The juvenile court advised Michael that a petition had been filed seeking termination of his parental rights and of the contents of that petition. See In re Interest of A.D.S. and A.D.S., 2 Neb.App. 469, 471, 511 N.W.2d 208, 210 (1994) (mother was adequately advised of nature of proceedings and possible consequences where juvenile court stated, “ ‘we are going to decide whether or not your rights as mother should be terminated’ ”). Further, the juvenilecourt advised Michael of his right to counsel, right to remain silent, right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, right to testify and to compel other witnesses to attend and testify, and right to appeal. Because Michael was given the required advisements under § 43–247.01(1), he was accorded his statutory due process rights, and therefore, we cannot say that the proceeding to terminate Michael's parental rights under § 43–292(4) was improper on this basis.

Ronald argues that the juvenile court's failure to give him the rights advisement during the termination phase of the proceedings violated his due process rights and that thus, the order terminating his parental rights should be vacated. In support of his argument, Ronald cites to In re Interest of Joelyann H., 6 Neb.App. 472, 574 N.W.2d 185 (1998), and In re Interest of A.D.S. and A.D.S., 2 Neb.App. 469, 511 N.W.2d 208 (1994). These cases are inapplicable to the present case.

Further, we have stated that the parent-child relationship is afforded due process protection. In re Interest of A.D.S. and A.D.S., 2 Neb. App. 469, 511 N.W.2d 208 (1994). The Nebraska Supreme Court, in In re Interest of Constance G., 254 Neb. 96, 102, 575 N.W.2d 133, 138 (1998), quoting Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 101 S.Ct. 2153, 68 L.Ed.2d 640 (1981), discussed due process in juvenile cases:

See, e.g., In re Interest of A.D.S. and A.D.S., 2 Neb. App. 469, 511 N.W.2d 208 (1994) (failure to advise of rights pursuant to § 43-279.01 requires reversal, and remand for new hearing).

See, e.g., In re Interest of N.M. and J.M., 240 Neb. 690, 484 N.W.2d 77 (1992); In re Interest of A.D.S. and A.D.S., 2 Neb. App. 469, 511 N.W.2d 208 (1994). However, because Kevin and Letta did not object to the procedure below on these grounds, because the record below on the proceedings at which they were supposedly advised of their rights under § 43-279(1) is not included in the bill of exceptions on this appeal, and because of our resolution of this appeal, we do not decide, in this case, the effect of the failure of the record on appeal to affirmatively show compliance with these provisions of the juvenile code.

01 necessitates that the order in this case be reversed and the cause remanded for a new adjudication hearing.In re Interest of A.D.S and A.D.S., 2 Neb. App. 469, 472, 511 N.W.2d 208, 210-11 (1994). Since this matter is only a temporary detention hearing, the failure to appoint an attorney might not be sufficient to cause a reversal of the orders appealed from.

In In re Interest of N.M. and J.M., 240 Neb. 690, 484 N.W.2d 77 (1992), the Supreme Court stated that parents are deprived of due process by the trial court's failure to tell them of the possibility of the termination of their parental rights and advise them of their right to have counsel. In the case In re Interest of A.D.S. and A.D.S., 2 Neb. App. 469, 511 N.W.2d 208 (1994), this court held a parent's due process rights were violated when the parent was not given the explanation required under § 43-279.01(1), and the cause was remanded for a new adjudication hearing.