Opinion
Case No. 01-54434-ASW, Adversary No. 01-5400
October 14, 2003
MEMORANDUM DECISION AFTER TRIAL
Before the Court is a complaint by Bankruptcy Receivables Management ("Creditor"), assignee of Ben Bridge Jeweler ("Jeweler"), against Mark Ngoc Huynh, the Debtor in this Chapter 7 case ("Debtor"). The complaint seeks determination that a debt of $6,229.65 plus interest is non-dischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) and (a)(6), and an award of attorney's fees and costs.
Unless otherwise noted, all statutory references are to Title 11, United States Code ("Bankruptcy Code"), as applicable to cases commenced on September 12, 2001.
The Creditor is represented by Richard Snyder, Esq. and the Debtor represents himself. The matter has been tried and submitted for decision. This Memorandum Decision constitutes the Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law, pursuant to Rule 7052 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.
I. FACTS
The Debtor filed a Chapter 7 petition on September 12, 2001. It is undisputed that he owed the Jeweler $6,229.65 at that time, for the purchase of a watch in March 2001.
The Debtor testified that he had been employed by The Good Guys since approximately 1998, as a salesman of electronic equipment. He worked on a commission basis and said that the business was somewhat seasonal, with January through March being the "slowest" time of the year and December being the "best" month. His gross income in 2000 was $41,717.82 (of which $21,645.69 was earned from January through July), and in 2001 it was $27,928.97 (of which $20,671.83 was earned from January through July).
Gross monthly earnings for that period in 2001 were as follows:
January — $2,668.96 February — $2,068.10 March — $3,047.36 ($2,185 net) April — $2,581.16 May — $2,915.03 June — $2,888.73 July — $1,501.33
The Debtor completed an application for credit from the Jeweler on March 17, 2001, which showed his monthly income to be $5,000 — he testified that the amount was a "rough estimate". On March 23, 2001, in response to the Jeweler's request, the Debtor furnished a copy of his 2000 "W-2 and Earnings Summary" ("W-2 Form"), and the Jeweler opened a charge account for him that same day.
The Debtor testified that, on the day the account was opened, he bought a man's Rolex watch ("Watch") for $7,128, charging a downpayment of $1,425.60 to a VISA card and charging the $5,702.40 balance of the purchase price to his new account with the Jeweler. At the time of purchase, the Debtor signed a "Retail Charge Agreement" ("Agreement"), which calls for monthly payments of at least 10% of the outstanding balance, and includes a security agreement that provides as follows:
I understand that [the Jeweler] retains a security interest in the goods purchased on this account until the unpaid balance of each separate purchase is fully paid. Payments will be applied to the earliest unpaid purchase. I agree not to dispose of the goods, remove them from the address listed, or encumber them without written consent of [the Jeweler], and will protect [the Jeweler] against all loss or damage of the goods from the time they are delivered until I have paid for them in full. [¶] In the event of default of any scheduled payment, I understand that at the option of [the Jeweler], my entire account may become due and payable on demand. If payment is not made on demand, [the Jeweler] may, in the manner and as provided by law retake the goods and pursue any further remedy provided by law. I will pay reasonable collection costs and, in the event the account is referred to an attorney, reasonable attorney fees and costs, whether or not suit is commenced.
The Debtor testified that he sent one payment for the Watch, but the check was lost in the mail. He said that he did not remember the number, date, or amount of the check.
The Debtor testified that he sold the Watch for $2,500 in July 2001. He said that he also made four other sales, which are set forth in the Statement of Financial Affairs filed in the bankruptcy case, but he could not recall whether he had made more sales in addition to those listed. The Statement of Financial Affairs states that transfers made within one year preceding the petition filing date of September 12, 2001 were as follows:
The Debtor testified that each of the dates was erroneously shown to be in 2000 and should instead have been shown to be in 2001.
26 inch TV sold to Tom — 5/00 for $500
24 inch TV, DVD sold to Tien — 8/00 for $125
Computer/monitor sold to Jimmy — 7/00 for $600
Men's designer watch — sold to Jimmy's friend -7/00 for $2500
DVD, speakers, rims — sold to Tim for $1500 5/OO
The Debtor testified that he never received payment from this buyer.
The Debtor testified that, with the exception of the Watch, he could not recall when he purchased any of this property. He said that he sold these items because his income "was substantially reduced" and he "needed the money". He also said that, when these sales were made, he had no credit available and was trying to pay off his accounts instead of charging more — he did not recall whether he actually did stop making charges and said that he used his credit cards "on a daily basis" to pay for such items as gasoline and food, and could not remember each transaction.
The schedules of unsecured non-priority claims filed in the bankruptcy case set forth, in addition to the Jeweler, nineteen creditors holding claims totalling $58,990.30 (each described as being for "Charge/Purchase"), but do not show when any debt was incurred.
The Debtor testified that he used the proceeds from selling the Watch and the other items to "pay bills, debts to people I owe, friends, relatives, family". He acknowledged that the Statement of Financial Affairs filed in the bankruptcy case states that no payments exceeding $600 were made to creditors within ninety days pre-petition and no payments were made to "insiders" within one year pre-petition, but said that he had not understood those questions when he completed the form. The Debtor testified that he did not deposit the sale proceeds in his checking account, and his bank statements for May 11, 2001 to September 10, 2001 (roughly the period when the sales were made) do not reflect any such deposits. He said that he made payments to creditors with cash and money orders as well as by check (but none of the creditors listed in the bankruptcy schedules were paid by check), although he could not recall who was paid what amount at what time — the bank statements for the aforesaid four month period reflect seven checks totalling $3,630.
Bruce Jackman ("Jackman") testified that he and his wife are sole shareholders of the Creditor, he is its President, and the Creditor received the Jeweler's claim against the Debtor by assignment. Jackman testified about a credit report received by the Jeweler in connection with the Debtor's application for the charge account in March 2001, and another credit report received by the Creditor after commencement of the Debtor's bankruptcy case. The first report lists twenty-one open accounts with eight outstanding balances totalling approximately $26,300, no single balance exceeding the account limit, and no failure to pay. The two reports together show that the Debtor's total outstanding debt for credit cards and charge accounts in March 2001 was $31,094.11 less than the total unsecured non-priority debt scheduled in his bankruptcy case approximately six months later (exclusive of the debt owed to the Jeweler). Those reports also show that the Debtor opened four accounts near the time that he opened the account with the Jeweler: First USA in January 2001; Capital One in February 2001; Micro Center and MBNA in March 2001. Jackman testified that the Jeweler's records show no payments made on the Debtor's account, and an outstanding balance of $6,229.65 on the date of bankruptcy.
The Debtor testified that he made "all these charges" because he "was making good money at the time" and "I figure if you make good money you be spending a lot", so "there was charges but that was when I was making good money". He said that "when I wasn't making that good of money is when I had to start selling product to keep up with my living at the same time paying bills". Specifically with respect to the Watch, the Debtor pointed out that the Agreement states "PURCHASER UNDERSTANDS THAT WATCHES CANNOT BE RETURNED IF ALTERED OR WORN", and said "if there's doubt why I didn't return it". The Debtor testified that, when he bought the Watch, he intended to pay for it.
II. ANALYSIS
The Creditor seeks a determination that Debtor's debt to the Jeweler (which has been assigned to the Creditor) is non-dischargeable in bankruptcy, under § 523(a)(2)(A) and/or § 523(a)(6). A. Standards
The Bankruptcy Code is "designed to afford debtors a fresh start, and we interpret liberally its provisions favoring debtors", see In re Bugna, 33 F.3d 1054, 1059 (9th Cir. 1994).
The Code's limited exceptions to the general policy of discharge are found in § 523(a) and are to be construed narrowly, see In re Riso, 978 F.2d 1151 (9th Cir. 1992).
The plaintiff in an action for determination of dischargeability under § 523(a) bears the burden of proving all elements of the claims for relief asserted by a preponderance of the evidence, see Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 111 S.Ct. 654 (1991).
B. § 523(a)(2)(A)
Pursuant to § 523(a)(2)(A), a debt arising from fraud "other than a statement respecting the debtor's or an insider's financial condition" is excepted from discharge. This statute requires a showing of actual fraud rather than constructive fraud or fraud implied in law, and the elements of a claim under this subsection are:
(1) a representation made by the debtor;
(2) known by the debtor at the time made to be false;
(3) made with the intention and purpose of deceiving the creditor;
(4) upon which the creditor justifiably relied;
(5) which proximately caused damage to the creditor. See In re Kirsh, 973 F.2d 1454 (9th Cir. 1992); Fields v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 116 S.Ct. 437 (1995).
The element of promximately caused damage has been established. It is undisputed that the Debtor bought the Watch from the Jeweler, paid $1,425.60 of the purchase price with a charge to a credit card, charged the $5,702.40 balance of the price to his new account with the Jeweler, failed to make any payments on that account, sold the Watch to a third party four months later, and did not turn the sale proceeds over to the Jeweler. As a result of the Debtor's actions, the Jeweler was deprived of both the Watch and most of its purchase price.
The element of the Jeweler's justifiable reliance has also been established. With respect to similar transactions such as charging purchases or cash advances to credit cards, the Ninth Circuit has held that a creditor "justifiably relies on a representation of intent to repay as long as the account is not in default and any initial investigations into a credit report do not raise red flags that would make reliance unjustifiable", In re Anastas, 94 F.3d 1280, 1286 (9th Cir. 1996) ("Anastas"), citing In re Eashai, 87 F.3d 1082, 1091 (9th Cir. 1996) ("Eashai"). In this case, the purchase of the Watch was the first activity on the new account, so there were no defaults at the time of purchase. Before opening the account, the Jeweler received the Debtor's written application showing him to be employed, his W-2 Form stating income from the same employer totalling $41,717.82 for the previous year, and a credit report listing twenty-one open accounts with eight outstanding balances totalling approximately $26,300. The amount of debt reflected on the credit report is over 50% of the Debtor's gross earnings for the preceding year, although no individual balance exceeded account limits and the report did not show failure to make payments. The actual minimum monthly payments specifically reflected on the credit report for Debtor's other debts are as follows:
MBNA America $143 Fleet CC $183 Citibank Gold $104 Bank America $93 Banana/MCCBG $16 First USA Bank $12 ____ $551
In addition, Debtor would owe a minimum monthly payment on the credit card to which he charged the $1,425.60 downpayment — in this Court's experience with similar cases, such payments are generally approximately 2% of the outstanding balance, which would be approximately $28, which would increase the above total to $579. The monthly payment required for the Watch was 10% of the outstanding balance, or approximately $570. The sum of those two totals is $1,149. Debtor's net income in March 2001 when he purchased the Watch was $2,185, which information was available to the Jeweler at the time of purchase. The difference between $1,135 in required payments and $2,185 in net income shows that Debtor had only $1,036 per month for all of his other living expenses, after making payments on all accounts. It appears to the Court from the foregoing analysis that Debtor could not afford the Watch, which should have been evident to the Jeweler as well because the Jeweler had all of the above information. However, Creditor retained a security interest in the Watch and was substantially protected by such interest. Moreover, Creditor did not know Debtor's actual monthly expenses — it was possible, for example, that Debtor lived with his parents and had very low monthly expenses. Therefore, under the particular facts of this case, this Court is not prepared to find that there was a "red flag" which should have precluded the Jeweler from making this sale on these terms. Moreover, there was no evidence of what might constitute a "red flag" in the Jeweler's experience or under typical industry standards, so a subjective analysis cannot be made. Applying an objective test, the information in the credit report (especially Debtor's credit history and the fact that there were no defaults on any of his accounts) is not so extreme that a hypothetical reasonable creditor would consider the Debtor a very bad credit risk for a secured loan of less than $6,000.
The remaining elements are a false representation of an intent to pay, made for the purpose of deceiving. With respect to those elements, the Ninth Circuit has rejected the "implied representation" and "assumption of the risk" theories used in other jurisdictions, and has adopted the "totality of the circumstances" approach, under which "a court may infer the existence of the debtor's intent not to pay if the facts and circumstances of a particular case present a picture of deceptive conduct by the debtor", Eashai, at 1087. The issue here is whether the Debtor charged the Watch to the account while secretly intending to leave the account unpaid. The Debtor said that he did intend to pay when he bought the Watch — he also said "I figure if you make good money you be spending a lot" and "there was charges but that was when I was making good money" — that testimony implies that he made charges only because he was earning "good money" and would not have incurred debt if he were not able to pay it, which in turn implies that he charged the Watch to his account with the intention of paying the account's balance. However, under Eashai, the Court is not limited to considering the Debtor's testimony, and his intent may be inferred from the totality of the circumstances — those are as follows:
The Debtor's application for a charge account with the Jeweler significantly overstated his income at $5,000 per month. He testified that the figure was a "rough estimate", but there is no basis for such an estimate having been made in good faith. The Debtor's $41,717.82 gross income for the previous year was a monthly average of less than $3,500, and his gross income to date in the year of purchase was far less than $5,000 per month: $2,668.96 in January, $2,068.10 in February, and $3,047.36 in March. There was no evidence that he had ever earned $5,000 per month, or had any reason to think that he would do so in the near future (e.q., bonus programs at work, a second job, etc.).
In May 2001, some two months after charging the Watch, the Debtor sold a television set for $500 and "DVD, speakers, rims" for $1,500. He testified that he did so because his income "was substantially reduced" and he "needed the money", but the facts adduced at trial do not show that — gross income was $2,581.16 in April and $2,915.03 in May, more than the Debtor had earned in any month that year except March (when he earned only slightly more at $3,047.36). Two months later, in July 2001, the Debtor's income did drop significantly, to $1,501.33 (and he earned only $7,257.14 during the remaining five months of the year) — in that month, he sold the Watch for $2,500 and "computer/monitor" for $600; the next month, he sold a television set for $125. The Debtor testified that he did not recall whether he had also sold other property during the year prior to commencement of his bankruptcy case in September 2001. According to the Debtor, he used all of the sale proceeds to "pay bills"— his checking account reflects no deposits of the sale proceeds and scant check activity during the sale period, but he testified that he made some payments by cash and money order as well as by check — regardless of how payments were made, he said that he could not recall who was paid, or in what amounts, or at what times.
If Debtor needed this money for other reasons, he did not testify to such reasons at trial.
When the Debtor bought the Watch in March 2001, he held twenty-one open accounts with eight outstanding balances that totalled over $26,000. Two of those accounts had just been opened, one in January and one in February — two more accounts were opened in March, the month in which the Watch was purchased. By the time bankruptcy was filed in September, the Debtor had incurred additional credit card and charge account debts totalling over $31,000.
The Debtor bought the Watch by charging a downpayment of $1,425.60 to a credit card and charging the $5,702.40 balance of the purchase price to the account that he opened with the Jeweler on the date of purchase. No payments were ever made on the account. The Debtor testified that he did send one payment but it was lost in the mail; he said that he could not recall the check number, date, or amount — he did not testify that he stopped payment on the lost check and issued a replacement, or otherwise attempted to make payments on the account.
The totality of the circumstances in this case does "present a picture of deceptive conduct" as discussed by Eashai, and it also suggests that the Debtor was deliberately "loading up" debt with the intention of discharging it in bankruptcy rather than paying it, which is an example of fraudulent intent cited by Anastas. The Debtor's very first contact with the Jeweler was not forthright, when he inflated his income by over 50% in his application for a charge account. Despite the Debtor's protestations that he only spent when he was earning, the fact is that he never made a monthly payment on his account with the Jeweler, even though he earned substantially the same amounts in April through June that he earned when he bought the Watch in March — he claimed to have sent one payment that was lost in the mail, but did not explain why he did not replace that and then made no other payments (even after he sold the Watch for $2,500 in July, which he said was used to "pay bills" that he could not identify). Nor did he provide a check register listing the missing check. The "spending spree" that increased the Debtor's debts by over $31,000 during the six month period immediately prior to bankruptcy occurred primarily after the Watch was purchased, but it demonstrates a pattern of amassing debt on the eve of bankruptcy, which bears upon the issue of whether the Debtor ever intended to pay for the Watch. The Debtor testified that, during this period, he was trying to pay off his accounts and incur no new debt, but he also said that he used credit cards daily and did not recall whether he ever stopped — the only evidence of any attempt to pay accumulated debts was the Debtor's testimony, which included no specific information about payments made and was not well supported by the records of minimal activity in his checking account. In general, the Debtor's testimony was not credible (primarily because most of it consisted of his claimed inability to recall virtually anything and, as discussed above, much of the remainder of his testimony was contradicted by undisputed facts).
As noted above, the Jeweler did not rely on this statement of income, but instead required the Debtor to provide a W-2 Form for calendar year 2000.
By contrast, the debtor in Anastas was insolvent and suffered from a "serious gambling problem", with no realistic prospect of being able to pay his credit card debt in full — yet he did make payments for six months and then attempted to arrange a payment schedule that he could meet. Such efforts were held to be inconsistent with making charges that he did not intend to pay.
The Debtor answered that he did not recall or remember in response to 69 questions.
Creditor has established that the debt to the Jeweler is non-dischargeable as one arising from fraud, pursuant to § 523(a)(2) (A).
C. § 523(a)(6)
A debt arising from willful, malicious damage to the property of another is excepted from discharge pursuant to § 523(a)(6). The elements of a claim under this statute have been established by In re Jercich, 238 F.3d 1202, 1208-09 (9th Cir. 2001) ("Jercich"):
We hold, consistent with the approaches taken by the Fifth and Sixth Circuits, that under [Kawaauhau, et vir., v. Geiqer, 523 U.S. 57, 118 S.Ct. 974 (1998)], the willful injury requirement of § 523(a)(6) is met when it is shown either that the debtor had a subjective motive to inflict the injury or that the debtor believed that injury was substantially certain to occur as a result of his conduct. . . . A malicious injury involves (1) a wrongful act, (2) done intentionally, (3) which necessarily causes injury, and (4) is done without just cause or excuse. [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]
The Ninth Circuit noted in In re Su, 290 F.3d 1140, 1148 (9th Cir. 2002) ("Su") that willfulness and malice are two separate requirements that are not to be "conflated" into a single inquiry, and made it clear that each alternative prong of the willfulness showing must be based on a subjective standard:
The subjective standard correctly focuses on the debtor's state of mind and precludes application of § 523(a)(6)'s nondischargeability provision short of the debtor's actual knowledge that harm to the creditor was substantially certain.
Su, at 1146.
The willful and malicious injury that is claimed here is the Debtor's sale of the Watch (which was subject to the Jeweler's security interest) without turning the proceeds over to the Jeweler. As discussed above, this Court finds that the Debtor bought the Watch without intending to pay for it. Accordingly, it follows that the Jeweler would never receive payment and its only recourse would be repossession of its collateral (or the proceeds thereof). The Debtor rendered repossession impossible by selling the Watch to "Jimmy's friend" four months after purchase and giving the proceeds to "people I owe, friends, relatives, family" whose names he could not recall — the Debtor did so after signing the Agreement, which provided for the Jeweler's security interest in the Watch and also stated "I agree not to dispose of the goods, remove them from the address listed, or encumber them without written consent of [the Jeweler], and will protect [the Jeweler] against all loss or damage of the goods from the time they are delivered until I have paid for them in full". Under such circumstances, the Debtor must be charged with knowledge that injury was substantially certain to occur as a
result of his conduct, since he was depriving the Jeweler of its collateral, which was its sole source of the recovery to which it was entitled by the Agreement. The sale was an intentional and wrongful act, because Debtor had agreed not to dispose of the Watch but voluntarily sold it. Debtor's testimony implied that he did not return the Watch because the Agreement states "PURCHASER UNDERSTANDS THAT WATCHES CANNOT BE RETURNED IF ALTERED OR WORN", which is a relevant, significant fact. However, the Agreement also states that the Jeweler may "retake the goods" when they are not paid for, which makes it clear that the Jeweler had a right to recover the Watch when the Debtor failed to make the required payments on the charge account.
Creditor has established that the debt to the Jeweler is non-dischargeable as one arising from willful and malicious damage to property, pursuant to § 523(a)(6).
D. Attorney's Fees And Costs
The Creditor seeks attorney's fees and costs, citing no authority. With respect to those expenses, the Agreement provides as follows:
If payment is not made on demand, [the Jeweler] may, in the manner and as provided by law retake the goods and pursue any further remedy provided by law. I will pay reasonable collection costs and, in the event the account is referred to an attorney, reasonable attorney fees and costs, whether or not suit is commenced.
The expenses sought by the Creditor are those incurred in this Adversary Proceeding. However, an award of attorney's fees is not permitted in the Ninth Circuit under the circumstances of this case. Attorney's fees may be awarded to an unsecured
creditor in a bankruptcy proceeding only to the extent that state law governs the substantive issues and authorizes the court to award fees. Renfrew v. Draper, 232 F.3d 688, 694 (9th Cir. 2000). . . . Under Renfrew, a creditor can recover attorney's fees incurred in connection with litigating the validity of a contract, even if the ultimate issue in the case is one of bankruptcy law. By contrast, the mere presence of an attorney's fees provision in the contract giving rise to the debt at issue does not entitle a prevailing party to attorney's fees. See In re Hashemi, 104 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 1996) (" [T]he question of the applicability of the bankruptcy laws to particular contracts is not a question of the enforceability of a contract but rather involves a unique, separate area of federal law.") (citing In re Coast Trading Co., 744 F.2d 686, 693 (9th Cir. 1984)). Our past cases awarding attorney's fees to prevailing debtors conform to the same basic principles. See In re Baroff, 105 F.3d 439, 440-42 (9th Cir. 1997) (awarding fees incurred by a prevailing party debtor in defending a state law fraudulent inducement claim, but refusing to award fees incurred in connection with a related issue of bankruptcy law) [W]e believe that a prevailing party should not be entitled to attorney's fees for litigation of state law issues merely tangential to an issue of federal bankruptcy law. This conclusion is consistent with our prior cases, in which we have awarded attorney's fees to prevailing bankruptcy parties only where the validity or enforceability of a contract was expressly at issue.
Thrifty Oil vs. Bank of America, 322 F.3d 1039, 1040-1041 (9th Cir. 2003) ("Thrifty Oil"). In this case, the validity or enforceability of the Agreement between the Jeweler and the Debtor is not at issue because the Debtor does not contest that he owes the debt claimed. The only issues raised by the Creditor's complaint, and the only issues tried, are whether the acknowledged debt is dischargeable in bankruptcy. It is undisputed that the Creditor's claim is unsecured so, under Thrifty Oil, attorney's fees would be recoverable only to the extent that "state law governs the substantive issues and authorizes the court to award fees" (emphasis supplied). Regardless
of whether state law may or may not authorize fee shifting with respect to this contract and the complaint in this Adversary Proceeding, the fact remains that the substantive issues are governed entirely by bankruptcy law and not by state law.
Pursuant to Thrifty Oil, the Creditor is not entitled to an award of attorney's fees for litigating the complaint in this Adversary Proceeding. The Creditor is entitled to recover its cost for the fee charged to file the complaint, pursuant to Rule 7054(b) of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.
E. Interest
The Creditor seeks an award of pre-judgment interest, citing no authority and stating no rate.
The Agreement between the Jeweler and the Debtor does not provide for interest. It does call for late charges and "finance charges", which are included in the $6,229.65 balance that existed on the date of bankruptcy. Finance charges and interest are two different things, the former applying to credit sales and the latter to loans or forbearance of money, see Boerner vs. Colwell Co., 21 Cal.3d 37 (1978) (In Bank).
California Civil Code § 3289(b) provides that "If a contract entered into after January 1, 1986, does not stipulate a legal rate of interest, the obligation shall bear interest at a rate of 10 percent per annum after a breach". The Creditor is therefore entitled to pre-judgment interest at the rate of 10% from the bankruptcy filing date of September 12, 2001 until entry of judgment. Thereafter, the Creditor will be entitled to post-judgment interest at the rate that is provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1961 on
the date that judgment is entered, until the judgment is fully satisfied.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons hereinabove set forth:
1/ The Creditor is entitled to judgment determining that the debt of $6,229.65 owed by the Debtor to the Jeweler, plus pre-judgment interest at the rate of 10% from the bankruptcy filing date of September 12, 2001 until entry of judgment, is excepted from discharge pursuant to §§ 523(a)(2)(A) and (6).
2/ The Creditor is entitled to an award of costs in the amount of the fee charged to file the complaint in this Adversary Proceeding.
3/ The Creditor is not entitled to an award of attorney's fees or other costs.
4/ The Creditor is entitled to post-judgment interest at the rate provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1961 on the date that judgment is entered, until the judgment is fully satisfied.
Counsel for the Creditor shall submit a form of judgment so providing, after review by the Debtor as to form.