Opinion
No. 07-20-00198-CV
12-03-2020
IN THE INTEREST OF K.L., B.L., A.L., AND C.L., CHILDREN
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 1 Randall County, Texas
Trial Court No. 71,833-L1, Honorable James W. Anderson, Presiding
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before QUINN, C.J., and PIRTLE and PARKER, JJ.
A. L., appellant, appeals from the trial court's dismissal of her suit to reinstate her parental rights. In her brief, she complains that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's verdict to terminate her parental rights and that termination was not in the children's best interests. She, further, complains of ineffective assistance of counsel at both the trial and appellate levels, and that the department failed to follow its own procedures. We affirm.
Background
A. L.'s parental rights were terminated on June 6, 2018, and the order of termination was affirmed by this Court on November 26, 2018, in In re K.L., No. 07-18- 00231-CV, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 9593 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Nov. 26, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.). On June 3, 2019, mandate was issued after the Texas Supreme Court denied her petition for review. Through her direct appeal, A. L. challenged the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support both the statutory grounds forming the basis for termination and the best interests's requirement. We overruled her issues and affirmed the termination order.
According to section 161.211(a) of the Texas Family Code "[n]otwithstanding Rule 329, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, the validity of an order terminating the parental rights of a person who has been personally served . . . or whose rights have been terminated under Section 161.002(b) is not subject to collateral or direct attack after the sixth month after the date the order was signed." TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.211(a) (West 2014). A direct attack consists of an appeal, a motion for new trial, or a bill of review and it attempts to correct, amend, modify, or vacate a judgment. PNS Stores, Inc. v. Rivera, 379 S.W.3d 267, 271-72 (Tex. 2012). So too must it be brought within a definite time period after the judgment's rendition. Id. A collateral attack on a judgment is one that attempts to avoid the effect of a judgment in a proceeding not instituted for the purpose of correcting, modifying, or vacating the judgment, but in order to "obtain specific relief that the judgment currently" stands as a bar against. Id. at 272 (citing Browning v. Prostok, 165 S.W.3d 336, 346 (Tex. 2005)).
Here, A. L. petitioned to reinstate her parental rights. Those rights were lost through a final order terminating them on June 6, 2018. She seeks, through her petition, to either vacate or nullify the June 6th decree or grant relief to which the June 6th decree stands as an impediment. Irrespective of whether her action is a direct or collateral attack upon the June 6th decree, statute nonetheless obligated her to initiate it within six months of June 6, 2018. The petition was filed, though, on July 1, 2020. Her having waited two years and 24 days to act, section 161.211(a) of the Family Code barred the trial court from considering the request. In re M.E., No. 07-16-00039-CV, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 195, at *7 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Jan. 8, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (stating that the six-month deadline in section 161.211(a) is a bar to or preclusion of a challenge to a termination order).
Accordingly, the trial court's order dismissing her petition is affirmed.
Brian Quinn
Chief Justice