Opinion
H12CP12014354A
03-03-2016
In re Jalaya M.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
CORRECTED MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE PETITION TO TERMINATE PARENTAL RIGHTS (CORRECTION TO MEMORANDUM OF DECISION DATED FEBRUARY 29, 2016 TO REFLECT CORRECT BIRTH DATE OF THE MINOR CHILD ON P. 1 AND THE MOTHER ON P. 9.)
Mary-Margaret D. Burgdorff, J.
In accordance with General Statutes § 46b-124 and Practice Book § 32a-7, the names of the parties involved in this case are not to be disclosed, and the records and papers of this case shall be open for inspection only to persons having a proper interest therein and only upon order of the Superior Court.
Before this court is the termination of parental rights (TPR) petition filed by the petitioner, the Department of Children and Families (" DCF"), on January 13, 2015, in the interest of Jalaya M., a minor child born on March 20, 2011, to Shaquinta D. (" mother") and Patrick M. (" father"). The petition alleges that parental rights of mother and father should be terminated on the grounds that Jalaya has been found in a prior proceeding to have been neglected or uncared for and mother and father have failed to achieve such a degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time, considering the age and needs of the child, they could assume a responsible position in the life of the child. As to mother, the petition also alleges that the child has been abandoned by the mother in the sense that mother has failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of the child and that there is no ongoing parent-child relationship with respect to mother that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on a day-to-day basis the physical, emotional, moral, and educational needs of the child and to allow further time for the establishment or re-establishment of the parent- child relationship would be detrimental to the best interests of the child.
The petition also alleged, as to father, that the child was denied, by reason of an act or acts of commission or omission, including but not limited to, sexual molestation or exploitation, severe physical abuse or pattern of abuse, in the care guidance or control necessary for her physical, educational, moral or emotional well-being. That ground was withdrawn by DCF at the time of trial.
The respondent parents were properly served. Mother and father appeared, were advised and appointed counsel. Paternity has been established. There are no other custody proceedings affecting this child. The child was appointed an attorney. The Indian Child Welfare Act is not applicable. The court finds that it has proper jurisdiction and there are no pending actions affecting the custody of the minor child. This matter was tried to the court on February 4, 2016. Mother and father were present with their respective counsel for trial. The child's attorney was present for trial.
The court heard testimony from seven witnesses who included two DCF social workers, a state trooper, three police officers, and mother's probation officer. Father also testified. Twenty exhibits offered by DCF were entered into evidence as full exhibits. These included the parents' specific steps, memoranda of decisions, DCF social worker affidavits, permanency plan studies, police reports, records from Wheeler Clinic, affidavits authored by the DCF social workers, social studies in support of the permanency plan and termination of parental rights petition, an addendum to the termination of parental rights study and certified criminal histories for mother and father. Father offered two exhibits which were entered into evidence as full exhibits. These consisted of records from My People Clinical Services and The Village. The representations in the social studies, status reports and affidavits will be considered for dispositional purposes.
A motion for judicial notice was filed by DCF on January 11, 2016, and granted by agreement of the parties. The court, therefore, takes judicial notice of the entire court record including the chronology of the proceedings, the filings or submissions of pleadings, petitions, social studies, statements of facts, affidavits, status reports, evaluations, court hearing memoranda and the court's findings, orders, rulings and judgments including the following:
As to the Mother's Minor Child, Johnen V. a/k/a Jordan D.
(1) Filing of neglect petition on November 8, 2010, in the interest of the minor child Johnen V., alleging the minor child was neglected in that he was being denied proper care and attention and that he was being permitted to live under conditions injurious to his well-being;
(2) Hearing held on December 16, 2010, whereby the court (Frazzini, J.) confirmed service of the neglect petition on the respondent parents and advised the respondent mother of her rights and whereby the respondent mother entered pro forma denials;
(3) Hearing held on May 26, 2011, whereby the court (Frazzini, J.) adjudicated the minor child neglected in that he was being permitted to live under conditions injurious to his well-being, issued order of protective supervision with the respondent mother for a period of six months, and ordered specific steps for the respondent parents;
(4) Hearing held on October 6, 2011, whereby the court (Cofield, J.) extended the order of protective supervision and found that the extension of protective supervision was in the best interest of the minor child;
(5) Filing of ex parte motion for order of temporary custody on January 20, 2012, granted ex parte by the court (Cofield, J.) accompanied by affidavits of DCF social workers;
(6) Findings of the court (Cofield, J.) on January 20, 2012 that the child was in immediate physical danger from his surroundings, that continuation in the home was contrary to the welfare of said child, that temporary care and custody of said child be vested in the department, and that reasonable efforts to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of said child were not possible;
(7) Preliminary hearing held on January 27, 2012, whereby the court (Frazzini, J.) sustained the order of temporary custody and reviewed, approved and ordered specific steps for the respondent parents;
(8) Trial held on April 25, 2012 before the court (Burgdorff J.) regarding the petitioner's motion to modify disposition;
(9) Decision of the court (Burgdorff, J.) dated May 2, 2012, whereby the court granted the motion to modify disposition, committed the minor child to the care and custody of the department, and reviewed, approved and ordered specific steps for the respondent parents;
(10) Hearing held on September 18, 2012, whereby the court (Dannehy, J.) granted the petitioner's motion to amend specific steps and reviewed, approved and ordered amended final specific steps for the respondent parents;
(11) Hearing held on December 4, 2012, whereby the court (Dannehy, J.) did not approve the permanency plan of reunification with respondent mother;
(12) Hearing held on March 5, 2013, whereby the court (Burgdorff, J.) approved the permanency plan of termination of parental rights and adoption, found that the plan was in the best interest of the minor child, and found that the department made reasonable efforts to effectuate the plan;
(13) Hearing held on June 11, 2013, whereby the court (Dannehy, J.) approved the permanency plan of transfer of guardianship to paternal grandmother, found that the plan was in the best interest of the minor child, and found that the department made reasonable efforts to effectuate the plan;
(14) Hearing held on April 22, 2014, whereby the court (Burgdorff, J.) approved the permanency plan of permanent transfer of guardianship to paternal grandmother, found that the plan was in the best interest of the minor child, and found that the department made reasonable efforts to effectuate the plan;
(15) Hearing held on February 24, 2015, whereby the court (Lobo, J.) transferred permanent guardianship of the minor child, Johnen V. a/k/a Jordan D. to paternal grandmother.
As to Mother's and Father's Minor Child, Jalaya M.
(1) Filing of the neglect petition on January 20, 2012, in the interest of the minor child, Jalaya M., alleging that the minor child was neglected in that she was being denied proper care and attention, and that she was being permitted to live under conditions injurious to her well-being;
(2) Filing of ex parte motion for order of temporary custody on January 20, 2012 granted ex parte by the court (Cofield, .J.) accompanied by affidavits of DCF social workers;
(3) Findings of the court (Cofield, J.) on January 20, 2012 that the child was in immediate physical danger from her surroundings, that continuation in the home was contrary to the welfare of said child, that temporary care and custody of said child be vested in the department, that reasonable efforts to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of said child were not possible, and review, approval and ordering of specific steps for respondent parents;
(4) Preliminary hearing held in January 27, 2012, whereby the respondent father contested the motion for order of temporary custody and whereby the court (Frazzini, J.) consolidated the motion for order of temporary custody with the neglect petition and reviewed, approved and ordered specific steps for the respondent parents;
(5) Trial held on April 25, 2015, before the court (Burgdorff, J.) regarding the motion for order of temporary custody and neglect petition, whereby the respondent parents filed nolo pleas as to the allegation that the minor child was neglected in that she was permitted to live under conditions injurious to her well-being;
(6) Decision of the court (Burgdorff, J.) dated May 2, 2012, whereby the court sustained the order vesting temporary custody of the minor child, committed the minor child to the care and custody of the department, and reviewed, approved and ordered specific steps for the respondent parents';
(7) Hearing held on September 18, 2012, whereby the court (Dannehy, J.) granted the petitioner's motion to amend specific steps and reviewed, approved and ordered amended final specific steps for the respondent parents;
(8) Hearing held on December 4, 2012, whereby the court (Dannehy, J.) approved the permanency plan of reunification with the respondent father, found that the plan was in the best interest of the minor child, and found that the department made reasonable efforts to effectuate the plan;
(9) Filing of motion to review permanency plan on May 10, 2013 requesting the court to approve a permanency plan of termination of parental rights;
(10) Trial held before the court (Burgdorff, J.) on August 28, 2013, regarding the motion to review permanency plan of termination of parental rights and respondent father's objection to the motion to review permanency plan;
(11) Decision of the court (Burgdorff, J.) dated September 6, 2013, whereby the court did not approve the permanency plan of termination of parental rights and adoption, sustained the respondent father's objection, and ordered the department to submit another permanency plan;
(12) Hearing held on October 31, 2013, whereby the court (Dannehy, J.) approved the permanency plan of reunification with the respondent father, found that the plan was in the best interest of the minor child, and found that the department made reasonable efforts to effectuate the plan;
(13) Hearing held on April 22, 2014, whereby the court (Burgdorff, J.) approved the permanency plan of reunification with respondent father, found that the plan was in the best interest of the minor child, and found that the department made reasonable efforts to effectuate the plan;
(14) Filing of petition for termination of parental rights on January 13, 2015;
(15) Hearing held on February 10, 2015, whereby the department withdrew the petition for termination of parental rights;
(16) Hearing held on April 16, 2015, whereby the court (Dannehy, J.) approved the plan of reunification with the respondent father, found that the plan was in the best interest of the minor child, and found that the department made reasonable efforts to effectuate the plan;
(17) Hearing held on September 10, 2015, whereby the court (Dannehy, J.) approved the permanency plan of reunification with father, found that the department made reasonable efforts to effectuate the plan, and modified the disposition by issuing an order of protective supervision with the respondent father for a period of six months;
(18) Filing of ex parte motion for order of temporary custody on September 25, 2015, granted ex parte by the court (Dannehy, J.) accompanied by affidavits of DCF social workers;
(19) Filing of petition for termination of parental rights on September 25, 2015;
(20) Findings of the court (Dannehy, J.) on September 25, 2015, that the child was in immediate physical danger from her surroundings, that continuation in the home was contrary to the welfare of said child, that temporary care and custody of said child be vested in the department, and that reasonable efforts to prevent or eliminate the need for removal were made by the state;
(21) Preliminary hearing held on October 2, 2015, whereby the court (Dannehy, J.) confirmed service on the respondent parents, advised the respondent parents as to their rights, vacated the order of temporary custody, committed the minor child to the care and custody of the department, found that commitment was in the best interest of the minor child, and reviewed, approved and ordered specific steps for the respondent parents;
Father's final specific steps ordered on 10/2/15 included the following: cooperate and keep appointments with DCF and keep the department informed of his address; undergo individual, family and parenting counseling and make progress for the identified treatment goals of developing and enhancing ability to parent responsibly and address substance abuse issues, maintain sobriety and provide safe and nurturing parenting, and follow through with all treatment recommendations, cooperate with in-home support services recommendations regarding assessment and treatment, and cooperate with court ordered evaluations or testing; accept in-home support services referred by DCF and cooperate with them; refrain from illegal drug use and not abuse alcohol or medicine, and refrain from involvement with the criminal justice system; cooperate with court ordered evaluations and testing; cooperate with recommended service providers including CRT for substance abuse treatment and mental health services and Klingberg for parenting; sign releases to enable DCF to communicate with service providers, sign releases allowing child's attorney to review child's medical, psychological, psychiatric and/or educational records; get and maintain adequate housing and legal income; immediately let DCF know about any changes in the make-up of the household, get and/or cooperate with a restraining/protective order and/or other appropriate safety plan approved by DCF to avoid more domestic violence incidents; not get involved with the criminal justice system; cooperate with the child's therapy; visit the child as often as DCF permits, keep the child in the State of Connecticut while case is going on unless permission is received from DCF or the court to take child out of state and inform DCF of any person who father would like DCF to consider as a placement for the child.
(22) Hearing held on October 20, 2015, whereby the court (Burgdorff, J.) confirmed service of the petition on the respondent parents and noted previous advisement on October 2, 2015.
All counsel participated in the examination of the witnesses and closing arguments. The court has carefully considered the petition, the criteria set forth in the relevant Connecticut General Statutes, the applicable case law as well as all of the evidence and testimony presented, the demeanor of mother and father, the demeanor and credibility of the witnesses, the evaluation of their testimony with all other testimony and documentary evidence, and the arguments of counsel, according to the standards required by law. The court was able to clearly listen to and observe all of the witnesses and determine the validity, cohesion, and the credibility of their testimony. The court thoroughly reviewed the documentary evidence. On the basis of the evidence presented and for the reasons stated below, the court finds in favor of the petition and hereby terminates the parental rights of the respondent mother and the respondent father as to their child, Jalaya M.
The court finds the following facts by clear and convincing evidence.
FACTS
Mother
Mother was born on April 8, 1992. Mother attended school and graduated from Hartford Culinary Arts Academy in 2011. She is currently attending school. She received her license to be a home health aide and is currently employed as a home health aide. Her income consists of cash assistance, food stamps and medical benefits in addition to her wages. She has a history of transience. She has most recently resided with maternal aunt in Simsbury.
Mother is the mother of two children. Johnen was born on July 17, 2009. Mother had a short relationship with Johnen's father in 2008 while attending high school at which time she became pregnant. As noted above, a transfer of guardianship as to Johnen was ordered by the court on February 24, 2015. Mother began a dating relationship with father in 2010 and became pregnant with Jalaya. They remained together until 2011. Their relationship has been replete with domestic violence.
Mother has been involved with DCF since 2009 due to referrals for medical neglect, physical neglect and emotional neglect of Johnen and Jalaya. Mother has history of abandoning Jalaya by leaving her without notice to father. In January 2012, physical neglect of Johnen by mother was substantiated due to her failure to obtain adequate medical care for Johnen. In January 2014, she left Jalaya on the doorstep of paternal grandmother without prior notice. She was arrested for risk of injury, abandonment and criminal mischief.
Mother has a history of substance abuse including cannabis abuse since the age of 18 to the present time. She has minimized the impact of cannabis abuse on her life. She has a history of unaddressed mental health and anger management issues. She has been diagnosed with adjustment disorder with depressed mood. She attempted suicide in May 2011 while Johnen and Jalaya were in the home. She has exhibited violent behavior in front of the children including stabbing father in 2011. On November 29, 2011, mother was assaulted by father and three other men. Father was arrested and incarcerated.
DCF referred mother to Community Health Services (CHS) for mental health services and treatment, Rambuh Center for parenting education, ADRC for substance abuse treatment, Coventry House for in-home parenting services, Interval House for Domestic Violence Counseling, Circle of Life Transition Center for Domestic Violence Counseling. Mother had inconsistent attendance at Circle of Life Transition Center. She attended an intake and attended nine sessions for domestic violence psycho-education. She was engaged in the sessions she attended but missed several sessions. She participated in only four sessions at CHS for individual therapy from February 2012, to April 2012. She made no progress toward resolving her substance abuse or mental health issues due to her failure to consistently attend appointments. Due to her lack of engagement, she was unsuccessfully discharged. She participated in individual therapy at Staltaro Psychological Services in June 2012 and July 2012. She stopped attending due to her incarceration from July 17, 2012 to October 9, 2012. Mother was re-referred for services in October 19, 2012 but was unable to attend the appointment. Mother was referred for an Advanced Behavioral Health (ABH) referral to ADRC for random drug screens and group sessions on February 6, 2013. Due to mother's transience and lack of a consistent working phone, she was not successful in this treatment. Mother was unsuccessfully discharged from Womens' Anger Management for Substance Abuse at Wheeler Clinic on January 17, 2013 due to her failure to attend. After her discharge, mother engaged in substance abuse and tested positive for marijuana. She was referred to ADRC but mother refused the referral instead requesting a program through her probation. She was re-referred to Wheeler Clinic for substance abuse evaluation on October 24, 2014, and December 22, 2014, but initially did not participate. She did begin services on January 16, 2015, at Wheeler Clinic but was unsuccessfully discharged due to her nonattendance. Mother tested positive for marijuana on February 2, 2015 and for marijuana and cocaine on March 3, 2015. An intake was scheduled at InterCommunity Recovery Center (ICRC) for February 8, 2016.
DCF also provided case management services, transportation to supervised visitations and bus passes. Mother has maintained sporadic contact with DCF. She failed to follow through with several meetings with the assigned social worker. She has failed to cooperate with signing releases. She has not been cooperative with visits from Jalaya's attorney. She attended two Administrative Case Review meetings on February 29, 2012 and February 6, 2013, and most recently in November 2015 but failed to attend ACR meetings on August 16, 2012, August 16, 2013, February 11, 2014, August 11, 2014, March 18, 2015 and August 11, 2015.
Mother has a criminal history dating back to 2010. Her charges include assault 3rd degree, criminal mischief 3rd degree, larceny 6th degree, disorderly conduct, threatening 2nd degree, risk of injury to a minor, breach of peace and violation of protective order. She was incarcerated from July 7, 2012, to October 9, 2012 due to outstanding warrants and criminal charges, including assault, breach of peace and violation of protective order. Mother was incarcerated in May 2013, for several weeks and was released on April 3, 2014. She was incarcerated from December 12, 2014, to December 17, 2014, for violation of probation. She is currently on probation through December 2016. Conditions of her probation include no assaulting of the victim, attend anger management classes and restitution. She is also required to test for substances. She has tested positive for marijuana during her probationary period, most recently on December 29, 2015. She initially was inconsistent in reporting to her probation officer but has improved over the last six months. She is currently the protected party in a protective order issued on March 12, 2014, due to a domestic violence issue.
Mother has been inconsistent in her visitation with Jalaya. She did not visit Jalaya from May 2014, until September 2014. She began supervised visitation in October 2014. She failed to visit Jalaya from June 2015, to September 2015. She did interact appropriately during the visits she did attend. Jalaya appeared to be bonded and happy with mother. She had a total of ten visits with Jalaya between October 31, 2014, and March 20, 2015. Most recently, she has visited with Jalaya in the presence of foster mother on an inconsistent basis.
Father
Father was born on November 23, 1993. Father attended Hartford Public Schools. He was employed at Capitol Regional Educational Council as a bus monitor prior to his recent arrest. He is presently incarcerated. He has received food stamp assistance from the State of Connecticut. He secured housing on December 1, 2014, with financial assistance from DCF.
Father and mother began their relationship in 2010. Their relationship involved repeated instances of domestic violence as discussed above.
Father has a significant criminal record dating back to 2009 for charges of assault, disorderly conduct, burglary 2nd and assault 3rd. In 2011, he was arrested for assaulting mother and was incarcerated. He was charged with reckless endangerment of a child, receiving stolen property, conspiracy to shoplift, negligent operation of a motor vehicle, failure to stop for police, failure to stay within marked lanes and speeding. These charges resulted from a high speed chase with the police on September 18, 2015, during which Jalaya was in the motor vehicle in addition to other individuals. Jalaya was injured. She was improperly restrained in the vehicle. Father was placed on probation for a year as the result of these charges. While on probation, father was arrested for disorderly conduct on January 1, 2016, as the result of a domestic violence incident with a girlfriend. He was arrested several hours later for possession of narcotics, possession of narcotics with intent to sell, possession of over half an ounce of marijuana, possession of marijuana with intent to sell, possession of drug paraphernalia and operating a drug factory. He remains incarcerated for those pending charges.
Father has a history of substance abuse. Father was referred to Wheeler Clinic for a substance abuse evaluation which was not completed until June 2014 due to his missed appointments. He completed substance abuse assessment at Wheeler Clinic on March 10, 2015. He tested negative for all substances and no recommendation for treatment was made at that time.
Father was referred to services for parenting education at My People's Clinical Services, transportation to supervised visits, bus passes, Supportive Housing referrals, The Village for Reconnecting Families Program and The Village Reunification Program in October 2012, and April 2014, for supervised visitations and parenting education, case management and reunification services. Prior to his current incarceration, father was compliant with visitation with Jalaya although he missed several visits. He has had appropriate interactions with Jalaya during the visits.
Father successfully completed a 26-week fatherhood parenting program in 2012. He was unsuccessfully discharged from the Father Works Program in January 2013. He commenced reunification services with Radiance Innovative Services in October 2013. He completed the first and second phases of the program successfully. He then began overnight visits with Jalaya in December 2013. However, during visits with Jalaya from February, 2014 father was evasive and did not accept visits from DCF. Jalaya was exposed to bedbugs. Due to concerns for Jalaya's safety, father was offered supervised visits and a safety agreement was put in place. DCF recommended that father undergo a more intensive reunification program and he was referred to RFP in April 2014. Father was compliant with that program but there were ongoing concerns with regarding father's ability to meet Jalaya's needs and housing issues. He was late for his visitations. Father was subject to a Careline Referral in May 2014, alleging that father was abusing substances in Jalaya's presence.
Father was discharged from Reconnecting Families in July 2014, as it was assessed that he was not ready to move to the next phase of the program. He had difficulty obtaining housing and remained living with his uncle. He did obtain housing in December 2014. He complied with The Village Reunification Family Time Program which commenced on February 25, 2015. He obtained supportive housing in March 2015. He was reunified with Jalaya on July 15, 2015. He successfully completed the Village Reunification Program on August 25, 2015. Thereafter, DCF filed a revocation of commitment seeking return of Jalaya's custody to father and modifying her commitment to six months protective supervision on September 10, 2015.
Thereafter, on September 17, 2015, father was involved in the above noted high speed chase, with speeds of up to 130 miles per hour, with the Massachusetts police resulting in a serious car crash. Jalaya sustained a broken arm in addition to abrasions and lacerations. Father was incarcerated. Upon his release, he returned to Connecticut on September 24, 2015. DCF then invoked a 96-hour hold on behalf of Jalaya due to father's disregard for Jalaya's safety and well-being. Father's visits with Jalaya since that time have been inconsistent. As also noted above, on January 1, 2016, father was arrested for disorderly conduct due to a domestic violence incident with his paramour. He was arrested the same day for possession of a controlled substance, possession with intent to sell, sale of a hallucinogen, possession of drug paraphernalia and operating a drug factory. His housing and employment are jeopardized due to his current incarceration.
Jalaya M.
Jalaya M. was born to mother and father on March 20, 2011 in Hartford, Connecticut. She spent one day in the NICU unit due to concerns about a possible artery outflow obstruction. She has no current medical issues. She is developmentally on target. As discussed above, Jalaya sustained a broken arm, abrasions and scrapes as the result of the motor vehicle incident which occurred on September 8, 2015, from which she has recovered.
Jalaya currently attends Beacon Light Pre-School/Daycare where she is doing well. She is described as being advanced academically. She is developing socially and emotionally with age appropriate tasks and daily activities. Jalaya has in the past exhibited some negative behaviors including tantrums and talking back to adults. Some of this behavior has been attributed to her mimicking her older brother, Johnen. Since her current placement with her foster parents, her behavior has improved and she is progressing well in her foster home.
As noted above, Jalaya has had two placements in DCF licensed foster homes. She has been in DCF's care since January 2012. She is thriving in her current foster home. She is bonded with her foster parents, whom she identifies as " mommy" and " daddy" and their children as her sisters. Her foster parents are willing to adopt her. The foster mother is supportive of mother and father having a relationship with Jalaya. Jalaya is a bright, attached and well-adjusted child.
ADJUDICATION
The court must first determine whether DCF has proven by clear and convincing evidence that the parental rights of mother and father should be terminated. " A hearing on a petition to terminate parental rights consists of two phases, adjudication and disposition . . . In the adjudicatory phase, the trial court determines whether one of the statutory grounds for termination of parental rights exists by clear and convincing evidence. If the trial court determines that a statutory ground for termination exists, it proceeds to the dispositional phase. In the dispositional phase, the trial court determines whether termination is in the best interest of the child." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Destiny R., 134 Conn.App. 625, 627, 39 A.3d 727, cert. denied, 304 Conn. 932, 43 A.3d 660 (2012); In re Shaun B., 97 Conn.App. 203, 206, 903 A.2d 246 (2006).
Reasonable Efforts
Section 17a-112(j) provides in relevant part: " The Superior Court . . . may grant a petition [to terminate parental rights] . . . if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that (1) the [department] has made reasonable efforts to locate the parents and to reunify the child with the parent in accordance with subsection (a) of section 17a-111b, unless the court finds in this proceeding that the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts . . ." (Emphasis added.) " [T]he department may meet its burden concerning reunification in one of three ways: (1) by showing that it made such efforts, (2) by showing that the parent was unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts or (3) by a previous judicial determination that such efforts were not appropriate . . ." In re Gabriella A., 154 Conn.App. 177, 104 A.3d 805 (2014). " Thus, the department must prove [by clear and convincing evidence] either that it has made reasonable efforts to reunify or, alternatively, that the parent is unwilling or unable to benefit from reunification efforts. Section 17a-112(j) clearly provides that the department is not required to prove both circumstances. Rather, either showing is sufficient to satisfy this statutory element." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Kylik A., 153 Conn.App. 584, 102 A.3d 141 (2014) citing In re Anvahnay S., 128 Conn.App. 186, 191, 16 A.3d 1244 (2011); see also In re Jermaine S., 86 Conn.App. 819, 837, 863 A.2d 720, cert. denied, 273 Conn. 938, 875 A.2d 43 (2005). " [I]n determining whether the department has made reasonable efforts to reunify a parent and a child or whether there is sufficient evidence that a parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts, the court is required in the adjudicatory phase to make its assessment on the basis of the events preceding the date on which the termination was filed . . . [T]he court, when making its reasonable efforts determination . . . is limited to considering only those facts preceding the filing of the termination petition or the most recent amendment to the petition . . ." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Kylik A., Id. citing In re Kyara H., 147 Conn.App. 855, 870-71, 83 A.3d 1264, cert. denied, 311 Conn. 923, 86 A.3d 468 (2014). See also Practice Book § 35a-7.
" [T]he statute imposes on the department the duty . . . to make reasonable efforts to unite the child or children with the parents. The word reasonable is the linchpin on which the department's efforts in a particular set of circumstances are to be adjudged, using the clear and convincing standard of proof. Neither the word reasonable nor the word efforts is, however, defined by our legislature or by the federal act by which the requirement was drawn . . . [R]easonable efforts mean doing everything reasonable, not everything possible . . ." (Citation omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Daniel C., 63 Conn.App. 339, 361, 776 A.2d 487 (2001); In re Tabitha T., 51 Conn.App. 595, 722 A.2d 1232 (1999). " [R]easonableness is an objective standard . . . and whether reasonable efforts have been proven depends on the careful consideration of the circumstances of each individual case." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Kyara H., 147 Conn.App. 855, 872-73, 83 A.3d 1264, cert. denied, 311 Conn. 923, 86 A.3d 468 (2014). See also In re Vincent B., 73 Conn.App. 637, 641, 809 A.2d 1119 (2002), cert. denied, 262 Conn. 934, 815 A.2d 136 (2003). " The department has a continuing duty to make reasonable efforts." Id., 644. But " [t]he department is required only to make 'reasonable efforts.' It is axiomatic that this does not require a useless and futile act." In re Antony B., 54 Conn.App. 463, 476, 735 A.2d 893 (1999). In addition, " making no efforts to reunify a parent and his or her child may be reasonable in certain circumstances . . ." In re Vincent B., supra, 73 Conn.App. 645. The court may also determine that the respondent parents were either unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts. See In re Alexander T., 81 Conn.App. 668, 676, 841 A.2d 274, cert. denied 268 Conn. 924, 848 A.2d 472 (2004).
DCF has proven by clear and convincing evidence that it used reasonable efforts to locate mother and father as contemplated by § 17a-112(j)(I). The evidence clearly establishes that mother and father were properly served. Both mother and father were present for the trial of this matter.
DCF has also proven by clear and convincing evidence that it made reasonable efforts to reunify Jalaya with mother and father. Both mother and father were offered appropriate services to facilitate reunification with their child. As discussed in detail above, mother was offered a multitude of services which included counseling, substance abuse treatment, mental health treatment and services, parenting services, in-home support services, domestic violence services and counseling, and individual therapy. She was also provided with case management services, transportation to supervised visitation, and bus passes. Unfortunately, mother garnered very little success or progression from the services in which she did engage. She has failed to fully engage in treatment to address her mental health issues nor has she made any significant progress in addressing her substance abuse issues or in understanding the consequences of her actions on Jalaya. She has clearly not gained sufficient insight into her issues with domestic violence, substance abuse or her mental health issues to the extent that Jalaya can safely return to her care. She has not demonstrated any rehabilitation she may have gained to an extent that she can care for Jalaya. Mother has been unable to put Jalaya's needs ahead of her own and has been unable to do so for the majority of Jalaya's life. The court notes that mother does appear to love Jalaya and did engage with her during visitations with her; however, that love and affection she has for him does not arise to parental competence. See In re Christina M., 90 Conn.App. 565, 575, 877 A.2d 941 (2005).
Father was offered numerous services to aid in attaining reunification with Jalaya including substance abuse evaluation and services, parenting education, transportation to supervised visits, bus passes, supportive housing referrals, The Village Reconnecting Families Program and The Village Reunification Program for supervised visitation and parenting education, case management and reunification services. Most concernedly, only days after Jalaya's commitment was modified and father was reunified with Jalaya, father was arrested as discussed in detail above. He has failed to maintain a level of stability to permit Jalaya to safely remain in his care. His reckless behavior put Jalaya's life at risk and resulted in physical injury and trauma to her. Further, his lack of judgment and poor decision making demonstrate that he has made limited progress and gained no lasting benefit from the services he has received. He has utterly failed to gain the necessary insight needed to care for his daughter. Father has been unable to put Jalaya's needs ahead of his own and has been unable to do so for the majority of her life as clearly demonstrated by his ongoing issues and his ongoing involvement with the criminal justice system. The court notes that father appears to deeply love his daughter and she loves him. However, that bond is woefully insufficient to overcome father's lack of judgment and competence. Id.
Accordingly, the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that DCF made reasonable efforts to locate mother and father and to reunify them, and further, that they are unable or unwilling to benefit from the reunification efforts.
Failure to Rehabilitate (As to Mother and Father)
In the adjudicatory phase, the court must next determine whether DCF has proved the statutory ground for termination of parental rights-failure to rehabilitate. " The . . . [grounds] alleged in this petition [are] that . . . [the parents] failed to achieve rehabilitation pursuant to § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(I) which allows for termination if a child has found by the Superior Court . . . to have been neglected or uncared for in a prior proceeding . . . the [parents] of such [child have] been provided specific steps to take to facilitate the return of the [child] to the parent pursuant to section 46b-129 and the [parents have] failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child . . . " Personal rehabilitation . . . refers to the restoration of the parent to his or her former constructive and useful role as a parent . . . [and] requires the trial court to analyze the [parents'] rehabilitative' status as it relates to the needs of the particular child, and further, that such rehabilitation must be foreseeable within a reasonable time . . . The statute does not require [the parents] to prove precisely when they will be able to assume a responsible position in [their child's] life. Nor does it require [them] to prove that [they] will be able to assume full responsibility for [their child], unaided by available support systems. It requires the court, to find by clear and convincing evidence, that the level of rehabilitation [they have] achieved, if any, falls short of that which would reasonably encourage a belief that at some future date [they] can assume a responsible position in [their child's] life." (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Samantha C., 268 Conn. 614, 628, 847 A.2d 883 (2004); In re Janazia S., 112 Conn.App. 69, 94, 961 A.2d 1036 (2009); In re Halle T., 96 Conn.App. 815, 835, 902 A.2d 670, cert. denied, 280 Conn. 924, 908 A.2d 1087 (2006), In re Eden F., 250 Conn. 674, 706, 741 A.2d 873 (1999)." The critical issue is not whether the [parents have] a improved [their] ability to manage [their] own life, but rather whether [they] have gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the child at issue." Id. at 835. The ultimate question [regarding each parent] is whether the parent at the time of the filing of the termination petition is more able to resume the responsibilities of a parent than he or she was at the time of the making of the commitment. In re Michael M., 29 Conn.App. 112, 614 A.2d 832 (1992). In making this determination, the court may properly rely upon events occurring after the date of the petition when considering whether the degree of rehabilitation is sufficient to foresee that the parent may resume a useful role in the child's life within a reasonable time. In re Stanley D., 61 Conn.App. 224, 230, 763 A.2d 83 (2000); In re Latifa K., 67 Conn.App. 742, 748, 789 A.2d 1024 (2002). See also In re Emerald C., 108 Conn.App. 839, 858-59, 949 A.2d 1266, cert. denied, 289 Conn. 923, 958 A.2d 150 (2008). " Terminating a parent's rights is not ordered to punish a parent who has not tried to rehabilitate; it is ordered so as not to punish a child by denying the child a safe and permanent home with proven competent caretakers because [the biological parent] . . . continues to be incapable of providing such a home for the child. In re Samantha B., 45 Conn.Supp. 468 477, 722 A.2d 300 (1997), aff'd 51 Conn.App. 376, 721 A.2d 1255 (1998), cert. denied, 248 Conn. 902, 732 A.2d 177 (1999). In light of the statutory elements of this ground as well as the case law interpreting it, this court finds by clear and convincing evidence that DCF has met its burden as to mother and father.
The evidence here proves clearly and convincingly the first element under the statute that Jalaya has been previously found to have been neglected. As noted above, Jalaya was adjudicated neglected on January 2, 2012. Specific steps were ordered as to mother and father.
As previously discussed in this decision, mother has been unable to successfully complete her steps. It is clear and convincing to the court that as of the conclusion of the trial, mother had not rehabilitated to the extent that she could care for Jalaya within a reasonable period of time given her age and needs for permanency. She failed to maintain consistent contact with DCF, and she failed to successfully comply with her recommended services which has prevented her from successfully reunify with Jalaya. She continues to have significant mental health and substance abuse issues. Mother has difficulty in controlling her emotions as demonstrated by her outbursts and agitated behavior during the trial. Further, giving mother additional time to rehabilitate is not in Jalaya's best interest especially in light of her being out of her mother's care for most of her young life. The court finds that mother's failure to rehabilitate, as it has been statutorily defined, has been proven by clear and convincing evidence.
Similarly, father was unable to fully and successfully complete his specific steps. Father's involvement with the criminal justice system, his substance abuse issues and his resulting incarcerations clearly demonstrate his failure to rehabilitate. Father is unable to meet the developmental, emotional, educational, medical and moral needs of Jalaya. He cannot provide for Jalaya shelter, nurturance, safety and security. See In re Paul M. Jr., 154 Conn.App. 488, 107 A.3d 552 (2014). Father did engage in services successfully to the extent that he was reunified with Jalaya under an order of protective supervision. However, as discussed in detail above, it was only seven days after Jalaya's commitment was revoked and reunification occurred that father exercised extremely poor judgment in engaging in a high-speed chase with Jalaya in the car. She was also improperly restrained in the car and suffered injuries leading to his arrest on multiple charges. Father was then arrested for disorderly conduct and multiple drug charges on January 1, 2016, for which he remains incarcerated. It is clear that as of the conclusion of the trial, father has not rehabilitated to the extent he can care for Jalaya. Further, it would not be in Jalaya's best interests, given father's lack of stability, to allow for more time for his rehabilitation, given Jalaya's tender age and need for permanency.
The evidence is clear and convincing that as of the adjudicatory date, neither mother nor father had achieved such a degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that, within a reasonable period of time, considering Jalaya's age and needs, they could assume a responsible position in her life. Neither has demonstrated that they are willing or able to provide a competent, safe and nurturing environment for their daughter. They continue to make poor decisions and exercise poor judgment. Both mother and father have failed to gain the necessary insight and ability to care for Jalaya given her age and needs within a reasonable period of time. See In re Eden, 250 Conn. 674, 706, 741 A.2d 873, reargument denied, 251 Conn. 924, 742 A.2d 364 (1999). While mother and father clearly love their daughter, their attempts to reunify with her have failed. " Motivation to parent is not enough; ability is required." In re Paul M. Jr., Id., citing In re G.S., 117 Conn.App. 710, 718, 980 A.2d 935, cert. denied, 294 Conn. 919, 984 A.2d 67 (2009). See also In re Ashley S., 61 Conn.App. 658, 667, 769 A.2d 718, cert. denied, 255 Conn. 950, 769 A.2d 61 (2001); In re Christina M., 90 Conn.App. 565, 575, 877 A.2d 941 (2007). Further, the legal obligation of a parent necessarily encompasses that fundamental right of a child to be safe-physically, psychologically and emotionally. General Statutes § § 46b-120(8) and (9) and 17a-112(j). See also In re Nelmarie O., 97 Conn.App. 624, 629, 905 A.2d 706 (2006). Of paramount consideration to the court is the issue of stability and permanency for Jalaya. See In re Katia M., 124 Conn.App. 650, 666-67, 6 A.3d 86 (2010). Our laws recognize that a child is legally entitled to some minimum standard of safety which should include a parent's desire to protect and keep their child safe in all ways including physically and emotionally. Jalaya's need for permanence far outweighs any remote chance that mother and father may rehabilitate in the far distant future. Mother and father have, either because of lack of ability or lack of desire, failed to successfully accomplish what was needed to consider reunification as an appropriate conclusion. Jalaya cannot afford to wait for her parents to rehabilitate. She has been out of her parents' care for all but nine months of her young life. DCF has presented compelling evidence that she needs permanency and stability now. She needs a permanent and stable living arrangement in order to grow and develop in a healthy manner. She has made progress in her current foster home which provides a structured, safe and loving environment where she is well cared for. Her foster parents love her and wish to adopt her. To return Jalaya to her mother or father would be clearly be detrimental to her physical safety and well-being. In light of the statutory elements of this ground, as well as the case law interpreting it, this court finds by clear and convincing evidence that DCF has met its burden as to Jalaya.
Abandonment and No Ongoing Parent Child Relationship (As to Mother)
" A parent abandons a child if the parent fails to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of the child . . . General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3)(A). Abandonment focuses on the parent's conduct . . . Abandonment occurs where a parent fails to visit a child, does not display love or affection for the child, does not personally interact with the child and demonstrates no concern for the child's welfare . . . General Statutes § 17a-112[(j)(3)(A)] does not contemplate a sporadic showing of the indicia of interest, concern or responsibility for the welfare of the child. A parent must maintain a reasonable degree of interest in the welfare of his or her child. Maintain implies a continuing, reasonable degree of concern." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Justice V., 111 Conn.App. 500, 513-14, 959 A.2d 1063 (2008), cert. denied, 290 Conn. 911, 964 A.2d 545 (2009).
The clear and convincing evidence does not show that mother has abandoned Jalaya. While mother has been sporadic in her involvement with Jalaya and her visitation, she has shown love and affection for Jalaya, and has interacted with her. The court finds that DCF has not met its burden of proof on the ground of abandonment as to mother.
Similarly, the clear and convincing evidence does not prove that mother has no on-going parent-child relationship with Jalaya pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3)(D). " This part of the statute requires the trial court to undertake a two-pronged analysis. First, there must be a determination that no parent-child relationship exists, and second, the court must look into the future and determine whether it would be detrimental to the child's best interest to allow time for such a relationship to develop . . . In considering whether an on-going parent-child relationship exists, the feelings of the child are of paramount importance . . . The ultimate question is whether the child has no present memories or feelings for the natural parent . . . Feelings for the natural parent connotes feeling of a positive nature only . . ." (Citations omitted; quotation marks omitted.) In re Jonathan G., 63 Conn.App. 516, 525, 777 A.2d 695 (2001).
As noted above, mother does have an ongoing, although sporadic, relationship with Jalaya. She does engage in some visitations with Jalaya and has acted in an appropriate and loving relationship with her during those visits. Further, Jalaya is aware of who her mother is and has a relationship with her. Therefore, DCF has not met its burden of proof as to the ground of no ongoing parent-child relationship in that it has not proven that no parent-child relationship exists.
DISPOSITION
For all of the above reasons, the court, having found by clear and convincing evidence that the statutory ground of failure to rehabilitate as alleged by the petitioner for the termination of mother and father's parental rights has been proven, the court must now consider and make findings on each of the seven criteria set forth in General Statutes § 17a-112(k). In re Romance M., 229 Conn. 345, 641 A.2d 378 (1994). " In the dispositional phase of a termination of parental rights hearing, the emphasis appropriately shifts from the conduct of the parent to the interest of the child . . . [T]he trial court must determine whether it is established by clear and convincing evidence that the continuation of the [respondents'] parental rights is not in the best interest of the [child]." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Janazia S., 112 Conn.App. 69, 97-98, 961 A.2d 1036 (2009). " The best interests of the [child] includes the [child's] interest in sustained growth, development, well-being and continuity and stability in [his] environment . . . In arriving at this decision, the court is mandated to consider and make written findings delineated in [§ 17a-112(k)]." Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Trevon G., 109 Conn.App. 782, 794-5, 952 A.2d 1280 (2008). " [These factors] serve simply as guidelines for the court and are not statutory prerequisites that need to be determined before termination can be ordered . . . There is no requirement that each factor be proved by clear and convincing evidence." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Davonta V., 98 Conn.App. 42, 47, 907 A.2d 126, aff'd 285 Conn. 483, 940 A.2d 733 (2008).
The seven statutory findings, which have been established by clear and convincing evidence, are as follows:
1. The Timeliness, Nature and Extent of Services Offered, Provided and Made Available to the Parent and the Child by an Agency to Facilitate the Reunion of the Child with the Parent
As discussed above, DCF offered timely and appropriate services to mother and father all in an effort to facilitate reunion with Jalaya. Both were offered services to address their personal and parental deficiencies. Mother was offered multiple services and therapy including domestic violence services, substance abuse services, parenting education, individual therapy and counseling, monthly bus passes, supervised visitation services and case management services. Father was offered counseling services, parent education, substance abuse and domestic violence services, supervised visitation, monthly bus passes and case management services. All of the recommended services were reasonable and appropriate, and offered on a consistent, timely and sufficient basis. Father engaged and successfully completed some of his services and reunified with Jalaya on September 10, 2015. However, as discussed above, father again became involved with the criminal justice system in September 2015 and January 2016.
2. Whether the Department of Children and Families Has Made Reasonable Efforts to Reunite the Family Pursuant to the Federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, as Amended
As discussed in detail above, reasonable efforts to reunify Jalaya with her mother and father were made by DCF pursuant to the Federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980. The services offered were appropriate and timely to address the issues that led to Jalaya's removal. They were offered on a consistent and timely basis, and tailored to address their specific individual needs. Mother and father failed to sufficiently benefit from the services offered and provided. They failed to adjust their circumstances, conduct or conditions to make it in the best interests of Jalaya to return to their care. Father was able to reunify with Jalaya for only a short period of time before becoming reinvolved with the criminal justice system. Neither parent has consistently availed themselves of their services in order to improve their circumstances to the extent they can assume a responsible role in Jalaya's life. Mother and father have clearly failed to demonstrate their ability to appropriately parent Jalaya. DCF has clearly made reasonable efforts toward family reunification.
3. The Terms of Any Applicable Court Order Entered Into and Agreed Upon by Any Individual or Agency and the Parent, and the Extent to Which All Parties Have Fulfilled Their Obligations Under Such Order
Neither mother nor father have fulfilled their obligations pursuant to the specific steps ordered by the court. They have failed to rehabilitate to a degree that would allow their daughter to return to their care. Mother has failed to successfully engage in the court-ordered recommended services to address the issues that led to DCF's involvement, she has inconsistently visited Jalaya and has a history of transiency. She continues to have substance abuse issues. As discussed in detail above, mother has not fully complied with her court ordered specific steps including participating in counseling, cooperate with the service providers recommended for parenting/individual and family counseling, in-home support service, substance abuse services, and has failed to maintain adequate housing. She has not gained sufficient insight into her issues. Father has failed to successfully engage in or complete his court ordered services as outlined above. Further, he continues to be involved with the criminal justice system and is presently incarcerated. He has not gained sufficient insight into his ongoing issues.
4. The Feelings and Emotional Ties of the Child With Respect to the Child's Parents, Any Guardian of Such Child's Person, and Any Person Who Has Exercised Physical Care, Custody or Control for at Least One Year and With Whom the Child Has Developed Significant Emotional Ties
Jalaya knows who mother is. However, their relationship has been intermittent and inconsistent due to mother's failure to visit her on a regular basis. Mother is affectionate and loving during the visits she does attend. Their interaction with each other is loving and appropriate. Prior to his recent incarceration, father maintained a consistent relationship with Jalaya. He is loving and affectionate and Jalaya is clearly bonded with him. Jalaya has a loving and strong bond with her foster parents whom she calls " mommy" and " daddy." Jalaya reaches out to her foster parents for her needs as well as love and support. She has resided with her foster parents for most of her life and is thriving in their care.
5. The Age of the Child
Jalaya was born on March 20, 2011. She is presently four years old.
6. The Efforts the Parent Has Made to Adjust Such Parent's Circumstances, Conduct, or Conditions to Make it in the Best Interest of the Child to Return Such Child Home in the Foreseeable Future, Including, But Not Limited to, (A) The Extent to Which the Parent Has Maintained Contact With the Child as Part of an Effort to Reunite the Child With the Parent, Provided the Court May Give Weight to Incidental Visitations, Communications or Contributions, and (B) The Maintenance of Regular Contact or Communication With the Guardian or Other Custodian of the Child
Neither mother nor father have made sufficient efforts or adjustment to their individual circumstances, conduct or conditions to make it in the best interest of Jalaya to return safely to their care in the foreseeable future as discussed in detail above. Mother and father maintain contact on an inconsistent basis with Jalaya through her foster parents. They both engage in irregular communication with the foster parents to schedule visits with Jalaya.
7. The Extent to Which a Parent Has Been Prevented From Maintaining a Meaningful Relationship With the Child by the Unreasonable Act or Conduct of the Other Parent of the Child, or the Unreasonable Act of Any Other Person or by the Economic Circumstances of the Parent
There is no credible evidence that mother or father have been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with Jalaya. No unreasonable act or conduct of mother or father, or any other person, have prevented mother and father from a meaningful relationship with Jalaya. The economic circumstances of mother and father have not prevented them from having a relationship or visits with Jalaya. Mother and father were offered and provided programs and services at no cost to them to assist them with their issues. There has been no claim that mother or father were unable to obtain services due to lack of financial resources. Legal counsel was appointed for them at no cost to them.
Best Interests of the Child
Once the court finds that the allegations of the petition have been proven by clear and convincing evidence, the court must find, also by clear and convincing evidence, that the termination is in the best interests of the child. In re Roshawn R., 51 Conn.App. 44, 52, 720 A.2d 1112 (1998)." [T]he determination of the child's best interests comes into play only after statutory grounds for termination of parental rights has been established by clear and convincing evidence." In re Zion R., 116 Conn.App. 723, 738, 977 A.2d 247 (2009). The best interest standard is inherently flexible and fact-specific to each child, giving the court broad discretion to consider all the different and individualized factors that might affect a specific child's welfare. In determining whether terminating the mother's and father's parental rights would be in the best interest of Jalaya, the court has considered various factors, including her interest in sustained growth, developed well-being, and in the continuity and stability of her environment; Cappetta v. Cappetta, 196 Conn. 10, 16, 490 A.2d 996 (1985); In re Jason R., 129 Conn.App. 746, 766 n.15, 23 A.3d 18 (2011); her age and needs; the length and nature of her stage of foster care; the contact with her parents or lack thereof; the potential benefit or detriment of retaining a connection with her mother and father and; her genetic bond with her birth parents; In re Savanna M., 55 Conn.App. 807, 816, 740 A.2d 484 (1999); and the seven statutory factors and the court's findings thereon. The court also finds that there is no disposition less restrictive than termination of parental rights that would serve Jalaya's best interests. To the contrary, in deciding the best interest in this case, the court has considered the adjudicatory and dispositional evidence in its entirety, and has concluded, by the clear and convincing evidence presented, that there is not permanency plan that could have secured the best interests of Jalaya that is less restrictive than the termination of parental rights at issue. See In re Azareon Y., et al., 309 Conn. 626, 72 A.3d 1074 (2013). It is clear that Jalaya cannot be returned to her mother or father. The court has balanced Jalaya's intrinsic need for stability, sustained growth, development, well-being and permanency against the potential benefits of maintaining a connection with her biological parents. See Pamela B. v. Ment, 244 Conn. 296, 314, 709 A.2d 1089 (1998) (child's physical and emotional well-being must be weighed against the interest in preserving family integrity.) In consideration of all these factors and after weighing all of the evidence, the court finds that the clear and convincing evidence has established that it is in the best interests of Jalaya to terminate the parental rights of the respondent mother and the respondent father to ensure that she has a secure and safe placement so she can grow and mature to become a productive child and adult. She has a strong bond with her foster family. She needs the permanency and stability her foster parents continue to provide for her. As our courts have long observed, the deleterious effects of prolonged temporary care is well known. In re Juvenile Appeal (84-CD), 189 Conn. 276, 292, 455 A.2d 1313 (1983). " It is undisputed that children require secure, stable, long-term, continuous relationships with their parents or foster parents. There is little that can be as detrimental to a child's sound development as uncertainty . . ." Lehman v. Lycoming Country Children's Services Agency, 458 U.S. 502, 513, 102 S.Ct, 3231, 73 L.Ed.2d 928 (1982). Jalaya needs this closure of the uncertainty in her life and the removal of the possibility of returning home to his mother or father. Neither mother nor father offer any reasonable prospect of providing any form of the stability and permanency that Jalaya needs in the foreseeable future. The evidence clearly and convincingly establishes that mother nor father are not stable and able caretakers for Jalaya.
Accordingly, after considering Jalaya's age and the totality of the circumstances, the court finds that termination of mother and father's parental rights is in the best interest of Jalaya. The convincing and clear evidence has established that mother and father are in no better position today to provide for her than they were at the time of her removal. The problems that led to her removal have not been rectified and the prospects of improvement are bleak at best. This conclusion is supported by the testimony of the witnesses as well as the information contained in the exhibits presented at the time of trial. Jalaya's attorney is in support of the termination of parental rights of mother and father in light of their failure to rehabilitate.
It is hereby ORDERED that the parental rights of Shaquinta D. and Patrick M. are hereby TERMINATED as to their child, Jalaya M.
CONCLUSION
Wherefore, based upon the foregoing findings and having considered all of the evidence, after due consideration of the child's need for a secure, permanent placement, the totality of the circumstances, having considered all statutory criteria, having found by clear and convincing evidence that reasonable efforts to locate mother and father were made, that efforts at reunification with mother and father were made, that mother and father have failed to rehabilitate, that mother and father were and continue to be unable or unwilling to benefit from those efforts, the court finds that grounds exist to terminate mother and father's parental rights as alleged, and that it is in the child's best interest to do so. It is accordingly ordered:
That the parental rights of the respondent mother, Shaquinta D., and the respondent father, Patrick M., are terminated;
That the Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families is appointed statutory parent of Jalaya for the purpose of securing her adoption as expeditiously as possible, with first consideration to be given to the current foster parents of Jalaya;
That a written report of the plan as to the status of the child shall be submitted to the court within thirty days, and such further reports shall be timely filed and presented to the court as required by law.
Judgment shall enter accordingly.
Mother's final specific steps ordered on 10/2/15 included the following, cooperate and keep appointments with DCF and keep the department informed of her address; undergo individual and parenting counseling and make progress toward identified treatment goals for parenting, individual and family including improving basic parenting skills, address anger management, address substance abuse issues, and provide safe and nurturing parenting; cooperate with recommendations regarding assessment and treatment; refrain from illegal drug use and refrain from abuse of alcohol or medication; accept in-home support services and cooperate with service providers recommended including Wheeler Clinic for substance abuse, mental health for individual and domestic violence and the Village for parenting; cooperate with court ordered evaluations and testing; sign releases to enable DCF to communicate with service providers; sign releases for child; get and maintain adequate housing and legal income; immediately let DCF know about any changes in the household; get and/or cooperate with restraining/protective order and/or other appropriate safety plan approved by DCF to avoid more domestic violence incidents; attend and complete domestic violence programs; keep child in State of Connecticut; visit child as often as DCF permits; do not get involved with criminal justice system and cooperate with Office of Adult Probation or parole officer and follow conditions of probation or parole; take of the child's physical, educational, medical or emotional needs including keeping the child's appointments with medical or educational providers; cooperate with child's therapy, visit the child as often as DCF permits; tell DCF in writing the names and addresses of grandparents, family relationship and birth date of persons who she would like DCF to investigate as a placement resource for the child.