Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Tulare County. No. JJD061599 Hugo J. Loza, Commissioner.
Jan B. Norman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, and Julie A. Hokans, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
CORNELL, Acting P.J.
The juvenile court found true a petition alleging J.A. came within the provisions of Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 because he violated Vehicle Code section 20001, subdivision (a) (failure to stop at the scene of an accident). J.A. alleges (1) there was not substantial evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding; (2) error occurred because he was not informed he was eligible for deferred entry of judgment; and (3) the juvenile court did not hold a suitability hearing. We conclude there was substantial evidence to support the juvenile court’s findings, but we must remand the matter to permit the juvenile court to determine if J.A. is suitable for the deferred entry of judgment program.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise stated.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
The incident in question involved three vehicles. A van was seen striking a silver sedan in a residential neighborhood multiple times. The occupant of the silver sedan proceeded to park it and then got out of the car. A red sedan then appeared on the scene, went by the van, and attempted to make a U-turn at the end of the street. The driver of the red sedan lost control of the vehicle and hit a fence. The red sedan backed up and entered the roadway. Occupants of the house saw the damage to their fence and apparently attacked the red sedan and its driver. A fence board was thrown at the red sedan, striking the driver. It appears the driver of the silver sedan was one of the occupants of the residence with the damaged fence.
As the red sedan sped away from the melee, it struck a pedestrian, causing him to fly several feet into the air. The red sedan did not stop and did not return to the scene of the accident. The pedestrian, who apparently was an innocent bystander, was helped from the scene by other individuals.
J.A. was the driver of the red sedan. The section 602 petition alleged he violated Vehicle Code section 20001, subdivision (a) by failing to stop at the scene of the accident. J.A. testified that he did not realize he had struck the pedestrian as he was leaving the scene of the confrontation. The juvenile court found the allegations of the petition true. J.A. was released to his father under the supervision of the probation department.
DISCUSSION
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
As relevant here, the elements of a violation of Vehicle Code section 20001, subdivision (a) are (1) the defendant was involved in an accident while driving a vehicle; (2) the accident caused someone else to sustain a serious injury; (3) the defendant knew he or she had been involved in an accident that injured another person or knew from the nature of the accident that it was probable that another person had been injured; and (4) either the defendant failed to stop at the scene or failed to provide reasonable assistance to any person injured in the accident. (CALCRIM No. 2140.)
J.A. asserts the evidence was insufficient to support the juvenile court’s findings for two reasons. First, he argues there was insufficient evidence to establish that he knew he had hit the pedestrian. Second, he contends there was a lack of evidence to establish the accident resulted in an injury to a person.
Standard of review
Our review of the sufficiency of the evidence is deferential. We “‘review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence -- that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 496; People v. Superior Court (Jones)(1998) 18 Cal.4th 667, 681.) We focus on the whole record, not isolated bits of evidence. (People v. Slaughter (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1187, 1203.) We presume the existence of every fact the trier of fact reasonably could deduce from the evidence that supports the judgment. (People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053.) We will not substitute our evaluations of a witness’s credibility for that of the trier of fact. (People v. Koontz (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041, 1078.)
“The standard of review is the same in cases in which the People rely mainly on circumstantial evidence. [Citation.] ‘Although it is the duty of the jury to acquit a defendant if it finds that circumstantial evidence is susceptible of two interpretations, one of which suggests guilt and the other innocence [citations], it is the jury, not the appellate court which must be convinced of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. “‘If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of the judgment.’” [Citations.]’ [Citation.] ‘“Circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to connect a defendant with the crime and to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”’ [Citations.]” (People v. Stanley (1995)10 Cal.4th 764, 792-793.) The same standard of review applies to juvenile matters.
Knowledge of collision
Three witnesses provided the relevant evidence. Donna Fleetwood was visiting her parents on the date of the accident. Her parents’ house was located near the events in question. Fleetwood first heard a noise that sounded like two vehicles colliding. She went outside and had an unobstructed view of what followed.
The van hit the silver sedan. The driver of the silver sedan parked the vehicle at his residence. Fleetwood then observed the red sedan go past the van to the end of the road and turn around. As the red sedan turned, the driver lost control and struck a fence, knocking it down. The red sedan backed up, started going forward, and then continued down the street. The pedestrian was standing on the side of the road. There was nothing that could have obstructed the view of the driver of the red sedan. The red sedan struck the side of the pedestrian, causing him to fly “real high in the air.” The red sedan was gone by the time the pedestrian landed on the ground.
Diane Hilliard is Fleetwood’s sister and also was visiting her parents on the day of the accident. She also heard the sound of two vehicles colliding and went outside, where she saw a van pushing or striking the silver sedan. The red sedan then came around the corner and struck the silver sedan. The red sedan continued down to the end of the street and attempted to turn around at a high rate of speed. The driver of the red sedan lost control of the vehicle and struck a fence. The red sedan backed out onto the street and began traveling down the street. The driver of the red sedan did not appear to have control of the vehicle. Someone picked up one of the fence boards and threw it at the red sedan, striking the driver.
Hilliard looked away for a moment. When she looked back, she saw the pedestrian flying in the air. The pedestrian appeared to be eight to 10 feet in the air. The red sedan continued down the road. Hilliard saw the pedestrian in court two weeks prior to her testimony. His leg was in a cast and he was using crutches.
The incident occurred on March 14, 2009. Hilliard testified on August 19, 2009. Her observations occurred on or about August 5, 2009, approximately five months after the incident.
J.A. testified in his own defense. He stated he had suffered a head injury in an automobile accident in 2007. As a result of that injury, J.A. is unable to move the left side of his body as well as he could before that accident. He also has trouble remembering events. If he gets hit in the head, he tends to get blood clots, which cause his body to start hurting.
On the date of the incident, he was hit on the left cheek, causing swelling and a small laceration. He stated he ran into the fence when he swerved to avoid another vehicle. That is when “they” ran up to him and started hitting him. He also was hit by a board. He went to a doctor sometime after being hit.
In response to the attack, J.A. backed up and drove home. He did not recall hitting anyone, nor did he feel a “bump, ” like he had hit someone or something. J.A. did not learn anyone had been hit until he was contacted by a lawyer regarding the incident.
Apparently, an attorney for the injured pedestrian.
Viewing this testimony in the light most favorable to the judgment, as we must, there was substantial evidence to support the adjudication. Both Fleetwood and Hilliard testified the pedestrian flew into the air when he was struck by the vehicle J.A. was driving. It is reasonable to infer that a substantial collision would have had to have occurred to cause this result. It also is reasonable to infer that this type of collision would have been felt by the driver of the vehicle, i.e., the driver of the vehicle would have known he had been involved in a collision.
J.A. argues that the other circumstances involved in the incident overcome this inference. Specifically, he argues that he was struck in the head by a board just prior to the accident and, as he sped away from the fence, the vehicle was fishtailing. But these facts merely went to the weight of the evidence. It was the juvenile court’s obligation to evaluate this evidence when rendering its decision. Presumably, it did so, especially since this is the same argument made by J.A. to the juvenile court. Our task is limited to determining whether there was reasonable, credible, and solid evidence to support the adjudication. The testimony of Fleetwood and Hilliard meet this requirement.
Proof of injured victim
J.A. also argues the prosecution failed to present evidence that the pedestrian was injured. The prosecution failed to prove that the medical records it subpoenaed were for the pedestrian struck by J.A. or were related to injuries sustained in the incident. The pedestrian did not testify. Accordingly, J.A. contends there was insufficient evidence that the pedestrian was injured or that he knew or should have known the pedestrian was injured.
Once again, we disagree because both of these elements reasonably can be inferred from the evidence. Indeed, any reasonable person would infer that the pedestrian was injured when he was struck hard enough by the vehicle being driven by J.A. to fly into the air eight to 10 feet. It would be difficult to imagine he was not injured. This inference was confirmed by the testimony that the pedestrian was helped from the scene after being struck by the vehicle. When Hilliard’s observations two weeks before the hearing are combined with these facts and inferences, it is clear there was substantial evidence to support the juvenile court’s conclusion that the pedestrian was injured.
Similarly, the pedestrian being struck by the vehicle hard enough to fly eight to 10 feet into the air also permitted the juvenile court to infer that J.A. knew, or should have known, that the pedestrian was injured. The force of the impact alone was enough to alert even the most distracted driver that not only had something or someone been hit but that injuries were likely.
The facts relied on by J.A., the prior accident, being struck by a fence board, and J.A.’s inability to control the vehicle were all considered, and rejected, by the juvenile court. These facts do not compel a different conclusion but merely suggest a different possible explanation for J.A.’s actions. Since our review is limited to determining whether substantial evidence supported the adjudication, we will not question the juvenile court’s resolution of disputed facts. The adjudication was supported by substantial evidence.
Since we conclude that adjudication was supported by substantial evidence, we necessarily reject J.A.’s claims that the adjudication violated his constitutional rights because it was not supported by substantial evidence.
II. Deferred Entry of Judgment
J.A. also asserts that the juvenile court violated section 790 et seq. because it failed to consider his eligibility for the deferred entry of judgment procedure.
The deferred entry of judgment procedure allows a minor to admit the allegations of a petition and to complete a period of probation, including participation in programs designated by the juvenile court. (§ 794.) If the minor successfully completes the probation, the charges against the minor are dropped and the record is sealed. (§ 793, subd. (c).)
The first step in the procedure requires the prosecutor to evaluate the minor and determine if the minor is eligible for deferred entry of judgment pursuant to the conditions established in section 790, subdivision (a). (Id., subd. (b).) After performing the evaluation, the prosecutor is required to file a declaration if the minor is found eligible. (Ibid.) The juvenile court is then required to determine if the minor is suitable for deferred entry of judgment. (Ibid.) The minor must be advised by the prosecutor of the deferred entry of judgment procedure, and the parents must be provided with written notice of the hearing to determine if the minor is suitable for deferred entry of judgment. (§§ 791, subd. (a), 792.)
In this case, the prosecutor evaluated the file and determined J.A. was eligible for the deferred entry of judgment procedure and filed a document so stating. There is no indication, however, that J.A. was notified he was eligible for deferred entry of judgment or that deferred entry of judgment was ever discussed on the record. No suitability hearing was held, and the juvenile court failed to determine if J.A. should have been offered deferred entry of judgment.
The parties contend there is a split of authority on what should happen when the statutory procedure for deferred entry of judgment is violated, as in this case. We do not see any division among the Courts of Appeal.
The prosecutors in In re Kenneth J. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 973 (Kenneth J.) and In re Usef S. (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 276 (Usef S.) each determined the minor was eligible for the deferred entry of judgment procedure and notified the minor and counsel of the minor’s eligibility. The juvenile court failed to hold a suitability hearing. On appeal, each minor argued the juvenile court’s failure required reversal of the contested adjudication. The appellate courts disagreed, concluding, in essence, that because the minors had notice they were eligible for deferred entry of judgment and decided to contest the allegations of the petition, they had impliedly rejected the deferred entry of judgment procedure and could not now complain. (Kenneth J., at pp. 979-980; Usef S. at p. 286.)
In In re Luis B. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1117 (Luis B.), the prosecutor failed to determine if the minor was eligible for the deferred entry of judgment procedure, and the trial court did not address the issue. The appellate court held the error required the matter to be remanded to the juvenile court so that it could comply with the requirements of the statute and applicable rules of court. (Id. at pp. 1123-1124.)
The clear distinction in the two approaches is the issue of notice to the minor and his attorney. In Kenneth J. and Usef S., the minor and counsel received notification of the minor’s eligibility for the deferred entry of judgment procedure. Therefore, the minor’s decision to contest the allegations of the section 602 petition waived the right to pursue deferred entry of judgment. In Luis B. the minor did not receive notification of eligibility for the deferred entry of judgment program and thus did not have the opportunity to pursue that program if he had chosen to do so. Therefore, the matter was remanded so the juvenile court could comply with the requirements of the statutory scheme.
Here, the record establishes that neither J.A. nor counsel was informed of J.A.’s eligibility for the deferred entry of judgment procedure. We must, therefore, remand the matter to the juvenile court so that it may comply with the statutory requirements.
DISPOSITION
The findings and dispositional orders are set aside, and the matter is remanded to the juvenile court for further proceedings in compliance with section 790 et seq. and California Rules of Court, rule 5.800. If, as a result of those proceedings, the juvenile court grants deferred entry of judgment to J.A., it shall issue an order vacating the findings and orders. If the juvenile court denies deferred entry of judgment to J.A., it shall reinstate its findings and orders, continuing in effect the judgment, subject to J.A.’s right to have the denial of deferred entry of judgment reviewed on appeal.
WE CONCUR: DAWSON, J., HILL, J.