Opinion
F050808
5-14-2007
In re JACOB O., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JACOB O., Defendant and Appellant.
Jackie Menaster, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Stephen G. Herndon and Jeanne R. Wolfe, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
INTRODUCTION
During the evening of June 2, 2005, appellant Jacob O. twice stabbed Robert A. in the back. When appellant stabbed him, Robert was engaged in a fistfight with appellants brother, Anthony.
After a contested jurisdictional hearing, the court found true allegations in a juvenile wardship petition that appellant committed an assault with a deadly weapon and by force likely to produce great bodily injury, and that during the commission of the offense appellant personally inflicted great bodily injury and personally used a dangerous and deadly weapon. (Pen. Code, §§ 245, subd. (a)(1), 969, subd. (f), 192.7, subd. (c)(8).) The court rejected appellants defense that the stabbing was lawful because he justifiably acted in Anthonys defense.
During the first dispositional hearing, the court followed the recommendation of the probation department and ordered appellant to reside with his parents while under the supervision of probation officers. The court subsequently granted the Peoples request for a dispositional rehearing and voided the dispositional order because it did not comply with Welfare and Institutional Code section 707, subdivision (d)(5). During the second dispositional hearing, the court accepted the probation departments amended recommendation and ordered appellant to be committed to the Tulare County Youth Treatment Center Unit (YTC) for a period of 45 to 180 days. Maximum confinement time was set at seven years (the revised dispositional order).
Unless otherwise specified, all statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
Appellant argues the evidence proves as a matter of law that the stabbing was justified. He also argues that the court abused its discretion in ordering him to be committed to the YTC. Finally, he contends that section 707, subdivision (d)(5), is unconstitutional because the statutes intent is punitive and he was not afforded a jury trial. All of appellants arguments fail; we will affirm.
FACTS
On the evening of June 2, 2005, a graduation party was held. Robert A., Brandon D. and some companions attended the party. Appellant and Anthony arrived at the party in a pickup truck. After learning that the party was ending, they returned to the truck.
Robert, Brandon and some other people walked over to the truck. Anthony and Robert began arguing. Appellant got out of the truck. He was fidgeting with something in his hand. Robert told Brandon to watch appellant. Brandon walked around the truck "to make sure [appellant] didnt try to jump in." Appellant got back into the truck.
Meanwhile, Robert and Anthonys verbal sparring had escalated into a fistfight. Anthony was knocked to the ground but he was able to get up and start fighting back. No one displayed a weapon. Numerous witnesses testified that this was a one-on-one fight between Robert and Anthony. Anthony testified that after being knocked to the ground, he was hit and kicked by Robert, Brandon and the African-American male. However, once he regained his footing, only he and Robert were involved in the fight.
Appellant got out of the truck and stabbed Robert twice in the back. Deanthony H. grabbed appellant, causing appellant to drop the knife. Robert and Anthony continued to fight until they were finally pulled apart.
Robert was transported to the hospital, where he remained for approximately two weeks. His spleen was removed and his lungs and pancreas were surgically repaired.
Appellant testified that Robert, Brandon and an unidentified African-American male approached the truck. Robert and Anthony began arguing. Robert was "egging [Anthony] on to get out of the car and fight." Appellant armed himself with a knife that his father kept in the truck and exited the vehicle. He was "going to tell Robert just to leave us alone." Robert said, "Brandon, go beat his ass." Brandon approached appellant. Appellant pulled the knife out of his pocket and displayed it to Brandon. Brandon "kind of backed off" and said, "What are you going to do with the knife? Put it away." Appellant returned to the truck and got inside, closing the knife and putting it back in his pocket. Robert pulled Anthony out of the truck and started hitting him. Appellant got out of the truck and took the knife out of his pocket. He saw "two or three guys hitting and kicking [Anthony] in the head." He stabbed Robert two times in the back because he "was in fear for [his] brothers life." Appellant admitted that when the police arrived to investigate, he denied seeing a knife and did not report the stabbing.
Anthony testified that Robert pulled him out of the truck by his legs. At least three people hit and kicked him while he was on the ground. He regained his footing and then fought with Antony and no one else.
DISCUSSION
I. The People proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the stabbing unlawful.
The court rejected appellants defense of another claim, concluding that the stabbing was not justified. During the second dispositional hearing, the court explained its reasoning:
"And Jacob, I know that you tell the Court that you have learned something from this. I hope that you have, because I can tell you that if this were [] an adult proceeding, I would not hesitate to send you to prison. I would send you to prison in a flash.
"And I know that your parents ... believe that you were simply defending yourself. But in this instance, it was not measured. It was not measured in light of the circumstances that you faced here. There were plenty of alternatives that you could have chosen at that time. Only as a last resort, under certain circumstances, could you be justified in using the kind of force that you used. The force was not justifiable here.
"And I saw the videotape and it was something that you clearly intended. You ... armed yourself, and you were ready to strike, and you did.
"And one of the arguments that you made was that your brother was being beaten up. At the time that you got involved in the fray — even if we assume your version of the facts, by the time that you got into the fray, it was a one-on-one fight. There was no longer any need for anyone else to be involved."
Appellant challenges this determination, arguing that "[t]he facts in the instant case establish self defense of others as a matter of law." He is incorrect. As we will explain, the record contains substantial evidence from which the court could have determined beyond a reasonable doubt that the People satisfied their burden of proving that appellant did not have the right or justification under the law to stab Robert twice in the back.
The applicable standard of appellate review is undisputed. When assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, a reviewing court considers the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether there is substantial evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Hawkins (1995) 10 Cal.4th 920, 955.) The reviewing court presumes in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier reasonably could deduce from the evidence, including reasonable inferences based on the evidence. (People v. Tran (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 759, 793.) We do not reweigh evidence or determine if other inferences more favorable to the defendant could have been drawn from it. (People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793.)
The law of defense of others is correlated to the law of self-defense. (See, e.g., People v. Roe (1922) 189 Cal. 548, 562.) The People bear the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in self-defense or in defense of another. (People v. Lee (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1413, 1429.) To establish defense of another, three elements must appear: (1) the defendant reasonably believed that he or someone else was in imminent danger of suffering bodily injury; (2) the defendant reasonably believed that the immediate use of force was necessary to defend against that danger; and (3) the defendant used no more force than was reasonably necessary to defend against that danger. (See People v. McKee (1968) 265 Cal.App.2d 53, 61; People v. Roe, supra, 189 Cal. at pp. 551-552.) The defendants beliefs are viewed under a reasonable person standard. (People v. Romero (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 846, 853.) An assault with the fists does not justify use of a deadly weapon unless a reasonable person would believe that the assault is likely to inflict great bodily injury. (1 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (3d ed. 2000) Defenses, § 72, p. 407; CALJIC No. 5.31.)
Appellants argument fails because it does not acknowledge the evidence given by prosecution witnesses contradicting appellants testimony or recognize those aspects of his testimony that support the judgment. On appeal, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment below. (People v. Tran, supra, 47 Cal.App.4th at p. 793.) The testimony of a single witness is sufficient to establish a disputed factual point. (People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 585, 608.) First, there is substantial evidence establishing that when appellant stabbed Robert, only Robert and Anthony were involved in the fistfight. Brandon testified that only Anthony and Robert were involved in the fistfight. Anthony testified that after he fought his way to his feet, only Robert and he were involved in the fight. The trier of fact was free to accept this testimony over conflicting testimony given by appellant. Second, there was no evidence indicating that anyone, including appellant, believed that Robert had a weapon of any sort. Third, appellant admitted that he did not yell for anyone to call 911 and he did not attempt to obtain assistance from a neighbor. He did not try to break up the fight using nonlethal means prior to stabbing Robert. In fact, appellant admitted that he armed himself and pointed the knife at Brandon prior to commencement of the fight. Appellant testified that he armed himself at that point, "Because I was scared. I didnt know if they were going to jump him or not. Anything can happen." Thus, appellant was preparing to use the knife even before the fight began. Finally, appellant admitted that he lied to the investigating police officer and denied seeing a knife.
Accordingly, we conclude that the evidence adequately supports the conclusion that appellants attempt to stop the fight by twice stabbing Robert in the back constitutes excessive force under the circumstances. It also supports the conclusion that a reasonable person facing the same situation would not have believed that the immediate use of potentially lethal force was necessary. There is ample evidentiary support for the trial courts determination that no reasonable person would have believed it was necessary to defend Anthony by stabbing Robert in the back. Thus, the People proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the stabbing was unlawful. Consequently, appellants evidentiary challenge fails.
II. The revised dispositional order was not an abuse of discretion.
A reviewing court will not disturb a juvenile courts ruling in a dependency proceeding "`"unless the trial court has exceeded the limits of legal discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination [citations]." [Citations.]" (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318.) Appellant contends that the courts revised dispositional order constitutes an abuse of discretion because the court should have concluded that the 10 days he spent in juvenile hall constituted adequate confinement time to satisfy the mandate of section 707, subdivision (d). Appellant unsuccessfully advanced this argument below. We are equally unreceptive to it. Appellants commitment to the YTC for a term of 45 to 180 days to complete the short-term program falls well within the bounds of judicial discretion.
Subdivision (d)(5) of section 707 provides: "For any offense for which the prosecutor may file the accusatory pleading in a court of criminal jurisdiction pursuant to this subdivision, but elects instead to file a petition in the juvenile court, if the minor is subsequently found to be a person described in subdivision (a) of Section 602, the minor shall be committed to placement in a juvenile hall, ranch camp, forestry camp, boot camp, or secure juvenile home pursuant to Section 730, or in any institution operated by the Youth Authority."
In this instance, the original dispositional order was set aside because it did not comply with subdivision (d)(5) of section 707 and was therefore unauthorized. Since the first dispositional order was unauthorized, it is not a proper frame of reference for consideration of the reasonableness of the revised dispositional order. The probation department and the court reexamined the entirety of the circumstances and the offender and both concluded that completion of the short-term program at the YTC would benefit appellant. This was entirely reasonable.
The probation department considered various alternatives, some more and some less severe than YTC commitment. It determined that "the most appropriate recommendation in the current matter is to place the minor in the [YTC] so he can be held accountable for his actions in the current matter and be given some time to reflect on what has happened over the past nine months."
In arguing in favor of this recommendation, the prosecutor stated:
"... [Appellant] is not necessarily a bad person, but merely made poor choices. But part of his rehabilitation is to show him the consequences of such serious actions. It would actually do a disservice to him to not give him some in-custody time because had he been an adult when he committed these offenses, the fact that hes a good person otherwise would not save him from prison.... [¶] And its part of his rehabilitation to, at least, have a taste of the fact that even if youre a good person, if you commit such a serious offense, there is a consequence. There will be consequences, and theyre not going to be necessarily pleasant."
The court elected to follow the recommendation of the probation department. In explaining this choice, the court emphasized that appellant could benefit from the program. While participating in the YTC short-term program, appellant will be provided with an opportunity to "search within [himself] and try to understand why it was that [he was] fortunate enough that [he] did not kill Robert that night. And [he] must get on that path that causes you to understand what it is that your fate leads you to because there must be some reason why you were spared from a potential murder that night." The court continued,
"And you will have a choice as you sit there in the detention center to basically determine whether you will become bitter or better. And if you choose bitterness, then that will take you down a different path. If you choose better, it will take you in a different direction.
"You can sit there and you can blame others, or you can take responsibility and you can take this as an opportunity to basically walk out of the program feeling that you have done full service, full restitution for the act youve committed....
"So when I say the 45 to 180 days, the choice is really yours. If you do everything thats required of you and you do not face any infractions, you could be done with your program in 45 days. But if you fail to do the program faithfully and you incur infractions, then you could be held up to 180 days."
In light of the violence of the assault and the serious injuries inflicted on Robert, we find nothing arbitrary or capricious in the revised dispositional order. Participation in the short-term program will provide appellant with an opportunity to reflect on the seriousness of his conduct and to learn that violent behavior has significant consequences. Thus, it will assist in appellants rehabilitation. Accordingly, we reject appellants challenge to the reasonableness of the revised dispositional order.
III. Section 707, subdivision (d)(5), is constitutional.
Finally, appellant argues that 707, subdivision (d)(5), violates due process because it converts the juvenile delinquency proceedings into criminal proceedings by imposing a mandatory punishment without allowing the minor the right to a jury trial. We reject this contention because mandatory confinement for juvenile offenders who have committed certain specified offenses does not fundamentally change the design and purpose of juvenile delinquency proceedings.
A statute is presumed to be constitutional. (Copley Press, Inc. v. Superior Court (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1272, 1302.) Unconstitutionality must be clearly shown by the party attacking the statute. Doubts are resolved in favor of the statutes validity. (Ibid.)
It is well established that juvenile offenders do not have a constitutional right to a jury trial. (In re Myresheai W. (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 734, 737.) It is also established that punishment has a place in the rehabilitative purpose of juvenile proceedings. (Id. at p. 741; § 202, subd. (b).) Thus, because punishment is a legitimate component of the rehabilitation goal inherent in juvenile proceedings, section 707, subdivision (b)(5), does not, on its face, conflict with the goal of the juvenile delinquency law to rehabilitate young offenders. Furthermore, as applied in this instance, section 707, subdivision (b)(5), did not infringe appellants due process right. Participating in the short-term program at the YTC for a period of 45 to 180 days serves a legitimate rehabilitative purpose; it did not fundamentally change the juvenile proceeding into a criminal prosecution. Thus, appellant has not demonstrated that section 707, subdivision (d)(5), is unconstitutional on its face or as applied.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We Concur:
Vartabedian, Acting P.J.
Harris, J.