigate and consider less restrictive alternatives.
A juvenile court has broad discretion in imposing disposition upon a ward, and an appellate court may reverse the juvenile courts commitment decision only upon a showing the trial court abused that discretion. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 727, subd. (a), 730, subd. (a), 731; In re Todd W. (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 408, 416.) " `We must indulge all reasonable inferences to support the decision of the juvenile court and will not disturb its findings when there is substantial evidence to support them. " (In re Lorenza M. (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 49, 53.)
In determining whether the juvenile court abused its discretion, a commitment must conform to the general purpose of the Juvenile Court Law. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 202; In re Todd W., supra, 96 Cal.App.3d at p. 417.) Legislation enacted in 1984 recognized punishment as a rehabilitation tool and shifted the "emphasis from a primarily less restrictive alternative approach oriented towards the benefit of the minor to the express `protection and safety of the public where care, treatment, and guidance shall conform to the interests of public safety and protection." (In re Michael D. (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1392, 1396, citations omitted.) The disposition must nevertheless evidence probable benefit to the minor and that less restrictive alternatives would be ineffective or inappropriate. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 202, subd. (e); In re Teofilio A. (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 571, 576.)
While the juvenile court law contemplates a progressively restrictive and punitive series of dispositions, there is no absolute rule that the court may not impose a particular commitment until less restrictive placements have actually been attempted. (In re Teofilio A., supra, 210 Cal.App.3d at p. 577.) "[I]f there is evidence in the record to show a consideration of less restrictive placements was before the court, the fact the judge does not state on the record his consideration of those alternatives and reasons for rejecting them will not result in a reversal." (Ibid.)
The record reveals the juvenile court considered less restrictive placement options, but found the alternatives inappropriate. The court expressly commented that it reviewed the evidence submitted by the county probation department consisting of a social study report, a limited psychological evaluation, and an exhaustive compilation of character references. The social study report explained the juvenile court previously placed James on probation, restricted him to an electronic monitor for 30 days, and ordered him to attend 14 days of community service and a victim offender program after finding he stole three motorcycles from a shed. (§ 496, subd. (a); Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a).) The psychological report explained that James, following the advice of counsel, refused to discuss the circumstances surrounding his offense and found that he experienced a strong need to "fake good" and was unwilling or unable to accept responsibility for his assaultive behavior.
Discussing Jamess possible dispositions, the juvenile court noted that despite continuing the disposition hearing to investigate less restrictive alternatives to CYA, defense counsel was "not able to come up with one alternative sentencing program for the courts consideration due to the nature of the offense." Further, the juvenile court explained that without Jamess cooperation in explaining the circumstances of his actions to the evaluating psychologist, the court lacked the ability to fully assess Jamess future risk of dangerousness to the public. From all the information available, however, the juvenile court found that a short-term commitment to the local juvenile facility with a sexual offender treatment program would neither safeguard the public nor afford James sufficient accountability for his actions.
The record demonstrates the juvenile court considered Jesses request for a placement less restrictive than CYA, but found the request inappropriate. (In re Teofilio A., supra, 210 Cal.App.3d at p. 577.) Although dispositions less restrictive than CYA may have been available, James has not shown that any alternative would have likely been effective. Taking into account Jamess conduct, risk to the public, delinquent history, age, treatment options, and need for accountability, the juvenile court reasonably concluded CYA presented Jamess most appropriate placement. Accordingly, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.