Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Solano County Super. Ct. No. J39771
NEEDHAM, J.
J. W. appeals from a juvenile court dispositional order, which imposed a probation condition that he submit to the search and seizure of his person and property without warrant or notice. He contends the condition is invalid. We will affirm the order.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
An amended wardship petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 charged appellant with misdemeanor battery (Pen. Code, § 242), misdemeanor disturbing the peace by fighting (Pen. Code, § 415), and a felony offense of threatening a public officer (Pen. Code, § 71).
A. Jurisdictional Hearing
At a contested jurisdictional hearing, the court dismissed the count pertaining to threatening a public officer. The evidence relevant to the battery and disturbing the peace counts included the following.
Victim R.C. testified that appellant, accompanied by about five others, approached him at a skate park and asked if he was “talking shit.” R.C. denied the accusation, and the two shook hands.
About 15 minutes later, appellant returned – again with his companions – and “sucker punched” R.C. six or seven times in the face. When R.C. stood to defend himself, appellant “threw [him] off” and R.C. fell to the concrete ground and broke two bones in his right arm. Appellant continued to hit R.C. until one of R.C.’s friends pulled appellant off. Appellant then ran away.
Mark A. confirmed R.C.’s account of his first encounter with appellant. Mark left the skate park and did not witness the second encounter.
Appellant and three of his friends – who are brothers – testified that there was an argument between R.C. and another minor (Richard) and appellant tried to stop it. R.C. grabbed appellant by the hair. R.C. and appellant fought and, to free himself, appellant swung R.C. around. R.C. “slipped” and fell.
On rebuttal, Fairfield Police Officer Larry Banks testified that appellant gave a statement after the incident. Appellant told the officer that he approached R.C.at the skate park regarding some disparaging comments R.C. had made, words were exchanged, appellant turned to walk away, R.C. pushed him, they began to fight, and R.C. fell to the ground and hurt his arm. The officer did not recall appellant mentioning “Richard.”
The juvenile court sustained the battery and disturbing the peace allegations.
B. Dispositional Order
At the dispositional hearing, the court placed appellant on probation for six months. The terms and conditions of appellant’s probation included conditions that he abstain from the use of alcohol and drugs and not possess any weapon or ammunition. Appellant did not object to these conditions. The court also imposed, over appellant’s objection, a condition that appellant “[s]ubmit [his] person and property (including automobile and residence) to search and seizure by any peace officer at any time of the day or night, with or without warrant, with or without probable cause.”
This appeal followed.
II. DISCUSSION
Appellant contends the court erred in imposing the search provision as a condition of his probation.
Welfare and Institutions Code section 730, subdivision (b) authorizes the juvenile court to impose any reasonable probation condition that is “fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done and the reformation and rehabilitation of the ward enhanced.”
Under People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, “[a] condition of probation will not be held invalid unless ‘it “(1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality.” (Id. at p. 486, fn. omitted.) The Lent test has been applied in juvenile cases as well. (In re T.C. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 837, 847.)
Nonetheless, the juvenile court retains broad discretion to select appropriate probation conditions in order to promote the reformation and rehabilitation of the minor and the protection of the public. (In re Walter P. (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 95, 99-100.) The reasonableness of the probation condition is measured not just by the circumstances of the current offense, but by the minor’s entire social history. (Id. at p. 100.)
Broad discretion is granted to the juvenile court because minors are more in need of guidance and supervision than adults and their constitutional rights are more circumscribed. (In re Antonio R. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 937, 941.) Thus, a probation condition may be reasonably imposed upon a minor even though it would be impermissible to impose the condition on an adult. (In re Todd L. (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 14, 19; In re Frankie J. (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 1149, 1153.) Even conditions infringing on the minor’s constitutional rights may be permissible if specifically tailored to meet the minor’s needs. (In re Tyrell J. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 68, 81, overruled on other grounds in In re Jaime P. (2006) 40 Cal.4th 128, 130, 139.)
“[P]robation conditions authorizing searches ‘aid in deterring future offenses... and in monitoring compliance with the terms of probation. [Citations.] By allowing close supervision of probationers, probation search conditions serve to promote rehabilitation and reduce recidivism while helping to protect the community from potential harm by probationers.’ (People v. Robles (2000) 23 Cal.4th 789, 795.) A condition of probation that enables a probation officer to supervise his or her charges effectively is, therefore, ‘reasonably related to future criminality.’ (See, e.g., People v. Kwizera (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1240 [affirming probation condition requiring the defendant to ‘ “follow such course of conduct as the probation officer prescribes” ’ as reasonable and necessary to enable the probation department to supervise compliance with specific conditions of probation]; [People v.] Balestra [(1999)] 76 Cal.App.4th [57, ] 65-67 [upholding warrantless search condition that served valid rehabilitative purpose of helping probation officer ensure that probationer obeys all laws].)” (People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 380-381.)
Because probation search conditions serve a valid rehabilitative purpose, “it is of no moment whether the underlying offense is reasonably related to theft, narcotics, or firearms:” the point is that it aids in supervision and is a “valuable measure of the effectiveness of the supervision given the [probationer].” (People v. Balestra, supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at p. 67, italics omitted.)
In the matter before us, appellant’s offense, his social history, and the terms of his probation as a whole supported the imposition of the probation condition. His prior delinquency and current offense suggested that the degree of supervision offered by the search condition would be appropriate to avoid escalating criminality. Although appellant did not yet have a criminal record, he had been cited for misdemeanor theft and granted diversion through the police department. In school, he had a history of poor behavior, bad grades, and poor attendance. In his first year of high school, his grades consisted of five ‘F’s” and one “D, ” he had referrals for truancy, and he racked up around 40 disciplinary referrals in roughly eight months. Then he was expelled from high school after a confrontation with a teacher and other staff, and did not return to school thereafter. He admitted previously using marijuana once or twice a week.
Moreover, the search condition was rationally related to monitoring appellant’s compliance with other terms of his probation. In addition to the search condition, the court required appellant to abstain from the use of alcohol and drugs and not possess any weapon or ammunition. Appellant did not object to these conditions. The search condition is reasonably appropriate to ensure that the probation officer can effectively monitor appellant’s compliance with these terms of his probation. In light of the aims of rehabilitating appellant and protecting the public, the juvenile court did not abuse its broad discretion in imposing the search condition.
Appellant’s reliance on In re Martinez (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 577 is misplaced. There, an adult defendant, who had pleaded guilty to assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury on a police officer, objected to a probation search condition. The appellate court agreed that the condition was improper because it was not reasonably related to the offense or future criminality, since the defendant had not used a concealed weapon, he was convicted only of a misdemeanor, and there was nothing in his history to suggest the offense was anything but an isolated incident. (Id. at pp. 583-584.) The court noted that, to support a probation condition on the ground that it is related to future criminality, there must be “some rational factual basis for projecting the possibility that [the] defendant may commit a particular type of crime in the future.” (Id. at p. 583.)
In re Martinez, however, involved an adult defendant, not a juvenile. “A condition of probation which is impermissible for an adult criminal defendant is not necessarily unreasonable for a juvenile receiving guidance and supervision from the juvenile court.” (In re Abdirahman S. (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 963, 969.)
In re Martinez was distinguished on this very ground nearly 14 years ago in In re Abdirahman S. There, the minor had committed a misdemeanor assault by handing a chunk of asphalt to a classmate who used it to injure someone else. The appellate court upheld the search condition, distinguishing In re Martinez because it pertained to an adult defendant. (In re Abdirahman S., supra, 58 Cal.App.4th at p. 969.) And although the minor in In re Abdirahman S. had a weapon (chunk of concrete) while appellant here did not, the reason the court upheld the search was because, under the circumstances, “the search condition [was] sufficiently related to public safety and [the minor’s] rehabilitation.” (Id. at p. 969.) Under the totality of the circumstances presented to us, we also conclude that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion.
Appellant fails to demonstrate reversible error.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur.JONES, P. J., SIMONS, J.