Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. CK 47092, Donna Levin, Referee.
Nancy Rabin Brucker, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Andrea Sheridan Ordin, County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel, and Judith A. Luby, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
FLIER, J.
Juan C., appeals from the dependency court’s orders asserting jurisdiction over his 14-month-old daughter, Jade C., and denying him custody over the child. Appellant contends the court lacked substantial evidence (1) to sustain the petition brought on the minor’s behalf by respondent Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b) (willful or negligent failure to protect) as to appellant; and (2) to make its dispositional orders removing the child from appellant’s custody and setting a case plan for appellant. We disagree and therefore affirm the court’s orders.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
FACTS
Mother, who did not appeal, has a long history with DCFS. Mother previously lost a total of six children through adoption in the child welfare system. In 2004, two children were detained from her care after she repeatedly struck one child, who was found to suffer from bruises in varying stages of healing all over his head and body, a burn and a bite on the arm. At that time, mother was involved with a man who had a significant drug and criminal history. A baby was hospitalized in 2005 due to her neglect, and another child had a positive toxicology for marijuana. Mother failed to protect two other children from physical abuse by the father of one of them. Ultimately, six children were adopted out of mother’s care.
We previously rejected a writ petition brought by the father of a half sibling of the yet unborn minor seeking review of the dependency court’s order terminating reunification services and setting a permanency planning hearing for the half sibling. (Tracey C. v. Superior Court (May 16, 2007, B196726) [nonpub. opn.].) We then affirmed the same father’s appeal from termination of parental rights in that half sibling. (In re T.C. (Aug. 5, 2008, B202846) [nonpub. opn.].) We later affirmed the dependency court’s orders denying that father’s petition for modification of orders and terminating parental rights in another half sibling. (In re A.C. (July 13, 2009, B211735) [nonpub. opn.].) Mother took no appeal from those orders.
The minor at issue was born in January 2010. Neither mother nor the minor tested positive for illicit substances, but an immediate referral was made to DCFS due to mother’s child welfare history. When interviewed by a social worker the day after the minor’s birth, mother admitted she had been incarcerated for child endangerment and currently was on parole. Appellant told the worker his criminal history was limited only to a 25-year-old assault charge and one arrest for possession and sale of drugs six years previously. Appellant knew about mother’s prison sentence and about mother’s other children being adopted. He expressed a belief it was the children’s father who caused their injuries, and he had no concerns about the minor’s safety with mother. Wishing to avoid court detention, appellant and mother voluntarily agreed to place the minor in foster care pending further investigation.
Subsequently, DCFS became concerned for the child’s welfare as a result of facts disclosed by its investigation. For example, a social worker spoke with mother’s parole agent and was told a condition of mother’s parole prohibited contact with any children, including her own. The social worker also worried that mother did not appear to comprehend what was said to her. Mother’s prior case worker indicated he did not believe she had mental health issues but thought she might suffer from mental delays. About a year earlier, the relative who adopted mother’s six children had ended mother’s visits due to the character of her then boyfriend. Mother appeared to have a pattern of involving herself with men with violent histories and substance abuse issues.
Facts regarding appellant also raised concerns. A criminal history check revealed that appellant had a more extensive criminal history than what he disclosed to the social worker. Appellant had no outstanding warrants, but he had served nine years in prison for assault with a deadly weapon, four years for possession of marijuana for sale and two years for possession of a narcotic substance. He had been convicted of receiving known stolen property and for fighting in a public place. He had arrests for inflicting corporal injury on a spouse or cohabitant and willful child cruelty. Despite agreeing to submit to testing, appellant failed to show up for a scheduled on-demand drug test. Appellant said he did not think he ought to have to test, as he was not using any drugs. During a team decision meeting on February 3, 2010, appellant became hostile and threatening when questioned about his extensive criminal history. He also wanted to know how long marijuana stayed in a person’s body, raising the social worker’s concern.
DCFS concluded the risk to the minor was very high. Thus, DCFS filed a section 300 petition on behalf of the minor. As to mother, the petition contained allegations brought under section 300, subdivisions (a) (serious physical harm), (b) (failure to protect), and (j) (physical abuse of a sibling). As to appellant, the petition contained a single allegation under section 300, subdivision (b) (failure to protect), alleging that the minor was at risk of harm due to appellant’s history of illicit drug abuse and convictions for possession of marijuana for sale and possession of a narcotic controlled substance.
The dependency court found a prima facie case to detain the minor, and it gave DCFS temporary custody over the minor. Appellant received monitored visitation for three hours a day, at least three times a week. Due to the terms of her parole, mother received no visitation.
DCFS’s prerelease investigation report reflected that appellant admitted to an arrest for child cruelty. However, he downplayed the incident, saying that although “a baby got knocked down” during a fight he had with the boyfriend of the child’s mother, the child was unhurt. Appellant’s criminal history report showed that the child cruelty charge was dismissed but that appellant instead was convicted of fighting in a public place. There was a referral the same year for physical abuse, but no case was opened and no details were known. Appellant denied having any history of substance abuse. He admitted to smoking marijuana but stated he had not done so for some six years. He stated he completed a substance abuse program in 2008 or 2009, adding it was not for drugs, only for “skills.” He also stated that he had taken classes in self-esteem and anger management. He reported that he had never had a dirty test through his parole. When he drug tested on February 4, 2010, the results were negative.
Appellant began monitored visitation with the minor from about two weeks after her birth. His visits were adjusted to shorter visits every weekday for the foster mother’s convenience. Appellant took an interest in the minor. He fed and held her during visits. He expressed a strong desire to care for his daughter.
At the prior team decision meeting, the social worker had explained to appellant that it was unlikely the minor would be placed in his home if mother also lived in the home. Appellant and mother currently were living in the home of a friend, and appellant indicated he intended for mother to continue living with him. Appellant hoped to have the terms of mother’s probation amended to delete the provision prohibiting her from having contact with any child less than 18 years of age. The social worker pointed out that even if the terms of parole were amended mother could not live in his home with the child due to mother’s unresolved history of child abuse. Mother expressed a willingness to move out of the home, but she had no place to go. Appellant did not appear to understand how mother’s history of abuse posed a current risk to the minor.
Mother informed the social worker she still felt no responsibility for the abuse to her other children, though she admittedly was present when her male companion tied one of her children to a chair. Appellant stated he did not believe mother had been guilty of the prior abuses and he did not feel a need to protect the minor from her.
The terms of mother’s parole were modified to prohibit her from having any contact with children under the age of 14 without the permission of her parole agent. Mother claimed that her parole agent had no problem with her visiting the minor. The parole agent, however, informed the social worker he had not given approval for mother to have contact with any children, including her own.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
DCFS filed the section 300 petition in early February 2010, when the minor was less than two weeks old. The dependency court ordered the child detained on the same day and vested her temporary care with DCFS. The court also ordered DCFS to investigate and report on the suitability of appellant’s home, as well as that of a paternal aunt, for the minor’s placement. DCFS received discretion to detain the child in the home of any suitable relative or nonrelated extended family member.
In prerelease investigation reports, DCFS recommended that the dependency court deny the release of the child into appellant’s care and grant DCFS discretion to place the child with the paternal aunt upon ASFA (Adoption Safe Family Act) approval.
DCFS expressed concerns about releasing the minor to appellant’s care, noting: “[I]t is apparent that father does not understand the risk that the mother poses to the child’s safety. Father does not understand why the mother would not be able to reside with the child. Father repeatedly stated that mother would be residing in his home, and only after the [social worker] explained to him several times the inappropriateness of mother residing in the home did father finally agree to have mother move out of the home. Father reports he plans to stay in a relationship with mother, and mother reports that she does not have anywhere to move to. The Department is very concerned that father would not protect the child from mother and would allow mother unlimited contact with the child.”
The court ordered DCFS to work with the aunt (appellant’s half sister) in expediting ASFA approval and meanwhile the child should remain in suitable placement. The minor was placed with her paternal aunt in March 2010.
At the pretrial resolution conference held in March 2010, the dependency court set the matter for a contested jurisdictional and dispositional hearing at the request of both parents. The court granted appellant unmonitored visits with the child within the aunt’s home contingent upon his testing clean on an on-demand basis.
In early April 2010, mother was placed on nonrevocable parole, under which she no longer needed to report to anyone and her parole conditions were no longer in effect. However, mother was required to complete a 52-week batterer’s program regarding domestic violence under the terms of the nonrevocable parole. DCFS recommended that the court allow mother monitored visitation with the minor, and the court granted her visitation.
At the contested jurisdictional hearing in April 2010, appellant provided the dependency court with a certificate showing he had completed a 90-day drug and alcohol treatment program in May 2008. The court took DCFS’s reports and appellant’s certificate into evidence, and the parties proceeded by way of argument.
Based on the evidence presented, the dependency court concluded that DCFS had met its burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. It sustained the petition as to appellant under section 300, subdivision (b). The court found that appellant was not shown to be a current abuser of marijuana, but it did find his history of drug usage to be “of such a quality that it does create a risk for his child.” The court noted appellant’s drug treatment certificate was two years old and he had provided the court with no details about the program.
As to mother, the dependency court also sustained the petition under section 300, subdivisions (a) (mother’s prior physical abuse of half sibling and loss of six children by permanent placement services posed risk to the minor), (b) (mother’s prior conviction for child cruelty and her gross neglect of half sibling placed minor at risk of harm) and (j) (mother’s abuse of her six other children placed the minor at risk of similar abuse).
The dependency court granted appellant unmonitored day visits with the minor on condition that mother not be present during the visits. The court continued the matter for an update on the parents’ situation. It indicated it would not be opposed to the minor living with appellant if he had an appropriate daycare plan and housing so long as mother was not living in the home.
Subsequently, DCFS reported that even though mother appeared to have moved out of appellant’s home, appellant had expressed an intention to stay in a relationship with mother. It did not appear that mother was actually living at the address that she reported was her new residence and it seemed mother had nowhere to live. Appellant meanwhile had tested positive for alcohol. The dependency court set the matter for disposition.
DCFS reported for the disposition hearing that appellant had been testing clean. However, appellant had told the foster mother he planned to leave the state once he obtained custody of the minor. Appellant denied making this statement claiming it was mother who said she was leaving the state so she would not prevent appellant from gaining custody of the minor.
At the contested disposition hearing, in addition to receiving DCFS’s reports, the dependency court heard testimony from the foster mother.
The foster mother testified appellant typically drove mother to visits, and he stopped to play with the child for a few minutes at the beginning of mother’s visits. Appellant only played with the minor during his own visits, seldom changed her diaper and never made her formula or took her to the doctor. Notwithstanding the grant to appellant of unmonitored visitation with the minor, he had only a single unmonitored two-hour visit. The foster mother worried because appellant had come for a visit the previous Saturday smelling of alcohol. Moreover, appellant had not arranged to visit with the child between June 14 and July 3, except for one attempt when the child was ill and could not visit with him. The foster mother believed her brother did not visit because he was upset about her negative view of his relationship with mother. She stated she loved her brother, but she was concerned that mother appeared to be more important to appellant than the minor’s safety. Appellant did not testify.
In closing arguments, counsel for DCFS opposed releasing the minor to appellant in light of his drug history and positive test for alcohol. Additionally, the evidence showed appellant was continuing in a relationship with mother. Mother claimed to be living elsewhere where she slept on a couch, but the social worker could find no personal possessions, not even a toothbrush, at her supposed place of residence. DCFS had concluded that mother was still living with appellant.
The child’s counsel argued there was no doubt appellant was still with mother. She believed appellant was being untruthful and had disregarded the court’s orders regarding visitation. She also was concerned about appellant’s positive alcohol test. She noted the caretaker, his sister, had been very supportive at first but now thought appellant was negligent. She observed that appellant demonstrated a lack of interest in the child and had no experience in caring for a child. He had “very minimal” contact with the infant and let his sister do the work. The child’s counsel stressed that her client was a baby. She noted that appellant had not visited for two weeks simply because the caretaker had taken him to task for his relationship with mother. The minor’s counsel pointed out appellant’s propensity for breaking rules. She told the court she would like to see appellant have 10 negative drug and alcohol tests and complete a parenting class as well as an anger management class before the minor could be placed with him. She observed it would be in the child’s best interests to have “a mother that’s gone through programs and a father that’s gone through programs.”
Appellant’s counsel indicated that appellant had consistently asked for the minor to be released to him, yet DCFS had opposed her release because of the alleged history of substance abuse. Appellant had completed a substance abuse counseling program and had three negative tests after having tested positive for alcohol. Appellant was testing clean and had done “all the programs.” Each time appellant returned to court, DCFS had asked him to “jump through another hoop.” Counsel argued there was no clear and convincing evidence of a substantial risk of detriment to the child to justify taking her away from appellant.
Mother’s counsel did not request release of the minor to mother but only that the dependency court allow her reunification services.
The dependency court found clear and convincing evidence of a substantial risk to the child if she were to be placed with appellant. Appellant was ordered to participate in parenting classes, conjoint counseling with mother and weekly random drug and alcohol testing. The court stated it was not troubled by appellant’s behavior at visits. On the other hand, the court noted the minor was a small child who could not talk or stand up for herself. The court was very concerned about appellant’s recent positive test for alcohol and the caretaker smelling alcohol on appellant during a recent visit.
At first, the dependency court ordered unmonitored visits for appellant, expressing the hope he could repair his relationship with the caretaker. Appellant vociferously rejected this idea in court, saying he did not want to deal with the caretaker at all because she had lied about him. After listening to and observing appellant, the court found that unmonitored visitation might be dangerous for the minor, given appellant’s emitting an odor of alcohol and failure to get along with the caretaker. The court also expressed concern that appellant might not return the infant from an unmonitored visit.
In contrast to appellant, the court was favorably impressed with mother’s behavior during this period and thus granted mother reunification services. The court ordered monitored visits for both parents, but they were not to visit at the same time. DCFS received discretion to allow them to visit together if they were both complying with the case plan.
The court ordered mother to attend a DCFS-approved program of parent education and to submit to random weekly drug and alcohol testing, with a full drug rehabilitation program if she missed a test or tested dirty. It ordered mother to undergo conjoint counseling with appellant and individual counseling to address case issues, including domestic violence and failure to reunify with her six previous children.
Appellant timely appealed from the dependency court’s jurisdictional and dispositional findings and orders.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review the dependency court’s findings for substantial evidence. (In re James C. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 470, 482.) Under the substantial evidence standard, our power as an appellate court begins and ends with a determination based on the entire record whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, that will support the dependency court’s findings. (In re Jason L. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1206, 1214.) We also construe all evidence in the light most favorable to the finder of fact. (In re Jasmine C. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 71, 75.) We do not reweigh the evidence when assessing its sufficiency. (Ibid.) The dependency court’s jurisdictional findings are reviewed for substantial evidence. (In re Rocco M. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 814, 820.)
We will not reverse the dependency court’s dispositional orders except for a clear abuse of discretion. (In re Ethan N. (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 55, 65; In re Christopher H. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1001, 1006.) An abuse occurs when the court exercises its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd manner resulting in a manifest miscarriage of justice. (In re Brequia Y. (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 1060, 1068; see also In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318-319.)
On appeal from an order based upon clear and convincing evidence, the clear and convincing standard disappears and we apply the customary rule of conflicting evidence, giving full weight to the respondent’s evidence, however slight, and disregarding the appellant’s evidence, however strong. (In re Mark L. (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 573, 580, 581; Sheila S. v. Superior Court (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 872, 881.) The appellant has the burden of showing there is no evidence of sufficiently substantial character to support the dependency court order. (In re L. Y. L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 947.)
DISCUSSION
1. Substantial Evidence Supports the Jurisdictional Findings Against Appellant
Appellant contends the jurisdictional findings against him are not supported by substantial evidence. We disagree.
The petition in the case at bar originally alleged that appellant “has a history of illicit drug abuse and is a current abuser of marijuana, which renders the father incapable of providing the child with regular care and supervision. The[] father has a criminal history of convictions of [p]ossession of Marijuana for Sale and possession of Narcotic Controlled Substance. The father’s abuse of illicit drugs endangers the child’s physical and emotional health and safety, creates a detrimental home environment and places the child at risk of physical harm, damage and danger.” The dependency court found that appellant did in fact have a history of drug abuse and criminal convictions, and the evidence supports such findings. However, the court deleted the italicized words in the petition because appellant’s three negative tests indicated he was not a current abuser of marijuana. Moreover, appellant never had the minor in his home so no detrimental home environment had been created. The court believed and found that the quality of appellant’s criminal history was such that it posed a risk for the child. Although appellant had a certificate for completing a substance abuse program for marijuana, the certificate was two years old. Appellant offered no evidence to back up the certificate, such as a showing of the program’s content, requirements, efficacy and testing. The court specifically found that appellant’s history of drug abuse rendered him incapable of providing regular care and supervision for the infant.
Appellant argues there was no substantial evidence that his history of marijuana use and drug possession convictions “years before the filing of the petition, ” affected his ability to care for his child, endangered the child or placed her at risk of any future harm. We are not persuaded.
When the minor was initially detained, appellant told the social worker his criminal history was limited to a 25-year-old assault charge and one arrest for possession and sale of drugs six years previously. He admitted he had used marijuana twice a day in the past but asserted he was currently “clean.” Subsequently, appellant disclosed he had an assault charge “‘from the early 80s’” and two possession charges six years previously, together with a child endangerment claim that was dismissed. Appellant’s criminal history was actually much more extensive than what he disclosed. Appellant had suffered a nine-year sentence for assault with a deadly weapon, a four-year sentence for possession of marijuana for sale, a two-year sentence for possession of a narcotic substance, a conviction for receiving known stolen property, a conviction for fighting in a public place as well as arrests for inflicting corporal injury on a spouse or cohabitant and willful child cruelty. A criminal history involving drugs and violence can provide sufficient basis for the court to conclude a child is at risk of harm. (In re James C., supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at p. 482.)
As to the charge of willful child cruelty, appellant stated a child got knocked down during a fight, but the child was not hurt and the charges were dismissed. Appellant also rationalized his other convictions, claiming in many instances that they were not due to any wrongdoing on his part.
The long history of criminal activity, including convictions for serious felonies, appellant’s attempts to conceal his criminal record and his demeanor, coupled with the tender age of the child, provided substantial evidence to support the dependency court’s exercise of jurisdiction over the child. Past conduct may be probative of current conditions if there is reason to believe the conduct may continue in the future. (In re Rocco M., supra, 1 Cal.App.4th at p. 824; see also In re Cole C. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 900, 917.) The court below had sufficient basis to believe that there was a substantial risk of harm to the minor notwithstanding appellant’s recent negative drug and alcohol tests. Although perceptions of risk, rather than actual evidence of risk, do not suffice as substantial evidence (In re James R. (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 129, 137), actual harm is not a prerequisite for the court taking action to protect the child, as “[t]he focus of the statute is on averting harm to the child.” (In re Cole C., supra, at p. 917, italics added.) Appellant’s positive test for alcohol and later visiting the child while reeking of alcohol gave the court additional reason to believe appellant would not act responsibly around the child thus placing her at substantial risk of harm. Moreover, the dependency court had cause for legitimate concern about appellant’s inability to sever his relationship with mother, who had lost six children to adoption through the child welfare system. Both appellant and mother had the fixed belief she had no responsibility for the placements of her other children, an attitude that exposed her seventh child to substantial risk of the past becoming the future.
Substantial evidence thus supports the dependency court’s exercise of jurisdiction over the child.
Even if the evidence against appellant were insufficient for jurisdiction, we need not reverse as there is no miscarriage of justice. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 .) The dependency court had ample justification to assert jurisdiction over the minor through mother’s past conduct. Mother did not appeal the court’s true findings, and the court could declare jurisdiction over the minor on the basis of the sustained allegations against mother alone. (§ 302, subd. (a); In re X.S. (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1154, 1161 [jurisdictional finding good against one parent is good against both]; In re James C., supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at p. 482 [in light of mother’s failure to appeal jurisdictional findings or order, “[t]he court could declare jurisdiction over the children based on the actions of the mother alone”]; In re Alysha S. (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 393, 397 [minor is dependent if action of either parent brings child within one of the statutory definitions of a dependent]; see In re Nicholas B. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1126, 1135 [“a finding against one parent is a finding against both in terms of the child being adjudged a dependent”].) The rationale for the rule is that dependency law is based on protection of the child rather than punishment of the parent. (In re James C., supra, at p. 481; In re Alysha S., supra, at p. 397.)
The dependency court therefore did not err in asserting jurisdiction over the minor.
2. The Evidence Is Sufficient to Support the Placement and Dispositional Orders
We further disagree with appellant’s contention that the dependency court erred in failing to place the minor with him and in ordering appellant to comply with reunification services. The court was free to consider the entire family dynamic when making its dispositional orders. (See In re Christopher H., supra, 50 Cal.App.4th at p. 1008.) Moreover, a dependency court may consider any relevant or material evidence at disposition. (§ 358, subd. (b) [“the court shall receive in evidence the social study of the child made by the social worker, any study or evaluation made by a child advocate appointed by the court, and other relevant and material evidence as may be offered...”].) Consideration of all of the evidence supports the court’s dispositional findings and orders.
A. Placement with Appellant
Appellant argues that even if a preponderance of evidence supported the lower court’s sustaining of allegations under section 300, subdivision (b), no clear and convincing evidence supported the finding of detriment at the dispositional hearing; accordingly, he asserts, the dependency court committed reversible error in ordering the minor removed from appellant’s custody. We, of course, review the removal findings for substantial evidence. (In re Mark L., supra, 94 Cal.App.4th at pp. 580-581; Sheila S. v. Superior Court, supra, 84 Cal.App.4th at p. 881.)
Appellant argues he complied with the dependency court’s orders during the pendency of the case and submitted to drug tests. He asserts that he tested negative for all illegal substances on 10 occasions during the period from February 4, 2010, to June 30, 2010. He excuses himself for the single positive test for alcohol, insisting that alcohol is legal and there was no evidence he had an alcohol abuse problem. Appellant additionally argues no evidence was presented as to what the positive alcohol test “actually meant, ” i.e., “Was it cough syrup, a beer, a sip of wine?”
Before the dependency court can remove a child from a parent’s physical custody, the court must find clear and convincing evidence that “[t]here is or would be a substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the minor if the minor were returned home, and there are no reasonable means by which the minor’s physical health can be protected without removing the minor from the minor’s parent’s... physical custody.” (§ 361, subd. (c)(1).) The focus of the statute centers upon the prevention of harm to the child. (In re Cole C., supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at p. 918.) The court below expressly found reasonable efforts had been made to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of the minor, and appellant does not argue that less drastic alternatives were available.
In arguing the insufficiency of evidence, appellant places unwarranted reliance on his negative drug and alcohol testing. He fails to focus upon other considerations influencing the dependency court’s decision not to place the minor in his custody. A number of factors contributed to the court’s determination, including the sustained allegations of the petition and the tender age of the child.
Appellant’s demeanor was of particular concern to the court. At a prior hearing, appellant disrupted the proceedings when he learned he would not be immediately receiving custody of the child. At the dispositional hearing, appellant again disrupted the proceedings when the court indicated it was inclined to have the caretaker monitor some visits so that appellant could learn “how to take care of a baby.”
Appellant’s lack of control was evident in his conduct toward his sister, the caretaker. He failed to visit his child for two weeks after quarreling with his sister over his continued relationship with mother. Penalizing a child by denying her visits merely because of a disagreement with the caretaker demonstrated a marked lack of responsibility for the child’s welfare. To a five-month-old child, an absence of even two weeks can be significant. At the dispositional hearing, appellant was still refusing to have anything to do with the child’s caretaker even after the court pointed out the detriment such conflict can have upon a child.
Although the court previously had granted appellant unmonitored visits outside of the caretaker’s home, appellant’s outburst prompted an order denying appellant such visits because of the risk he would not return the child after a visit. In addition to the evidence presented at the hearing, the court expressly based its findings on “all of the evidence that I’ve heard and seen and heard from [appellant] himself today.” The court was in a unique position to observe appellant and assess from his abusive demeanor whether his personal circumstances presently posed a risk to the physical well being of the minor. Coupled with appellant’s failure to exercise personal control was his obvious inability to care for the child. Although he had changed a diaper on one or two occasions, he had no prolonged contact with the child. He had not acted as a parent to her, had not made her formula or taken her to the doctor. Even after the court allowed appellant unmonitored visits, his contacts were brief and consisted mainly of merely holding the child. Brief superficial contact does not prove one’s capability for sustained parenting such as awakening in the night to tend to the child or nurturing an ill and cranky child. The court below had substantial reason for not placing the child with appellant.
We will not substitute our deductions for those of the dependency court.
B. Disposition Case Plan Orders
Appellant argues the dependency court further erred in ordering him to participate in programs and counseling, in reducing his visitation and in ordering his visits to be monitored. He complains there was no showing that the child was harmed or was at risk of harm during his (single) unmonitored visit with the child, nor was there evidence he exhibited any behavior that would impair or impede his ability to properly care for the child. He further asserts there was no basis for other orders, such as those for random drug and alcohol tests and conjoint counseling with mother. His complaints essentially amount to a contention there was no nexus between the dispositional orders and the facts of this case.
The court’s authority in fashioning disposition orders is not limited to issues raised by jurisdictional findings. “[W]hen the court is aware of other deficiencies that impede the parent’s ability to reunify with his child, the court may address them in the reunification plan.” (In re Christopher H., supra, 50 Cal.App.4th at p. 1008, cited with approval in Sara M. v. Superior Court (2005) 36 Cal.4th 998, 1018.) The court has great leeway in determining what would best serve and protect the child’s interest and in fashioning a dispositional order consistent with this discretion. (In re Christopher H., supra, at p. 1006.)
We need not repeat all the evidence before the dependency court, which has been set forth above. It suffices to say that we find a substantial nexus between the evidence presented and the court’s dispositional orders. The court did not abuse its discretion in ordering appellant to undergo services and counseling.
DISPOSITION
The findings and orders are affirmed.
WE CONCUR: BIGELOW, P.J., RUBIN, J.