Id. at 20-21 (citing Interest of D.G., 241 A.3d 1230 (Pa. Super. 2020); Interest of D.N.G., 230 A.3d 361, 366 (Pa. Super. 2020)). Therefore, Mother concludes that because the trial court deprived Children of their statutory right to legal counsel, the decrees terminating her parental rights must be reversed.
Father did not appeal. As discussed below in further detail, the trial court previously terminated Mother's parental rights to Child's sibling, D.N.G. (Sibling 1), but this Court vacated that decree in a published opinion in Interest of D.N.G. , 230 A.3d 361 (Pa. Super. 2020). We consolidate Mother's and the GAL's appeals for the purpose of this decision.
Id. at 20-21 (citing, inter alia, Interest of D.N.G., 230 A.3d 361, 366 (Pa. Super. 2020)). Therefore, Mother concludes that because the trial court deprived Children of their statutory right to legal counsel, the goal change orders must be reversed that the role of a child's legal counsel is “to engage in client-directed advocacy on behalf of the child.” Id. at 20-21 (citing, inter alia, Interest of D.N.G., 230 A.3d 361, 366 (Pa. Super. 2020)). Therefore, Mother concludes that because the trial court deprived Children of their statutory right to legal counsel, the goal change orders must be reversed.
Mother relies on In the Interest of D.N.G., 230 A.3d 361 (Pa. Super. 2020), but the case sub judice is clearly distinguishable. In D.N.G., this Court found that the eleven-year-old child's legal counsel failed to zealously advocate for the child's legal interests when counsel advised the court of the child's unequivocal preference not to be adopted, yet advocated for termination.
See P.G.F, 247 A.3d at 966 ("[w]e will not mandate that an attorney convey highly sensitive, significant, and potentially emotionally damaging information to a child, or engage in a raw inquiry, merely to discern the clearest indication of a child's preference"); see also In re T.S., 192 A.3d 1080, 1082 n.2 (Pa. 2018) ("'[l]egal interests' denotes that an attorney is to express the child's wishes to the court regardless of whether the attorney agrees with the child's recommendation"). Mother relies on In the Interest of D.N.G., 230 A.3d 361 (Pa. Super. 2020), but the case sub judice is clearly distinguishable. In D.N.G., this Court found that the eleven-year-old child's legal counsel failed to zealously advocate for the child's legal interests when counsel advised the court of the child's unequivocal preference not to be adopted, yet advocated for termination.
Further, "[a]n issue identified on appeal but not developed in the appellant's brief is abandoned and, therefore, waived." In re D.N.G., 230 A.3d 361, 363 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citation omitted). Here, the orphans' court concluded that Appellant waived the first, second, fourth, fifth, and seventh issues that he raised in his Rule 1925(b) statement because he failed to raise them at the September 26, 2022 hearing.
This Court has held that any issue "identified on appeal but not developed in the appellant's brief is abandoned and, therefore, waived." See Int. of D.N.G., 230 A.3d 361, 363 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citation omitted). Accordingly, Mother has waived her second and fourth issues.
N.T. 15-16. Petitioner introduced the decision, In re D.N.G., 2020 PA Super 62, as an exhibit. P-1.
Mother's reliance on Interest of D.N.G., 230 A.3d 361, 363 (Pa. Super. 2020), is unfounded as D.N.G. involved consolidated appeals from a contemporaneous termination decree and goal change order. Thus, we affirm the decree involuntarily terminating Mother's parental rights.
Therefore, Father has abandoned this issue for purposes of appeal. See Interest of D.N.G., 230 A.3d 361, 363 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2020) (stating that "[a]n issue identified on appeal but not developed in the appellant's brief is abandoned and, therefore, waived" (citation omitted)).