Opinion
F073674
02-14-2018
In re JAIME ROSAS On Habeas Corpus.
Kamala D. Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Phillip J. Lindsay, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Jessica N. Blonien and Krista L. Pollard, Deputy Attorneys General, for Appellant. Michael Satris, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. HC014423A)
OPINION
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Kern County. Michael E. Dellostritto, Judge. Kamala D. Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Phillip J. Lindsay, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Jessica N. Blonien and Krista L. Pollard, Deputy Attorneys General, for Appellant. Michael Satris, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Respondent.
-ooOoo-
INTRODUCTION
Appellant Attorney General of California appeals the superior court's order granting respondent Jaime Rosas's petition for writ of habeas corpus. The order vacated a disciplinary decision of the California Department of Corrections (CDC) that had found respondent guilty of battery with a deadly weapon pursuant to California Code of Regulations, title 15, section 3005, subdivision (d)(1). We affirm because the facts do not establish battery.
All future statutory references are to title 15 of the California Code of Regulations unless otherwise noted. We will generally refer to these as the Regulations. --------
BACKGROUND
I. The Facts Underlying The CDC Violation.
In July 2013, two correctional officers were conducting body searches of prison inmates. An officer noticed a bulge in respondent's sock and asked him if he had anything there. Respondent denied that he was concealing anything in his sock. Respondent was ordered to remove his sock, and he again denied that he was concealing anything there. After being again ordered to remove his sock, respondent took it off and placed it on a counter. An officer picked up his sock to inspect it and was pricked by something, which caused bleeding. Another officer found an inmate manufactured syringe hidden inside respondent's sock.
II. The CDC Hearing.
In August 2013, a CDC rules violation hearing occurred. At the conclusion of the hearing, the CDC found respondent guilty of battery with a deadly weapon. The CDC made its findings based upon a preponderance of the evidence consistent with the facts above. In finding that respondent committed battery with a deadly weapon, the CDC expressly defined battery as "the deliberate use of force or violence on the person of another. Deliberate means it is not accidental. Force is power, violence, compulsion, or constraint, exerted upon or against a person." "Violence" was defined, in part, as "the exertion of any physical force so as to injure, damage or abuse. This includes every type of physical contact from unlawful touching or simple battery, through battery with enough force to result in serious injury or death."
Because of this violation, the CDC assessed various punishments against respondent, including a forfeiture of 360 days of credits.
III. The Writ Of Habeas Corpus.
In December 2014, respondent petitioned the superior court for a writ of habeas corpus, challenging the CDC's decision. Respondent contended, in part, that he had lacked sufficient criminal intent to support the CDC's finding.
The superior court issued an order to show cause regarding whether any evidence supported the guilty finding of a violation of section 3005, subdivision (d)(1), for battery on a peace officer with a deadly weapon.
In response to the order to show cause, appellant filed a declaration in the superior court from a high-level CDC officer that sought to explain the CDC's interpretation of section 3005, subdivision (d)(1). According to the CDC's declaration, "any act in which an inmate is aware of the nature of the act and chooses to ignore its potential for injury is a willful act in violation of the regulations. It is no defense that an inmate did not have a specific intent to injure his victim or violate the regulations. Instead, as long as the inmate had the general intent to commit the act that led to an unlawful touching, he has violated the regulations. Lastly, an inmate need not directly apply force to cause the unlawful touching. Force is defined broadly and encompasses more than a physical corporeal assault. Force includes setting into motion those events that led to the unlawful touching."
In the superior court, appellant argued that some evidence supported the guilty finding. Appellant contended that, under the governing regulations, an inmate commits battery with a deadly weapon when an inmate commits an act that has the potential for injury, and someone is injured by that act. Further, appellant asserted that its interpretation of its own regulations was reasonable and entitled to judicial deference.
The superior court rejected appellant's arguments and found no "use of force" sufficient for battery under the facts presented. The court granted respondent's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The court vacated the disciplinary decision and ordered appellant to restore the 360-day credit loss.
Appellant filed this present appeal.
DISCUSSION
I. The Trial Court Correctly Found Insufficient Evidence Of Battery.
Appellant asserts that respondent is not entitled to habeas relief. Appellant requests that we reverse the superior court's order granting the petition.
A. Standard of review.
"Prison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution, and the 'full panoply of rights' due a defendant in such proceedings does not apply. [Citation.] As a result, the standard courts apply in reviewing disciplinary proceedings is lower than that applied in reviewing criminal convictions." (In re Dikes (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 825, 830.) However, because this appeal concerns an issue of law, we review this matter de novo. (In re Borlik (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 30, 35.) "Further, when the lower court reaches a decision based on the pleadings and attached exhibits, as in this case, we independently review the record. [Citation.]" (Ibid.)
B. Analysis.
To satisfy procedural due process, a prison disciplinary decision that revokes time credits must be supported by "some evidence in the record." (Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Institution v. Hill (1985) 472 U.S. 445, 454.) "In determining whether the evidentiary standard is satisfied, the relevant question is whether there is 'any' evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board. [Citation.]" (In re Dikes, supra, 121 Cal.App.4th at p. 830.)
Appellant argues that battery under the Regulations, unlike its counterpart under the Penal Code, does not require force or violence. Appellant asserts that respondent is guilty because he willfully set into motion the events which caused harm to the correctional officer. According to appellant, due process was satisfied because "some evidence" supported a finding of battery under this definition. We find appellant's contentions unpersuasive.
Pursuant to section 3005, subdivision (d)(1), prison inmates may not "willfully commit or assist another person in the commission of an assault or battery to any person or persons, nor attempt to threaten the use of force or violence upon another person." Neither this section nor the Regulations in general define battery. (See §§ 3000, 3005.) However, section 3005 cites Penal Code section 242, among other Penal Code sections, as an authority reference. (§ 3005, Notes.)
Penal Code section 242 defines a battery as "any willful and unlawful use of force or violence upon the person of another." Battery is a general intent crime. (People v. Lara (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 102, 107; James v. State of California (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 130, 142.) Battery cannot be found when the force or violence was accomplished with a lesser state of mind, such as criminal negligence. (People v. Lara, supra, 44 Cal.App.4th at p. 107.) "Thus, the crime of battery requires that the defendant actually intend to commit a 'willful and unlawful use of force or violence upon the person of another.' [Citations.]" (Ibid.) "In the case of simple battery, any force against the person is sufficient for a conviction. There need be no proof of an intent to injure, only an intent to commit the act." (People v. Lindsay (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 849, 855.)
Here, respondent concealed a syringe in his sock and then denied that he had anything in that sock when confronted by correctional officers. As ordered, respondent removed his sock and placed it on a counter. An officer manipulated the sock and was pricked by the syringe. As the superior court noted, these facts do not establish any willful and unlawful use of force or violence upon the person of another. Based on this record, respondent did not commit a battery.
We disagree with appellant that we should give deference to the CDC's definition of battery. Generally a court will give deference to an agency's interpretation of its own regulations unless that interpretation is clearly erroneous or inconsistent. (Auer v. Robbins (1997) 519 U.S. 452, 461; Sharp Image Gaming, Inc. v. Shingle Springs Band of Miwok Indians (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 391, 432-433.)
Here, as an initial matter, although section 3005 does not define battery, it cites Penal Code 242 as a reference. This is a clear signal that section 3005 is based on the Penal Code's definition of battery.
Moreover, the paperwork from respondent's hearing contradicts the CDC's subsequently filed declaration. In its rules violation report that memorialized respondent's disciplinary hearing, the CDC defined battery as "the deliberate use of force or violence on the person of another. Deliberate means it is not accidental. Force is power, violence, compulsion, or constraint, exerted upon or against a person." "Violence" was defined, in part, as "the exertion of any physical force so as to injure, damage or abuse. This includes every type of physical contact from unlawful touching or simple battery, through battery with enough force to result in serious injury or death." (Italics added.) Under these circumstances, we decline to defer to the CDC's interpretation of section 3005 as expressed in its declaration.
Based on this record, the CDC's disciplinary decision that revoked respondent's time credits was not supported by any evidence that he committed battery. As such, the superior court properly granted respondent's petition for writ of habeas corpus. Accordingly, appellant's appeal is without merit.
DISPOSITION
The superior court's order is affirmed.
/s/_________
LEVY, Acting P.J. WE CONCUR: /s/_________
FRANSON, J. /s/_________
MEEHAN, J.