Opinion
J-S02034-20 No. 1589 MDA 2019 No. 1590 MDA 2019 No. 1591 MDA 2019 No. 1592 MDA 2019 No. 1593 MDA 2019 No. 1594 MDA 2019 No. 1595 MDA 2019 No. 1596 MDA 2019 No. 1598 MDA 2019 No. 1599 MDA 2019 No. 1600 MDA 2019 No. 1602 MDA 2019 No. 1603 MDA 2019 No. 1605 MDA 2019
03-18-2020
IN THE INTEREST OF: R.L., A MINOR APPEAL OF: E.L., FATHER IN RE: ADOPTION OF: R.E.L., A MINOR APPEAL OF: E.L., FATHER IN THE INTEREST OF: K.L., A MINOR APPEAL OF: E.L., FATHER IN RE: ADOPTION OF: K.M.L., A MINOR APPEAL OF: E.L., FATHER IN THE INTEREST OF: D.L., A MINOR APPEAL OF: E.L., FATHER IN RE: ADOPTION OF: D.L.L, A MINOR APPEAL OF: E.L., FATHER IN THE INTEREST OF: A.L., A MINOR APPEAL OF: E.L., FATHER IN RE: ADOPTION OF: A.N.L., A MINOR APPEAL OF: E.L., FATHER IN THE INTEREST OF: T.L., A MINOR APPEAL OF: E.L., FATHER IN RE: ADOPTION OF: T.O.L., A MINOR APPEAL OF: E.L., FATHER IN THE INTEREST OF: E.L., A MINOR APPEAL OF: E.L., FATHER IN RE: ADOPTION OF: E.L.L., A MINOR APPEAL OF: E.L., FATHER IN THE INTEREST OF: W.L., A MINOR APPEAL OF: E.L., FATHER IN RE: ADOPTION OF: W.A.L., A MINOR APPEAL OF: E.L., FATHER
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Order Entered August 22, 2019 in the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County
Juvenile Division at No(s): 39 Adopt 2019, 40 Adopt 2019, 41 Adopt 2019, 42 Adopt 2019, 43 Adopt 2019, 44 Adopt 2019, 45 Adopt 2019, CP-28-DP-0000072-2016, CP-28-DP-0000073-2016, CP-28-DP-0000075-2016, CP-28-DP-0000076-2016, CP-28-DP-0000077-2016, CP-28-DP-0000078-2016, CP-28-DP-0000079-2016 Appeal from the Decree Entered August 22, 2019 in the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County
Orphans' Court at No(s): 39-ADOPT-2019 Appeal from the Order Entered August 22, 2019 in the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County
Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-28-DP-0000073-2016 Appeal from the Decree Entered August 22, 2019 in the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County
Orphans' Court at No(s): 40-ADOPT-2019 Appeal from the Order Entered August 22, 2019 in the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County
Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-28-DP-0000075-2016 Appeal from the Decree Entered August 21, 2019 in the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County
Orphans' Court at No(s): 41-Adopt-2019 Appeal from the Order Entered August 22, 2019 in the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County
Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-28-DP-0000076-2016 Appeal from the Order Entered August 21, 2019 in the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County
Orphans' Court at No(s): 45-ADOPT-2019 Appeal from the Order Entered August 22, 2019 in the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County
Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-28-DP-0000077-2016 Appeal from the Decree Entered August 22, 2019 in the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County
Orphans' Court at No(s): 44-ADOPT-2019 Appeal from the Order Entered August 22, 2019 in the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County
Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-28-DP-0000078-2016 Appeal from the Decree Entered August 22, 2019 in the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County
Orphans' Court at No(s): 43-ADOPT-2019 Appeal from the Order Entered August 22, 2019 in the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County
Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-28-DP-0000079-2016 Appeal from the Order Entered August 21, 2019 in the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County
Orphans' Court at No(s): 42-ADOPT-2019 BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., KING, J., and MUSMANNO, J. MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.:
E.L. ("Father") appeals from the Decrees and Orders granting the Petitions filed by Franklin County Office of Children and Youth Services ("CYS"), involuntarily terminating Father's parental rights to his children with K.S.L. ("Mother"): R.E.L./R.L. (born in July 2006); K.M.L./K.L. (born in May 2007); D.L.L./D.L. (born in November 2008); W.A.L./W.L. (born in November 2009); E.L.L./E.L. (born in June 2013); T.O.L./T.L. (born in March 2015); and A.N.L./A.L. (born in October 2016) ("Children"), pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b), and changing Children's permanency goals to adoption pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351.,
On August 21, 2019, the trial court also entered Decrees involuntarily terminating Mother's parental rights, but she has not filed a brief in the instant appeal or any appeal from the termination Decrees or permanency review Orders.
Father and Mother have an eighth child, L.A.L., who resides with Father's mother and is not a subject of this appeal.
In its Opinion, the trial court set forth the factual background and procedural history of this appeal, which we adopt herein. See Trial Court Opinion, 10/17/19, at 2-17.
On July 12, 2019, CYS filed Petitions to terminate the parental rights of Father to Children, and, on July 19, 2019, CYS filed Petitions for permanency review hearings regarding Children. The trial court held evidentiary hearings on the Petitions on August 19-20, 2019, at which Father and Mother were present, along with their counsel, and all legal counsel and the GAL for Children. On August 22, 2019, the trial court entered termination Decrees and goal-change Orders. On September 18, 2019, Father timely filed Notices of Appeal, along with Concise Statements pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i).
The trial court appointed Attorney Kristen Hamilton to represent all Children as guardian ad litem ("GAL") and as legal counsel for T.O.L. and A.N.L.; Attorney Ann Rotz as legal counsel for R.E.L., K.M.L., D.L.L., and E.L.L.; and Attorney Barbara Townsend as legal counsel for W.A.L.
Father raises two issues:
[1. Whether, i]n the Adoption Docket, the trial court abused its discretion in terminating the parental rights of Father where he had not evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing his parental claim to the [C]hildren[,] and he was unfairly penalized by his employment as an interstate over[-]the[-]road truck driver that made it impracticable for him to complete some of the required services to achieve reunification[?]Father's Brief at 5.
[2. Whether, i]n the Juvenile Docket, the trial court abused its discretion in changing the permanency goal to adoption where Father's employment as an interstate over[-]the[-]road truck driver that [sic] made it impracticable for him to complete some of the required services to achieve reunification[?]
In his first claim, Father argues that the trial court erred and abused its discretion because CYS failed to prove that the requirements of 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (8) were satisfied, and there was no evidence to show he had a settled purpose of relinquishing his parental rights. See Father's Brief at 12-15. Father asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that he had minimally complied with the permanency plan for the family; made no progress toward alleviating the circumstances that necessitated Children's original placement; and, due to his work schedule, continued to present Mother as the primary caregiver. Id. Father contends that the trial court unfairly penalized him for his employment as an interstate over-the-road truck driver, which made it impracticable for him to complete some of the required services to achieve reunification. Id. at 12, 14.
In reviewing an appeal from a decree terminating parental rights, we adhere to the following standard:
[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion standard when considering a trial court's determination of a petition for termination of parental rights. As in dependency cases, our standard of review requires an appellate court to accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law or abused its discretion. As has been often stated, an abuse of discretion does not result merely because the reviewing court might have reached a different conclusion. Instead, a decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.
As we discussed in [ In re: R.J.T., 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010)], there are clear reasons for applying an abuse of discretion standard of review in these cases. We observed that, unlike trial courts, appellate courts are not equipped to make the fact-specific determinations on a cold record, where the trial judges are observing the parties during the relevant hearing and often presiding over numerous other hearings regarding the child and parents. R.J.T., 9 A.3d at 1190. Therefore, even where the facts
could support an opposite result, as is often the case in dependency and termination cases, an appellate court must resist the urge to second guess the trial court and impose its own credibility determinations and judgment; instead we must defer to the trial judges so long as the factual findings are supported by the record and the court's legal conclusions are not the result of an error of law or an abuse of discretion.In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826-27 (Pa. 2012) (some citations omitted).
In its Opinion, the trial court set forth the relevant law and cogently addressed Father's claims. See Trial Court Opinion, 10/17/19, at 18-27, 30-32. Our review of the record reflects that the trial court's decision to terminate the parental rights of Father under sections 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8) and (b) is supported by competent, clear and convincing evidence. See Adoption of S.P., supra. We therefore adopt the sound reasoning of the trial court for the purpose of this appeal, and affirm on this basis. See Trial Court Opinion, 10/17/19, at 18-27, 30-32.
Father does not raise section 2511(b) in the statement of questions involved in his brief. See Krebs v. United Refining Co. of Pa., 893 A.2d 776, 797 (Pa. Super. 2006) (stating that any issue not set forth in or suggested by an appellate brief's statement of questions involved is deemed waived). We, nevertheless, agree with the trial court's disposition of section 2511(b).
In his second claim, Father incorporates the points he set forth in his first argument, and reiterates that he was unfairly penalized due to the nature of his employment as an interstate over-the-road truck driver. See Father's Brief at 14-15.
The standard of review in dependency cases requires an appellate court to accept findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the record, but does not require the appellate court to accept the lower court's inferences or conclusions of law. We review for abuse of discretion.In Interest of: L.Z., A Minor Child , 111 A.3d 1164, 1174 (Pa. 2015) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
In its Opinion, the trial court set forth the relevant law and cogently addressed Father's claims. See Trial Court Opinion, 10/17/19, at 27-30, 30-32. Our review of the record reflects that the trial court's decision to change the Children's permanency goal to adoption is supported by competent, clear and convincing evidence. See id., supra. We therefore adopt the sound reasoning of the trial court for the purpose of this appeal, and affirm on this basis. See Trial Court Opinion, 10/17/19, at 27-30, 30-32.
Decrees and Orders affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 3/18/2020
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