Opinion
357705
01-13-2022
In re I.R.K., Minor.
UNPUBLISHED
Calhoun Circuit Court Family Division LC No. 2021-000690-NA
Before: Boonstra, P.J., and Cavanagh and Riordan, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent-mother (hereafter, "respondent") appeals by right the order terminating her parental rights to her minor child, IRK, under MCL 712A.19b(3)(i) (parental rights to one or more siblings have been terminated because of serious and chronic neglect or physical or sexual abuse, and parent has failed to rectify conditions that led to prior termination), and (j) (reasonable likelihood child will be harmed if returned to parent's home). We affirm.
IRK's father was not a respondent in the proceedings below, and is not a party to this appeal.
I. PERTINENT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In January 2021, Children's Protective Services (CPS) received a complaint from Cameron Memorial Community Hospital (Cameron Memorial) in Indiana, after the birth of IRK. An employee of Cameron Memorial reported that IRK had tested positive for methamphetamine at birth. CPS did not investigate this complaint, but received another complaint in January 2021 regarding respondent's failure to supervise IRK. CPS investigated that complaint but could not locate or contact respondent. In March 2021, Sergeant Anthony Newman of the Emmett Township Department of Public Safety contacted CPS to report that he had located respondent, IRK's putative father, and IRK in a home, without authorization, with no running water or electricity, and surrounded by methamphetamine and syringes. Respondent admitted to Sergeant Newman that she had used methamphetamine a couple of days before that incident. Petitioner, the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), subsequently filed an ex parte petition requesting that the trial court issue an order removing IRK from respondent's care. The trial court issued the order that same day and, on March 13, 2021, CPS removed IRK from respondent's care.
Respondent's CPS file indicates that one of respondent's children had died of "shaken baby syndrome" while in her care. Further, respondent's parental rights to three other children were terminated, and she was incarcerated from 2015-2017 for crimes related to methamphetamine use. As a result, DHHS requested that the trial court terminate respondent's rights to IRK at the initial dispositional hearing. The adjudication hearing began on May 5, 2020. It continued on May 20, 2020, and the initial dispositional hearing was held that afternoon. At that hearing, the trial court terminated respondent's parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(i) and (j). The trial court found that DHHS had made reasonable efforts towards reunification by offering respondent various services between IRK's removal and the dispositional hearing, as well as in respondent's earlier terminations, but that respondent had availed herself of none of them. The trial court also found that respondent's parental rights to three of IRK's siblings had previously been terminated, and that respondent had failed to rectify the conditions, specifically substance abuse and neglect, that had led to the earlier terminations. Finally, the trial court determined that IRK would be at great risk of harm in respondent's care, and that termination was in IRK's best interests.
This appeal followed.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review for clear error whether DHHS made reasonable efforts at reunification. In re Frey, 297 Mich.App. 242, 247; 824 N.W.2d 569 (2012); In re Fried, 266 Mich.App. 535, 541; 702 N.W.2d 192 (2005). We review de novo issues involving the interpretation of statutes and court rules. Bint v Doe, 274 Mich.App. 232, 234; 732 N.W.2d 156 (2007).
III. ANALYSIS
Respondent argues that the trial court erred by determining that DHHS made reasonable efforts at reunification. We disagree, however, that DHHS was even required to make such efforts; in any event, we conclude DHHS made reasonable efforts under the circumstances of this case.
"Reasonable efforts to reunify the child and family must be made in all cases except those involving aggravated circumstances under MCL 712A.19(a)(2)." In re Mason, 486 Mich. 142, 152; 782 N.W.2d 747 (2010). Reasonable efforts include services "to the parents, child, and foster parents in order to improve the conditions in the parents' home, facilitate return of the child to his own safe home or permanent placement of the child." In re Rood, 483 Mich. 73, 104-105; 763 N.W.2d 587 (2009) (quotation marks and citations omitted). When DHHS has an obligation to offer services, the respondent-parent has a commensurate duty to participate in the services and to benefit from them. See In re TK, 306 Mich.App. 698, 711; 859 N.W.2d 208 (2014) ("Not only must respondent cooperate and participate in the services, she must benefit from them."). Moreover, a respondent who challenges the services provided by DHHS must be able to demonstrate that he or she would have fared better if different services had been offered. See Fried, 266 Mich.App. at 543 (finding that the respondent did not demonstrate that he would have fared better if DHHS had offered additional services to him).
Although DHHS is generally required to make reasonable efforts to reunify the child and family, they are not required to do so if "[t]here is a judicial determination that the parent has subjected the child to aggravated circumstances as provided in section 18(1) and (2) of the child protection law, . . . MCL 722.638." MCL 712A.19a(2)(a). Relatedly, MCL 722.638 states:
(1) The department shall submit a petition for authorization by the court under section 2(b) of chapter XIIA of 1939 PA 288, MCL 712A.2, if 1 or more of the following apply:
* * *
(b) The department determines that there is risk of harm, child abuse, or child neglect to the child and either of the following is true:
(i) The parent's rights to another child were terminated as a result of proceedings under section 2(b) of chapter XIIA of 1939 PA 288, MCL 712A.2, or a similar law of another state and the parent has failed to rectify the conditions that led to the prior termination of parental rights. MCL 722.638(1)(b)(/).
Moreover, MCR 3.977(E) states:
The court shall order termination of the parental rights of a respondent at the initial dispositional hearing held pursuant to MCR 3.973, and shall order that additional efforts for reunification of the child with the respondent shall not be made, if
(1) the original, or amended, petition contains a request for termination;
(2) at the trial or plea proceedings, the trier of fact finds by a preponderance of the evidence that one or more of the grounds for assumption of jurisdiction over the child under MCL 712A.2(b) have been established;
(3) at the initial disposition hearing, the court finds on the basis of clear and convincing legally admissible evidence that had been introduced at the trial or plea proceedings, or that is introduced at the dispositional hearing, that one or more facts alleged in the petition:
(a) are true, and
(b) establish grounds for termination of parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(a), (b), (d), (e), (f), (g), (h), (i), (j), (k), (/), or (m);
(4) termination of parental rights is in the child's best interests.
The record demonstrates that respondent subjected IRK to aggravated circumstances, as described in MCL 722.638(1). In its petition, DHHS sought termination of respondent's parental rights, and at the adjudication hearing, DHHS requested termination at the initial disposition. DHHS alleged that respondent's rights to three of IRK's siblings were terminated because of improper supervision, failure to protect, and physical neglect of the children. The basis for respondent's termination in this case also involves improper supervision and physical neglect. DHHS also alleged that respondent had caused IRK to be born positive for methamphetamine, which respondent has been using since 2014, and that since IRK's birth CPS had received two complaints regarding respondent's improper supervision of IRK. These allegations were supported by the exhibits and testimony proffered at the adjudication hearing and initial dispositional hearing.
At the adjudication hearing, the trial court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that there were statutory grounds to exercise jurisdiction over IRK under MCL 712A.2(b)(2). On the basis of the testimony and exhibits presented, the trial court found that respondent had failed to protect IRK, because she admitted to using methamphetamine after IRK's birth and had allowed IRK to be in a home that contained methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia; in fact, the trial court found that the drugs and paraphernalia where within six feet of IRK. The trial court further noted that respondent has been struggling with a methamphetamine addiction since at least 2014, and that respondent's previous parental rights terminations were also premised on respondent's failure to protect her children, as well as chronic and serious substance abuse. As a result of respondent's failure to provide IRK with basic necessities for the care of a child, the death of IRK's sibling, respondent's multiple earlier terminations and significant substance abuse history, and her failure to protect IRK from serious harm, the trial court found there were statutory grounds to exercise jurisdiction over IRK under MCL 712A.2(b)(2).
The trial court made similar findings when it held that DHHS had established statutory grounds for termination. Specifically, the trial court noted that the earlier termination of respondent's parental rights to three of IRK's siblings, and the death of another, had resulted from issues with substance abuse, failure to protect, and criminality. Further, the court noted that respondent was offered services related to the earlier terminations, but had declined to engage in or benefit from those services. The trial court found that the same issues were present in this case. Therefore, it found that DHHS had established, by clear and convincing evidence, grounds to terminate respondent's parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(i) and (j). The trial court also found that termination was in IRK's best interests.
Given these findings, the trial court satisfied the requirements of MCR 3.977(E) in terminating respondent's parental rights at the initial dispositional hearing. The trial determined, based on the evidence presented, that: (1) respondent had placed IRK at risk of serious and chronic neglect and physical abuse; (2) respondent's parental rights to three other children were also terminated as a result of child protective proceedings; and (3) respondent had failed to rectify the conditions that led to her previous terminations of parental rights. Such stated findings by the trial court constitute a judicial determination that a respondent-parent subjected her child to aggravated circumstances, under MCL 722.638(1) and (2). In re Rippy, 330 Mich.App. 350, 358-359; 948 N.W.2d 131 (2019) (determining that the trial court's stated findings, the respondent's admission to drinking alcohol throughout her pregnancy, the child's resulting medical issues, and the respondent's failure to seek beneficial services, amounted to a judicial determination that respondent had subjected her child to aggravated circumstances, as provided in MCL 722.638). Accordingly, under MCL 712A.19b(2)(a), DHHS was not required to make reasonable efforts to reunite respondent with IRK, and respondent's argument that DHHS failed to make reasonable efforts is without merit.
In any event, the trial court did not err when it found that DHHS made reasonable efforts to reunite respondent and IRK. Respondent did not demonstrate that she would have fared better if different services were offered. Fried, 266 Mich.App. at 543. Further, the record shows that DHHS offered a number of services to respondent before IRK's birth as well as after IRK's removal from respondent's care. These services included: (a) attempts to schedule parenting time with respondent and IRK; (b) various attempts at communication, using a variety of methods; and (c) referrals for transportation services, drug screening services, and housing services. These efforts to provide services were repeatedly frustrated by respondent's absenteeism, refusal to keep in contact with DHHS workers, and inability to be located by service providers despite extensive efforts. Respondent admitted that she did not keep in contact with her caseworker as much as she should have, and that DHHS offered her transportation services as well as drug screening. Although respondent testified that she did not participate in services because she did not have identification, respondent also admitted that when she informed DHHS of this issue, they gave her information on a drug screening service that she was able to participate in, even without official identification; yet respondent never participated in drug screening. Respondent's caseworker also testified that respondent was offered transportation to services and parenting time, but that respondent never contacted her for transportation.
Even assuming that DHHS had an obligation to offer services, respondent had a corresponding duty to participate in the services and to benefit from them. TK, 306 Mich.App. at 711. This record shows that DHHS offered respondent services addressing her specific needs- for example, her need for transportation services, and drug screening services that did not require identification. The record also shows that respondent either declined to participate in, or failed to complete, the services offered by DHHS.
Nonetheless, respondent argues that DHHS failed to provide her with adequate services in light of the COVID-19 pandemic. Respondent does not elaborate further on appeal, and made no argument before the trial court regarding the pandemic's effect on the services provided to her. Respondent did not even assert before the trial court that the pandemic had made it more difficult to comply with her service plan. Respondent cited her lack of a vehicle and identification as reasons why she could not participate in services. In addition, DHHS offered multiple services to respondent between IRK's removal and respondent's termination, despite the pandemic. Respondent's arguments regarding her lack of a cellular telephone or stable residence are similarly meritless.
Despite having had seven years to address her substance abuse issues, respondent was no closer to being able to care for a child at the time of IRK's dispositional hearing than she was when she first came into contact with DHHS in 2014. And, as the trial court noted, DHHS could have removed IRK at her birth, given that respondent's parental rights to three other children had been terminated, and that another child had died while in respondent's care. See MCL 712A.19b(3)(i) (making involuntary termination of parental rights to a child's sibling a ground for termination). However, DHHS did not remove IRK until after it received two complaints related to respondent's failure to supervise IRK, which was about two months after IRK's birth. During the time between IRK's removal and respondent's termination, DHHS referred respondent to the housing services, drug screenings, and transportation services; respondent availed herself of none of them.
In sum, although DHHS was not required to make reasonable efforts at reunification, the record shows that DHHS did make efforts that were reasonable under the circumstances, and that respondent was unable or unwilling to engage with these services to any degree. Respondent even missed every parenting time appointment that had been scheduled, and frequently declined to schedule appointments when she was permitted to do so. The trial court did not err by terminating respondent's parental rights at the initial dispositional hearing. Frey, 297 Mich.App. at 247.
Affirmed.