See id. See In re Interest of Lisa V. , 3 Neb. App. 559, 529 N.W.2d 805 (1995). One of the reasons the juvenile court may terminate its jurisdiction over a juvenile is that the child is no longer in need of protection.

An order terminating the jurisdiction of the juvenile court is a final, appealable order. In re Interest of L.P. and R.P., 240 Neb. 112, 480 N.W.2d 421 (1992); In re Interest of Lisa V., 3 Neb. App. 559, 529 N.W.2d 805 (1995). Juvenile cases are reviewed de novo on the record, and the appellate court is required to reach a conclusion independent of the juvenile court's findings; however, when the evidence is in conflict, the appellate court will consider and give weight to the fact that the lower court observed the witnesses and accepted one version of the facts over the other.

Because the juvenile court is not a court of general jurisdiction, it lacks authority to modify or vacate its own judgments during the term in which they are rendered. See In re Interest of Lisa V., 3 Neb. App. 559, 529 N.W.2d 805 (1995). We conclude that the portion of the April 28, 2003, order purporting to modify the prior approval of Moran's fees and costs must be vacated and that the April 18 order approving those fees and costs must be reinstated. Moran assigns no error regarding the remaining portions of the April 28 order directing Moran to perform no additional work without express approval and appointing a coguardian ad litem, and our decision does not affect those portions of the April 28 order.

Clearly, juvenile courts are courts of limited and special jurisdiction. See In re Interest of Lisa V., 3 Neb. App. 559, 529 N.W.2d 805 (1995) (holding that juvenile court is not court of general jurisdiction). In Buckingham, supra, the court noted, "The absence of authorization for summary judgment motions found in the workers' compensation statutes contrasts with the express statutory authorization for the use of summary judgment motions in the district and county courts."