Opinion
2017 CA 0615
04-04-2018
INTERDICTION OF AMERICA JEAN MORRIS METZLER
David R. Paddison Covington, Louisiana Counsel for Defendant/Appellee America Jean Morris Metzler Mitchell J. Hoffman Suzette Marie Smith New Orleans, Louisiana Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee Stanton L. Cadow Michael L. DeShazo Henry W. Kinney Kelly L. Staples New Orleans, Louisiana and Gordon T. Herrin Covington, Louisiana Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant Michael A. McNulty, Jr., Intervenor and in his capacity as Independent Executor of the Succession of John A. Metzler, Sr. Michael D. Conroy Amanda D. Hogue Covington, Louisiana Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee Kim Cadow Richard
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
On Appeal from the Twenty-Second Judicial District Court In and For the Parish of St. Tammany State of Louisiana
No. 2014-13789 Honorable Reginald T. Badeaux, III, Judge Presiding David R. Paddison
Covington, Louisiana Counsel for Defendant/Appellee
America Jean Morris Metzler Mitchell J. Hoffman
Suzette Marie Smith
New Orleans, Louisiana Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee
Stanton L. Cadow Michael L. DeShazo
Henry W. Kinney
Kelly L. Staples
New Orleans, Louisiana
and
Gordon T. Herrin
Covington, Louisiana Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant
Michael A. McNulty, Jr., Intervenor
and in his capacity as Independent
Executor of the Succession of John A.
Metzler, Sr. Michael D. Conroy
Amanda D. Hogue
Covington, Louisiana Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee
Kim Cadow Richard BEFORE: McCLENDON, WELCH, AND THERIOT, JJ. McCLENDON, J.
In this proceeding for the full interdiction of a wife diagnosed with Alzheimer's disease, the executor of the succession of the deceased husband appeals the trial court judgment granting the interdiction and denying an award of attorney fees. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On August 21, 2014, Stanton Lee Cadow filed a petition seeking to interdict his mother, America Jean Morris Metzler, who had been diagnosed with Alzheimer's disease. Mr. Cadow alleged that John Metzler, Sr., his mother's husband, had kidney failure, was on dialysis, suffered with congestive heart problems, and was unable to care for Mrs. Metzler. Mrs. Metzler answered the petition, asserting that Mr. Metzler had a viable power of attorney to act on her behalf, seeking the dismissal of Mr. Cadow's petition, and requesting that all costs of the proceedings be assessed against Mr. Cadow. On February 20, 2015, following a hearing, the trial court signed a judgment denying and dismissing Mr. Cadow's claims without prejudice. The judgment further decreed that Mr. Metzler was the legal agent/mandatary of Mrs. Metzler by authentic act and that he was competent to care for her personal needs and protect her interests. Lastly, the judgment ordered that "all attorney fees and costs incurred in the defense of [Mrs.] Metzler shall be assessed to and paid by [Mr.] Cadow." Mr. Cadow appealed.
Subsequently, this court dismissed the appeal, finding that the judgment was not precise and certain in that the exact amount of attorney fees could not be determined from the judgment, and, as such, there was no final appealable judgment before the court. See In re Interdiction of Metzler, 15-0982 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2/22/16), 189 So.3d 467, 469. Thereafter, Mr. Cadow filed what he entitled a "La. Code of Civil Procedure Article 1915.B Motion" in which he requested, inter alia, a revised judgment for a judgment of interdiction and judgment vacating that portion of the February 20, 2015 judgment that ordered the payment of attorney fees.
It is well-settled in the jurisprudence of this state that a pleading is governed by its substance rather than its caption; pleadings should be construed for what they really are, not for what they are erroneously designated. Belser v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 542 So.2d 163, 165-66 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1989).
Meanwhile, on March 28, 2015, Mr. Metzler died. Thereafter, his succession was opened, and Michael A. McNulty, Jr., in his capacity as Independent Executor of the Succession of John A. Metzler, Sr. (Mr. McNulty), filed a motion for leave of court to file a petition for intervention, which was granted on December 15, 2015, to determine the costs and attorney fees to be paid by Mr. Cadow resulting from the original interdiction hearing.
In the December 15, 2015 judgment, Mr. McNulty was "granted leave to file his Petition for Intervention to assert claims of the Succession of John A. Metzler, Sr. to the attorneys' fees and costs assessed against [Mr.] Cadow by Judgment dated February 20, 2015 in the above-captioned case." The Motion for Leave of Court to File Petition for Intervention was "otherwise denied as to Mr. McNulty's request to assert claims regarding movable property."
Following a hearing on the "Article 1915.B Motion," the trial court signed a judgment on June 16, 2016, which vacated the February 20, 2015 judgment and placed Mrs. Metzler under full interdiction. Mr. McNulty filed a motion for new trial, asserting that he was never served with a rule to show cause indicating the date of the hearing on the motion or notified in any other manner of the hearing date. On January 25, 2017, the trial court heard Mr. McNulty's motion for new trial with regard to Mr. Cadow's "Article 1915.B Motion." At the hearing, counsel for Mrs. Metzler stated that her condition had worsened and argued that it was in Mrs. Metzler's best interest that she be interdicted. The trial court granted the request to interdict Mrs. Metzler and signed its judgment on February 13, 2017, granting Mr. Cadow's "Article 1915.B Motion," vacating the court's February 20, 2015 judgment, and placing Mrs. Metzler, who was then domiciled in Dallas, Texas, under full interdiction. The judgment also provided for other matters, including that "each party shall pay their own costs and attorney fees." Mr. McNulty appealed, asserting that the trial court erred in granting Mr. Cadow's Petition for Interdiction and in vacating its February 20, 2015 judgment pursuant to Mr. Cadow's "Article 1915(B) Motion."
A hearing on the motion for new trial was held on October 11, 2016, and the trial court granted the motion and set the new trial solely on the issue of attorney fees. The trial court signed its judgment on January 24, 2017, granting in part the motion for new trial, "but only to permit a new trial on the issue of whether attorney fees should be awarded and, if so, to whom and in what amount." However, the judgment was vacated that same date.
The judgment also appointed Mrs. Metzler's daughter, Kim Cadow Richard, as curatrix and Ms. Richard's husband, Steven Robert Richard, as undercurator. The Richards live in Texas near Kim's mother.
DISCUSSION
At the first hearing for the interdiction, on November 18, 2014, Dr. Ted Bloch, III, Mrs. Metzler's expert in geriatric psychiatry, testified that Mrs. Metzler was in "the mild moderate stage of dementia" and that she was "about a five" on the seven-point Reisberg Global Deterioration Scale, where three is considered to be mild cognitive impairment, and seven was "the end stage of dementia." Dr. Bloch also testified that he did not believe that Mrs. Metzler was able to make financial decisions. Additionally, he stated that Mrs. Metzler was not aware of the proceedings and was not aware that she had hired an attorney. Nevertheless, Dr. Bloch opined that at that time there was no cause for Mrs. Metzler's interdiction because he saw no problem with Mr. Metzler taking care of her, as there was no evidence that Mr. Metzler had mismanaged Mrs. Metzler's affairs, and Mr. Metzler was very loving, very attentive, and wanted to continue to take care of Mrs. Metzler, his wife.
Subsequent to Mr. Metzler's death and by the time of the new trial hearing on January 25, 2017, Mrs. Metzler's condition had clearly worsened. All of the parties (with the exception of Mr. McNulty) agreed that the interdiction of Mrs. Metzler was necessary and in her best interest. Mrs. Metzler was then living in Texas in an assisted living facility close to her daughter and son-in-law. The trial court considered the developing circumstances and evidence of Mrs. Metzler's deteriorating condition at the new trial hearing and granted the petition for intervention.
In order to consider whether the granting of the petition for interdiction was proper, we must first determine whether the trial court erred in vacating its February 20, 2015 judgment that found that interdiction was not necessary. Mr. McNulty maintains that LSA-C.C.P. art. 1915B was not the correct procedural vehicle for pleading new facts or making new allegations. He asserts that the February 20, 2015 judgment determined the merits of the entire case, leaving only the amount of attorney fees at issue. Therefore, according to Mr. McNulty, under Article 1915B, the sole remaining issue of attorney fees did not open the door for Mr. Cadow to re-litigate the merits of the case based on events and circumstances that were not present before or during the original trial. Thus, the real issue presented herein is whether the trial court was able to revisit the issues of the interdiction and the attorney fees.
A judgment is the determination of the rights of the parties in an action and may award any relief to which the parties are entitled. It may be interlocutory or final. LSA-C.C.P. art. 1841. A judgment that does not determine the merits, but only preliminary matters in the course of the action, is an interlocutory judgment. A judgment that determines the merits in whole or in part is a final judgment. Id.; George v. Dugas, 16-0710 (La. 11/7/16), 203 So.3d 1043, 1047.
This court's appellate jurisdiction extends to final judgments. See LSA-C.C.P. art. 2083A. A final judgment determines the merits of a controversy, in whole or in part. LSA-C.C.P. art. 1841. A judgment that only partially determines the merits of an action is a partial judgment and, as such, is immediately appealable only if authorized by LSA-C.C.P. art. 1915. Quality Environmental Processes, Inc. v. Energy Development Corporation, 16-0171 (La.App. 1 Cir. 4/12/17), 218 So.3d 1045, 1053.
In contrast, an interlocutory judgment does not determine the merits, but decides only preliminary matters in the course of an action. LSA-C.C.P. art. 1841. An interlocutory judgment is appealable only when expressly provided by law. LSA-C.C.P. art. 2083C.
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 1915B provides:
(1) When a court renders a partial judgment or partial summary judgment or sustains an exception in part, as to one or more but less than all of the claims, demands, issues, or theories against a party, whether in an original demand, reconventional demand, cross-claim, third-party claim, or intervention, the judgment shall not constitute a final judgment unless it is designated as a final judgment by the court after an express determination that there is no just reason for delay.
(2) In the absence of such a determination and designation, any such order or decision shall not constitute a final judgment for the purpose of
an immediate appeal and may be revised at any time prior to rendition of the judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.
In this matter, the judgment originally rendered by the trial court partially addressed the merits of the case, i.e., the interdiction. However, the issue of attorney fees remained. Thus, the judgment rendered on February 20, 2015 was a partial judgment, albeit not final, as described in LSA-C.C.P. art. 1915B. See In re Interdiction of Metzler, 189 So.3d at 469. Because we have already determined that the partial judgment was not a final appealable judgment, Article 1915B permits that such a "decision issued may be revised at any time prior to rendition of the judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties." LSA-C.C.P. art. 1915B(2). Accordingly, the trial court was able to reconsider and revise its previously granted partial judgment at any time prior to the rendition of the judgment adjudicating the remaining issues in the case. See Templet v. State ex rel. Dept. of Public Safety and Corrections, 05-1903 (La.App 1 Cir. 11/3/06), 951 So.2d 182, 187.
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1911 provides that an appeal may not be taken from a partial judgment until the judgment has been designated a final judgment in accordance with LSA-C.C.P. art. 1915B.
Once a final judgment becomes final and definitive and acquires the authority of the thing adjudged, no court has jurisdiction, in the sense of power and authority, to modify, revise or reverse the judgment, regardless of the magnitude of the error in the final judgment. Tolis v. Board of Sup'rs of Louisiana State University, 95-1529 (La. 10/16/95), 660 So.2d 1206, 1207 (per curiam); Succession of Poole, 15-1317 (La.App. 1 Cir. 10/28/16), 213 So.3d 18, 23.
With regard to the interdiction, pursuant to Title VIII of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure, entitled "Interdiction and Curatorship of Interdicts," the principal parties to an interdiction are the individual petitioning the court for the interdiction, the person sought to be interdicted referred to as the "defendant," the curator/curatrix, and the undercurator/undercuratrix. See LSA-C.C.P. arts. 4541, et. seq.; In re Helm, 2011-0914 (La.App. 4 Cir. 12/21/11), 84 So.3d 607, 610. Mr. Metzler did not fall within any of these categories, nor does Mr. McNulty. To have standing, a plaintiff must assert an adequate interest in himself, which the law recognizes, against a defendant having a substantial adverse interest. Howard v. Administrators of Tulane Educational Fund, 07-2224 (La. 7/1/08), 986 So.2d 47, 54. Therefore, we find that Mr. McNulty cannot challenge the interdiction of Ms. Metzler. This court can notice the objection of no right of action on its own motion, and we choose to do so.
When the facts alleged in a petition provide a remedy under the law to someone, but the plaintiff who seeks the relief is not the person in whose favor the law extends the remedy, the proper objection is no right of action, or want of interest in the plaintiff to institute the suit. Howard, 986 So.2d at 59. The objection is urged through the peremptory exception of no right of action raised by the defendant or noticed by the court on its own motion, in either the trial or appellate court. Id.; LSA-C.C.P. arts. 927 and 2163. The focus in an exception of no right of action is on whether the particular plaintiff has a right to bring the suit, but it assumes that the petition states a valid cause of action for some person and questions whether the plaintiff in the particular case is a member of the class that has a legal interest in the subject matter of the litigation. Howard, 986 So.2d at 60.
Nevertheless, Mr. McNulty asserts that he, as the succession representative and intervenor, has an interest in challenging the trial court's ruling because the February 20, 2015 judgment awarded attorney fees and costs to Mrs. Metzler and that such an award is a community asset. However, as previously stated, Mr. Cadow and Mrs. Metzler both aver that Mr. Metzler (or the succession representative) was not a party to the interdiction proceeding and that Mr. McNulty has no standing as he was not awarded any attorney fees and costs.
In an interdiction proceeding, LSA-C.C.P. art. 4550 provides the statutory authority for an award of attorney fees and costs. Article 4550 provides that the trial court may render judgment for costs and attorney fees, or any part thereof, against any party, as the court may consider fair. Therefore, vast discretion is vested with the trial court. See In re Benson, 15-0874 (La.App. 4 Cir. 2/24/16), 216 So.3d 950, 961, writ denied, 16-0314 (La. 4/8/16), 188 So.3d 1052. In the present case, the trial court determined that no award of attorney fees was warranted. After reviewing the record and recognizing the long and convoluted history of this case, we find that the trial court did not abuse its vast discretion in vacating the prior award of attorney fees. Accordingly, we need not address the argument of Mr. Cadow and Mrs. Metzler that Mr. McNulty lacked standing to challenge that portion of the February 13, 2017 judgment that vacated the prior award of attorney fees.
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure art. 4550 provides:
The court may render judgment for costs and attorney fees, or any part thereof, against any party, as the court may consider fair. However, no attorney fees shall be awarded to a petitioner when judgment is granted against the petitioner or the petition is dismissed on the merits.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the February 13, 2017 judgment of the trial court. All costs of this appeal are assessed against Michael A. McNulty, Jr., in his capacity as Independent Executor of the Succession of John A. Metzler, Sr.
AFFIRMED.