Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
San Mateo County Super. Ct. No. 74602
Kline, P.J.
Ian B. (appellant) appeals after the juvenile court sustained two counts of misdemeanor battery in a juvenile wardship petition (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602), and removed him from his home for placement. On appeal, appellant contends (1) there is insufficient evidence to support the findings that he committed battery; (2) the juvenile court misapplied the law applicable to self-defense; (3) the juvenile court erred in admitting evidence of appellant’s prior acts of aggression under Evidence Code sections 1101 and 352; and (4) Penal Code section 654 precluded punishment for both batteries. We shall affirm.
All further statutory references are to the Evidence Code unless otherwise indicated.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
An amended petition, filed on January 5, 2009 pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, alleged that appellant (then 16 years old) had committed one count of battery with serious bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 243, subd. (d)–count one), and two counts of misdemeanor battery (Pen. Code, § 242–counts two and three).
On February 18, 2009, at the contested jurisdictional hearing, the juvenile court sustained counts two and three and, at the prosecutor’s request, dismissed count one. On that same date, at the dispositional hearing, the juvenile court declared appellant a ward of the court with a maximum confinement time of eight months, and removed him from home for placement.
On March 3, 2009, appellant filed a notice of appeal.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Appellant’s mother, Doreen B., was the sole witness in the prosecution’s case in chief. She testified that, when she came home on the early afternoon of December 31, 2008, appellant, two of his friends, his twin sister Zoe, and Doreen’s brother Greg Brown were at the house. Zoe complained to Doreen that appellant and his friends had been in her room again. At that point, Doreen asked appellant’s friend Luis to come downstairs to talk to her. After talking to Luis, she asked him to send down appellant’s other friend, Kevin. She heard appellant say, “I’ll handle this” in a “take charge” angry voice; he then came downstairs instead of Kevin.
For consistency, we will use Greg Brown’s first name when discussing him in this opinion.
Appellant yelled and argued, telling Doreen she should not be worried about his friends, but should be worried about her daughter. He then pointed at each of the three of them—Zoe, Doreen, and Greg—and said, “Fuck you” to each of them individually. Greg, who was “60-something” years old, then stood up and said, “Fuck me?” and started walking toward appellant. Appellant said to “[b]ack the fuck up” and took a swing at Greg with a closed fist from about three feet away. He missed by quite a bit, which made Doreen think he might have been trying to “posture and protect.” Doreen also saw Greg put up his hands and say, “Do you want to fight?” after appellant swung at him.
Appellant also pushed Greg on his chest and shoulder. Doreen was not certain whether the punch or the push came first. The push caused Greg to stumble, and he had trouble getting up. Doreen never saw Greg take a swing at appellant, but she was behind them. She also called the police during the “scuffle” and therefore might not have seen everything.
Finally, appellant tackled Greg by wrapping his arms around Greg’s legs and “took him down” onto the floor. Greg landed against a china hutch. Appellant then ran over to the couch. Zoe went to appellant and spoke to him angrily and appellant ran upstairs. Doreen went to her brother and helped him to stand up. He appeared injured in that he stood hunched over. He had had a liver transplant and was guarded in how he moved.
Greg had been appellant’s father role model. Doreen had previously seen Greg swing a plastic chair at appellant when appellant was about 13 years old and his behavior had started declining. She was not sure who the aggressor was in that incident.
Over the previous three years, appellant began to demonstrate an anger problem. He had hit family members in the last three years. In other situations when appellant had “gone off like that,” Doreen recognized he was losing control and might hurt someone. She saw the same type of anger and behavior he had exhibited in the past on December 31 when he confronted Greg. At that point, she thought, “here it comes again.”
On cross-examination, Doreen testified that, several weeks prior to the incident in question, appellant and Greg had an argument, during which Greg went to his car and retrieved a baseball bat. Doreen saw him holding the bat and told him to put it away.
Defense Case
Appellant testified that, when he went downstairs on December 31, 2008, he told his mother and sister “to stop blaming my friends and that it was my fault.” He did not say “fuck you” to each individual downstairs, but “to the room at large.” His uncle Greg then rose out of his chair swiftly; his face looked contorted and angry. Greg mumbled something under his breath, “along the lines of I’m going to fucking knock you” as he continued to come toward appellant. His hands were clenched at his sides. Appellant started walking backwards, saying “Back the fuck up. Back the fuck up. Get away from me.”
Greg tried to grab appellant’s wrist and appellant put his hands up in front of himself. He continued to back up until he hit the wall behind him. Greg then “took a jab” at appellant, but missed. Appellant fell to his knees and wrapped his arms around Greg’s knees; he “curled” himself and felt Greg’s weight go forward. Appellant tried to move away from Greg, but his sister had come up and was trying to hit him. He then went back to the couch, and his sister followed him there.
When Greg had approached appellant before appellant grabbed him around the knees, appellant was worried that Greg was going to attack him physically. Previous physical confrontations with Greg played into appellant’s fear that he was going to be attacked. Most recently, a few weeks before the present incident, appellant was leaving the house after an argument with his mother and Greg followed him outside. Greg went to his car trunk and got a baseball bat. He then raised the bat and started walking toward appellant. Appellant backed up and Greg did not hit him. Also, about three years earlier, appellant was at the pool at Greg’s apartment complex. They got into an argument and Greg picked up a pool chair and threw it at appellant. The chair did not hit appellant, but landed about a foot away from him.
Other things appellant had heard about Greg’s history gave him concern that Greg might be violent with him on December 31, 2008. These included Greg telling him that he had been to San Quentin and that he had threatened people if they messed with him. Appellant’s mother had told him that Greg had struck her when appellant was younger, and his sister told him she felt threatened by something Greg had said to her. Appellant had also heard from a family friend about a threat that Greg made to him.
During the incident on December 31, appellant’s intention, when he told Greg to back up, was to get out of the house and away from the whole situation. He did in fact leave, as soon as he could physically get away.
On cross-examination, appellant testified that he had had an anger management problem but had gone through a program twice and, as of about a year previously, he no longer had that problem. His mother was lying when she said he took a swing at Greg. He did not push Greg, either.
Rebuttal
Appellant’s sister Zoe B. testified that she had seen their uncle Greg strike or attempt to strike appellant about six years previously when Greg threw a chair at appellant. On December 31, 2008, when appellant came downstairs, he said “fuck you” three times, individually and directly to Zoe, her mother, and her uncle Greg. She saw appellant swing at Greg, but never saw Greg throw a punch at or touch appellant. She only saw Greg approach appellant and put his hands up after appellant swung at him. Greg also said, “You want to fight me? Come on.” Appellant then pushed Greg and Greg fell back into a chair. Zoe started yelling at and hitting appellant because she was upset with him for pushing their uncle. Zoe acknowledged that she did not see the entire incident and that it “was a blur.”
Tension between appellant and Greg had been building for weeks before this incident, with lots of little arguments. On that night, she knew the tension had broken, but she also knew nothing would happen because she had talked to her uncle and she knew he would not hit appellant. Greg had told her “he would never do that now and he knew it wasn’t a smart idea.” Zoe did not know if appellant knew this.
DISCUSSION
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence of Battery
Appellant contends there is insufficient evidence to support the findings that he committed battery.
Misdemeanor battery is defined as “any willful and unlawful use of force or violence upon the person of another.” (Pen. Code, § 242.) Self-defense is a complete defense to battery. (Pen. Code, §§ 692, 693.) Self-defense is established as a matter of law when all of the evidence shows that the battery was justified. (See People v. Clark (1982) 130 Cal.App.3d 371, 379, overruled on another ground in People v. Blakeley (2000) 23 Cal.4th 82, 92.) “[H]owever, where some of the evidence tends to show a situation in which a killing [or, as here, a battery] may not be justified then the issue is a question of fact for the jury to determine. [Citation.]” (People v. Clark, at p. 379.)
In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, “[o]ur review is governed by the same principles applicable to adult criminal appeals. [Citation.] Our function is ‘to determine whether the record contains any substantial evidence tending to support the finding of the trier of fact, and in considering this question we must view this evidence in the light most favorable to the finding.’ [Citation.]” (In re Muhammed C. (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1325, 1328.)
In the present case, the evidence shows that appellant angrily came downstairs and said, “Fuck you” individually to his mother, sister, and uncle Greg. When Greg approached appellant with his fists clenched at his sides, appellant threw a punch at him. When Greg responded by putting up his hands and asking appellant if he wanted to fight, appellant pushed him and then tackled him. In light of these actions on appellant’s part, along with the evidence of his anger management problems and similar aggressive behavior towards family members over the previous three years, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s rejection of appellant’s claim of self-defense and its findings that the push and the tackling constituted misdemeanor batteries. (See In re Muhammed C., supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at p. 1329; People v. Clark, supra, 130 Cal.App.3d at p. 379.) That there might also be some evidence that would support a finding that appellant acted in self-defense does not change this conclusion. (See ibid.)
Although Greg did respond to appellant’s verbal and physical provocation, the evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that it would not be reasonable for appellant to believe he was in imminent danger of bodily harm due to Greg’s actions. (See CALCRIM No. 3470; see also pt. II. of this opinion, post.)
II. Juvenile Court’s Application of the Law Related to Self-Defense
Appellant contends the juvenile court misinterpreted and misapplied the law applicable to self-defense.
A. Juvenile Court Background
In concluding that appellant had committed the two counts of misdemeanor battery, the juvenile court ruled as follows: “Listening to the evidence as I have and now I think assessing the mother’s testimony, the daughter’s testimony, the defendant’s testimony, there are some points that are contradictory. [¶] Frankly, I find the mother’s testimony most believable and in so doing, I do find that clearly there was not a legal right of self-defense here. I think there’s been an argument for it, but it doesn’t meet the standard of self-defense.
“The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in lawful self-defense. And I think it’s been demonstrated the defendant did not act in lawful self-defense. From the testimony including the fact that he was the—he was the one who was provocative in the first place under [CALCRIM No.] 3472. [¶] Further, that under [CALCRIM Nos.] 3471 and 3470, clearly the defense of self-defense is not applicable here.”
B. Legal Analysis
CALCRIM No. 3470, which sets forth the general law regarding self-defense, provides in part: “Self-defense is a defense to [battery]. The defendant is not guilty of [that crime if he] used force against the other person in lawful [self-defense]. The defendant acted in lawful [self-defense] if:
“1. The defendant reasonably believed that [he] was in imminent danger of suffering bodily injury [or was in imminent danger of being touched unlawfully];
“2. The defendant reasonably believed that the immediate use of force was necessary to defend against that danger;
“AND
“3. The defendant used no more force than was reasonably necessary to defend against that danger.” (Revised April 2008.)
CALCRIM No. 3470 further provides: “Belief in future harm is not sufficient, no matter how great or how likely the harm is believed to be. The defendant must have believed there was imminent danger of violence to [himself]. Defendant’s belief must have been reasonable and [he] must have acted because of that belief. The defendant is only entitled to use that amount of force that a reasonable person would believe is necessary in the same situation. If the defendant used more force than was reasonable, the defendant did not act in lawful [self-defense].
CALCRIM No. 3471 provides: “A person who engages in mutual combat or who is the initial aggressor has a right to self-defense only if:
“1. [He] actually and in good faith tries to stop fighting;
“[AND]
“2. [He] indicates, by word or by conduct, to [his] opponent, in a way that a reasonable person would understand, that [he] wants to stop fighting and that [he] has stopped fighting[;]
“<Give element 3 in cases of mutual combat>
“[AND
“3. [He] gives [his] opponent a chance to stop fighting.]
“If a person meets these requirements, [he] then has a right to self-defense if the opponent continues to fight.
“[A fight is mutual combat when it began or continued by mutual consent or agreement. That agreement may be expressly stated or implied and must occur before the claim to self-defense arose.]” (Revised Dec. 2008.)
CALCRIM No. 3472 provides: “A person does not have the right to self-defense if he or she provokes a fight or quarrel with the intent to create an excuse to use force.” (New Jan. 2006.)
Appellant asserts that the de novo standard of review applies “in assessing whether instructions correctly state the law.” (People v. Posey (2004) 32 Cal.4th 193, 218.) Here, however, appellant is not actually arguing that any of these instructions misstated the law but, rather, that the court misapplied these instructions to the present case or, in other words, that there was not substantial evidence to support the court’s consideration of these instructions. (See, e.g., People v. Garnier (1950) 95 Cal.App.2d 489, 496.)
Appellant first argues that the juvenile court’s reliance on CALCRIM No. 3471 was misplaced in that there was not substantial evidence either that he was the initial aggressor or that he and Greg were engaged in mutual combat. We disagree.
First, in light of the evidence presented in this case, we presume the court relied on the “initial aggressor” portion of CALCRIM No. 3471, rather than the “mutual combat” portion. There is substantial evidence that appellant was the initial aggressor. After saying, “Fuck you” to Greg, he swung at Greg as Greg approached him, then pushed Greg as Greg put his fists up and asked if appellant wanted to fight. Both Doreen and Zoe testified that Greg did not lash out physically at appellant, even after appellant cursed at him and later swung at him. Indeed, the evidence supports the juvenile court’s express and implied findings that appellant initiated the interaction, that he was the only one who made physical contact and, further, that his resort to force was not reasonable in the circumstances. (See CALCRIM No. 3470.) Moreover, the court reasonably found that appellant did not attempt to stop fighting once he began to use force against Greg. The court’s reliance on CALCRIM No. 3471 thus was appropriate.
Appellant further argues that the court should not have relied on CALCRIM No. 3472, which is only applicable if the defendant provoked a quarrel with the intent to create an excuse to use force.
In light of the circumstances—including the ongoing tension between appellant and Greg, as well as appellant’s recent history of violence on family members—the court was not unreasonable in concluding that appellant’s initial “Fuck you” to Greg was said to provoke a fight “with the intent to create an excuse to use force.” (CALCRIM No. 3472.) Moreover, the court’s overall conclusion that self-defense did not apply was supported by substantial evidence. (See pt. I., ante.) Accordingly, the court’s partial reliance on CALCRIM Nos. 3471 and 3472 was not erroneous and did not in any way prejudice appellant.
III. Admission of Appellant’s Prior Acts of Aggression Under Section 1101
Appellant contends the juvenile court erred in admitting evidence of appellant’s prior acts of aggression under sections 1101 and 352.
A. Juvenile Court Background
Appellant moved in limine to exclude evidence of any of his “alleged prior criminal or bad acts.” During argument on the motion, the prosecutor stated that appellant’s prior acts “might become relevant.” The following discussion then occurred:
The probation report documented numerous instances of appellant’s violent behavior toward family members over the previous three and one-half years. It also documented, inter alia, several battery allegations that were sustained based on violent acts toward family members.
“MR. ELY [defense counsel]: This [is a] battery case. Evidence of previous batteries introduced as character evidence would be unduly prejudicial and also excludable as character evidence. My client at least at this point does not plan on testifying.
“THE COURT: If he doesn’t testify, I don’t see it coming in. Your position, Mr. Briggs?
“MR. BRIGGS [prosecutor]: If he doesn’t testify, your Honor, I’m thinking that it could come in depending on—at this point I intend to call the victim’s sister who is the minor’s mother as well as the minor’s sister. The minor has a history, your Honor, of battery.
“And I think it would come in perhaps depending on their testimony to show motive or lack of mistake on his part. He has a violent history and could come before the court and claim self-defense under the circumstances which, I believe, it is going to be the defense somewhat belied by his prior history.
“THE COURT: All right. At this juncture I will exclude evidence. If the door is open and then if the issues arise, you can raise it.”
During the prosecutor’s direct examination of Doreen B., the following exchange took place:
“Q: You had said something to the effect that [around the time of the incident with Greg and the pool chair three years earlier] is when Ian started acting up?
“A: Yes. That’s when his behavior was beginning to be problematic.
“Q: Has Ian shown aggressive signs in the last three years?
“A: Yes.
“Q": Has he hit other people, family members in the last three years?
“A: Yes.
“MR. ELY: Objection. Lack of—well, relevance. And, I believe, we’re heading down sort of a track that the court had ruled on in my [in limine] motions that essentially the prosecutor is trying to prove that my client battered Mr. Brown proving that he has in the past.
“THE COURT: The court will not take it in that way. If this were a jury trial, there would be issues in regards to a jury’s inability to separate. But being a court trial, I don’t see those issues. Your objection is well taken, but it is overruled.”
The prosecutor then elicited the following related testimony from Doreen: Over the previous three years, appellant had begun to show an anger problem. He had hit family members in the last three years. In other situations when appellant had “gone off like that,” Doreen recognized he was losing control and might hurt someone. She saw the same type of anger and behavior he had exhibited in the past on December 31 when he confronted Greg. At that point, she thought, “here it comes again.”
Later, during cross-examination of appellant, after appellant claimed that he had been “cured” of his anger management problem, with the last incident occurring “about a year ago,” the prosecutor attempted to impeach him with his October 28, 2008 admission to committing battery. Defense counsel objected, stating, “[t]hat goes to the in limine objections I have regarding character evidence to prove his conduct in the specific case.” The court sustained the objection on relevance grounds.
Subsequently, the prosecutor attempted to impeach appellant with his record of batteries, asserting that the crimes involved moral turpitude. The court stated, “I don’t believe battery is a crime of moral turpitude,” and the prosecutor responded, “I will leave it at that.”
B. Legal Analysis
“Subdivision (a) of section 1101 prohibits admission of evidence of a person’s character, including evidence of character in the form of specific instances of uncharged misconduct, to prove the conduct of that person on a specified occasion. Subdivision (b) of section 1101 clarifies, however, that this rule does not prohibit admission of evidence of uncharged misconduct when such evidence is relevant to establish some fact other than the person’s character or disposition.” (People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 393.)
Section 1101 provides in relevant part: “(a) Except as provided in this section and in Sections 1102, 1103, 1108, and 1109, evidence of a person’s character or a trait of his or her character (whether in the form of an opinion, evidence of reputation, or evidence of specific instances of his or her conduct) is inadmissible when offered to prove his or her conduct on a specified occasion. “(b) Nothing in this section prohibits the admission of evidence that a person committed a crime, civil wrong, or other act when relevant to prove some fact (such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident, or whether a defendant in a prosecution for an unlawful sexual act or attempted unlawful sexual act did not reasonably and in good faith believe that the victim consented) other than his or her disposition to commit such an act.”
“The least degree of similarity (between the uncharged act and the charged offense) is required in order to prove intent. [Citation.] ‘[T]he recurrence of a similar result... tends (increasingly with each instance) to negative accident or inadvertence or self-defense or good faith or other innocent mental state, and tends to establish (provisionally, at least, though not certainly) the presence of the normal, i.e., criminal, intent accompanying such an act....’ [Citation.] In order to be admissible to prove intent, the uncharged misconduct must be sufficiently similar to support the inference that the defendant ‘ “probably harbor[ed] the same intent in each instance.” [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 402.)
Here, appellant claims the juvenile court abused its discretion when it admitted the evidence of appellant’s prior aggressive acts toward family members. According to appellant, the court failed to make any inquiry into the facts of appellant’s prior acts and, therefore, “had no basis to determine that there was any similarity, whatsoever, in the circumstances that would make the prior acts relevant to show appellant’s intent in the charged offense.” We disagree.
When the prosecutor attempted to impeach appellant with previous specific acts of battery, the court disallowed it. However, when the court learned, from an exchange between the prosecutor and Doreen, that appellant’s behavior had begun to be problematic, that he had shown “aggressive signs” over the last three years, and that he had committed aggressive acts toward his family, the court was within its discretion in deciding that this evidence was admissible. As the court stated, given that this was a court trial, there were not the same concerns about a “jury’s inability to separate” the prior and current offenses. This evidence, which also included Doreen’s testimony that appellant’s behavior in this case resembled his past aggressive behavior, demonstrates that there was sufficient similarity between the prior acts and the current allegations to warrant admission under section 1101, subdivision (b), to prove appellant’s intent and to “negative” self-defense. (See People v. Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 402.)
Appellant also contends that, even if the evidence was otherwise admissible under section 1101, subdivision (b), the court should have exercised its discretion to exclude it under section 352 as more prejudicial than probative, and the court further failed to weigh these two factors on the record, as it was required to do. (See People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 25 [record must affirmatively show that court “did in fact weigh prejudice against probative value” under section 352].)
Section 352 provides: “The court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.
Although the court did not explicitly state that it was weighing the probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial effect, it did state that it did not see the issue raised by defense counsel—regarding the prosecutor’s alleged effort to prove that appellant committed battery against Greg by proving that he has committed such acts in the past—as a concern in a court trial. Moreover, even if this statement was insufficient to show that the court had in fact exercised its discretion under section 352, appellant cannot show prejudice. (See People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.)
This was a court trial, in which Doreen testified only that appellant had similarly hurt family members in the past. This evidence was similar, relevant, and took up almost no time during the hearing. (See § 352.) Moreover, as previously discussed, there was clearly sufficient evidence to support the court’s battery findings and negate appellant’s claim of self-defense. (See pt. I., ante.) Therefore, especially in light of the court’s stated ability to separate the past acts from the present allegations, we conclude there is not a reasonable probability that the result in this case would have been different had the court not admitted this evidence. (See People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.)
We also reject appellant’s claim that admission of this evidence rendered the trial “fundamentally unfair,” in violation of his right to due process. No federal constitutional error has been demonstrated. (See Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24.)
IV. Applicability of Penal Code Section 654
Appellant contends Penal Code section 654 precluded punishment for both batteries.
At the dispositional hearing, the juvenile court removed appellant from his home for placement and declared his maximum time of confinement to be eight months, based on a six-month term for one battery count and a consecutive two-month term for the second battery count. Defense counsel objected at the hearing, under Penal Code section 654, arguing that the offenses were “part of a single objective.” The court disagreed, stating that the two counts were based on appellant first pushing Greg and then grabbing his legs.
“ ‘[S]ection 654 prohibits multiple punishment for an indivisible course of conduct....’ [Citation.] But multiple crimes are not one transaction where the defendant had a chance to reflect between offenses and each offense created a new risk of harm. [Citations.] ‘Separate sentencing is permitted for offenses that are divisible in time....’ [Citation.]” (People v. Felix (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 905, 915.)
In the present case, appellant argues that there is no evidence as to whether there was enough time between the push and the tackle for appellant to have “a sufficient opportunity to reflect on his next action and thereby renew his intent to batter” his uncle. According to appellant, there is insufficient evidence from which to determine “that appellant had anything more than one sole objective in committing both batteries.”
In People v. Trotter (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 363, 366, the appellate court rejected the defendant’s contention that he should not have been separately punished for two assaults based on two gunshots he fired at police officers approximately one minute apart, because both shots were part of a single course of conduct and incidental to one objective. The court found that the assaults were “volitional and calculated, and were separated by periods of time during which reflection was possible. None was spontaneous or uncontrollable. ‘[D]efendant should... not be rewarded where, instead of taking advantage of an opportunity to walk away from the victim, he voluntarily resumed his... assaultive behavior.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Trotter, supra, 7 Cal.App.4th at p. 368, quoting People v. Harrison (1989) 48 Cal.3d 321, 338.)
There was a third gunshot, fired seconds after the second shot, for which the defendant was also convicted of assault. However, the court apparently stayed punishment on this count. (People v. Trotter, supra, 7 Cal.App.4th at p. 365.)
Here, Doreen testified that, when appellant pushed Greg on the chest and shoulder, Greg stumbled and had trouble getting up. Doreen then tried to intervene and calm everyone down, but appellant ignored her efforts. The court thus had sufficient evidence from which to determine that appellant performed two separate volitional acts, with enough time after the push to reflect on his actions before choosing to tackle his uncle. (See People v. Trotter, supra, 7 Cal.App.4th at p. 368.) In light of the evidence presented at the hearing, the court reasonably could conclude that appellant committed two independent batteries. (See People v. Felix, supra, 92 Cal.App.4th at p. 915.)
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s order is affirmed.
We concur: Haerle, J., Richman, J.
“When deciding whether the defendant’s beliefs were reasonable, consider all the circumstances as they were known to and appeared to the defendant and consider what a reasonable person in a similar situation with similar knowledge would have believed. If the defendant’s beliefs were reasonable, the danger does not need to have actually existed.
“[The defendant’s belief that [he] was threatened may be reasonable even if [he] relied on information that was not true. However, the defendant must actually and reasonably have believed that the information was true.]
“[If you find that [the victim] threatened or harmed the defendant [or others] in the past, you may consider that information in deciding whether the defendant’s conduct and beliefs were reasonable.]
“[If you find that the defendant knew that [the victim] had threatened or harmed others in the past, you may consider that information in deciding whether the defendant’s conduct and beliefs were reasonable.]
“[Someone who has been threatened or harmed by a person in the past is justified in acting more quickly or taking greater self-defense measures against that person.]
[¶]... [¶]
“[A defendant is not required to retreat. He or she is entitled to stand his or her ground and defend himself or herself and, if reasonably necessary, to pursue an assailant until the danger of [battery] has passed. This is so even if safety could have been achieved by retreating.]
“The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in lawful [self-defense]. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of [battery].”
In light of our conclusion, we need not decide whether section 1103 is applicable to the present case, as is argued by respondent.