Opinion
2 CA-JV 2023-0110
03-21-2024
In re Termination of Parental Rights as to I.P.,
Ulysses P., San Luis Obispo, California In Propria Persona Pima County Office of Children's Counsel, Tucson By David Miller Counsel for Minor
Not for Publication - Rule 111(c), Rules of the Arizona Supreme Court
Appeal from the Superior Court in Pima County No. S20200025 The Honorable Geoffrey L. Ferlan, Judge Pro Tempore
AFFIRMED
Ulysses P., San Luis Obispo, California In Propria Persona
Pima County Office of Children's Counsel, Tucson By David Miller Counsel for Minor
Judge Sklar authored the decision of the Court, in which Vice Chief Judge Staring and Judge O'Neil concurred.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
SKLAR, Judge
¶1 Ulysses P. appeals from the juvenile court's order terminating his parental rights to his daughter, I.P., born June 2014, under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(4) based on his incarceration for a felony. He argues the court erred in finding termination was in I.P.'s best interests. We affirm.
¶2 I.P.'s mother, Michelle, petitioned to terminate Ulysses's parental rights following his October 2019 arrest for sexually assaulting her older daughters. Ulysses was later convicted in California and sentenced to a ninety-year prison term. He pled no contest to the allegation in an amended petition that termination was warranted under § 8-533(B)(4) because his incarceration would deprive I.P. "of a normal home for a period of years." He argued, however, that termination was not in I.P.'s best interests because she could lose contact with her paternal family, including her grandparents.
¶3 The juvenile court granted the petition to terminate Ulysses's parental rights. It found termination was in I.P.'s best interests because she would be adopted by her stepfather and was bonded with him. It additionally noted that her relationship with her paternal family was "unsupported and unstable." This appeal followed.
¶4 On appeal, Ulysses argues that insufficient evidence supports the juvenile court's best-interests finding because he was "innocent of any crimes and [he] anticipate[s] prevailing in appealing [his] criminal conviction." "We review the court's termination decision for an abuse of discretion and will affirm unless no reasonable evidence supports the court's findings." Jessie D. v. Dep't of Child Safety, 251 Ariz. 574, ¶ 10 (2021). "Once the juvenile court finds by clear and convincing evidence that a statutory ground for termination exists, the court must then determine by a preponderance of the evidence whether severance is in the child's best interests." Id. ¶ 26. Termination is in a child's best interests if the child will benefit from severance or be harmed if severance is denied. Id. ¶ 27.
¶5 Ulysses did not raise this argument below and, accordingly, has waived it on appeal. See Christy C. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 214 Ariz. 445, ¶ 21 (App. 2007). Moreover, he has not meaningfully complied with our rules governing appellate briefs. See Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 13(a) (appellate brief must contain statement of facts with citation to the record and argument including supporting authority); see also Ariz. R. P. Juv. Ct. 607(b) (Rule 13, Ariz. R. Civ. App. P., applies to appeals from juvenile court). His failure to cite the record or provide legal support for his arguments also constitutes waiver. See Bennigno R. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 233 Ariz. 345, ¶ 11 (App. 2013); Ritchie v. Krasner, 221 Ariz. 288, ¶ 62 (App. 2009). Additionally, his argument is, at its core, an attack on the basis for termination due to the length of his sentence-a sentence he now claims he will not serve to completion. As we noted, Ulysses admitted his incarceration was of sufficient length to warrant termination under § 8-533(B)(4), and there is no basis to revisit that admission through the lens of best interests. Finally, Ulysses has not identified any evidence suggesting he is likely to prevail in his efforts to overturn his convictions and sentence.
Ulysses suggests in his reply brief that the juvenile court erred by denying his efforts to delay the contested hearing until his appeal was resolved. It does not appear Ulysses filed any such motion and, in any event, we do not address arguments first raised in reply. See Romero v. Sw. Ambulance, 211 Ariz. 200, n.3 (App. 2005).
¶6 We affirm the juvenile court's order terminating Ulysses's parental rights to I.P.