Opinion
06-20-00016-CV
07-24-2020
IN THE INTEREST OF A.R., A CHILD
On Appeal from the 307th District Court Gregg County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2018-1505-DR Before Morriss, C.J., Burgess and Stevens, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In this suit affecting the parent-child relationship, the Department of Family and Protective Services (Department) entered into a Rule 11 agreement with Mother, on the record, in which Mother would be named as a joint-possessory conservator of her child, A.R., and the Department would be named the managing conservator. After the terms of the Rule 11 agreement were recited in open court, the trial court found that its terms were in A.R.'s best interests and incorporated the agreed terms in its final judgment. Mother's appeal questions whether the oral agreement placed on the record was sufficient to support the trial court's appointment of the Department as managing conservator. Because we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the Department managing conservatorship based on the valid Rule 11 agreement, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
"A trial court's order regarding conservatorship is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard." In re J.Y., 528 S.W.3d 679, 686 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2017, no pet.) (citing In re J.A.J., 243 S.W.3d 611, 616 (Tex. 2007)). "A trial court abuses its discretion if it acts arbitrarily and unreasonably or without reference to any guiding principles." Id. (citing Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Tex. 1985)). "We, therefore, will not reverse a trial court's appointment of a non-parent as . . . managing conservator unless we determine that the appointment was arbitrary and unreasonable." Id. (citing J.A.J., 243 S.W.3d at 616; Earvin v. Dep't of Family & Protective Servs., 229 S.W.3d 345, 350 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.)). "We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's decision and indulge every legal presumption in favor of its judgment." Id. (quoting Earvin, 229 S.W.3d at 350).
"Legal and factual sufficiency are not independent grounds of error in conservatorship cases but are merely relevant factors in deciding whether the trial court abused its discretion." Id. (citing In re W.M., 172 S.W.3d 718, 725 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, no pet.)). "[I]t is not enough for us to simply disagree with the outcome. Rather, we must conclude that the decision lacked basis in fact or law or involved a misapplication of fact to law." In re C.R.T., 61 S.W.3d 62, 65 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2001, pet. denied).
An agreement between attorneys or parties will be enforced if "it be made in open court and entered of record." TEX. R. CIV. P. 11. This Rule applies to conservatorship cases. See In re L.W., No. 12-19-00375-CV, 2020 WL 2078793, at *2 (Tex. App.—Tyler Apr. 30, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.). At trial, the Court heard the following Rule 11 agreement which would allow A.R., who was fourteen, to continue living with her foster parents:
[BY THE DEPARTMENT]: Your Honor, . . . I'm going to attempt to recite an agreement with the assistance of counsel. The parties have all agreed that the Department will be named permanent managing conservator of the child, however, we are all in agreement that as soon as possible that permanent managing conservatorship will be transferred to the [foster] family, which is the current placement. They are finishing their Fostering Connections Program. We believe that that's going to be done in a few months, but all the parties agree that, without having to come to court again, that we're all in agreement that permanent managing conservatorship, as soon as we are able, will be transferred to the [foster family] . . . . This is something that, pursuant to the agreement of the parties, we're going to go ahead and built [sic] into the order.
The mother will be named as possessory conservator of the child, however, we are in agreement that she will not receive the right to consult school officials, the right to consult with medical professionals, or the right to access records. She will, however -- we are in agreement that her rights not be terminated, and she will maintain standing going forward with regard to the child.
The [maternal grandparent and great aunt] will also be named as possessory conservators. They're the intervenors in this case, but they will have all the rights and duties normally given to a possessory conservator, pursuant to the Family Code. They will also have the benefit of a standard possession order . . . . The party entitled to possession, whether that's the [maternal grandparent and great aunt] or the [foster] family, will be allowed to allow the mother possession or access to the child under supervision . . . . Down the road, . . . if it's all agreed that we can do away with the supervision, then that's fine.Mother's counsel confirmed, "[T]hat's our understanding of the agreement." Mother testified that she was living in a shelter and that A.R. wished to continue living with her foster parents. Mother also confirmed that the Rule 11 agreement that was read into the record was in the child's best interests.
As a result, the trial court's final order recited that the parties agreed to the order appointing the Department as managing conservator of A.R., "as evidenced by their testimony on the record and in open court regarding conservatorship, possession, and access regarding the child the subject of this suit," and found that the order was in A.R.'s best interests. The order also recited that appointment of Mother "as managing conservator would not be in the best interest of the child because [it] would significantly impair the child's physical health or emotional development." Mother was awarded possessory conservatorship in accordance with the terms of the Rule 11 agreement.
"The primary consideration in determining conservatorship is always the best interest of the child." J.Y., 528 S.W.3d at 686 (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.002). "Because the trial court is in a position to analyze the facts, with regard to issues of conservatorship, control, possession, child support, and visitation, the trial court is given 'wide latitude in determining the best interests of a minor child.'" In re M.T.C., 299 S.W.3d 474, 479 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2009, no pet.) (quoting Stallworth v. Stallworth, 201 S.W.3d 338, 347 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.)). "When, as here, no findings of fact and conclusions of law were requested or filed, it is implied that the trial court made all findings necessary to support its judgment." Matter of Marriage of Mitchell, 585 S.W.3d 38, 47 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2019, no pet.).
"A managing conservator must be a parent, a competent adult, the Department of Family and Protective Services, or a licensed child-placing agency." TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.005(b) (Supp.). Under the parental presumption contained in Chapter 153, "a parent shall be appointed sole managing conservator" unless the court finds that appointment of the parent or parents would not be in the best interest of the child because the appointment would significantly impair the child's physical health or emotional development. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.131(a). Also, Section 263.404 of the Texas Family Code states,
The court may render a final order appointing the department as managing conservator of the child without terminating the rights of the parent of the child if the court finds that:TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.404(a).
(1) appointment of a parent as managing conservator would not be in the best interest of the child because the appointment would significantly impair the child's physical health or emotional development; and
(2) it would not be in the best interest of the child to appoint a relative of the child or another person as managing conservator.
"It is the policy of this state to encourage the peaceable resolution of disputes, with special consideration given to disputes involving the parent-child relationship, including the mediation of issues involving conservatorship, possession, and support of children, and the early settlement of pending litigation through voluntary settlement procedures." TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 154.002; see In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d 624, 632 (Tex. 2018). Mother entered into a Rule 11 agreement in open court. Even so, Mother argues that the trial court erred in appointing the Department as managing conservator because no independent evidence was elicited at trial showing that her appointment would significantly impair A.R.'s physical health or emotional development. We disagree.
The trial court heard that Mother was living in a shelter, that A.R. wished to remain in her foster home, and that Mother agreed that appointing the Department managing conservator was in A.R.'s best interests. The trial court could have found that, in entering into the Rule 11 agreement, Mother and her counsel were aware of all requirements for the Department's appointment as managing conservator and agreed that those requirements were met. In other words, the Rule 11 agreement was sufficient evidence of the requirements because it constituted "[a] judicial admission . . . that dispense[d] with the production of evidence on [this] issue and bar[red] the admitting party from disputing it." See L.W., 2020 WL 2078793, at *2 (citing Lee v. Lee, 43 S.W.3d 636, 641 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001, no pet.)); In re C.M., No. 05-12-00380-CV, 2014 WL 470774, at *4, *7 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 6, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.)("Agreed judgments, once rendered, are contracts between the parties that excuse error and operate to end all controversy between the parties."). On these facts, we cannot conclude that the trial court's decision to appoint the Department as managing conservator lacked basis in fact or law or involved a misapplication of fact to law.
As a result, we find that the trial court's entry of a judgment based on Mother's Rule 11 agreement at trial was not an abuse of discretion. Therefore, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
Josh R. Morriss, III
Chief Justice Date Submitted: July 23, 2020
Date Decided: July 24, 2020