Opinion
No. 347848
09-19-2019
In re HUNT, Minors.
If this opinion indicates that it is "FOR PUBLICATION," it is subject to revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports. UNPUBLISHED Cass Circuit Court Family Division
LC No. 17-000028-NA Before: SWARTZLE, P.J., and GLEICHER and M. J. KELLY, JJ. PER CURIAM.
Respondent-mother appeals as of right the trial court order terminating her parental rights to her minor children under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) and MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(j). Because the trial court's termination decision is not clearly erroneous, we affirm.
I. BASIC FACTS
The children in this case were traumatized because of the actions of their father. In 2017, following an instance of domestic abuse perpetrated by the children's father against respondent-mother, petitioner sought removal of their father from the home. The children were initially left in respondent-mother's custody. However, during its investigation the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) discovered that the domestic violence in the home was significantly more severe than was initially believed and that it included abuse of the children. In particular, the DHHS learned that the children's father had beat J so severely that the other children believed J had been killed. The children also reported that they saw many other instances of abuse directed against respondent-mother and their siblings. Respondent-mother did not report any of the abuse to the police, and despite the children's father being removed from the home respondent-mother maintained contact with him and allowed him contact with the children. Accordingly, the children were removed from her care and she was provided with reunification services to remedy her victim mentality and to assist her in separating from the children's father.
The children's father's parental rights were terminated during the same proceedings. He has not appealed that decision.
The children underwent therapy. Their therapists consistently testified that all of the children were at risk of severe trauma stunting their development. Three out of the six children received the maximum score on a test intended to measure post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). The therapist who administered this test noted that this was extremely rare for a child to score so high. To slightly varying degrees, each child displayed a variety of mental disorders related to trauma, such as hypervigilance, extreme anxiety, and a lack of trust displayed toward adults. Even the youngest minor child, a toddler, displayed behaviors that indicated early stages of PTSD. In addition, each child displayed fear of African American adult males, which the therapists attributed to the fact that their father was an African American male. The children also reported that their father encouraged them to bully and physically abuse J, and during the case one of the children attacked J for no reason at a party.
For approximately one year, respondent-mother participated in the case services plan. During that time, she demonstrated adequate parenting skills and was affectionate toward the children. In addition, early in the case, she expressed a desire to separate from the children's father in order to protect them. Yet, respondent-mother's attitude shifted. The children's father was seen by DHHS employees driving respondent-mother to her appointments and he was in the same area as respondent-mother on a number of occasions. When questioned about the contact, respondent-mother would first lie, claiming that she had no contact, but she would then admit that she had limited contact with the children's father. Later, the DHHS learned that respondent-mother had continued a sexual relationship with the children's father and was pregnant with his child. Further, when the baby was born respondent-mother went to a parenting-time visit with the children's father. There was also evidence suggesting that after one day of the termination hearing respondent-mother's ribs were broken by the children's father. At the termination hearing, therapists who evaluated respondent-mother testified that she consistently downplayed the extent of the children's trauma and the impact of the abuse from their father. Respondent-mother's testimony likewise minimized the abuse, and she suggested that the children's trauma was caused by their removal from her care as opposed to the abuse inflicted by their father.
II. STATUTORY GROUNDS
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Respondent-mother argues that the trial court erred by finding statutory grounds to terminate her parental rights. "In order to terminate parental rights, the trial court must find by clear and convincing evidence that at least one of the statutory grounds for termination in MCL 712A.19b(3) has been met." In re VanDalen, 293 Mich App 120, 139; 809 NW2d 412 (2011). We review for clear error a trial court's factual determination that statutory grounds exist for termination. Id. "A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if the reviewing court had a definite and firm conviction that a mistake had been committed, giving due regard to the trial court's special opportunity to observe the witnesses." In re BZ, 264 Mich App 286, 296-297; 690 NW2d 505 (2004).
B. ANALYSIS
The trial court terminated respondent-mother's parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) and (j), which provide that termination is proper if:
(c) The parent was a respondent in a proceeding brought under this chapter, 182 or more days have elapsed since the issuance of an initial dispositional order, and the court, by clear and convincing evidence, finds either of the following:
(i) The conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist and there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable time considering the child's age.
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(j) There is a reasonable likelihood, based on the conduct or capacity of the child's parent, that the child will be harmed if he or she is returned to the home of the parent.
With regard to subdivision (c)(i), more than 182 days elapsed between the issuance of the initial dispositional order and the termination hearing. The main barrier to reunification was respondent-mother's continued contact with the children's father, and for over one year, the DHHS offered her services to help her separate from him.
Yet, respondent-mother continued to have voluntary contact with the children's father. Multiple DHHS employees observed him dropping respondent-mother off on numerous occasions. Respondent-mother also became pregnant by him during the pendency of the case and then permitted him contact with the new child. At various points in the case, she expressed a desire to reunify with the children's father once he had changed his behavior. She also minimized the abuse he inflicted on her and the minor children, and, at the termination hearing, she suggested that the trauma the children suffered was inflicted by the DHHS's decision to separate her from the children as opposed to abuse by the children's father. The court did not credit that testimony and instead relied on the testimony from multiple expert witnesses who evaluated the children and opined that the trauma exhibited by the children was from their contact with respondent-father. Those same experts opined that even one additional contact with respondent-father could result in a major setback on the children's recovery, and they consistently expressed concern that respondent-mother would be unable to keep the children's father from continued contact. Instead, there was testimony that, in light of the lack of progress in this case, respondent-mother possessed a high risk of returning to the children's father and was unlikely to break contact with him for the foreseeable future. On appeal, respondent-mother directs this Court to her testimony that she was firmly committed to divorcing the children's father and denying him future entry to her home. She testified that her life with him was now behind her and that she accepted the gravity of the situation. The trial court, however, found that respondent-mother's testimony lacked credibility given her history of lying about her contact with respondent-father and her history of maintaining contact with him. We give "deference to the trial court's special opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses." In re HRC, 286 Mich App 444, 459; 781 NW2d 105 (2009).
On the basis of the above evidence, we conclude that the court's finding that the conditions that led to adjudication continued to exist and that there was no reasonable likelihood that the conditions would be rectified in a reasonable time considering the age of the children. See In re Williams, 286 Mich App 253, 272; 779 NW2d 286 (2009) (stating that termination under subdivision (c)(i) was proper when "the totality of the evidence amply support[ed] that [the respondent] had not accomplished any meaningful change in the conditions" that led to adjudication). Similarly, given respondent-mother's conduct of continually maintaining contact with the children's father, and given the expert testimony that any contact between the children and their father would be significantly detrimental to their mental health, the court did not clearly err by finding that the children would be harmed if returned to respondent-mother's home.
Respondent-mother also directs this Court to the undisputed testimony that she loved her children, that they loved her, and that her parenting skills were praised by the caseworkers. However, the reasons for termination were not based on a lack of love between her and the children, nor were they based on deficient parenting skills. Instead, the factual underpinnings of the termination decision were based upon her inability to separate from the children's father in order to protect the children. As a result, termination under subdivisions (c)(i) and (j) was proper for the reasons stated above, notwithstanding respondent-mother's bond with the children and her parenting skills. --------
III. BEST INTERESTS
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Respondent-mother next challenges the trial court's best-interest analysis, arguing that the record reflects that she loved the children, that they loved her, and that she possessed the necessary skills to parent them. We review for clear error a trial court's best-interest determination. In re White, 303 Mich App 701, 713; 846 NW2d 61 (2014).
B. ANALYSIS
Respondent-mother argues that the trial court failed to consider certain factors when deciding that termination of her parental rights was in the children's best interests. Specifically, she again directs this Court to evidence showing that she loved her children and possessed the parenting skills to care for them. However, "[i]n deciding whether termination is in the child's best interests, the court may consider the child's bond to the parent, the parent's parenting ability, the child's need for permanency, stability, and finality, and the advantages of a foster home over the parent's home." In re Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App 35, 41-42; 823 NW2d 144 (2012) (citations omitted; emphasis added). "The trial court may also consider a parent's history of domestic violence, the parent's compliance with his or her case service plan, the parent's visitation history with the child, and the children's well-being while in care, and the possibility of adoption." In re White Minors, 303 Mich App at 713-714 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Accordingly, given the wide number of considerations that the court can take into account, the failure to address respondent's parenting skills and love for her children, does not amount to reversible error.
Instead, we must examine the factors that the court did rely upon to determine whether its findings were clearly erroneous. Here, the court extensively considered the individual best interests of each of the children, noting the individual trauma they suffered, how they had each reacted to it, and how their recovery was progressing in each case. The court concluded that each child required an environment that was "nurturing" and "calm" so that they could recover from the trauma they had suffered. The court found that under the facts of this case, respondent-mother could not provide them with that environment. In doing so, the court found that the children's need for permanence and stability was paramount. There was extensive testimony regarding the individualized trauma inflicted on the children and their need for stability and safety in their home environment so that they could recover from it.
We acknowledge that respondent-mother intermittently recognized the importance of separating from him, and she took some steps to do so, including obtaining a personal protection order (PPO) at one point. However, it is also clear from the record that respondent-mother minimized his role in the domestic violence and trauma her children experienced despite being informed by the children's therapists that all six of the minor children were severely traumatized by their father. Even setting aside the risk that respondent-mother would bring the minor children into contact with the children's father again, this minimization of trauma is not consistent with the minor children's needs for intense therapy to recover from years of abuse. Furthermore, as explained above, the trial court's finding that respondent-mother was likely to make contact with the children's father again is supported by the record. Finally, the record reflects that all the minor children were improving in their respective foster homes. For these reasons, we discern no error in the court's finding that termination of respondent-mother's parental rights is in the children's best interests.
Affirmed.
/s/ Brock A. Swartzle
/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher
/s/ Michael J. Kelly