Opinion
J-S39002-19 No. 513 EDA 2019 No. 514 EDA 2019
09-09-2019
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Order Entered January 23, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0001097-2017 Appeal from the Order Entered January 23, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Family Court at No(s): CP-51-DP-0002642-2016 BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J.E., STABILE, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E. MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.E.:
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
Appellant, D.H. ("Father"), purports to appeal from the orders entered in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, reinstating the trial court's prior decree terminating Father's parental rights to his minor child, A.R.F.H-H. ("Child"), and changing the goal to adoption. We affirm.
The record lists Child's initials alternatively as both A.R.F.H-H and A.H.; both sets of initials refer to the same Child.
In its opinion, the trial court sets forth most of the relevant facts and procedural history of this case. Therefore, we have no need to restate them. We add Father and R.B.H. ("Mother") are the natural parents of Child. On December 7, 2016, the court adjudicated Child dependent. The Philadelphia Department of Human Services ("DHS") filed on November 8, 2017, petitions to terminate parents' parental rights to Child and to change Child's permanency goal to adoption. Following a hearing on December 15, 2017, the court terminated Father's parental rights to Child and changed Child's permanency goal to adoption.
Following a separate hearing, the trial court terminated Mother's parental rights to Child on February 14, 2018. This Court affirmed on July 24, 2018. See In Interest of A.H., 194 A.3d 706 (Pa.Super. 2018) (unpublished memorandum). Mother is not a party to the current appeal.
On January 10, 2018, Father timely appealed and filed a contemporaneous concise statement of errors complained of on appeal per Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i). In his notice of appeal, Father purported to appeal from the termination of his parental rights and the goal change to adoption. In his concise statement and on appeal, however, Father raised issues challenging only the termination of his parental rights to Child.
On October 1, 2018, this Court vacated the December 15, 2017 decree terminating Father's parental rights and remanded for the trial court to appoint legal counsel for Child to determine and develop the record on Child's preferred outcome. See Interest of A.R.F.H-H., 200 A.3d 524 (Pa.Super. 2018) (unpublished memorandum).
Upon remand, the trial court appointed legal counsel for Child on December 3, 2018. On January 23, 2019, the court conducted a hearing, where Child's legal counsel assured the court that no conflict existed between Child's best interests and legal interests. Counsel explained Child is bonded with her maternal grandfather, Child's pre-adoptive parent, and wants her maternal grandfather to adopt her. By order of January 23, 2019, the court reinstated the December 15, 2017 decree terminating Father's parental rights. Father filed on February 18, 2019, a timely notice of appeal and contemporaneous Rule 1925 statement at both the termination and the goal change docket numbers. This Court consolidated Father's appeals sua sponte on March 8, 2019.
Father raises the following issues for our review:
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY TERMINATING THE PARENTAL RIGHTS OF [FATHER] UNDER 23 PA.C.S.A. § 2511(A)(1)?(Father's Brief at 5-6).
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY TERMINATING THE PARENTAL RIGHTS OF [FATHER] UNDER 23 PA.C.S.A. § 2511(A)(2)?
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY TERMINATING THE PARENTAL RIGHTS OF [FATHER] UNDER 23 PA.C.S.A. § 2511(A)(5)?
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY TERMINATING THE PARENTAL RIGHTS OF [FATHER] UNDER 23 PA.C.S.A. § 2511(A)(8)?
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY TERMINATING THE PARENTAL RIGHTS OF [FATHER] UNDER 23 PA.C.S.A. § 2511(B)?
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DETERMINING IT TO BE IN...CHILD'S BEST INTEREST TO CHANGE THE GOAL FROM REUNIFICATION TO ADOPTION?
As a preliminary matter, "where a case is remanded to resolve a limited issue, only matters related to the issue on remand may be appealed." Commonwealth v. Lawson , 789 A.2d 252, 253 (Pa.Super. 2001). Any issue unrelated to the matter on remand, which was not previously raised in the trial court, is waived. Commonwealth v. Jackson , 765 A.2d 389, 395 (Pa.Super. 2000), appeal denied, 568 Pa. 628, 793 A.2d 905 (2002). See also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (explaining general rule that issues not raised before trial court are waived and cannot be raised for first time on appeal). Additionally, issues not raised in a Rule 1925 concise statement of errors will be deemed waived. Lineberger v. Wyeth , 894 A.2d 141 (Pa.Super. 2006). See also In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505 (Pa.Super. 2007) (applying Rule 1925 waiver standards in family law context).
Instantly, Father purports to challenge in his sixth issue the December 15, 2017 change of Child's permanency goal to adoption. When Father originally appealed from the December 15th decree, however, Father raised in his concise statement and on appeal issues pertaining only to the termination of his parental rights to Child. Thus, Father waived any challenge to the goal change determination. See Lineberger , supra; Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). Further, in its October 1, 2018 disposition, this Court vacated the December 15th decree only insofar as it terminated Father's parental rights; this Court left undisturbed the goal change determination. Further, this Court remanded strictly for the purpose of assessing and developing the record on Child's preferred outcome, as it pertained to the termination of Father's parental rights. Therefore, Father can challenge in the current appeal only the termination of his parental rights to Child. See Lawson , supra. Accordingly, we give Father's sixth issue no further attention.
Regarding Father's remaining issues one through five, appellate review in termination of parental rights cases implicates the following principles:
In cases involving termination of parental rights: "our standard of review is limited to determining whether the order of the trial court is supported by competent evidence, and whether the trial court gave adequate consideration to the effect of such a decree on the welfare of the child."In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1115 (Pa.Super. 2010) (quoting In re I.J., 972 A.2d 5, 8 (Pa.Super. 2009)).
Absent an abuse of discretion, an error of law, or insufficient evidentiary support for the trial court's decision, the decree must stand. ... We must employ a broad, comprehensive review of the record in order to determine whether the trial court's decision is supported by competent evidence.
In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 383 (Pa.Super. 2004) (en banc), appeal denied, 581 Pa. 668, 863 A.2d 1141 (2004) (internal citations omitted).
Furthermore, we note that the trial court, as the finder of fact, is the sole determiner of the credibility of witnesses and all conflicts in testimony are to be resolved by the finder of fact. The burden of proof is on the party seeking termination to establish by clear and convincing evidence the existence of grounds for doing so.
In re Adoption of A.C.H., 803 A.2d 224, 228 (Pa.Super.
2002) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The standard of clear and convincing evidence means testimony that is so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitation, of the truth of the precise facts in issue. In re J.D.W.M., 810 A.2d 688, 690 (Pa.Super. 2002). We may uphold a termination decision if any proper basis exists for the result reached. In re C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa.Super. 2000) (en banc). If the court's findings are supported by competent evidence, we must affirm the court's decision, even if the record could support an opposite result. In re R.L.T.M., 860 A.2d 190, 191-92 (Pa.Super. 2004).In re Z.P., supra at 1115-16 (quoting In re Adoption of K.J., 936 A.2d 1128, 1131-32 (Pa.Super. 2007), appeal denied, 597 Pa. 718, 951 A.2d 1165 (2008)).
After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable Joseph Fernandes, we conclude Father's remaining issues merit no relief. The trial court opinion comprehensively discusses and properly disposes of Father's issues one through five. ( See Trial Court Opinion, filed May 10, 2019, at 5-16) (finding: (1-5) Father was aware of his Single Case Plan ("SCP") objectives six months before DHS filed petition to terminate his parental rights to Child; Father showed settled purpose to relinquish his parental claim to Child by failing to accomplish any of his SCP objectives; for example, Father failed to complete treatment for drug and alcohol, perform drug screens, obtain appropriate housing, attend weekly visits with Child, complete parenting and domestic violence programming, comply with stay-away order and protection from abuse ("PFA") order as to maternal grandfather, and sign consent and release forms for Child; Child has been in system since November 28, 2016, thirteen months prior to termination hearing in December 2017 and twenty-six months prior to termination hearing in January 2019; Father has been unable to place himself in position to parent Child for life of case, and conditions which led to removal of Child continue to exist after twenty-six months; Child would not suffer irreparable harm if Father's parental rights were terminated; Child has strong bond with maternal grandfather, to whom she looks to meet her daily needs and as her caregiver; Child has stability in maternal grandfather's home; termination of Father's parental rights is in best interest of Child's physical, intellectual, moral, and spiritual well-being). The record supports the trial court's rationale. See In re Z.P., supra. Accordingly, we affirm based on the trial court opinion.
Orders affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 9/9/19
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