Opinion
A21-1293 A21-1295
02-16-2022
In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: J. T. and C. W., Parents (A21-1293), and In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: S. B. and J. T., Parents (A21-1295).
Kandiyohi County District Court File Nos. 34-JV-21-118, 34-JV-21-122
Considered and decided by Reilly, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Smith, Tracy M., Judge.
ORDER OPINION
FRANCIS J. CONNOLLY JUDGE
BASED ON THE FILE, RECORD, AND PROCEEDINGS, AND BECAUSE:
1. Appellant J.T. (father) is the father of Child 1 and Child 2. Father has sole legal and sole physical custody of Child 1, who is covered by the protections of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). Father shares legal and physical custody of Child 2 with that child's mother, but the primary residence of the child is with him.
2. In June 2021, respondent Kandiyohi County Health and Human Services filed separate petitions alleging that Child 1 and Child 2 are in need of protection or services (CHIPS). Both petitions alleged the following two statutory grounds supporting the petitions: (1) that the children are "without proper parental care because of the emotional, mental, or physical disability, or state of immaturity of the child[ren]'s parent, guardian, or other custodian" and (2) the children's "behavior, condition, or environment is such as to be injurious or dangerous to the children] or others." See Minn. Stat. § 260C.007, subd. 6(8), (9) (2020). Father entered denials to the petitions, but Child 2's mother admitted that Child 2 should be adjudicated CHIPS.
3. Before trial, the district court granted father's parents' motion to intervene as parties. The matter then proceeded to trial, at which father testified that when his children are in his custody, they live with his parents. According to father, he signed delegation of parental authority forms (DOPA) on June 11, 2019, under which he delegated to his parents the legal authority to make decisions on behalf of his children. Although each DOPA stated that it was to last for a period of three years, it is undisputed that the DOPAs expired in June 2020 because, under Minnesota law, a DOPA should not exceed a period of one year. See Minn. Stat. § 524.5-211(a) (2020).
4. On cross-examination, father admitted that he is not in a position to care for his children due to his drug and alcohol addiction, and that if the district court denied the CHIPS petition, his parents would "at this point" continue to provide most of the children's care. After father's admission, the district court continued to hear testimony, but it suspended trial proceedings later that day based on father's admission. Over father's objection, the district court did not allow father to put on any evidence in his own case. Written submissions were subsequently submitted by the parties related to whether father's admissions constituted a basis to adjudicate the children CHIPS.
5. On September 30, 2021, the district court filed its orders adjudicating the children CHIPS. The district court found that father "admitted that he is not currently in a position to parent" the children, and that "if the CHIPS petition was dismissed, the [children] would return to the care of his parents." The district court also determined that, because of the expiration of the DOPA, father's parents "do not have any current legal authority to care for the child[ren]." The district court then noted that "[a]lthough nothing in the Juvenile Protection Rules provides for a suspension of trial proceedings, or granting summary judgment, the sole issue following [father's] admission was whether the paternal grandparents' parenting assistance provided sufficient rebuttal." The district court concluded that father's "testimony constitutes an admission to the statutory basis for the Petition and the very core of child protection: his current inability to parent his child given his chemical addiction." Thus, the district court concluded that "[a]dditional evidence and testimony is unnecessary, and . .. contrary to judicial economy." Father then appealed the adjudication of Child 1 and Child 2 as CHIPS, and this court consolidated the appeals.
Although the district court issued separate orders adjudicating Child 1 and Child 2 CHIPS, the grounds for determining that the children are in need of protection or services are identical.
6. "To adjudicate a child in need of protection or services, the county must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, the existence of one of the statutory child-protection grounds under Minn. Stat. § 260C.007, subd. 6, and that the child needs protection or services as a result." In re Welfare of Child of H.G. D., 962 N.W.2d 861, 873 (Minn. 2021); see Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 49.03 (stating that the burden of proof in CHIPS matters for Indian children and other children is clear and convincing evidence). This court reviews the "district court's decision that a child is in need of protection or services to determine whether the findings address the statutory criteria and whether the district court's findings are supported by substantial evidence and not clearly erroneous." H.G.D., 962 N.W.2d at 873 (quotation omitted).
7. Father argues that the district court erred by suspending trial proceedings after father admitted the statutory basis for the CHIPS petition because it denied him the right to present his case. We agree. Minnesota law provides: '"Child in need of protection or services' means a child who is in need of protection or services because the child: .. .." Minn. Stat. § 260C.007, subd. 6 (2020). The statute then lists 15 grounds that may support a finding that a child is in need of protection or services. Id. This court has construed this statute to mean that a child does not meet the statutory definition of a child in need of protection or services under section 260C.007, subdivision 6, "unless one of the enumerated child-protection grounds exists and the child needs protection or services as a result." In re Welfare of Child of S.S.W., 767 N.W.2d 723, 732 (Minn.App. 2009) (emphasis added). In reaching this conclusion, this court stated that its construction of Minn. Stat. § 260C.007, subd. 6 "allows the district court to consider the particular circumstances of each case and the unique needs of the subject child" and "ensures that children will not be removed from their parents' custody unless a change in custody is necessary." Id. at 730.
8. Here, the district court determined that father admitted the enumerated child-protection grounds alleged in the CHIPS petition. But even if father's testimony supports an admission of the enumerated child-protection grounds alleged in the CHIPS petition, the district court was still required to determine whether the children need protection or services as a result of his admission. See id. at 732. Such a decision is a discretionary one to be made by the district court after consideration of any "particular circumstances" and the "unique needs" of the children. See id. at 730. Father never admitted that his children need protection or services. Instead, he claims that his children need not be adjudicated CHIPS because his parents are providing appropriate care for his children while he addresses his addiction. By suspending trial proceedings, the district court prevented father from presenting evidence supporting his position. And any additional evidence presented by father, and the county, may be relevant to determine whether the children are in need of protection or services "because" of father's purported admission to the enumerated child-protection grounds alleged in the CHIPS petition. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.007, subd. 6. Accordingly, the district court erred by suspending trial proceedings before father had the opportunity to present his case. We therefore reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. The district court's order is reversed and remanded.
2. Pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c), this order opinion is nonprecedential, except as law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.