Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County No. SJ12200C, Carol Isackson, Judge.
HALLER, J.
Cheryl P. appeals a juvenile court order terminating her parental rights to her minor daughter, J.A., under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. Cheryl contends the court erred by summarily denying her section 388 petition for modification. She also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the court's findings J.A. was likely to be adopted and the beneficial parent-child relationship and beneficial sibling relationship exceptions to adoption did not apply to preclude terminating parental rights. We affirm the order.
Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In August 2009, Cheryl's eight-year-old son Jared S. and two-year-old daughter Maia S. (together, the siblings) were removed from Cheryl's custody because of ongoing domestic violence between Cheryl and J.A.'s father (the father). During one incident, the father tried to punch Cheryl in the stomach when she was pregnant with J.A., and dragged her across the room by the hair. On another occasion, the father spit in Cheryl's face and threatened to kill her. Cheryl had a history of drug abuse and domestic violence with the siblings' father. She had mental health issues and had attempted suicide in Jared's presence. The San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) intervened on many occasions and offered Cheryl voluntary services. She participated in a domestic violence program, but continued to have physical altercations with the father, did not follow her safety plan and violated the court's no contact order.
The siblings are not subjects of this appeal.
The siblings have a different father.
J.A. was born prematurely in September 2009, and was detained in out-of-home care. Agency filed petitions in the juvenile court on behalf of J.A. and the siblings under section 300, subdivision (b). The court ordered no contact between Cheryl and the father. However, a few weeks later, another violent incident occurred between them, resulting in the father's arrest. Cheryl admitted she had been seeing the father twice a week because she was afraid of being alone and had nowhere to go.
The maternal grandparents were caring for the siblings, but were unable to provide J.A. with the level of care, attention and supervision she currently needed. Agency, however, planned to reassess them as a placement for J.A. in the future. In the meantime, the grandparents supervised Cheryl's visits with J.A., which occurred in the grandparents' home every day for five or six hours.
At a jurisdiction and disposition hearing, the court declared J.A. a dependent, removed her from parental custody and placed her in foster care. The court ordered reunification services for Cheryl and the father and ordered no contact between them. However, Cheryl continued to have contact with the father, and was involved in another violent incident with him.
According to a psychological evaluation, Cheryl reported she experienced severe depression and anxiety during stressful times. She had engaged in therapy on several occasions in the past. Although she was currently in therapy again, she missed more than half her sessions. The evaluation showed Cheryl had a personality disorder marked by dependent, antisocial and borderline traits. The evaluator believed Cheryl could substantially benefit from learning to maintain healthy boundaries and increase her social support. Her isolation caused her to remain in abusive relationships, which ultimately placed her children at risk of being exposed to domestic violence. The evaluator recommended long-term individual and group therapy and continued medication management by a psychiatrist.
A psychiatric evaluation confirmed the findings and recommendations of the psychological evaluator. The psychiatrist concluded Cheryl had too many active risk factors to be able to independently care for her children. Although she had adequate knowledge of parenting roles and activities, she did not have adequate judgment to implement that knowledge.
Cheryl and the father continued to see each other, harass each other and have physical altercations. At a six-month review hearing, the court terminated services and set a hearing under section 366.26 to select and implement a permanent plan for J.A., finding Cheryl had not made progress with services and continued to violate the court's no contact order.
The social worker assessed J.A. as generally and specifically adoptable. J.A. was described as a cute, happy, engaging 13-month-old girl with an easygoing temperament. Although she wore a helmet to correct a "flat spot" on her head, and her premature birth had resulted in minor respiratory problems, she was generally healthy and reaching developmental milestones. Her current caregivers wanted to adopt her and there were 40 other families in San Diego County interested in adopting a child with J.A.'s characteristics. In the social worker's opinion, there was no beneficial parent-child relationship or beneficial sibling relationship that outweighed the benefits of adoption for J.A.
Cheryl filed a section 388 petition for modification, seeking to have J.A. placed with the maternal grandparents and to have the court reinstate services for another four months. At a prima facie hearing, the court found Cheryl had made no showing of changed circumstances or best interests to warrant an evidentiary hearing on her petition.
At a contested selection and implementation hearing, the court received in evidence Agency's reports, an atonement letter Cheryl had written to J.A. and photographs of Cheryl with J.A. and the siblings. The court also accepted the stipulated testimony of the social worker that there were now 32 families willing to adopt a child like J.A. Cheryl testified she had made a mistake in the past by staying in a relationship with the father. She believed she was now a better person and she wanted to parent J.A.
After considering the evidence and argument of counsel, the court found J.A. was likely to be adopted and none of the exceptions precluding adoption applied. The court terminated parental rights and referred J.A. for adoptive placement.
DISCUSSION
I
Cheryl contends the court erred by summarily denying her section 388 petition to modify the court's previous orders continuing J.A.'s placement in foster care and setting a selection and implementation hearing. Cheryl asserts she made a prima facie showing her circumstances had changed and the proposed modification—placing J.A. with the maternal grandparents and reinstating reunification services—was in J.A.'s best interests.
A
A party may petition the court under section 388 to change, modify or set aside a previous court order. The petitioning party has the burden of showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that (1) there is a change of circumstances or new evidence, and (2) the proposed change is in the child's best interests. (§ 388; In re Jasmon O. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 398, 415; In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 47.) The petition must be liberally construed in favor of its sufficiency. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.570(a); In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 309.) "The parent need only make a prima facie showing to trigger the right to proceed by way of a full hearing." (In re Marilyn H., supra, at p. 310.) " '[I]f the petition presents any evidence that a hearing would promote the best interests of the child, the court will order the hearing.' [Citation.]" (In re Jasmon O., supra, at p. 415.) If, however, "the liberally construed allegations of the petition do not make a prima facie showing of changed circumstances and that the proposed change would promote the best interests of the child, the court need not order a hearing on the petition. [Citations.] The prima facie requirement is not met unless the facts alleged, if supported by evidence given credit at the hearing, would sustain a favorable decision on the petition." (In re Zachary G. (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 799, 806.) In determining whether the petition makes the necessary showing, the court may consider the entire factual and procedural history of the case. (In re Justice P. (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 181, 188-189.)
B
Cheryl's modification petition sought to have the court vacate the selection and implementation hearing, reinstate reunification services and place J.A. with the grandparents. The petition alleged Cheryl's circumstances had changed because the grandparents were now requesting placement of J.A., and Cheryl had made significant progress in therapy and domestic violence treatment, was having supervised visits with J.A. and no longer had contact with the father. In support of her request, Cheryl attached several domestic violence group progress reports, the safety and self-care plans she had developed and her psychological evaluation. Her modification petition alleged the proposed changes were in J.A.'s best interests because J.A. had a relationship with Cheryl as a result of consistent and positive visits, and J.A. had developed a strong relationship with the grandparents and siblings through regular visits.
We note that only one of the progress reports was from a session Cheryl attended after the court made the order she seeks to modify.
Cheryl's petition did not make a prima facie showing her circumstances had changed with respect to having J.A. placed with the grandparents. The grandparents initially declined to have J.A. placed with them. Once they were ready to care for her, they were denied placement through the relative home approval process based on an interview with the grandmother, a criminal and child welfare services history and recent concerns that the grandparents were allowing Cheryl to have unsupervised visits with J.A. and the siblings. Additionally, during the time the grandparents supervised visits between Cheryl and J.A. in their home, J.A. was returned to her caregivers hungry and with dirty diapers. The grandparents unsuccessfully challenged the denial of placement through the administrative grievance process with the Office of the Ombudsman. Even assuming J.A. had a strong relationship with the grandparents, Agency could not place J.A. in their home. (See §§ 361.3, subd. (a)(8), 309, subd. (d)(2), 361.4.) In this regard, the petition's liberally construed allegations did not show J.A.'s best interests would be served by granting an evidentiary hearing. (In re Aljamie D. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 424, 431-432.)
C
As to Cheryl's request to have the court vacate the selection and implementation hearing and reinstate reunification services, the petition alleged Cheryl currently participates in therapy weekly, successfully completed domestic violence treatment, has a safety and self-care plan, no longer has contact with the father, has expanded her support system and is not engaging in violent relationships. Even assuming Cheryl could support these allegations with credible evidence at an evidentiary hearing, the petition showed her circumstances were "changing, " but had not changed. (In re Casey D., supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at p. 47.) Cheryl's progress, although commendable, was relatively new compared to her history of domestic violence and her inability to adequately address the protective issues through court-ordered services. According to the reports she submitted, Cheryl had made significant progress in some areas, but only moderate progress in other areas, and she needed to continue working on "maturing and healing the family of origin relationships." The psychological evaluator believed Cheryl needed to participate in services for an additional six months to a year "to learn how to set effective boundaries for herself and maintain adequate social support to protect herself from relapsing into an abusive relationship." Cheryl did not, and could not, claim she had completed her treatment programs or had eliminated the concerns that necessitated J.A.'s removal. A petition like Cheryl's that alleges changing circumstances does not promote a child's best interests or stability for the child because it would mean delaying the selection of a permanent home to determine whether a parent who has not reunified with the child might be able to reunify at some future time. (In re Casey D., supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at p. 47.) "Childhood does not wait for the parent to become adequate." (In re Marilyn H., supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 310.) Any changes in Cheryl's circumstances were "not legally sufficient to require a hearing on her section 388 petition." (In re Angel B. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 454, 465.)
Even had Cheryl made a prima facie showing of changed circumstances, her petition did not show that offering her additional services, and thereby delaying permanency for J.A., was in J.A.'s best interests. J.A. was removed from Cheryl's custody at birth and has never lived with her. Cheryl had regular visitation with J.A., but she never progressed beyond supervised visits. Although Cheryl argues the proposed modification was in J.A.'s best interests because J.A. has a history and relationship with her, "[t]he presumption favoring natural parents by itself does not satisfy the best interests prong of section 388." (In re Justice P., supra, 123 Cal.App.4th at p. 192.)
Moreover, after reunification services are terminated, a parent's "interest in the care, custody and companionship of the child are no longer paramount. Rather, at this point 'the focus shifts to the needs of the child for permanency and stability' [citation], and in fact, there is a rebuttable presumption that continued foster care is in the best interest of the child." (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 317; see also In re C.J.W. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1075, 1081 [summary denial of section 388 petition was proper where there was no showing of how the children's best interests would be served by depriving them of a permanent stable home in exchange for an uncertain future].) The proper focus of this case was J.A.'s need for stability, continuity and permanency, regardless of Cheryl's interest in reunification. (In re Stephanie, supra, at pp. 317-318; In re Brittany K. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1497, 1507.) Because the facts alleged in the petition would not have sustained a favorable decision on the section 388 petition, Cheryl was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing. (In re Zachary G., supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 808; In re Mary G. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 184, 205-206.)
D
Cheryl contends the court's summary denial of her modification petition violated her due process rights. She asserts the court improperly considered Agency's evidence, contained in its reports, while denying her the opportunity to refute that evidence.
As we previously noted, the court may consider the entire factual and procedural history of the case in determining whether to order an evidentiary hearing on a section 388 modification petition. (In re Justice P., supra, 123 Cal.App.4th at pp. 188-189.) In finding Cheryl did not make a sufficient prima facie showing on her modification petition, the court relied on the uncontroverted history of the case, not on any new evidence that Cheryl could have rebutted. In this regard, the facts considered by the court were not subject to challenge. Moreover, the court did not base its ruling on Agency's "evidence, " but on the insufficiency of Cheryl's allegations in the petition. This comported with due process. (In re C.J.W., supra, 157 Cal.App.4th at p. 1081.)
Agency's addendum report proffered no "new" evidence, but instead referred to facts already before the court.
Contrary to Cheryl's argument, she was not harmed by the lack of an opportunity to present live testimony and cross-examine witnesses. (See In re Clifton V. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1400, 1406.) Section 388 required the court to conduct a hearing at which Cheryl had the burden of making a prima facie showing before she was entitled to an evidentiary hearing. In the context of that prima facie hearing, Cheryl had the opportunity to submit documentation and argue the merits in support of her modification petition. This allowed the court to consider all relevant and current information before deciding whether to grant an evidentiary hearing. Once Cheryl did not meet her threshold burden of showing changed circumstances or best interests, no further hearing to "prove" her allegations was required. The court did not violate Cheryl's due process rights by summarily denying her petition. (In re C.J.W., supra, 157 Cal.App.4th at p. 1080 [hearing may comport with due process where court receives written evidence and hears argument of counsel].)
II
Cheryl challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the court's finding J.A. was likely to be adopted within a reasonable time. She asserts: (1) J.A.'s special needs are an obstacle to adoption; (2) J.A.'s caregivers have not been approved to adopt her; and (3) the court lacked an adequate assessment of J.A.'s medical condition.
A
The court can terminate parental rights only if it determines by clear and convincing evidence the minor is adoptable. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1).) An adoptability finding requires "a low threshold:" the court need only determine it is " 'likely' " the child will be adopted within a reasonable time. (In re K.B. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1275, 1292; accord In re Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 406; In re B.D. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 1218, 1231.) A determination of adoptability focuses on whether a child's age, physical condition and emotional state will create difficulty in locating a family willing to adopt. (§ 366.22, subd. (b); In re David H. (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 368, 378.) The possibility a child may have future problems does not mean the child is not likely to be adopted. (In re Jennilee T. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 212, 223-225.)
The likelihood of adoptability may be satisfied by a showing the minor is generally adoptable, that is, independent of whether the minor is in a prospective adoptive home (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)), or has a prospective adoptive parent " 'waiting in the wings.' " (In re Sarah M. (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1642, 1649; In re A.A. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1292, 1313.) Nevertheless, "the fact that a prospective adoptive parent has expressed interest in adopting the minor is evidence that the minor's age, physical condition, mental state, and other matters relating to the child are not likely to dissuade individuals from adopting the minor. In other words, a prospective adoptive parent's willingness to adopt generally indicates the minor is likely to be adopted within a reasonable time either by the prospective adoptive parent or by some other family." (In re Sarah M., supra, at pp. 1649-1650.)
We review a court's finding that a minor is adoptable for substantial evidence. (In re Josue G. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 725, 732; In re Lukas B. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1145, 1154.) If, on the entire record, there is substantial evidence to support the findings of the juvenile court, we uphold those findings. We do not pass on the credibility of witnesses, attempt to resolve conflicts in the evidence or reweigh the evidence. Instead, we view the record favorably to the juvenile court's order and affirm the order even if there is substantial evidence supporting a contrary finding. (In re Casey D., supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at pp. 52-53.) The appellant has the burden of showing there is no evidence of a sufficiently substantial nature to support the finding or order. (In re L.Y.L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 947.)
B
Contrary to Cheryl's position, J.A.'s "special needs" are not an obstacle to adoption. J.A. was likely to be adopted because she was a cute, happy, engaging 13-month-old girl with an easygoing temperament. Although she wore a helmet to correct a "flat spot" on her head and she had some minor respiratory problems, she was generally healthy and reaching developmental milestones. J.A.'s current caregivers are fully aware of her medical needs and remain committed to adopting her. (See In re A.A., supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at p. 1313 [juvenile court may properly consider caregiver's willingness to adopt as evidence that child is likely to be adopted within a reasonable time].) The caregivers have begun a home study and nothing in the record suggests "there were any obstacles to completing it in a routine manner." (In re Brandon T. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1400, 1410-1411 [adoptive home study need not be completed before court can find minor adoptable].) Were this placement to fail, there are 32 other approved adoptive families in San Diego County willing to adopt a child with J.A.'s characteristics. (See In re Sarah M., supra, 22 Cal.App.4th at p. 1650 [minor was likely to be adopted within reasonable time by prospective adoptive parent or some other family]; compare In re Asia L. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 498, 512 [sibling set of three was not adoptable because minors had emotional and psychological problems that required specialized care and there were no approved families willing to adopt children with similar problems].) Substantial evidence supports the court's finding J.A. is likely to be adopted within a reasonable time.
C
Cheryl asserts Agency did not adequately assess J.A.'s medical condition as required by statute and thus, the court did not have sufficient evidence of her adoptability. Before selecting and implementing a permanent plan for a minor, the court must order a written assessment of specified relevant factors, including an evaluation of the child's medical status. (§ 366.21, subd. (i)(1)(C).) When adoption is the recommended permanent plan, the assessment report serves to provide the juvenile court with information necessary to determine whether adoption is in the child's best interests. (See In re Dakota S. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 494, 496.)
The assessment report need not be entirely complete, as long as it is in substantial compliance with statutory requirements. (In re John F. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1365, 1378; In re Diana G. (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1468, 1482.) When an assessment is challenged as incomplete, the reviewing court looks at the totality of the evidence before it; deficiencies go to the weight of the evidence and may prove insignificant unless they are so egregious as to undermine the court's permanent plan decision. (In re Valerie W. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1, 14-15; In re John F., supra, at p. 1378; In re Crystal J. (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 407, 413.) An assessment report need not include actual medical records or the full text of evaluations or testing by a health care professional. Instead, section 366.21, subdivision (i)(1)(C), simply requires that the social worker evaluate "the child's medical, developmental, scholastic, mental, and emotional status." Here, the social worker properly evaluated J.A.'s medical, developmental, and emotional and mental status based on information from various sources such as J.A.'s medical history, test results and input from her caregivers. The assessment report substantially complied with the statutory requirement of providing an evaluation of J.A.'s medical status. (Ibid.)
III
Cheryl challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the court's finding the beneficial parent-child relationship exception did not apply to preclude terminating her parental rights. She asserts she had regular contact with J.A., and they shared a significant and beneficial relationship that was worthy of preserving.
A
After reunification services are terminated, the focus of a dependency proceeding shifts from preserving the family to promoting the best interests of the child, including the child's interest in a stable, permanent placement that allows the caregiver to make a full emotional commitment to the child. (In re Fernando M. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 529, 534.) At the selection and implementation hearing, the court has three options: (1) terminate parental rights and order adoption as the permanent plan; (2) appoint a legal guardian for the child; or (3) order the child placed in long-term foster care. (Ibid.)
"Adoption, where possible, is the permanent plan preferred by the Legislature." (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 573.) If the court finds a child cannot be returned to his or her parent and is likely to be adopted if parental rights are terminated, it must select adoption as the permanent plan unless it finds a compelling reason for determining that termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child under one or more of the enumerated statutory exceptions. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A) & (B)(i)-(vi); In re A.A., supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at p. 1320.) "The parent has the burden of establishing the existence of any circumstance that constitutes an exception to termination of parental rights." (In re T.S. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1031, 1039.) Because a selection and implementation hearing occurs "after the court has repeatedly found the parent unable to meet the child's needs, it is only in an extraordinary case that preservation of the parent's rights will prevail over the Legislature's preference for adoptive placement." (In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1350.)
Section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i), provides an exception to the adoption preference if terminating parental rights would be detrimental to the child because "[t]he parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship." We have interpreted the phrase "benefit from continuing the relationship" to refer to a parent-child relationship that "promotes the well-being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents. In other words, the court balances the strength and quality of the natural parent[-]child relationship in a tenuous placement against the security and sense of belonging a new family would confer. If severing the natural parent[-]child relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed, the preference for adoption is overcome and the natural parent's rights are not terminated." (In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at pp. 574-575; accord In re Jason J. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 922, 936-937.)
To meet the burden of proof for this statutory exception, the parent must show more than frequent and loving contact, an emotional bond with the child or pleasant visits. (In re Jason J., supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at pp. 936-937; In re Derek W. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 823, 827.) The parent must show he or she occupies a parental role in the child's life, resulting in a significant, positive emotional attachment from child to parent. (In re Derek W., supra, at p. 827; In re Elizabeth M. (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 318, 324.) We review the court's finding regarding the applicability of a statutory exception to adoption for substantial evidence. (In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 576.)
B
Although Cheryl regularly visited J.A., she did not have a beneficial parent-child relationship with her that would overcome the legislative preference for adoption. J.A. was removed from Cheryl's custody at birth and had never lived with Cheryl. The relationship Cheryl had with J.A. was positive but not parental. During visits in the grandparents' home, Cheryl took a passive role in caring for J.A. and her siblings. She did not use her visitation time to fully engage J.A. or nurture the mother-child relationship, and consequently, she never progressed to unsupervised visits. Although J.A. recognized Cheryl and enjoyed visits, she looked to her caregivers to meet her physical, medical, social, developmental and emotional needs. There was no evidence J.A. was negatively impacted by Cheryl's absence from her daily life. "A biological parent who has failed to reunify with an adoptable child may not derail an adoption merely by showing the child would derive some benefit from continuing a relationship maintained during periods of visitation with the parent." (In re Angel B., supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 466.) Cheryl did not show J.A. had a "significant, positive, emotional attachment" to her so that terminating the parent-child relationship would result in "great harm" to J.A. (In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575; In re Jason J., supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 938.)
Further, Cheryl did not show that maintaining the parent-child relationship outweighed the benefits of adoption for J.A. Throughout the reunification period, Cheryl continued her violent relationship with the father and ignored her mental health issues. Her insight, judgment and ability to follow directions remained poor, and she consistently chose her relationship with men over her personal safety and the well-being of her children. Although Cheryl was beginning to make progress at the time of the selection and implementation hearing, she needed continued therapy to be able to protect herself from relapsing into an abusive relationship. In the meantime, J.A. is thriving in the home of her caregivers, who are committed to adopting her. (See In re Justice P., supra, 123 Cal.App.4th at p. 191 [child's interest in stable and permanent home is paramount once a parent's interest in reunification is no longer at issue].) In the social worker's opinion, adoption would offer J.A. the continuity, stability and permanency she deserved. The court was required to, and did, weigh the strength and quality of the parent-child relationship, and the detriment involved in terminating it, against the potential benefit of an adoptive home for J.A. We do not reweigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the juvenile court. (In re Casey D., supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at p. 53.) Substantial evidence supports the court's finding the beneficial parent-child relationship exception did not apply to preclude terminating parental rights.
IV
Cheryl challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the court's finding the sibling relationship exception to adoption did not apply. She asserts terminating parental rights is likely to substantially interfere with the bonded relationship between J.A. and her siblings, and will result in detriment to J.A.
A
The sibling relationship exception applies when the juvenile court finds there is a compelling reason for determining termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child because it would substantially interfere with that child's sibling relationship. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(v).) Factors to be considered include the nature and extent of the relationship, whether the child was raised with a sibling in the same home and whether the child has strong bonds with a sibling. The court must also consider whether ongoing contact is in the child's best interests, including the child's long-term emotional interest, as compared to the benefit of legal permanence through adoption. (Ibid.) The purpose of this exception is to preserve long-standing sibling relationships that "serve as anchors for dependent children whose lives are in turmoil." (In re Erik P. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 395, 404.)
"The sibling relationship exception contains strong language creating a heavy burden for the party opposing adoption." (In re Daniel H. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 804, 813.) Similar to the beneficial parent-child relationship exception of section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i), application of the sibling relationship exception requires a balancing of interests. (In re L.Y.L., supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at p. 951.) The parent must first show: (1) the existence of a significant sibling relationship; (2) terminating parental rights would substantially interfere with that relationship; and (3) it would be detrimental to the child if the relationship ended. (Id. at p. 952.) After the parent shows a sibling relationship is so strong that its severance would be detrimental to the adoptive child, the court then decides whether the benefit to the child of continuing the sibling relationship outweighs the benefits of adoption. (Id. at pp. 952-953; In re Naomi P. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 808, 823.)
B
J.A. had never lived with her siblings, but she did have frequent and positive contact with them. During visits, the siblings doted on and played with their baby sister. Nevertheless, their shared experiences were minimal. Although J.A. was comfortable and content with her siblings, there was no showing the relationship she had with them was sufficiently strong to result in detriment to J.A. if it ended. (In re Eric P., supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at p. 402.)
The evidence supports a finding the benefit to J.A. of continuing the sibling relationship was outweighed by the benefits she would realize through adoption. Her need for competent, caring and stable parents is paramount, and could be realized only through the permanency of adoption. (In re L.Y.L., supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at p. 950; In re Megan S. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 247, 252.) The sibling relationship was not sufficiently significant to constitute a "compelling reason" to order a permanent plan other than adoption for J.A. (§ 366.26, subds. (c)(1), (c)(1)(B)(v).)
Moreover, the evidence showed the siblings were being transitioned into their father's home. Both the siblings' father and J.A.'s caregivers were willing to continue facilitating contact between J.A. and her siblings. Although, as Cheryl argues, there are no guarantees sibling contact will continue after J.A. is adopted, this factor is not determinative. (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 55 [court cannot require, but can encourage, adoptive parents to agree to visits among siblings].) Under the proper legal analysis of section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(v), there was no showing termination of parental rights would substantially interfere with the sibling relationship. (In re L.Y.L., supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at p. 952.) Substantial evidence supports the court's finding the beneficial sibling relationship exception did not apply to preclude terminating Cheryl's parental rights. (In re Celine R., supra, at pp. 61-62.)
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: McCONNELL, P. J., McDONALD, J.