J.S.C. ignores the fact that his service plan, and a court order adopting his service plan and ordering J.S.C. to comply with it, was filed in the papers of the court and is in the clerk's record. See In re H.S.V., No 04-12-00150-CV, 2012 WL 3597211, at *5 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Aug. 22, 2012, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (family service plan, and order adopting plan and ordering appellant to comply with it, was filed in papers of the court and was in clerk's record...such documents specifically set forth what appellant was ordered to do to get children back). More specifically, in the temporary order following the adversary hearing, the trial court ordered J.S.C. to comply with each requirement set out in the Department's original, or any amended, service plan during the pendency of the suit.

As the judge of a witness's credibility and demeanor, the habeas court may have viewed the snippet of Garcia's testimony referenced by the State as a misstatement. Ex parte Peterson , 117 S.W.3d 804, 819 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003), overruled in part on other grounds byEx parte Lewis , 219 S.W.3d 335 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) ; see alsoIn re H.S.V. , No. 04-12-00150-CV, 2012 WL 3597211 at *4 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Aug. 22, 2012, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (providing that a trial court, siting as the factfinder in a case, may have found any misstatements or contradictions in a witness's testimony to be minor errors). First, it argues that there is no distinction between misadvice and failure to advise.

Evidence of the violation of the safety plan, implemented for the children's protection, establishes that the children were removed as a result of "abuse or neglect" under section 161.001(1)(O). See In re H.S.V., No. 04-12-00150-CV, 2012 WL 3597211, at **1-4 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Aug. 22, 2012, no pet. h.) (mem. op.) ("self-evident that a violation of a safety plan could, in fact, constitute abuse or neglect"). L.F. also argues that the Department must make every attempt to return the children to her, but this contention is based on a provision in section 161.001(1)(N)(i), which requires the Department to make reasonable efforts to return a child before a finding of constructive abandonment can be made.

Thus, this court has held that when the record is silent, as here, the trial court may be presumed to have taken judicial notice of the records in the court's file without any request being made and without an announcement in the record that it has done so. In re H.S.V., No. 04–12–00150–CV, 2012 WL 3597211, at *5 (Tex.App.-San Antonio Aug. 22, 2012, pet. filed); In re S.J.S., No. 04–12–00067–CV, 2012 WL 2450817, at *6 (Tex.App.-San Antonio June 27, 2012, pet. filed); In re A.X.A., No. 04–09–00519–CV, 2009 WL 5150068, at *4 n. 3 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2009, no pet.). A trial court may take judicial notice of its own records in matters that are generally known, easily proven, and not reasonably disputed.