Opinion
A24D0353
06-17-2024
IN THE INTEREST OF I. T. C., A CHILD (MOTHER).
On April 23, 2024, the juvenile court entered an order terminating the parental rights of the mother of minor child I. T. C. The mother has filed an application for discretionary appeal in this Court. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (12). However, because her previously filed motion for new trial remains pending below, this application is dismissed.
The order also terminated the parental rights of the child's biological father, his legal father, and any other party claiming a parental interest, but only the mother is a party to this application.
The mother's motion for new trial, filed on February 28, 2024-after the termination hearing and the juvenile court's oral pronouncement of its ruling, but before the court entered its written order-ripened upon the entry of the court's April 23, 2024 order. See Southall v. State, 300 Ga. 462, 467 (1) (796 S.E.2d 261) (2017) (concluding that a "prematurely filed motion for new trial that sufficiently identifies the judgment involved becomes fully effective upon entry of that judgment").
Pursuant to OCGA § 5-6-35 (d), an application for discretionary review should be filed within 30 days of entry of the order complained of, but "[w]hen a motion for new trial . . . has been filed, the application shall be filed within 30 days after the entry of the order granting, overruling, or otherwise finally disposing of the motion." As a general rule, an appeal filed when a motion for new trial is pending confers no jurisdiction on an appellate court and results in dismissal of the appeal. See Booker v. Amdur, 186 Ga.App. 276, 276 (367 S.E.2d 94) (1988).Here, the order complained of will not be ripe for appellate review until the trial court has disposed of the motion for new trial. Accordingly, this application is hereby DISMISSED.
The mother indicates in her application that the trial court denied her motion for new trial, but has not yet signed a denial order. And indeed, her application materials contain no such order. Thus, the ruling is not yet effective. See Sharp v. State, 183 Ga.App. 641, 642 (1) (360 S.E.2d 50) (1987) ("[A]n oral order is not final nor appealable until and unless it is reduced to writing, signed by the judge, and filed with the clerk."); Bonner v. State, 182 Ga.App. 133, 134 (355 S.E.2d 91) (1987) ("[N]o judgment is effective until it is signed by the judge and filed with the clerk.") (punctuation and citation omitted).