Opinion
W.C. Nos. 4-496-790 4-380-625
July 14, 2003
FINAL ORDER
The claimant seeks review of an order of Administrative Law Judge Muramoto (ALJ) which determined the claim was closed for failure to prosecute. The claimant contends that because the insurer failed to give the employer notice of the motion to close, and because the Director of the Division of Workers' Compensation (Director) failed to provide notice of the Order to Show Cause to the insurer or the employer, the claimant was deprived of statutory and due process rights to adequate notice. We affirm.
The facts are undisputed. The claimant sustained a compensable injury in May 1998 while employed by respondent California Cafe. At that time the claimant resided at 1365 Columbine Street in Denver, Colorado. The respondents apparently admitted liability for the injury.
On January 12, 1999, the respondents, through counsel, filed with the Director a Motion to Close based on the claimant's alleged failure to prosecute the claim. See Rule of Procedure X (A), 7 Code Colo. Reg. 1101-3 at 37. The motion was mailed to the then pro se claimant's Columbine Street Address, but not to the employer. On January 29, 1999, the Director mailed an Order to Show Cause to the Columbine Street address. The order notified the claimant that the claim would be automatically closed after 30 days unless the claimant provided a written statement showing why the claim should remain open. The certificate of mailing on the Order to Show Cause does not indicate that it was mailed to the employer or insurer, or their counsel.
The claimant moved from the Columbine Street address in June 1998, and did not receive the Motion to Close or the Order to Show Cause. Consequently, the claimant did not respond to either document. At the hearing the ALJ accepted the claimant's offer of proof that he notified "management people" at the California Cafe of his move, and that in January 1999 he received his W-2 form at his new address. The claimant also conceded that he failed to notify the Division of Workers' Compensation (Division) of his new address.
In February 2003 the matter proceeded to hearing on the claimant's request for permanent partial disability benefits, and the respondents defended on the ground that the claim was closed by the claimant's failure to respond to the Order to Show Cause. The ALJ ruled that it was the claimant's responsibility to apprise the Division of a change of address. Therefore, the claimant was responsible for the failure to receive notice of the Order to Show Cause, and the claim was closed by operation of law.
On review, the claimant contends the failure of the respondents' counsel to mail a copy of the Motion to Close to the employer violated Rule of Procedure XI (B)(1), 7 Code Colo. Reg. 1101-3 at 39, which requires that whenever a document is filed with the Division, "a copy of the document shall be mailed to each party to the claim." (Emphasis added). Similarly, the claimant argues there was a violation of § 8-43-207(1)(n), C.R.S. 2002, because the Director failed to notify "all the parties" of the proposed dismissal for failure to prosecute. In support of these arguments the claimant asserts that if the employer had been properly notified of the Motion to Close or the Order to Show Cause the employer could have provided these documents to the claimant as it "provided him with his W-2 forms at that particular time." Finally, the claimant contends that he was denied due process of law. Under the circumstances, we are not persuaded by the claimant's arguments.
Rule of Procedure XI (B)(I) and § 8-43-207(1)(n) certainly require that notice be provided to all parties to a claim, which would include the employer, California Cafe. Further, the claimant is entitled, as a matter of due process, to reasonable notice of motions and decisions which may affect his right to benefits. Hall v. Home Furniture Co., 724 P.2d 94 (Colo.App. 1986). However, in our view, the claimant lacks standing to assert that failure to provide notice to the employer constitutes a violation of his statutory or constitutional rights.
Section 8-43-301(2), C.R.S. 2002, provides that the claimant, as a "dissatisfied party," may seek review of an order which denies any benefits. The concept of a "dissatisfied party" contemplates more than mere disagreement with an order and imports into the Act the principle of legal standing. Standing exists if a party has suffered an injury in fact to a legally cognizable right. Adams v. Neoplan U.S.A. Corp., 881 P.2d 373 (Colo.App. 1993) (respondents lacked standing to challenge award of attorney fees against the attorney which represented them); Bradley v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 841 P.2d 1071 (Colo.App. 1992) (CCIA lacked standing to challenge an award of fees to attorney who represented claimant because the fee was paid from existing benefits and did not create any new liability for CCIA).
We hold that the requirement for notice to all parties found in Rule XI and § 8-43-201(1)(n), as well as the due process requirement of notice, is to insure that "all parties" have an opportunity to present evidence and raise arguments on behalf of their respective positions. See Whiteside v. Smith, 67 P.3d 1240, 1248 (Colo. 2003) (fundamental requirement of due process is opportunity to be heard at meaningful time in a meaningful manner); Gilford v. People, 2 P.3d 120, 126 (Colo. 2000) (procedural due process notions require that persons whose rights are affected be given notice and opportunity to be heard). However, we do not view the statute, the rule, or the due process clause as investing the claimant with any cognizable legal interest in seeing that the employer receives an opportunity to present evidence and raise arguments. In this case it was the claimant's rights which were in jeopardy, so it is the claimant's statutory and constitutional rights which were at issue.
Neither are we persuaded that because the employer, as opposed to the insurer and respondents' counsel, may have known of the claimant's new address changes the result. The claimant cites no legal authority, and we are aware of none, for the proposition that the purpose of requiring notice to the employer is so that the employer may act as a secondary source of notice to the claimant.
Indeed, as the ALJ concluded, the general rule is that a claimant is responsible for keeping the Division, opposing parties and their counsel advised of the claimant's current address. The claimant's official address for purposes of a workers' compensation claim is the claimant's home address. Bowlen v. Munford, 921 P.2d 59 (Colo.App. 1996). Once the home address is established of record, legal notices must be sent to that address unless and until the claimant provides official notice of a new address. Bowlen v. Munford, supra. If the claimant moves but fails to take the necessary steps to change his address with the Division, the claimant is at fault for the failure to receive subsequent notices, and there is no violation of statutory or due process requirements. See Klingbeil v. State, 668 P.2d 930 (Colo.App. 1983) (where driver gave Boulder address on traffic tickets but returned to his Ohio home, he was not denied due process of law in license suspension proceeding when state mailed notice to the Boulder address); Klosterman v. Industrial Commission, 694 P.2d 873 (Colo.App. 1984) (employer's failure to notify Division of current address, and consequent failure to attend hearing and receive order, not the type of mistake which would justify reopening); Hall v. Home Furniture Co., supra (due process is violated when attorney of record "through no fault of his own" is denied notice of critical determinations in a case).
In this case, if the claimant had notified the Division of a change of address, and also provided a copy of the change to the respondents and their attorney as contemplated by Rule XI (B)(1), both the Motion to Close and the Order to Show Cause would, presumably, have been mailed to and received by the claimant. However, the claimant failed to complete his responsibility for this procedural step, and he may not now blame the failure to receive notice on the respondents. As indicated in Klingbeil v. State, supra, citizens have imputed knowledge of the law which governs their actions, a duty to monitor pending litigation, and a duty to provide a current and correct address so that the state may provide prompt notice of pending hearings and decisions. 668 P.2d at 933.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the ALJ's order dated March 4, 2003, is affirmed.
INDUSTRIAL CLAIM APPEALS PANEL ________________________________ David Cain ________________________________ Bill Whitacre
NOTICE
This Order is final unless an action to modify or vacate this Order is commenced in the Colorado Court of Appeals, 2 East 14th Avenue, Denver, CO 80203, by filing a petition for review with the Court, within twenty (20) days after the date this Order is mailed, pursuant to § 8-43-301(10) and § 8-43-307, C.R.S. 2002. The appealing party must serve a copy of the petition upon all other parties, including the Industrial Claim Appeals Office, which may be served by mail at 1515 Arapahoe Street, Tower 3, Suite 350, Denver, CO 80202.
Copies of this decision were mailed July 14, 2003 to the following parties:
David Hroncheck, 24549 County Road 46, LaSalle, CO 80645
Constellation Concepts, Inc. d/b/a California Cafe, 8505 Park Meadows Center Dr., Littleton, CO 80124
Karen Gioia, Hartford Underwriters' Insurance, 7670 S. Chester St., #300, Englewood, CO 80112
Thomas J. Roberts, Esq., 940 Wadsworth Blvd., 4th Floor, Lakewood, CO 80214 (For Claimant)
Bradley R. Unkeless, Esq., 7670 S. Chester St., #330, Englewood, CO 80112 (For Respondents)
By: A. Hurtado