Opinion
NUMBER 13-19-00416-CV
01-28-2021
IN THE INTEREST OF K.S., A MINOR
On appeal from the County Court at Law No. 5 of Nueces County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Hinojosa and Silva
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Hinojosa
The Department of Family and Protective Services (the Department) filed a suit affecting the parent-child relationship (SAPCR) seeking to terminate the parental rights of appellant S.K. (Mother) to her minor child K.S. and to be named as K.S.'s managing conservator. Mother appeals the trial court's final judgment, which appoints her the sole managing conservator of K.S. and awards possessory conservatorship to appellees R.S. and V.S., the child's maternal great-uncle and great-aunt, respectively. In six issues, which we have reordered, Mother argues: (1) the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter a final order; (2) appellees' petition in intervention should be dismissed because they lacked standing; (3) the case should be dismissed because respondent "unknown father" was not served with citation; (4) the trial court abused its discretion in signing an emergency removal order because the Department's removal affidavit was deficient; (5) the adversary hearing was not timely held in violation of Mother's due process rights; and (6) the trial court erred in imposing a geographic restriction on Mother's right to designate the child's primary residence.
To protect the identity of the minor child, we refer to the child and her relatives by their initials or an alias. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 109.002(d); TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(a).
Appellees have not filed a brief to assist the Court in the resolution of this appeal.
K.S., through her attorney ad litem, also appeals the trial court's judgment. In three issues, which we treat as two, K.S. argues that: (1) the trial court was without jurisdiction to enter the final order; and (2) the trial court abused its discretion by ignoring Mother's completion of her service plan. We reverse and render in part and affirm in part.
I. BACKGROUND
On May 9, 2017, the Department filed an original SAPCR supported by a removal affidavit. The affiant, a Department caseworker, testified that the Department took custody of twenty-month-old K.S. the previous day because Mother was in the Nueces County Jail on charges of possession of a controlled substance and had left K.S. in the care of a friend with a history of drug use and criminal behavior. According to the affiant, the Department took K.S. to Driscoll Children's Hospital in Corpus Christi, Texas, where laboratory tests indicated that K.S. was exposed to amphetamines while in the care of Mother's friend. The trial court signed an order for protection of a child in an emergency which appointed the Department as the temporary managing conservator of K.S. and scheduled an adversary hearing to occur on May 22, 2017. On that date, the trial court ordered that K.S. be placed with appellees.
The adversary hearing commenced as scheduled but was recessed until June 6, 2017. Following the recessed hearing, the trial court signed an order maintaining the Department as K.S.'s temporary managing conservator and requiring Mother to comply with a family service plan signed by Mother and the Department.
Appellees filed a "Motion Seeking Intervention" on October 23, 2017. In their most recent pleading, filed on October 3, 2018, appellees requested to be named joint managing conservators of K.S. or, in the alternative, to be named possessory conservators.
On May 24, 2018, the trial court signed an order retaining the suit on the trial court's docket and extending the statutory dismissal deadline from May 14, 2018, to October 7, 2018. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.401 ("Dismissal After One Year; New Trials; Extension"). On August 9, 2018, the trial court ordered that K.S. be returned to the care of Mother while the Department retained temporary managing conservatorship. See id. § 263.403 ("Monitored Return of Child to Parent"). The trial court did not further extend the dismissal date.
The case proceeded to a final hearing on January 30, 2019, and February 27, 2019, during which the Department recommended that the trial court award sole managing conservatorship to Mother, who had maintained her sobriety and had successfully completed her court-ordered services. Appellees requested to be appointed joint managing conservators or, in the alternative, possessory conservators.
Evonne Flores, a Department caseworker, testified at the hearing that Mother had been drug free since September 2017. Flores stated that Mother completed her court-ordered services, including counseling and drug rehabilitation. According to Flores, Mother currently provided K.S. with a positive home environment. Flores stated that Mother had a job and transportation. Flores observed that K.S. has been very happy since being returned to Mother's care. Flores stated that Mother's case was one of the "very few successful cases" she has worked on for the Department. Flores did not believe Mother would prevent appellees from seeing K.S. Flores stated that Mother previously accommodated appellees' requests to have visitation outside of the court-ordered schedule. Flores noted that Mother had been open to having appellees be a part of K.S.'s life outside of a court-ordered relationship.
Haitham Jifi-Bahlool, M.D., testified that Mother had been his patient since 2014. During that time, Dr. Jifi-Bahlool prescribed medication for pain management. Dr. Jifi-Bahlool acknowledged that Mother may have been prescribed pain medication during the early part of Mother's pregnancy with K.S. However, Dr. Jifi-Bahlool agreed with counsel's statement that K.S. did not test positive for any harmful narcotics at birth.
V.S. testified that she and R.S. took care of K.S. from May 22, 2017 through August 9, 2018, when she was returned to Mother's care. V.S. testified that K.S. was "in pretty bad shape emotionally" when she came into her care after being away from Mother for a month. V.S. stated that K.S. received play therapy to help her with attachment disorder, which "helped [K.S.] a lot." V.S. testified that she and Mother "work very well together most of the time."
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court took the matter under advisement. On May 31, 2019, the trial court signed a final order appointing Mother as the permanent managing conservator of K.S. The trial court appointed appellees as possessory conservators. The trial court granted appellees' request to restrict Mother's right to designate the child's primary residence to Nueces County, Texas. Upon the Department's request, the trial court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court denied motions for new trial filed by Mother and the Department. This appeal followed.
II. JURISDICTION
By her first issue, Mother argues that the trial court lost jurisdiction by operation of law because it failed to commence a trial on the merits within the statutory deadline. Mother maintains that the trial court's final order is void as a result. K.S. presents the same argument in her first issue.
An appellate court does not have jurisdiction to address the merits of appeals from void orders. Freedom Commc'ns., Inc. v. Coronado, 372 S.W.3d 621, 623-24 (Tex. 2012). In such a case, the appellate court must declare the orders void and dismiss the appeal. See State ex rel. Latty v. Owens, 907 S.W.2d 484, 486 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam). Section 263.401 of the family code provides that the Department's lawsuit requesting termination of parental rights must be dismissed on the first Monday after the first anniversary of the date the court rendered the first temporary order naming the Department as temporary managing conservator unless the court has commenced a trial on the merits or granted a one-time extension under subsection (b). See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.401.
Sections 263.401 and 263.402 of the family code were amended by the 85th Legislature. The last version of those amendments took effect on September 1, 2017 and is applicable only to suits filed on or after the effective date. Act of May 28, 2017, 85th Leg., R.S., ch. 319, § 33, 2017 TEX. GEN LAWS 713, 735; see TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 311.025(b) (calling for resolution of conflicting amendments by providing that bill upon which the last legislative vote was taken controls); see also In re K.M., No. 05-16-01048-CV, 2017 WL 491262 at *1-2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 7, 2017, pet. denied) (mem. op.). Because the present suit was filed before September 1, 2017, we cite to the version of the statutes in force when suit was filed, unless otherwise indicated.
To be entitled to dismissal, a party to a termination proceeding must file a motion to dismiss before the trial on the merits commences. See id. § 263.402(b). If a party fails to make a timely motion to dismiss, then the party "waives the right to object to the court's failure to dismiss the suit." Id. The statutory dismissal deadline applicable to the present case is not jurisdictional in nature. In re Dep't of Family & Protective Servs., 273 S.W.3d 637, 642 (Tex. 2009).
Under the current version of the statute, if the trial court fails to commence the trial before the statutory deadline, "the court's jurisdiction over the suit . . . is terminated and the suit is automatically dismissed without a court order." TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.401(a).
Here, the trial on the merits was held after the extended statutory dismissal deadline. However, no party filed a motion to dismiss in the trial court. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.402(b); In re Dep't of Family & Protective Servs., 273 S.W.3d at 642. Having failed to do so, Mother and K.S. have waived error concerning the trial court's failure to dismiss the suit. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.402(b); In re Dep't of Family & Protective Servs., 273 S.W.3d at 642. We overrule both Mother and K.S.'s first issue.
III. STANDING
In her second issue, Mother argues that appellees lacked standing to intervene.
A. Standard of Review & Applicable Law
A party seeking conservatorship of a child must have standing to seek such relief. In re S.S.J.-J., 153 S.W.3d 132, 134 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2004, no pet.). As a general rule, an individual's standing to intervene is commensurate with that individual's standing to file an original lawsuit. Whitworth v. Whitworth, 222 S.W.3d 616, 621 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.). "Standing is implicit in the concept of subject matter jurisdiction." Tex. Ass'n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 443 (Tex. 1993). Because "[s]ubject matter jurisdiction is essential to the authority of a court to decide a case," a party's lack of standing deprives the court of subject matter jurisdiction and renders any subsequent trial court action void. Id.; In re Smith, 260 S.W.3d 568, 572 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, orig. proceeding). Standing cannot be conferred by consent or waiver and may be raised for the first time on appeal. In re A.C.F.H., 373 S.W.3d 148, 150 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2012, no pet.). A party's standing to seek relief is a question of law we review de novo. Tex. Dep't of Transp. v. City of Sunset Valley, 146 S.W.3d 637, 646 (Tex. 2004); In re S.S.J.-J., 153 S.W.3d at 134. When, as here, standing is challenged for the first time on appeal, the appellate court construes the pleadings in favor of the appellee and reviews the entire record to determine if any evidence supports standing. Tex. Ass'n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 446; In re A.C.F.H., 373 S.W.3d at 150.
B. Analysis
Mother argues that appellees lacked standing to intervene under § 102.004(a) of the family code which permits "a grandparent, or another relative of the child related within the third degree by consanguinity, [to] file an original suit requesting managing conservatorship" under certain circumstances. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 102.004(a). We agree that appellees, who are not related to K.S. within the third degree of consanguinity, would not have standing to file an original suit under § 102.004(a). See id.; TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 573.023 ("Computation of Degree of Consanguinity"). However, Mother fails to address other statutory provisions supporting appellees' standing in this case. For instance, "an original suit may be filed at any time by . . . a person, other than a foster parent, who has had actual care, control, and possession of the child for at least six months ending not more than 90 days preceding the date of the filing of the petition[.]" TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 102.003(a)(9). Having reviewed the entire record, we conclude that the record supports appellees' standing under § 102.003(a)(9). See Tex. Ass'n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 446; In re A.C.F.H., 373 S.W.3d at 150. At the time appellees filed their second amended petition to intervene, their period of possession of K.S. extended to over a year, and the possession period ended less than ninety days preceding the filing of the petition. Further, appellees' standing to intervene is commensurate with their standing to file an original suit under § 102.003(a)(9). See Whitworth, 222 S.W.3d at 621. Accordingly, we overrule Mother's second issue.
Appellees could have also intervened pursuant to § 102.004(b) of the family code, which provides that the trial court "may grant a . . . person . . . deemed by the court to have had substantial past contact with the child leave to intervene in a pending suit filed by a person authorized to do so under this chapter if there is satisfactory proof to the court that appointment of a parent as a sole managing conservator or both parents as joint managing conservators would significantly impair the child's physical health or emotional development." TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 102.004(b). Section 102.004 has since been amended to add subsection (b-1), which reads as follows: "A foster parent may only be granted leave to intervene under Subsection(b) if the foster parent would have standing to file an original suit as provided by Section 102.003(a)(12)." Act of May 19, 2017, 85th Leg., R.S., ch. 341, § 1, 2017 TEX. GEN LAWS; see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 102.003(a)(12) (affording standing to file an original suit to "the foster parent of a child placed by the Department of Family and Protective Services in the person's home for at least 12 months ending not more than 90 days preceding the date of the filing of the petition"). The present case was filed before the amendment's effective date of September 1, 2017. Act of May 19, 2017, 85th Leg., R.S., ch. 341, § 2, 2017 TEX. GEN LAWS.
In overruling this issue, we express no opinion as to whether the trial court abused its discretion in awarding possessory conservatorship to appellees as that issue is not before the Court. We observe, however, that the trial court's conservatorship determinations are subject to modification where "modification would be in the best interest of the child" and "the circumstances of the child, a conservator, or other party affected by the order have materially and substantially changed[.]" TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 156.101(a).
IV. SERVICE
In her third issue, Mother argues that the case must be dismissed because K.S.'s father was not served with citation.
The Department alleged in its petition that K.S.'s father was unknown. Although the unknown father's parental rights were not terminated, we note that the family code permits the termination of the rights of an alleged father to a child over one year of age at the time a petition is filed when the alleged father's identity and location are unknown and the alleged father has not registered with the paternity registry. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.002(b)(2)(A). "The termination of the rights of an alleged father under Subsection (b)(2) . . . does not require personal service of citation or citation by publication on the alleged father, and there is no requirement to identify or locate an alleged father who has not registered with the paternity registry under Chapter 160." Id. § 161.002(c-1). Based on our resolution of this issue, we need not decide whether service on the unknown father was required in this case. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.
A complete failure of service deprives a litigant of due process. In re P.RJ E., 499 S.W.3d 571, 574-75 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. denied). However, a party lacks standing to assert a due process violation based on the improper service of another party. In re Guardianship of V.A., 390 S.W.3d 414, 418 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2012, pet. denied); Sw. Constr. Receivables, Ltd. v. Regions Bank, 162 S.W.3d 859, 864 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2005, pet. denied); see Gonzalez v. Gonzalez, 331 S.W.3d 864, 867 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, no pet.) ("[Appellant] does not have standing to assert an alleged violation of the due process rights of a third-party."); see also In re E.M., No. 12-09-00092-CV, 2010 WL 3341463, at *1-2 (Tex. App.—Tyler Aug. 25, 2010, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
Mother does not have standing to raise an issue concerning service of process for K.S.'s father. See In re Guardianship of V.A., 390 S.W.3d at 418; Regions Bank, 162 S.W.3d at 864. Therefore, we overrule Mother's third issue.
V. EX PARTE REMOVAL & ADVERSARY HEARING
In her fourth issue, Mother argues that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering the initial removal of K.S. because the Department's removal affidavit was "fatally flawed." In her fifth issue, Mother complains of the trial court's failure to timely hold an adversary hearing following removal.
A. Applicable Law
Chapter 262 of the family code sets forth the procedural and substantive requirements for the Department to take possession of a child when necessary to protect that child's health and safety. In re J.M., 549 S.W.3d 330, 332-33 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2018, no pet.). Under this chapter, the Department is granted authority in urgent circumstances to remove a child from his or her home without prior notice. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 262.101, 262.104. This emergency authority is subject to judicial oversight. See id. §§ 262.102, 262.106-.107. After the Department takes possession of a child without a court order, the Department is required to, among other things "request an initial hearing to be held by no later than the first business day after the date the child is taken into possession." Id. § 262.105(a). The initial hearing is held so the trial court can review the propriety of the removal and issue a temporary order. See id. §§ 262.106(a), 262.107. The initial hearing may be ex parte. Id. § 262.106(b).
Additionally, a full adversary hearing must be "held not later than the 14th day after the date the child was taken into possession" by the Department. Id. § 262.201(a). The full adversary hearing serves the same purpose as the initial hearing—the Department must prove that "there is a continuing danger to the physical health or safety of the child[ren]" and that remaining in the home is contrary to the welfare of the children. Id. § 262.201(h). However, the adversary hearing affords the parents the opportunity to present evidence on their own behalf, hear and challenge the Department's evidence, and challenge the Department's right to retain the children it previously took into custody under an ex parte order. In re E.D.L., 105 S.W.3d 679, 688 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, pet. denied).
The requirements of §§ 262.106 and 262.201 are procedural, not jurisdictional. In re J.M., 549 S.W.3d at 333. Therefore, a party may challenge the trial court's removal orders only through mandamus proceedings. See id.; In re E.R.W., 528 S.W.3d 251, 257 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.). Once a trial court renders a final judgment, any issue concerning its earlier removal orders becomes moot. See In re E.R.W., 528 S.W.3d at 257.
B. Analysis
Mother did not challenge the trial court's removal and temporary orders through a mandamus proceeding. See In re J.M., 549 S.W.3d at 333; In re E.R.W., 528 S.W.3d at 257; see also In re J.D.S., 494 S.W.3d 387, 389 (Tex. App.—Waco 2015, no pet.) (holding that the trial court's decision to allow Department to maintain custody of child following an adversary hearing is reviewable, if at all, through petition for writ of mandamus). Because the trial court has since rendered a final judgment, we conclude that Mother's complaints about the temporary orders authorizing removal are now moot. See In re E.R.W., 528 S.W.3d at 257 (holding that Mother's issue challenging temporary orders of the trial court were moot); see also L.F. v. Dep't of Family & Protective Servs., No. 01-10-01148-CV, 2012 WL 1564547, at *14 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] May 3, 2012, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (declining to review the trial court's temporary orders authorizing emergency removal after a final order of termination was entered). We overrule Mother's fourth and fifth issues.
VI. BRIEFING WAIVER
We next address K.S.'s second issue, in which she asks: "Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it ex post facto changed the requirements, ignored the completion of the service plan and subsequently reduced the rights of appellant similar to the rejection of a plea deal[?]"
K.S.'s argument in support of this issue is conclusory. Further, she fails to support her argument with citation to the record or pertinent authority. Rule 38.1 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure requires that an appellant's brief "contain a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record." TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i). "Bare assertions of error without argument or authority waive error." In re J.A.M.R., 303 S.W.3d 422, 425 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.). An appellate court is not permitted to perform an independent review of the record and applicable law to determine whether there was error. Valadez v. Avitia, 238 S.W.3d 843, 845 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2007, no pet.). In doing so, we would be abandoning our role as neutral adjudicators and become an advocate for that party. Id. We overrule K.S.'s second issue as it is inadequately briefed.
VII. GEOGRAPHIC RESTRICTION
In her sixth issue, Mother argues the trial court abused its discretion by imposing a geographic restriction on Mother's right to establish K.S.'s primary residence.
A. Standard of Review & Applicable Law
An appellate court reviews a trial court's order regarding conservatorship under an abuse of discretion standard. Gillespie v. Gillespie, 644 S.W.2d 449, 451 (Tex. 1982); In re Christensen, 570 S.W.3d 933, 937 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2019, no pet.). A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily and unreasonably or without reference to any guiding principles. In re Christensen, 570 S.W.3d at 937. Legal and factual insufficiency are not independent grounds for reversing a conservatorship ruling, but they are factors relevant to our assessment of whether the trial court abused its discretion. Id. When an appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in cases where the proper standard is abuse of discretion, we engage in a two-prong analysis: (1) we ask whether the trial court had sufficient information upon which to exercise its discretion; and (2) we ask whether the trial court erred in its application of its discretion. In re A.C.M., 593 S.W.3d 894, 897 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2019, no pet.).
"The best interest of the child shall always be the primary consideration of the court in determining the issues of conservatorship and possession of and access to the child." TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.002; Lenz v. Lenz, 79 S.W.3d 10, 24 (Tex. 2002). The family code authorizes a trial court to impose a geographic residency restriction when it appoints joint managing conservators. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 105.002, 153.133, 153.134. This is consistent with the legislature's statement that "[t]he public policy of this state is to . . . assure that children will have frequent and continuing contact with parents who have shown the ability to act in the best interest of the child[.]" Id. § 153.001. A number of our sister courts have held that the trial court's authority to impose a geographic residency restriction extends to sole managing conservators, even in the absence of statutory authorization. See Guion v. Guion, 597 S.W.3d 899, 908 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, no pet.); In re S.M.D., 329 S.W.3d 8, 22 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2010, pet. dism'd); In re M.M.M., 307 S.W.3d 846, 850-52 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2010, no pet.); In re A.S., 298 S.W.3d 834, 836 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2009, no pet.); see also In re D.C., No. 05-12-01574-CV, 2014 WL 1887611, at *7 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 9, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op).
In considering whether a geographic restriction is in the best interest of the child, the Texas Supreme Court suggested consideration of the following factors: (1) the reasons for and against a prospective move, including the parents' good faith motives in requesting or opposing it; (2) health, education, and leisure opportunities afforded by the prospective move; (3) the degree of economic, emotional, and educational enhancement for the custodial parent and child; (4) the effect on extended family relationships; (5) accommodation of the child's special needs or talents; (6) the effect on visitation and communication with the non-custodial parent to maintain a full and continuous relationship with the child; (7) the possibility of a visitation schedule allowing the continuation of a meaningful relationship between the non-custodial parent and child; and (8) the ability of the non-custodial parent to relocate. Lenz, 79 S.W.3d at 15-16.
B. Analysis
Mother argues there is no evidence that public policy, as articulated by the legislature, would be served by a geographic restriction in this case. We construe Mother's argument as challenging the sufficiency of the evidence on which the trial court exercised its discretion. The trial court made no explicit findings of fact concerning whether the geographic restriction was in K.S.'s best interest. Therefore, we examine the record for evidence to support the trial court's implied findings of fact. See Mauldin v. Clements, 428 S.W.3d 247, 263 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.).
Reviewing the record in its entirety, we find no evidence demonstrating that a geographic restriction was in K.S.'s best interest. There is no evidence that a geographic restriction was required to facilitate appellees' possessory rights. For instance, there was no evidence that Mother had interfered with previous court-ordered visitation between appellees and K.S., that Mother intended to relocate, or that a prospective move by Mother would be contrary K.S.'s best interests. The record generally reflects that Mother was cooperative with appellees in ensuring their access to K.S. There is a complete absence of evidence pertaining to any of the factors identified by the Texas Supreme Court in Lenz. See Lenz, 79 S.W.3d at 15-16. Without any evidence supporting the trial court's implied findings, we conclude that the trial court lacked sufficient information upon which to exercise its discretion in imposing a geographic restriction. See In re A.C.M., 593 S.W.3d at 897; see also In re M.C.M., No. 11-13-00375-CV, 2014 WL 3698283, at *8 (Tex. App.—Eastland July 17, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding that the trial court did not have sufficient information upon which to determine that a geographic restriction was in the child's best interest); In re T.L.S., No. 02-08-00238-CV, 2009 WL 976007, at *5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 9, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.) (concluding that there was no evidence to support the trial court's modification by further restricting a managing conservator's right to designate the child's primary residence). Therefore, we hold that the trial court abused its discretion by restricting K.S.'s primary residence to Nueces County, Texas. See Gillespie, 644 S.W.2d at 451; In re Christensen, 570 S.W.3d at 937. We sustain Mother's sixth issue.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We reverse that portion of the trial court's judgment imposing a geographic restriction on Mother's right to designate the primary residence of K.S., and we render judgment denying such restriction. We affirm the remainder of the judgment.
LETICIA HINOJOSA
Justice Delivered and filed on the 28th day of January, 2021.