Opinion
G062271
07-26-2024
In re HUAN NGUYEN on Habeas Corpus.
Sandra Gillies, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Petitioner. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Robin Urbanski and Laura Baggett, Deputy Attorneys General, for Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Original proceedings; petition for a writ of habeas corpus to challenge an order of the Superior Court of Orange County No. 02CF0760, Jonathan S. Fish, Judge. Petition denied.
Sandra Gillies, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Petitioner.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Robin Urbanski and Laura Baggett, Deputy Attorneys General, for Respondent.
OPINION
MOORE, ACTING P. J.
Huan Nguyen was 21 years old when he shot and killed a suspected rival gang member. Nguyen was convicted of a lying-in-wait special circumstance murder and was sentenced to prison for life without the possibility of parole (LWOP). Nguyen filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the trial court, seeking a Franklin proceeding to create a record for a later youth offender parole hearing. (See People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 (Franklin).)
The trial court denied Nguyen's habeas corpus petition because persons who receive LWOP sentences are ineligible for youth offender parole hearings. (Pen. Code, § 3051, subd. (h).) Nguyen filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in this court arguing section 3051 violates the equal protection clause because it denies youth offender parole hearings to young adults (18 to 25 years of age) who receive LWOP sentences, but it does not deny such hearings to other young adults who commit murders and do not receive LWOP sentences. This court issued an order to show cause.
Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
While Nguyen's habeas corpus matter was pending in this court, the California Supreme Court held section 3051, subdivision (h), is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose and does not violate the equal protection clause. (See People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834, 863-864 (Hardin).) However, the Supreme Court left open the possibility of "other as-applied challenges based on particular special circumstances or the factual circumstances of individual cases." (Id. at p. 864.)
Accordingly, we reject Nguyen's equal protection challenge to section 3051, subdivision (h). However, we are denying the petition without prejudice to Nguyen's right to seek further relief in the trial court by filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleging section 3051 is unconstitutional as applied to his particular special circumstance (lying in wait) or the factual circumstances of his individual case.
I
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 1994, Robert Sapinoso and Edward B. were in Sapinoso's car following a van, which they believed had been involved in a prior incident of vandalism. When Sapinoso stopped at a light, Nguyen got out of the van and "stood on the corner and looked around in all directions. With one hand behind his back, [Nguyen] then walked quickly toward Sapinoso's car. [Nguyen] appeared very angry and aggressive. When he was approximately five feet away from Sapinoso's car, [Nguyen] drew a gun from behind his back. [Edward] ducked, heard three to five 'pops,' and heard the car windows shattering. [Edward] immediately saw Sapinoso had been shot. [Nguyen], who had not said anything before firing, ran back to the van. Sapinoso died as a result of four gunshot wounds." (People v. Nguyen (June 9, 2005, G034173) [nonpub. opn.].)
In 2002, a jury convicted Nguyen of murder and attempted voluntary manslaughter. The jury found true a lying-in-wait special circumstance and related firearm enhancements. Nguyen pleaded guilty to a substantive gang crime and admitted gang enhancements. The jury deadlocked as to the death penalty, and the prosecution elected not to pursue it any further. The trial court imposed a mandatory LWOP sentence and two years for the gang crime. The prosecution dismissed the attempted voluntary manslaughter offense. The judgment was affirmed on direct appeal. (See People v. Nguyen, supra, G034173.)
In 2018, "after a background investigation was completed, the Board of Parole Hearings reviewed Mr. Nguyen's case at an en banc meeting and referred his application to the Governor with a favorable recommendation for a commutation of sentence." However, the Supreme Court did not "make the recommendation required . . . for the Governor to grant a commutation of sentence."
Justice Lui voted in favor of making the recommendation.
In December 2022, Nguyen filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the trial court seeking a Franklin proceeding. (Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th 261.) Citing section 3051, subdivision (h), the court denied the petition, in part, because Nguyen was 21 years old when he committed the murder and "he was convicted as an adult offender of a special circumstance 1st degree murder committed while lying in wait and sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole."
In February 2023, Nguyen filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in this court. Citing a recent Court of Appeal opinion, Nguyen argued, "LWOP Youth Offenders have an equal protection right to a section 3051 Youth Offender Parole hearing and a Franklin hearing." We appointed counsel for Nguyen and received informal briefing from the Office of the Attorney General.
In November 2023, this court issued an order to show cause and in January 2024, the Attorney General filed a return. On March 4, 2024, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th 834. On March 22, 2024, Nguyen filed a traverse. This court then requested supplemental briefing addressing Hardin.
II
DISCUSSION
"Broadly speaking, a Franklin proceeding allows youth offenders sentenced to long prison terms an opportunity to introduce into the record mitigating evidence relating to their youth. As explained in the case for which it is named, . . . the purpose of this proceeding is to preserve such evidence for consideration at future parole hearings." (People v. Howard (2021) 74 Cal.App.5th 141, 145.)
"A youth offender parole hearing is a hearing by the Board of Parole Hearings for the purpose of reviewing the parole suitability of any prisoner who was 25 years of age or younger, . . . at the time of the controlling offense." (§ 3051, subd. (a)(1).) "The youth offender parole hearing to consider release shall provide for a meaningful opportunity to obtain release." (§ 3051, sudd. (e).) "This section shall not apply to . . . cases in which an individual is sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole for a controlling offense that was committed after the person had attained 18 years of age." (§ 3051, subd. (h), underlining added.)
In Hardin, appellant (Hardin) robbed and killed an elderly neighbor when he was 25 years old. (Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 840.) A jury convicted Hardin of first degree murder and related crimes. The jury found true a felony-murder special-circumstance allegation, but it did not return a verdict of death. The trial court imposed a mandatory prison sentence of LWOP. Years later, Hardin filed a motion in the trial court to develop and preserve evidence in a Franklin proceeding for later use in a youth offender parole hearing under section 3051. (Hardin, at p. 840.) Hardin argued the exclusion under section 3051, subdivision (h), for persons such as him that were sentenced to LWOP violates equal protection principles. (Hardin, at p. 840.) The trial court rejected Hardin's argument, but the Court of Appeal reversed. (Ibid.)
The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeal, holding that the exclusion of youth offender parole hearings under section 3051, subdivision (h), for persons convicted of murder and sentenced to LWOP is not irrational or constitutionally invalid under the equal protection clause. (Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 863-864.) The Court reasoned the statute reflects the Legislature's permissible balancing of "multiple considerations, including both concerns about increasing opportunities for release for young adults able to show growth and maturity and concerns about calibrating the level of punishment appropriate for certain serious criminal offenses." (Id. at p. 857.) The Court further rejected Hardin's argument that "the Legislature could not rationally conclude that a conviction for special circumstance murder is a reliable indication of the seriousness of an offense or the culpability of the offender, such that it could rationally decide to exclude the offender from receiving the youth offender parole consideration to which other young adults are statutorily entitled." (Id. at p. 859.)
Justice Liu and Justice Evans dissented. "In light of today's decision, nearly 3,000 inmates continue to be denied any chance to demonstrate-as no doubt many could-that as mature adults they are more than the worst thing they ever did in their youth." (Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 867 (dis. opn. of Liu, J.).) "The [section 3051] exclusion bears the taint of racial prejudice and perpetuates extreme racial disparities plaguing our juvenile and criminal justice systems." (Id. at p. 898 (dis. opn. of Evans, J.).)
"Without foreclosing the possibility of other as-applied challenges to the statute, we conclude that Hardin has not demonstrated that Penal Code section 3051's exclusion of young adult offenders sentenced to life without parole is constitutionally invalid under a rational basis standard, either on its face or as applied to Hardin and other individuals who are serving life without parole sentences for special circumstance murder." (Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 839, italics added.) The Court went on to state that it did not "resolve here the constitutionality of section 3051, subdivision (h) as it might arise in other as-applied challenges based on particular special circumstances or the factual circumstances of individual cases." (Id. at p. 864, italics added.)
Here, in his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, Nguyen raised the same constitutional arguments raised in Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th 834. Accordingly, we are denying Nguyen's petition in light of the Supreme Court's binding ruling. (See Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 ["Under the doctrine of stare decisis, all tribunals exercising inferior jurisdiction are required to follow decisions of courts exercising superior jurisdiction"].)
However, we are denying the petition without prejudice to Nguyen's right to seek relief in the trial court by way of a further petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleging section 3051, subdivision (h), is unconstitutional as applied to his particular special circumstance (lying in wait) or the factual circumstances of his individual case. (See Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 862 ["we do not foreclose the possibility of other challenges to the distinctions drawn by the special circumstances statute based on a more robust record or a more focused as-applied inquiry"].)
In Hardin, the jury found true a felony-murder special circumstance. (Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 840; § 190.2, subd. (a)(17).) There are several other special circumstances within section 190.2, including: murder for financial gain, multiple murder, murder by destructive device, lying in wait, etc. (See 190.2, subd. (a)(1)-(22).) The Supreme Court seems to be suggesting that inmates can raise future as-applied challenges to particular special circumstances, although that specific as-applied equal protection claim was not analyzed in Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th 834.
"A facial challenge to the constitutional validity of a statute or ordinance considers only the text of the measure itself, not its application to the particular circumstances of an individual." (Tobe v. City of Santa Ana (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1069, 1084; see also United States v. Stevens (2010) 559 U.S. 460, 472 ["To succeed in a typical facial attack, Stevens would have to establish 'that no set of circumstances exists under which [the challenged statute] would be valid'"].)
An as-applied challenge "contemplates analysis of the facts of a particular case or cases to determine the circumstances in which the statute or ordinance has been applied and to consider whether in those particular circumstances the application deprived the individual to whom it was applied of a protected right. [Citations.] When a criminal defendant claims that a facially valid statute or ordinance has been applied in a constitutionally impermissible manner to the defendant, the court evaluates the propriety of the application on a case-by-case basis to determine whether to relieve the defendant of the sanction." (Tobe v. City of Santa Ana, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 1084.)
"Our state Constitution guarantees the right to habeas corpus." (In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439, 452.) A petition for writ of habeas corpus must be supported with adequate documentation. (See People v. Duvall (1995) 9 Cal.4th 464, 474 [the petition must "state fully and with particularity the facts on which relief is sought" and "include copies of reasonably available documentary evidence supporting the claim, including pertinent portions of trial transcripts and affidavits or declarations"].) Conclusory allegations without any explanation of the basis for the allegations are not sufficient for a prima facie showing in a habeas petition. (Ibid.)
Nguyen argues that given the Board of Parole Hearing's recommendation to the Governor in 2018 for commutation of his sentence, his rehabilitation efforts in prison, his plans for life outside of prison, and other factors, "he would be eligible for parole if not for the LWOP sentence."
But just as in Hardin, Nguyen's LWOP sentence was mandatorily imposed by the trial court because the jury found true that he committed a special circumstance murder. That is, Nguyen's argument is the same argument that was considered and rejected by the Supreme Court in Hardin. (See Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 839 ["Hardin has not demonstrated that Penal Code section 3051's exclusion of young adult offenders sentenced to life without parole is constitutionally invalid under a rational basis standard, either on its face or as applied to Hardin and other individuals who are serving life without parole sentences for special circumstance murder"], italics added.)
Nguyen also argues: "By supporting Nguyen's application for clemency, the Board determined that he should be considered for parole. In the Board's view, Nguyen's culpability was sufficiently similar to one convicted of murder without a special circumstance." But Nguyen does not support this argument with any citations to the record, or any legal authorities. Here, we agree with the Attorney General that "it is only an assumption." But in any event, under section 3051, subdivision (h), Nguyen is statutorily ineligible for a youth offender parole hearing, and the California Supreme Court has plainly held that provision of law does not violate the equal protection clause. (See Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 839-840.)
Finally, Nguyen argues that: "By filing a return addressing only the facial challenge, respondent should not now be heard on the as applied challenge properly raised in the supplemental pleadings and exhibits." We disagree.
Although Nguyen's as-applied argument was raised in his supplemental points and authorities, and it was not directly challenged in the return, the Attorney General did state that "each and every legal characterization contained in the petition is erroneous, and none of the facts alleged in the petition demonstrate any entitlement to relief." Further, the Attorney General responded to Nguyen's as-applied argument in its supplemental briefing, and Nguyen was given a further opportunity to reply in his supplemental reply brief.
In sum, we agree with the Attorney General that Nguyen-at least at this point-"has not carried his burden to establish Penal Code section 3051 is unconstitutional as applied to him, based on his special circumstance lying-in-wait first degree murder conviction."
But again, we do not foreclose the opportunity for Nguyen to file a habeas corpus petition in the trial court, consistent with the view that "the constitutionality of section 3051, subdivision (h) . . . might arise in other as-applied challenges based on particular special circumstances or the factual circumstances of individual cases." (See Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 862, 864 ["we do not foreclose the possibility of other challenges to the distinctions drawn by the special circumstances statute based on a more robust record or a more focused as-applied inquiry"], italics added.)
III
DISPOSITION
Nguyen's petition for habeas corpus relief is denied. Nguyen may file a petition for habeas corpus relief in the trial court as explained within this opinion.
By not foreclosing Nguyen's opportunity to file a further petition for writ of habeas corpus in the trial court we do not mean to suggest that Nguyen will necessarily be able to obtain relief. Indeed, the Supreme Court in Hardin stated that in the Eighth Amendment context (cruel and unusual punishments), the Legislature identified within the special circumstance statute (§ 190.2), those murders that are "sufficiently egregious to warrant the law's most severe penalty." (Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 859.)
WE CONCUR: SANCHEZ, J., DELANEY, J.