Opinion
112,413.
04-24-2015
In the Interest of C.R. and J.R., Minor Children Under the Age of Eighteen.
Michael J. Nichols, of Michael J. Nichols, P.A., of Kansas City, for appellant natural Father. Ashley Hutton, assistant district attorney, and Jerome A. Gorman, district attorney, for appellee.
Michael J. Nichols, of Michael J. Nichols, P.A., of Kansas City, for appellant natural Father.
Ashley Hutton, assistant district attorney, and Jerome A. Gorman, district attorney, for appellee.
Before HILL, P.J., PIERRON and POWELL, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
PER CURIAM.
Claiming insufficient evidence, J.R., the father of two sons, asks us to overturn the district court's order terminating his parental rights to his two sons. Our review of the record on appeal leads us to hold that the State met its burden of proof that Father is unfit and it is in the best interests of the boys that his parental rights should be terminated. We affirm.
The facts are not in dispute.
In July 2013, social workers with the Kansas Department of Children and Families became concerned about the care and safety of brothers C.R., born in 2006, and J.R., born in 2004. A.A., their mother, uses drugs, is unstable, and does not care for her children. According to the State, Father was serving an 84–month sentence in the penitentiary for aggravated kidnapping and aggravated battery convictions in 2010.
The district court issued temporary orders after the State filed its petition under the Revised Kansas Code for Care of Children, K.S .A.2014 Supp. 38–2234. In late July 2013, the district court granted DCF temporary custody of the boys. Two months later, the court adjudicated them children in need of care. Custody of the boys remained with DCF but they were eventually placed in the care of their maternal grandmother.
The district court ordered Mother and Father to perform various tasks generally designed to rehabilitate the family and reintegrate children into their home. The court ordered both parents to: maintain a stable income, maintain monthly contact with the assigned DCF caseworker, complete psychosocial and substance abuse assessments and follow all resulting recommendations, attend supervised visits with the boys, and complete parenting classes. Neither Mother nor Father, who were both represented by counsel, disputed that they received these orders or otherwise challenged them. Nor did either parent ever provide verification that they completed any of the assigned tasks.
After 6 months, the State moved for an order terminating Father's parental rights. The court took evidence on the motion in 2014. The court heard testimony from the social worker who had written letters to Father in prison. She had received no response. Father was present with his counsel but chose not to testify.
At the close of the hearing, the district court orally pronounced its judgment terminating Father's parental rights. In support, the district court found the State proved that Father is unfit due to his failure to make sufficient efforts to contact and maintain an ongoing relationship with his children during his imprisonment. The court also found that this condition of unfitness is unlikely to change in the reasonably foreseeable future, particularly when viewed from the boys' perspective of time. And finally, the court found that it is in the boys' best interests to terminate Father's parental rights.
The rules that guide us.
K.S.A.2014 Supp. 38–2269 states that before a court can terminate the rights of a parent of a child who has been adjudicated a CINC, it must make three findings:
• First, the district court must find clear and convincing evidence that the parent is “unfit by reason of conduct or condition which renders the parent unable to care properly for a child.” K.S.A.2014 Supp. 38–2269(a).
• Second, the court must find clear and convincing evidence that the conduct or condition of unfitness “is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future.” K.S.A.2014 Supp. 38–2269(a).
• And finally, the court must determine, in its discretion, whether the termination of parental rights is in the child or children's best interests, with primary consideration given to the physical, mental, and emotional needs of the child or children. K.S.A.2014 Supp. 38–2269(g)(1).
The district court here followed this procedure.
We must review this record for clear and convincing evidence. We consider the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, because it was the prevailing party, to determine whether it could have convinced a rational factfinder that it is highly probable Father is unfit. Notably, this court cannot weigh conflicting evidence, pass on the credibility of witnesses, or redetermine questions of fact in reviewing for clear and convincing evidence. See In re B.D.-Y., 286 Kan. 686, 705, 187 P.3d 594 (2008).
Father's argument implies the State must facilitate contact with his sons.
Father suggests that either the State or the district court had the burden to affirmatively facilitate his contact with his sons before he could be declared unfit under K.S.A.2014 Supp. 38–2269(a) due to his felony incarceration under K.S.A.2014 Supp. 38–2269(b)(5). In particular, he focuses on the State's failure to present any evidence of:
• opportunities or options that might have been available to Father to carry out his parental duties;
• opportunities the State provided to Father for supervised visits or to even contact his sons; or
• a reasonable plan for rehabilitation approved by the court with tasks “tailored to [Father's] particular situation,” i.e., his incarceration.
Father complains the district court's orders did not provide him any opportunity to contact or maintain a reasonable relationship with his children. We see nothing in the preliminary orders that prohibited Father from making contact with his sons. He offers no explanation why he did not respond to the social worker's letters sent to him in prison. In fact, he offered no explanation for his complete disengagement from his sons' lives. We cannot say that the district court ignored evidence of Father's efforts towards rehabilitation of his relationship with his sons, for none was presented. We certainly see no evidence of bias, passion, or prejudice that would lead us to overturn this decision. See Hamel v. Hamel, 296 Kan. 1060, 1078, 299 P.3d 278 (2013).
We are not saying the burden of proof was on Father, but if he wanted to undercut the State's evidence that he is unfit to parent as a result of his felony incarceration, he needed to do so with contrary evidence. He failed to do so.
The evidence in this record leads us to conclude that a rational factfinder would find Father unfit and it was in the boys' best interests to terminate his parental rights.
Affirmed.