Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Tulare County, No. JJD061972, Valeriano Saucedo, Judge.
Jagdish J. Bijlani, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Lloyd G. Carter and Louis M. Vasquez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
Before Vartabedian, A.P.J., Wiseman, J., and Levy, J.
INTRODUCTION
On October 27, 2008, a first amended petition was filed pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 alleging appellant, J.A., disturbed the peace (Pen. Code, § 415, subd. (1), count one) and committed petty theft (§ 484, subd. (a), count two). On January 14, 2009, appellant waived her constitutional rights and admitted count two. Count one was dismissed.
Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
On March 18, 2009, the juvenile court placed appellant on probation in the custody of her parents. One of the terms and conditions of appellant’s probation was that she “[n]ot use, possess, or be under the influence of any alcoholic beverage or illegal or intoxicating substance, or possess any associated paraphernalia.”
On appeal, appellant contends the juvenile court erred in setting her maximum term of confinement because she was placed with her parents. Respondent concedes this finding was error but argues it was harmless. Appellant contends the condition of her probation in the court’s minute order that she not use or possess drugs was vague and overbroad. We will reverse the court’s finding concerning the maximum term of confinement and affirm the challenged probation condition.
SPECIFIED TERM OF CONFINEMENT
The parties concur the juvenile court erred in specifying the maximum term of confinement because, although appellant was found to be a ward of the court, she was placed in her parents’ physical custody. Because this issue has recurred in juvenile courts throughout our appellate district, we reject respondent’s argument that this issue has no legal effect and will remand the case for the juvenile court to correct its order. Section 726 deals with the maximum term of confinement in juvenile wardship cases. (In re Sean W. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1177, 1187.) Subdivision (c) of section 726 (section 726(c)) requires the juvenile court to specify that the minor may not be confined for a period in excess of the maximum term of imprisonment that could be imposed on an adult convicted of the offense that brought the minor under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. By its express terms, however, section 726(c) applies only “[i]f the minor is removed from the physical custody of his or her parent or guardian ….” (§ 726(c); In re Ali A. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 569, 573 (Ali A.); see also In re Matthew A. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 537, 541.)
Respondent submits that striking the maximum term of commitment is not strictly necessary, but would not object to a remand of this case for the juvenile court to strike. We disagree, and find that remand is necessary.
Physical confinement is defined under the statute as “placement in a juvenile hall, ranch, camp, forestry camp or secure juvenile home pursuant to Section 730, or in any institution operated by the Youth Authority.” (§ 726(c).) Where, as here, a minor is not removed from the physical custody of his parents or guardian, section 726(c) does not apply and the juvenile court is not required by section 726(c) to include a maximum term of confinement in its dispositional order, and the setting of a maximum term of confinement “is of no legal effect” (Ali A., supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at p. 574). We therefore remand the case to the juvenile court to correct its order.
PROBATION CONDITION
The parties further concur the juvenile court’s condition of probation that appellant “[n]ot use possess, or be under the influence of any alcoholic beverage or illegal or intoxicating substance, or possess any associated paraphernalia” is vague and overbroad and we must reject it because the term intoxicating substance is imprecise.
The juvenile “court may impose and require any and all reasonable conditions that it may determine fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done and the reformation and rehabilitation of the ward enhanced.” (§ 730, subd. (b).) A juvenile court has broad discretion to fashion conditions of probation for the purpose of rehabilitation and may even impose a condition of probation that would be unconstitutional or otherwise improper so long as it is tailored to specifically meet the needs of the juvenile. The juvenile court’s discretion will not be disturbed in the absence of manifest abuse. (In re Josh W. (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1, 5.)
A condition of probation which is impermissible for an adult criminal defendant is not necessarily unreasonable for a juvenile receiving guidance and supervision from the juvenile court. (In re Todd L. (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 14, 19.) The broad purpose of the juvenile court law is to provide for the protection and safety of the public as well as of the minor. (In re Binh L. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 194, 204; Wel & Inst. Code, § 202, subds. (a), (b) & (d). Because the testing condition relates to criminal conduct and is reasonably related to future criminality, its imposition is within the juvenile court's discretion. (In re Kacy S. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 704, 710-711.)
We agree with respondent that the testing condition, which includes a ban on “intoxicating substances,” is not vague or overbroad. We construe the meaning that would appear reasonable to the objective reader. (People v. Bravo (1987) 43 Cal.3d 600, 606-607.) The condition, read as a whole, limits appellant’s use of alcohol, narcotics, and associated paraphernalia. The challenged phrase would also likely cover use of other potential intoxicants such as glue, paint thinner, or other petroleum distillates. Limiting appellant’s future attempt to become intoxicated fits well within the juvenile court’s discretion and the goals of juvenile law.
Read in context, this condition would limit appellant from using substances to become intoxicated. As currently phrased and read from the perspective of an objective reader, the condition would not limit appellant’s use of glue for an art project, helping her parents paint their home, or filling the tank of the family car with gasoline. We therefore reject appellant’s contention that this condition of probation is vague or overbroad.
Because we reject this issue on the merits, we do not reach appellant’s alternative argument that appellant’s counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge this probation condition.
DISPOSITION
The case is remanded to the juvenile court for the court to strike the maximum term of confinement it set. The judgment is affirmed in all other respects.