Opinion
No. 349827 No. 349828
02-27-2020
In re C. J. B. HUNT, Minor.
If this opinion indicates that it is "FOR PUBLICATION," it is subject to revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports. UNPUBLISHED Cass Circuit Court Family Division
LC No. 18-000145-NA Before: SAWYER, P.J., and MARKEY and STEPHENS, JJ. PER CURIAM.
In these consolidated appeals, respondent-mother and respondent-father appeal by right the court's order terminating their parental rights to their child, CH, pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(j) (reasonable likelihood that the child will be harmed if returned to parent). We affirm.
CH was removed from respondents' care at the time of her birth because respondents' other six children had previously been removed and were currently in foster care because of domestic violence and physical abuse. Respondents failed to benefit from services and adequately address the trauma the six older children suffered as a result of the domestic violence against respondent-mother and the physical abuse of the children. Respondent-father was the perpetrator of the violence and abuse. Respondents' parental rights to those six children were terminated on February 1, 2019, while proceedings were ongoing in the instant case. Respondents showed no improvement from their services and treatment plans; consequently, on June 19, 2019, the court terminated their parental rights to CH. Respondents now appeal.
I. REASONABLE EFFORTS TO REUNIFY
Respondent-mother argues that the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) failed to make reasonable efforts to reunify her with CH. We disagree. Generally, this Court reviews for clear error a court's finding that the DHHS engaged in reasonable efforts to reunify a child with his or her parent. See In re Mason, 486 Mich 142, 152; 782 NW2d 747 (2010). But respondent-mother failed to preserve this issue, and unpreserved claims are reviewed for plain error affecting substantial rights. In re Utrera, 281 Mich App 1, 8-9; 761 NW2d 253 (2008).
Absent aggravating circumstances, "[b]efore a court may enter an order terminating parental rights, Michigan's Probate Code, MCL 710.21 et seq., requires a finding that the Department . . . has made reasonable efforts at family reunification." In re Hicks/Brown, 500 Mich 79, 83; 893 NW2d 637 (2017). "As part of these reasonable efforts, the Department must create a service plan outlining the steps that both it and the parent will take to rectify the issues that led to court involvement and to achieve reunification." Id. at 85-86. At each review hearing, the court is required to consider compliance with the case service plan and whether the parent has benefited from those services. In re Mason, 486 Mich at 156. Not only must a respondent cooperate and participate in the services, the respondent must benefit from them. In re TK, 306 Mich App 698, 711; 859 NW2d 208 (2014). A respondent must establish that he or she would have fared better if other services had been offered. See In re Fried, 266 Mich App 535, 543; 702 NW2d 192 (2005). "The adequacy of the petitioner's efforts to provide services may bear on whether there is sufficient evidence to terminate a parent's rights." In re Rood, 483 Mich 73, 89; 763 NW2d 587 (2009).
Respondent-mother maintains that for reasons beyond her control, she was unable to live and receive services at Haven as ordered by the court. Respondent-mother further contends that her inability to obtain services at Haven led to the court's terminating her parental rights because she did not receive mental health services at the facility. It is true that as part of respondent-mother's plea agreement, she agreed to go to Haven in Battle Creek, which is a shelter where she could receive services. Haven had been recommended by the DHHS. But, soon after the plea agreement, it was discovered that respondent-mother did not qualify for entry into Haven because it only took women who had substance abuse issues, which was not a primary concern for respondent-mother, and, regardless, there were no openings.
Respondent-mother mischaracterizes what transpired during the proceedings that led to the termination of her parental rights. When the foster care worker, Tina Johnson, discovered that respondent-mother was unable to live at Haven, staff at Haven gave Johnson information for Safe Place, a shelter at which respondent-mother could live and receive services. Respondent-mother started to reside at Safe Place on November 13, 2019, and she had her stay extended past the 60-day limit, until March 2, 2019. Thus, the DHHS provided respondent-mother with an alternative once it learned of the problem. Moreover, the basis of the plea agreement was that respondent-mother find a safe place to live and prove that she could eventually provide a safe and proper home for CH. Haven was merely a suggested place for purposes of fulfilling that agreement. Furthermore, there is no indication that the court terminated respondent-mother's parental rights because she did not specifically receive treatment at Haven.
Respondent-mother had the opportunity to receive mental health services outside of Haven. The DHHS referred respondent-mother for mental health services with Rachel Hooley. Respondent-mother stopped receiving services from Hooley because respondent-mother moved to Battle Creek to live at Safe Place. As a result, the DHHS referred respondent-mother for services with Sandra Burdick, an outreach therapist, who traveled to respondent-mother's location to provide her with mental health counseling. Respondent-mother chose to stop attending sessions with Burdick in April 2019. The DHHS also provided respondent-mother with multiple other services, including random drug screens, a substance abuse assessment, a psychological evaluation, and family team meetings. Thus, the DHHS made reasonable efforts to reunify respondent-mother with CH. Accordingly, the court did not clearly err by finding that reasonable efforts at reunification had been made.
II. STATUTORY GROUNDS AND BEST INTERESTS
Respondent-mother and respondent-father argue that the court clearly erred by finding that there existed clear and convincing evidence supporting termination of their parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j) and by finding that termination was in CH's best interests. We disagree as to both respondents.
If a trial court finds that a single statutory ground for termination has been established by clear and convincing evidence and that it has been proved by a preponderance of the evidence that termination of parental rights is in the best interests of a child, the court is mandated to terminate a respondent's parental rights to that child. MCL 712A.19b(3) and (5); MCR 3.977(H)(3); In re Beck, 488 Mich 6, 10-11; 793 NW2d 562 (2010); In re Moss, 301 Mich App 76, 90; 836 NW2d 182 (2013); In re Ellis, 294 Mich App 30, 32; 817 NW2d 111 (2011). "This Court reviews for clear error the trial court's ruling that a statutory ground for termination has been established and its ruling that termination is in the children's best interests." In re Hudson, 294 Mich App 261, 264; 817 NW2d 115 (2011); see also MCR 3.977(K). "A finding . . . is clearly erroneous if the reviewing court has a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed[.]" In re BZ, 264 Mich App 286, 296; 690 NW2d 505 (2004). In applying the clear error standard in parental termination cases, "regard is to be given to the special opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses who appeared before it." In re Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989); see also MCR 2.613(C).
The court may terminate parental rights pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(j) when "[t]here is a reasonable likelihood, based on the conduct or capacity of the child's parent, that the child will be harmed if he or she is returned to the home of the parent." Under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j), harm encompasses both physical and emotional harm. In re Hudson, 294 Mich App at 268.
With respect to respondent-mother, there was clear and convincing evidence of a reasonable likelihood that CH would be harmed if returned to respondent-mother's care. Respondent-mother's parental rights had already been terminated to her other six children for failure to progress in and benefit from services after the children were removed from her care because of domestic violence and physical abuse in the home. In addition to the services received in the case involving the older six children, respondent-mother received 11 months of services for CH before her rights were terminated. Respondent-mother, however, failed to benefit from those additional services and prove that she could care for CH. There was sufficient evidence presented showing that respondent-mother had failed to address her mental health issues as necessary to ensure that she could provide a safe home for CH.
Respondent-mother had been a victim of respondent-father's abuse for many years. She, however, stopped engaging in mental health services with Burdick in April 2019, two months before her parental rights to CH were terminated. Evidence indicated that respondent-mother continued to minimize the trauma her children suffered as a result of the domestic violence and physical abuse in the home. Respondent-mother continued to blame others for the removal of her children and failed to take responsibility for her failure to protect the children. Moreover, Dr. James Henry testified that respondent-mother had failed to address her own trauma and had demonstrated an inability to make independent decisions. Therefore, Dr. Henry believed that even if respondent-mother were not in a relationship with respondent-father, she would likely reenact the same relationship with another man.
Moreover, respondent-mother failed to show that she had suitable housing for CH. At the time of the termination hearing, respondent-mother was living with her fiancé. Testimony established that Calhoun County Child Protective Services had received allegations that respondent-mother and her fiancé were using drugs around the fiancé's children. There was also evidence of other troubling behavior by respondent-mother's fiancé. Thus, even though CH was taken at birth and never lived with respondent-mother, sufficient evidence was presented showing a reasonable likelihood that CH would be harmed if placed in respondent-mother's care.
With respect to respondent-father, we find sufficient evidence was presented establishing a reasonable likelihood that CH would be harmed if placed in his care. Respondent-father was initially offered services in the case regarding the six older children. Then, after CH was born, an updated case service plan was put in place for respondent-father. Respondent-father was offered a variety of services, including case management, probation services, a mental health assessment, a substance abuse assessment, drug screens, a psychological evaluation, domestic violence and anger management services, an adult trauma assessment, and housing assistance. Respondent-father stopped engaging in mental health services in October 2018. In November 2018, he appeared for a hearing regarding the other six children, but he did not appear for any subsequent hearings until the termination hearing regarding CH on June 4, 2019. Moreover, at the termination hearing, respondent-father testified that the self-styled services he was engaging in to address his anger and abusive behavior included working, saving money, and receiving therapy through his church. Amber Barton, the foster care worker, could not confirm that respondent-father was receiving adequate mental health services with a licensed professional. Despite the fact that respondent-father admitted to having physically abused respondent-mother in the past, he denied ever physically abusing his children or ever physically abusing respondent-mother in the presence of the children. But this testimony was contrary to evidence that the children had suffered extreme trauma as a result of physical abuse respondent-father inflicted on the children and respondent-mother. There was evidence that respondent-father beat one of the children so severely that she was rendered unconscious and leaving the other children to believe that respondent-father had killed her. The evidence indicated that respondent-father had not received proper mental health services to address his abusive behavior and had yet to acknowledge the harm he had inflicted on his children. Accordingly, the court did not clearly err in concluding that there was a reasonable likelihood that CH would be harmed if placed in respondent-father's care.
With respect to a child's best interests, we place our focus on the child rather than the parent. In re Moss, 301 Mich App at 87. In assessing a child's best interests, a trial court may consider such factors as a "child's bond to the parent, the parent's parenting ability, the child's need for permanency, stability, and finality, and the advantages of a foster home over the parent's home." In re Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App 35, 41-42; 823 NW2d 144 (2012) (citations omitted). "The trial court may also consider a parent's history of domestic violence, the parent's compliance with his or her case service plan, the parent's visitation history with the child, the children's well-being while in care, and the possibility of adoption." In re White, 303 Mich App 701, 714; 846 NW2d 61 (2014).
With regard to respondent-mother, as noted above, she failed to make significant progress with services or demonstrate that she could provide a safe home for CH. Respondent-mother had stopped receiving mental health services, which were necessary to address domestic violence and her own trauma. Moreover, she continued to minimize the trauma suffered by her other six children despite expert testimony as to the magnitude of their damage. Also, not only was there was no bond between CH and respondent-mother, it was also evident that CH was doing well in her foster home. CH was placed in a foster home with one of her sisters, and the foster family wished to provide long-term care for CH. Thus, the court did not clearly err by finding that it was in CH's best interests to terminate respondent-mother's parental rights.
With respect to respondent-father, we note that he had not engaged in mental health services since October 2018. He had an extensive history of inflicting physical abuse on respondent-mother and his children, but he refused to acknowledge either. And, CH had no bond with respondent-father; therefore, the court did not clearly err by finding that it was in CH's best interests to terminate respondent-father's parental rights.
We affirm.
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Cynthia Diane Stephens