" In re Crane, 253 Ga. 667, 669 (2), 670 ( 324 S.E.2d 443). "[O]n appeal of a criminal contempt conviction the appropriate standard of appellate review is `whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.' [Cits.]" In re Irvin, 254 Ga. 251, 256 ( 328 S.E.2d 215). It follows that the trial court's contempt order must be supported by the record on appeal and that the trial court is not authorized to base its finding of contempt on facts not in the record. In re Bryant, 188 Ga. App. 383, 384 ( 373 S.E.2d 74); In re Hayes, 185 Ga. App. 818, 819 (1) ( 366 S.E.2d 204); In re Sykes, 151 Ga. App. 233, 234 (2) ( 259 S.E.2d 215).
Sheriff Peterson's authority and duty to administer the jail in his jurisdiction flows from the State, not Clinch County. See In re Irvin, 254 Ga. 251, 253, 328 S.E.2d 215 (1985) ("It is clear that the legislature has vested broad authority in the office of sheriff to administer the jails."). Sheriffs who refuse to take custody of an inmate may be charged with a misdemeanor.
"In In re Crane, 253 Ga. 667, 670 ( 324 S.E.2d 443) (1985) this court held `that the standard of proof in criminal-contempt cases is the beyond-reasonable-doubt standard.'" In re Irvin, 254 Ga. 251, 255 (2) ( 328 S.E.2d 215) (1985). Our examination of the record in this case does not reveal any ruling or finding in which the trial judge applied the beyond-reasonable-doubt standard.
(Punctuation omitted.) In re Irvin, 254 Ga. 251, 256 ( 328 SE2d 215) (1985). Moreover, in a contempt hearing before a judge sitting as the trier of fact, the hearing judge, and not the appellate court, determines the credibility of witnesses.
The issue in the case sub judice is whether any rational trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that respondents wilfully violated a lawful order of this Court. See In re Irvin, 251, 254 ( 328 S.E.2d 215). We acknowledge and reaffirm this Court's power to enforce its lawful orders and to impose penalties for the wilfull disobedience thereof.
Appellant in this case contends that the trial court erred in entering a pretrial order that stated that the legal authority of Contestabile v. Business Dev. Corp. of Ga., 259 Ga. 783 ( 387 S.E.2d 137) (1990), is controlling precedent in this action and must be followed to the extent that it is in conflict with an earlier precedent, Emmons v. Burkett, 256 Ga. 855 ( 353 S.E.2d 908) (1987). Although the trial court was undoubtedly correct that the later opinion of this court would necessarily control, In re Irvin, 254 Ga. 251 ( 328 S.E.2d 215) (1985), we granted this petition for certiorari to explain the holding of Contestabile and remove any confusion arising from an apparent conflict with Emmons. In Emmons, supra, we held that when a creditor forecloses on secured property without the statutorily required notice to the debtor, or when the creditor conducts a commercially unreasonable sale, a rebuttable presumption is created that the value of the collateral is equal to the indebtedness.
However, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the appellees, we conclude that any rational trier of fact could have found the appellants in contempt beyond a reasonable doubt. See In re Irvin, 254 Ga. 251, 256 (2) ( 328 S.E.2d 215) (1985). 3.
The trial court applied the correct standard and on appeal we find a rational trier of fact could find contempt beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Irvin, 254 Ga. 251 ( 328 S.E.2d 215) (1985). Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur, except Bell, J., who concurs in the judgment only.
The need for security in this case was obvious: one of the co-indictees had, with the assistance of armed masked intruders, escaped from jail, while another remained at large. See In re Irvin, 254 Ga. 251 ( 328 S.E.2d 215) (1985). We are not persuaded that the jurors in this case were intimidated by the presence of GBI agents such that they were unable to decide the issues fairly.
In re Bergin, 176 Ga. App. 52 ( 335 S.E.2d 132) (1985). We granted certiorari to determine whether the standard of review applied by the Court of Appeals is consistent with our rulings in In re Crane, 253 Ga. 667 ( 324 S.E.2d 443) (1985); Garland v. State, 253 Ga. 789 ( 325 S.E.2d 131) (1985); and In re Irvin, 254 Ga. 251 ( 328 S.E.2d 215) (1985). The Court of Appeals relied upon the standard set out in In re Pruitt, 249 Ga. 190, 191 ( 288 S.E.2d 208) (1982), holding that the trial court's determination was not clearly erroneous.