Opinion
No. 04-20-00605-CV
04-21-2021
IN THE INTEREST OF I.E.L., a Child
MEMORANDUM OPINION
From the 408th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2020PA00245
Honorable Richard Garcia, Judge Presiding Opinion by: Beth Watkins, Justice Sitting: Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice Beth Watkins, Justice Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice AFFIRMED
C.L. appeals the trial court's order terminating her parental rights to her daughter I.E.L. On appeal, she argues the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court's finding that termination was in I.E.L.'s best interest. We affirm the trial court's order.
To protect the privacy of the minor child, we refer to the parent and child by their initials. TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b)(2); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 109.002(d).
BACKGROUND
The Texas Department of Family and Protective Services removed I.E.L. from C.L.'s care after receiving a referral that I.E.L. was born addicted to opiates. Due to concerns regarding C.L.'s drug use, the Department filed a petition to terminate C.L.'s parental rights to I.E.L., obtained temporary managing conservatorship over I.E.L., and placed I.E.L. with a foster family. The trial court made a pretrial finding that C.L. had subjected I.E.L. to aggravated circumstances, dispensing with the requirement that the Department make reasonable efforts to return I.E.L. to C.L. As a result of the aggravated circumstances finding, the Department also did not implement a formal service plan for C.L. but instead provided her with resources to seek drug treatment. Due to C.L.'s inability to address her drug use, the Department pursued termination of C.L.'s parental rights.
On November 2, 2020, the trial court held a one-day bench trial via Zoom. C.L. did not appear. At the time of trial, I.E.L. was almost one year old. The trial court heard testimony from the Department caseworker and reviewed two orders terminating C.L.'s parental rights to her other children. At the conclusion of trial, the court signed an order terminating C.L.'s parental rights, finding by clear and convincing evidence that she engaged in conduct under section 161.001(b)(1)(E), (M), and (R), and that termination of her parental rights was in I.E.L.'s best interest. C.L. now appeals challenging the legal and factual sufficiency of the court's best interest finding.
ANALYSIS
Standard of Review
The involuntary termination of a natural parent's rights implicates fundamental constitutional rights and "divests the parent and child of all legal rights, privileges, duties, and powers normally existing between them, except for the child's right to inherit from the parent." In re S.J.R.-Z., 537 S.W.3d 677, 683 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2017, pet. denied) (internal quotation marks omitted). "As a result, appellate courts must strictly scrutinize involuntary termination proceedings in favor of the parent." Id. The Department has the burden to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, both that a statutory ground existed to terminate C.L.'s parental rights and that termination was in the best interest of I.E.L. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.206; In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 362 (Tex. 2003). "'Clear and convincing evidence' means the measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established." TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 101.007; In re S.J.R.-Z., 537 S.W.3d at 683.
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a trial court's order of termination, we apply well-established standards of review. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 101.007, 161.206(a); In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 263 (Tex. 2002). To determine whether the Department presented clear and convincing evidence, a legal sufficiency review requires us to "look at all the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding to determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding was true." In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266. We "assume that the factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor of its finding if a reasonable factfinder could do so." In re R.S.-T., 522 S.W.3d 92, 98 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2017, no pet.). "A corollary to this requirement is that a court should disregard all evidence that a reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved or found to have been incredible." In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266. Nevertheless, "we may not simply disregard undisputed facts that do not support the finding; to do so would not comport with the heightened burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence." In re S.L.M., 513 S.W.3d 746, 748 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2017, no pet.). If a reasonable factfinder could "form a firm belief or conviction" that the matter is true, then the evidence is legally sufficient. Id. at 747.
In contrast, in conducting a factual sufficiency review, we must review and weigh all the evidence, including the evidence contrary to the trial court's findings. In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 345 (Tex. 2009). We consider whether the disputed evidence is such that a reasonable factfinder could not have resolved it in favor of the challenged finding. In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266. The evidence is factually insufficient only if "in light of the entire record, the disputed evidence that a reasonable factfinder could not have credited in favor of the finding is so significant that a factfinder could not reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction." Id.
In both legal and factual sufficiency review, the trial court, as factfinder, is the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence. In re A.F., No. 04-20-00216-CV, 2020 WL 6928390, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Nov. 25, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.). We must defer to the factfinder's resolution of disputed evidentiary issues and cannot substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder. See, e.g., In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105, 108 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam) (factual sufficiency); In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005) (legal sufficiency).
Best Interest
Applicable Law
There is a strong presumption that a child's best interest is served by maintaining the relationship between a child and the natural parent, and the Department has the burden to rebut that presumption by clear and convincing evidence. See, e.g., In re R.S.-T., 522 S.W.3d at 97. To determine whether the Department satisfied this burden, the Texas Legislature has provided several factors for courts to consider regarding a parent's willingness and ability to provide a child with a safe environment, and the Texas Supreme Court has provided a similar list of factors to determine a child's best interest. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.307(b); Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371-72 (Tex. 1976).
These factors include, inter alia: "(1) the child's age and physical and mental vulnerabilities; (2) the frequency and nature of out-of-home placements; (3) the magnitude, frequency, and circumstances of the harm to the child; (4) whether the child has been the victim of repeated harm after the initial report and intervention by the department; (5) whether the child is fearful of living in or returning to the child's home; (6) the results of psychiatric, psychological, or developmental evaluations of the child, the child's parents, other family members, or others who have access to the child's home; (7) whether there is a history of abusive or assaultive conduct by the child's family or others who have access to the child's home; (8) whether there is a history of substance abuse by the child's family or others who have access to the child's home; (9) whether the perpetrator of the harm to the child is identified; (10) the willingness and ability of the child's family to seek out, accept, and complete counseling services and to cooperate with and facilitate an appropriate agency's close supervision; (11) the willingness and ability of the child's family to effect positive environmental and personal changes within a reasonable period of time; (12) whether the child's family demonstrates adequate parenting skills [. . .]; and (13) whether an adequate social support system consisting of an extended family and friends is available to the child." TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.307(b).
Those factors include: (1) the desires of the child; (2) the emotional and physical needs of the child now and in the future; (3) the emotional and physical danger to the child now and in the future; (4) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody; (5) the programs available to assist those individuals to promote the best interest of the child; (6) the plans for the child by these individuals or the agency seeking custody; (7) the stability of the home or proposed placement; (8) the acts or omissions of the parent that may indicate the existing parent-child relationship is not a proper one; and (9) any excuse for the acts or omissions of the parent. Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371-72 (Tex. 1976). --------
A best interest finding, however, does not require proof of any particular factors. See In re G.C.D., No. 04-14-00769-CV, 2015 WL 1938435, at *5 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Apr. 29, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.). Neither the statutory factors nor the Holley factors are exhaustive, and "[e]vidence of a single factor may be sufficient for a factfinder to form a reasonable belief or conviction that termination is in the child's best interest." In re J.B.-F., No. 04-18-00181-CV, 2018 WL 3551208, at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio July 25, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.). Additionally, evidence that proves a statutory ground for termination is probative on the issue of best interest. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 28 (Tex. 2002). Finally, "[a] trier of fact may measure a parent's future conduct by his past conduct [in] determin[ing] whether termination of parental rights is in the child's best interest." In re E.D., 419 S.W.3d 615, 620 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, pet. denied).
Application
The Department presented evidence that C.L. admitted to regular methamphetamine use. "Parental drug abuse reflects poor judgment and may be a factor to consider in determining a child's best interest." In re J.M.T., 519 S.W.3d 258, 269 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. denied); see also TEX. FAM. CODE § 263.307(b)(8) (stating courts may consider history of substance abuse by child's family). According to the Department caseworker, the Department removed I.E.L. from C.L.'s care after I.E.L. was born addicted to opiates. The caseworker testified that after I.E.L. was removed from C.L.'s care, C.L. admitted to regular methamphetamine use, and the caseworker expressed concern about allowing I.E.L. to be around that type of behavior. Based on this evidence, the court could have formed a firm belief or conviction that C.L.'s drug use demonstrated an inability to provide a safe environment for I.E.L. See In re A.M.L., No. 04-19-00422-CV, 2019 WL 6719028, at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Dec. 11, 2019, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (considering evidence that child was born addicted to heroin and parent admitted to abusing drugs in best interest determination).
The Department also produced evidence that C.L. expressed no interest in maintaining a relationship with I.E.L. A parent's lack of contact with a child supports a best interest finding. See In re R.A.G., 545 S.W.3d 645, 654 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2017, no pet.). Here, the caseworker testified that since losing custody of I.E.L, C.L. did not maintain significant contact with the Department and "did not have many visits with [I.E.L.]. . . one maybe." The caseworker stated that a month before trial, she tried to contact C.L. using the phone number C.L. provided her, but she "could not get through to her."
C.L. argues, however, that the Department did not afford her an opportunity to complete a service plan because it did not provide her with one. Section 262.2015(a) provides that a trial court "may waive the requirement of a service plan and the requirement to make reasonable efforts to return the child to a parent" if the court finds that the parent subjected the child to aggravated circumstances. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 262.2015(a). Aggravated circumstances exist if a "parent's parental rights with regard to another child have been involuntarily terminated based on a finding that the parent's conduct violated Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) or (E)." Id. § 262.2015(b)(5). Here, the court signed a pre-trial order finding C.L. had subjected I.E.L. to aggravated circumstances. As a result of that finding, the caseworker testified, a service plan was not prepared for C.L., and the court admitted the prior orders involuntarily terminating C.L.'s parental rights to her two older children into evidence at trial. See In re R.S.D., 446 S.W.3d 816, 820 n.4 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, no pet.) (noting court may take judicial notice of previous signed order in parental termination). Those orders showed that C.L.'s previous terminations were based on findings that she endangered—or left the children with persons who endangered—the physical or emotional well-being of the children under sections 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E). See TEX. FAM. CODE § 262.2015(b)(5).
The caseworker further testified that even though the Department did not prepare a formal service plan for C.L., the Department provided her with resources to seek drug treatment. See In re S.A.C., No. 04-13-00058-CV, 2013 WL 2247471, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio May 22, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.) (affirming termination when Department provided parent with resources but not formal service plan). However, there was no confirmation that C.L. took advantage of these resources. The caseworker explained that after receiving information about these resources, C.L. asked for help with transportation and a list of other programs, and the Department mailed bus passes to C.L. at her last known address. Other than this interaction, C.L. did not express any interest in participating in a drug treatment program or demonstrate that she could provide I.E.L. with a safe and drug-free home environment. When asked whether C.L. provided any indication that she was not actively using drugs during this case, the caseworker testified she did not. Based on this evidence, the court could have formed a firm belief or conviction C.L. was not willing to seek out and participate in drug a treatment program to effect a positive change for I.E.L. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 263.307(b)(10) (willingness and ability of parent to seek out, accept, and complete services); id. § 263.307(b)(11) (willingness and ability of parent to effect positive changes).
C.L. also argues the Department did not present any evidence regarding I.E.L.'s desires. We note, however, that the Holley and statutory factors are not exhaustive, and the Department is not required to prove each of them to support a finding that termination is in the best interest of the child. See In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27. Additionally, "[w]hen children are too young to express their desires, the fact finder may consider that the children have bonded with the foster family, are well-cared for by them, and have spent minimal time with a parent." In re J.D., 436 S.W.3d 105, 118 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). Here, I.E.L. was almost one year old at the time of trial and too young to express her desires. The Department presented evidence that since removal, I.E.L. has been living with a foster family whose members are related to the family members who adopted C.L.'s older two children after her parental rights were terminated. The caseworker testified that I.E.L. is "doing very well" with the foster family and is up to date on all her medical and dental appointments. I.E.L. is also "eating well and sleeping well" in her foster home and "really bonded" to the foster family. According to the caseworker, the foster family is interested in adopting I.E.L., and she believes the family is able to meet I.E.L.'s physical and emotional needs now and in the future. The caseworker further added termination of C.L.'s parental rights would be in I.E.L.'s best interest because it would provide I.E.L. with permanency. Finally, the trial court was aware of C.L.'s prior history with the Department and could have taken that history into consideration when determining I.E.L.'s best interest. See In re S.A.C., 2013 WL 2247471, at *5 (noting trial court may measure parent's future conduct by her past conduct to determine child's best interest).
Accordingly, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's finding, we conclude a reasonable factfinder could have formed a firm belief or conviction that termination of C.L.'s parental rights was in the best interest of I.E.L. See In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266. We therefore hold that legally and factually sufficient evidence supports the trial court's best interest finding, and we overrule C.L.'s arguments to the contrary.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court's order of termination.
Beth Watkins, Justice