Opinion
COA23-97
09-05-2023
IN THE MATTER OF: H.R.M.
Amanda C. Knight for the Petitioner-Appellee-Grandparents. Benjamin J. Kull for the Respondent-Appellant-Mother.
An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Heard in the Court of Appeals 7 July 2023.
Appeal by Respondent-Mother from order entered 27 September 2022 by Judge Sherri Murrell in Chatham County No. 17 JT 37 District Court.
Amanda C. Knight for the Petitioner-Appellee-Grandparents.
Benjamin J. Kull for the Respondent-Appellant-Mother.
STADING, JUDGE.
Respondent-Appellant ("Mother") appeals from the trial court's order terminating her parental rights to her minor child pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111 (2021). For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
I. Background
"Henry" was born to Mother in March of 2017. At birth, he was addicted to cocaine and had chlamydia of the lungs. Subsequently, Henry was adjudicated neglected and dependent. He was placed with his paternal grandparents-Veronica and Clyde Scotton ("petitioners"). Throughout the adjudication and subsequent proceedings, Mother was represented by legal counsel.
Henry is a pseudonym to protect the identity of the minor child. See N.C. R. App. P. 42.
The trial court held two permanency planning hearings and determined that the permanency plan would be guardianship with a secondary plan of reunification. On 9 August 2018, the trial court held a third hearing to "develop or review the plan to achieve a safe, permanent home for the juvenile within a reasonable period of time." On 19 September 2018, the trial court entered a permanency planning order containing findings regarding the parents' ability to take care of Henry, Mother's minimal participation in court ordered treatment, and her failure to visit Henry since July 2017. As a result, the trial court concluded that "[the] permanent plan has been achieved[,]" "concurrent planning is no longer required[,]" and appointed petitioners as Henry's guardians. However, the trial court provided that Mother "shall be allowed supervised visitation with [Henry] at the [Chatham County] Visitation Center for a minimum of 1 hour once a month[,]" but "shall have no contact with [petitioners] and all scheduling shall be done through the Visitation Center."
On 13 June 2022, petitioners filed a petition to terminate Mother's parental rights, alleging three separate grounds for termination: N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1), (2), and (7). The trial court held a termination hearing on 26 September 2022. On the same day, petitioners filed a "voluntary dismissal or termination of parental rights claim with respect to [Father]." Mother was served with notice of the hearing but did not attend. Nonetheless, her attorney of record was present and notified the court that she had tried to contact Mother, to no avail.
While the petition includes allegations against Father, petitioners subsequently voluntarily dismissed the petition with respect to Father.
At the hearing, the trial court heard testimony from petitioner-grandmother ("Grandmother"). Grandmother testified that until February 2020, Mother was participating in visits with Henry at the visitation center. However, to navigate COVID-19 restrictions, the visitation center closed and only held electronic virtual visitations. In accordance with the pending guardianship order, the visitation center's supervisor contacted Grandmother to ask for permission to schedule a virtual visit between Mother and Henry. Grandmother agreed to the virtual visits but did not hear from the center again. Additionally, Grandmother testified that she believes that Mother attempted to contact the visitation center once about scheduling virtual visits, but she "guess[ed] [Mother] hasn't tried to get in touch with the visitation center[.]" In any event, Mother has not seen Henry since February 2020. The trial court did not hear testimony from anyone at the visitation center, and Mother's counsel did not present evidence, but did cross-examine Grandmother.
On 27 September 2022, the trial court entered an order terminating Mother's parental rights to Henry. In its order, the court made a number of findings of facts, including:
1. This is an action involving one minor child, [Henry]. The minor child was born at University of North Carolina Medical Center in Chapel Hill, North Carolina on March . . . 2017. . . . . . .
4. [Mother] was served with the Petition to Terminate Parental Rights on June 23, 2022, via service by Sheriff.
5. Pam Bates Smith was appointed as [Mother's] counsel and has attempted to make contact with [Mother] on several occasions since her appointment in this matter. Said attorney also represented [Mother] in the DSS abuse and neglect action. [Maternal grandmother] contacted said attorney following her appointment in the [Termination of Parental Rights] matter and left a message. Counsel returned her call several times, but was unable to leave a message because the voice mail box was full. [Mother] has not made any other attempts to contact her appointed counsel, has not filed any responsive pleading in this matter and has not appeared in court on either of the two properly noticed court dates.
6 ..... [ Father's] last known address is . . . North Carolina. . . .
7 ..... [Mother's] last known address is . . . North Carolina.. . .
8. Respondents were never married but were involved in a romantic relationship of which one (1) minor child was born[.]
9. On July 27, 2017, the minor child was adjudicated neglected and dependent in the Chatham County, North Carolina action . . . bearing file number 17-JA-37. After the third permanency planning hearing in the matter, the
Court entered a Permanency Planning Order (hereinafter referred to as "PPO") on September 19, 2018, which took effect on August 9, 2018 and appointed Petitioners as guardians of the person of the minor child. . . .
12. The facts are sufficient to warrant a determination that grounds exist pursuant to N.C. G.S. § 7B-1111(a) for termination of [Mother's] parental rights as follows:
a. [Mother] has neglected the minor child, as determined by N.C. G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1). The minor child was adjudicated neglected [on 27 July 2017]. . . .
b. [Mother] has willfully left the minor child in placement outside the home for more than twelve (12) months without showing to the satisfaction of the Court that reasonable progress under the circumstances has been made in correcting those conditions which led to the removal of the minor child, which constitutes grounds for termination of parental rights pursuant to N.C. G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2).
c.[Mother] has willfully abandoned the minor child for at least six consecutive months immediately preceding the filing of this petition, which constitutes grounds for termination of parental rights pursuant to N.C. G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(7). [Mother] was entitled to supervised visitation with the minor child in the guardianship order. While [Mother] participated in some visitations prior to the pandemic beginning in March 2020, [Mother] has failed to make good faith efforts to see or otherwise contact the minor child since February 2020. At some point in 2020, [Mother] contacted the visitation center regarding her visits with the minor child and the visitation center reached out to Petitioners to see if they would agree to allowing the minor child to visit with [Mother] via zoom since the visitation center was closed at that time. Petitioners agreed to zoom visitations, but [Mother] failed to follow through in setting up such visitation and Petitioners did not hear anything further regarding visitation.
13. Petitioners have been the minor child's primary [caretakers] for the majority of his life and have provided a safe, stable and loving home for the minor child. The minor child is thriving in their care. . . .
17. The minor child has expressed wanting to be fully in Petitioner's family[.]
18. Petitioners intend to adopt the minor child and have taken steps to begin that process with DSS. . . .
19. It is in the best interest of the minor child that [Mother's] rights be terminated in that Petitioners wish to adopt the minor child, change his surname to their own, and ensure that he feels as though he is part of their family and grows up in the environment he deserves.
Thus, the trial court concluded that grounds existed under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1), (2), and (7) to terminate Mother's parental rights, and that it was in Henry's best interest for Mother's parental rights be terminated. Mother filed a notice of appeal on 14 November 2022.
II. Jurisdiction
This Court has jurisdiction in the present matter pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 7A-27(b)(2) and 7B-1001(a)(7) (2021).
III. Analysis
Mother raises the following issues on appeal: (1) whether certain findings of fact are actually conclusions of law; (2) whether certain findings of fact are supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence; (3) whether termination under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(7) must be reversed because the findings of fact do not answer the "integral" question of whether Mother ever acted with the requisite "willful intent;" (4) whether termination under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1) must be reversed because the trial court made no findings of fact or conclusions of law regarding the likelihood of future neglect; (5) whether termination under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(2) must be reversed because the trial court made no findings of fact identifying the conditions that led to Henry's removal or amount of Mother's progress toward correcting those conditions; (6) whether this matter must be remanded for dismissal of the termination petition because petitioners presented insufficient evidence to support their claims; and, in the alternative, (7) whether the termination order must be reversed because Mother received ineffective assistance of counsel at the termination hearing.
A. Findings of Facts as Conclusions of Law
First, Mother argues that the following portions of finding of fact no. 12 contain determinations that are conclusions of law:
12. The facts are sufficient to warrant a determination that grounds exist pursuant to N.C. G.S. § 7B-1111(a) for termination of [Mother's] parental rights as follows:
a. [Mother] has neglected the minor child, as determined by N.C. G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1).
b. Respondent-mother has willfully left the minor child in placement outside the home for more than twelve (12) months without showing to the satisfaction of the Court that reasonable progress under the circumstances has been made in correcting those conditions which led to the removal of the minor child, which constitutes grounds for
termination of parental rights pursuant to N.C. G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2).
c. [Mother] has willfully abandoned the minor child for at least six consecutive months immediately preceding the filing of this petition, which constitutes grounds for termination of parental rights pursuant to N.C. G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(7).
This Court has previously noted that "any determination requiring the exercise of judgment or the application of legal principles is more properly classified as a conclusion of law," and that any determination reached through "logical reasoning from the evidentiary facts" should be classified as a finding of fact. In re Helms, 127 N.C.App. 505, 510, 491 S.E.2d 672, 675 (1997) (citations omitted). Furthermore, this Court has held that "[t]he trial court's classification of its own determination as a finding or conclusion does not govern our analysis." In re J.T.C., 273 N.C.App. 66, 73, 847 S.E.2d 452, 458 (2020). And, if a trial court mislabels "conclusions of law as findings of fact, findings of fact which are essentially conclusions of law will be treated as such on appeal." In re J.O.D., 374 N.C. 797, 807, 844 S.E.2d 570, 578 (2020) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
The above-listed portions of finding of fact no. 12 recite the statutory grounds for termination of Mother's parental rights to Henry under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1), (2), and (7). These portions are more properly classified as conclusions of law. Thus, this Court will review these portions of finding of fact no. 12 de novo. See In re Z.D., 258 N.C. at 443, 812 S.E.2d at 671.
B. Findings Based on Clear, Cogent, and Convincing Evidence
Next, Mother argues that certain findings of fact are not supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. Specifically, she argues that there is insufficient evidence to support statements within finding of fact no. 12-that "[a]t some point in 2020, Respondent-mother contacted the visitation center regarding her visits with the minor child[;]" that Mother "has failed to make good faith efforts to see or otherwise contact the minor child since February 2020[;]" and that Mother "failed to follow through in setting up such [virtual] visitations[.]" She also claims that other details from the trial court's findings are not based on sufficient evidence-Henry's birthplace in finding no. 1, Father's last known address in finding no. 6, Mother's last known address in finding no. 7, respondent-parent's relationship in finding no. 8, information regarding the underlying neglect and dependency adjudication in finding no. 9, and Henry's history of residences in finding no. 11.
"The trial court has the duty of evaluating the weight and credibility of the evidence and, in a [termination of parental rights] case, before making a finding of fact, the trial court must be sufficiently satisfied with the evidence to be able to find the facts by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence." In re S.I.D.-M., __ N.C.App. __, 885 S.E.2d 344, 351 (2023). It is the sole province of the trial court to weigh evidence and draw any reasonable inferences therefrom. In re K.L.T., 374 N.C. 826, 843, 845 S.E.2d 28, 41 (2020). "If a different inference may be drawn from the evidence, the trial court alone determines which inferences to draw and which to reject." In re T.H.T., 185 N.C.App. 337, 343, 648 S.E.2d 519, 523 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). "Such inferences, however, cannot rest on conjecture or surmise. This is necessarily so because an inference is a permissible conclusion drawn by reason from a premise established by proof. Accordingly, an appellate court may review the reasonableness of the inferences drawn by the trial court from the evidence." In re K.L.T., 374 N.C. at 843, 845 S.E.2d at 41.
1. Finding of Fact No. 12
At the hearing, the only evidence that the trial court heard regarding any attempt by Mother to contact the visitation center came from Grandmother's testimony, stating: "I guess she hasn't tried to get in touch with the visitation center [because] all her visits [were] through the visitation center" and "[Mother] has contacted the visitation center once since COVID, and [the visitation center] contacted me and asked me about Zoom[.]" Because there was no evidence from the visitation center showing that Mother contacted the center in 2020, failed to make efforts to contact Henry through the center, or failed to follow through in setting up virtual visits, the trial court appears to have taken Grandmother's testimony as true and accurate, and utilized it to draw the inferences contained finding of fact no. 12. However, it cannot be said that Grandmother's testimony and findings inferred therefrom are supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence, as they are based on surmise and conjecture, and were not drawn by a premise established by proof. See id.
Black's Law Dictionary defines "conjecture" as "[a] guess; supposition[,]" and "surmise" as "[an] idea based on weak evidence[.]" Conjecture, Black's Law Dictionary (7th ed. 1999); Surmise, Black's Law Dictionary (7th ed. 1999). Grandmother's testimony fits squarely within these definitions. While this Court recognizes that the trial court was free to evaluate the weight and credibility of Grandmother's testimony to create a reasonable inference, the trial court was still responsible for ensuring that its inferences contained in the findings were reasonable and drawn from "a premise established by proof." Id. It cannot be said that the testimony of Grandmother-a very interested party in the matter-meets this standard. Grandmother had not spoken to anyone at the visitation center since they contacted her once about potential virtual visits nor had she confirmed the number of times Mother reached out to the center. And although Mother did not attend the hearing and her trial counsel was unable to proffer evidence to negate Grandmother's testimony, it was improper for the trial court to accept Grandmother's testimony as true without having a reasonable basis for doing so. Therefore, since portions of finding of fact no. 12 are statements based on conjecture or surmise, these portions cannot be determinations that are supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence.
2. Findings of Fact Nos. 1, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 11.
Contrary to Mother's claim that finding of fact no. 1 is not based on evidence presented by petitioners, the transcript of the proceeding shows that Grandmother did testify to the town and hospital where Henry was born.
Regarding findings of fact nos. 6 and 7, Mother is correct that evidence was not presented showing the parents' last known addresses. Although the prior
"Permanency Planning Order" was attached and incorporated by reference in the verified "Petition to Terminate Parental Rights," the transcript shows that neither the order, nor its contents, were admitted into evidence in some fashion - either by judicial notice or testimony of its underlying contents. See In re S.M., 375 N.C. 673, 690, 850 S.E.2d 292, 306 (2020) (holding that a finding of fact concerning a Guardian ad Litem report was not supported by competent evidence since "the transcript does not show that the GAL report was admitted into evidence by the trial court during the hearing"). See also In re J.W., 173 N.C.App. 450, 455, 619 S.E.2d 534, 539 (2005) (holding that: "[A] court may take judicial notice of earlier proceedings in the same cause") (quoting In re Byrd, 72 N.C.App. 277 at 279, 324 S.E.2d 273, at 276 (1985)), aff'd 360 N.C. 361, 625 S.E.2d 780 (2006). In this particular context, absent introduction into evidence by some mechanism, the trial court cannot consider the contents of the petition or attached order. See In re I.D., 239 N.C.App. 172, 174, 769 S.E.2d 846 (2015) (stating: "This Court has held that '[a]s the link between a parent and child is a fundamental right worthy of the highest degree of scrutiny, the trial court must fulfill all procedural requirements in the course of its duty to determine whether allegations of neglect are supported by clear and convincing evidence'") (quoting In re Shaw, 152 N.C.App. 126, 129, 566 S.E.2d 744, 746 (2002)). Therefore, we find there was not clear, convincing, and cogent evidence to support these findings by the trial court. Nonetheless, the record does not reflect any controversy concerning the relevance of the parents' addresses with respect to the ultimate determination of any ground for termination cited by the trial court.
Similarly, the challenged portion of finding of fact no. 8-the nature of the parents' relationship-is inconsequential in considering the grounds for termination.
With respect to finding of fact no. 9, since the "Permanency Planning Order" was not admitted into evidence, some portions of this finding are supported by competent evidence from testimony at the hearing, while other portions are not. Grandmother's testimony provides for a reasonable inference by the trial court that Henry was adjudicated neglected and dependent, there was a permanency planning hearing, and that petitioners acquired guardianship in 2018. However, in the foregoing analysis, we pay no heed to the any other language contained in this finding since it is not supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence.
C. Willful Abandonment
We next consider Mother's contention that the trial court's ground for termination under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(7) must be reversed because the findings of fact do not address whether Mother acted with the requisite willful intent. Mother argues that the trial court did not make findings of fact that show she acted with the requisite "willful intent," because the findings only establish that she has not had contact with Henry during the requisite period.
"At the adjudicatory stage of a termination of parental rights hearing, the burden is on the petitioner to prove by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that at least one ground for termination exists." In re O.J.R., 239 N.C.App. 329, 332, 769 S.E.2d 631, 634 (2015) (citations omitted); see also N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1109(f) (2021). The trial court may terminate a party's parental rights upon a finding that "[t]he parent has willfully abandoned the juvenile for at least six consecutive months immediately preceding the filing of the petition or motion[.]" N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(7). "Although the trial court may consider a parent's conduct outside the six-month window in evaluating a parent's credibility and intentions, the 'determinative' period for adjudicating willful abandonment is the six consecutive months preceding the filing of the petition." In re J.D.C.H., 375 N.C. 335, 338, 847 S.E.2d 868, 872 (2020). Petitioners filed this petition on 13 June 2022, so the relevant six-month period is between 13 December 2021 and 13 June 2022.
"Abandonment implies conduct on the part of the parent which manifests a willful determination to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child. The word willful encompasses more than an intention to do a thing; there must also be purpose and deliberation." In re Adoption of Searle, 82 N.C.App. 273, 275, 346 S.E.2d 511, 514 (1986) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). "Thus, termination based on abandonment requires findings that show more than a failure of the parent to live up to his or her obligations as a parent in an appropriate fashion." In re D.M.O., 250 N.C.App. 570, 572-73, 794 S.E.2d 258, 861 (2016). "[I]f a parent withholds his presence, his love, his care, the opportunity to display filial affection, and wilfully neglects to lend support and maintenance, such parent relinquishes all parental claims and abandons the child." In re B.C.B., 374 N.C. 32, 35, 839 S.E.2d 748, 752 (2020) (citing Pratt v. Bishop, 257 N.C. 486, 501, 126 S.E.2d 597, 608 (1962)).
In support of her argument, Mother points to In re N.D.A., in which our Supreme Court reversed a trial court's order terminating the respondent-father's parental rights based on willful abandonment because "the trial court's findings make no mention of the issue of whether respondent-father had the ability to contact [the juvenile or her custodian] during the relevant six-month period." 373 N.C. 71, 79, 833 S.E.2d 768, 774 (2019). The Court explained that the trial court's findings failed to support its determination that respondent-father willfully abandoned the juvenile under N.C. G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(7)." Id. There, the "respondent-father's unchallenged testimony tended to show that he had unsuccessfully attempted to work out arrangements under which he could visit with [his child] . . . including making contact with Our House, DSS, and the office of the Clerk of Superior Court on at least fifteen occasions" during the relevant statutory period. Id. at 78, 833 S.E.2d at 774. The Court determined that while the trial court was free to disbelieve the testimony, the findings concerning willfulness "consisted of nothing more than a recitation of the relevant portion of respondent-father's testimony without making any determination as to whether the relevant portion of respondent-father's testimony was credible." Id. (internal citation omitted).
Here, there is no evidence that Mother made any effort to contact Henry during the relevant period. While the permanency planning order did prohibit Mother from contacting petitioners directly, the unchallenged findings provide that Mother was entitled to supervised visitation and participated in some visits at the center, demonstrating that she had the ability and knew how to contact the visitation center at some point. Although the findings discussing the extent of Mother's contact with the visitation center are not supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence, assuming arguendo that she had reached out to the visitation center on multiple occasions, without receiving a response, Mother could have sought visitation through other means, such as through DSS or the court. See In re D.E.M., 254 N.C.App. 401, 407-08, 802 S.E.2d 766, 771 (2017) (holding that "failure to even attempt to show affection for her child through her limited options was evidence that the child had been abandoned") (citations omitted).
Additionally, while Mother could not contact petitioners directly, she was not prohibited "from using other persons as a vehicle for indirect communication of [her] love, affection, and parental concern[.]" In re A.G.D., 374 N.C. 317, 325, 841 S.E.2d 238, 243 (2020). Although Mother's options were limited after the trial court appointed petitioners as Henry's guardians, "she was not absolved of the requirement that she take whatever measures possible to show an interest in" Henry. In re D.E.M., 254 N.C.App. at 407, 802 S.E.2d at 771. Mother's argument fails as "the trial court's findings reflect a total failure on [her] part to take any action whatsoever to indicate that [she] had any interest in preserving [her] parental connection with" Henry. In re A.G.D., 374 N.C. at 327, 841 S.E.2d at 244. Therefore, the findings of fact support the trial court's determination that grounds existed to terminate Mother's parental rights to Henry pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(7).
D. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1), (2)
"Because a single ground for terminating parental rights is sufficient to support a termination order, [the reviewing court] can uphold the trial court's order based on one ground without reviewing any remaining grounds." In re C.K.I., 379 N.C. 207, 210, 864 S.E.2d 323, 326 (2021). Since there is clear, cogent, and convincing evidence supporting Mother's willful abandonment under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(7), it is unnecessary to address the remaining arguments on other grounds found by the trial court. See In re J.R.F., 380 N.C. 43, 52, 867 S.E.2d 870, 877 (2022).
E. Insufficient Evidence to Support the Petition
Mother also urges our Court to remand this matter to the trial court for dismissal of the termination petition because petitioners did not present sufficient evidence to support their claims. Mother contends that "there was no evidence presented from which the trial court could conceivably make the type of findings that would be needed to support the conclusions of law that would be needed to terminate [Mother's] constitutionally protected parental rights." However, as discussed above, there is sufficient evidence in the record to support at least one ground for terminating Mother's parental rights. Thus, contrary to Mother's argument, the trial court appropriately determined that circumstances authorizing termination of Mother's parental rights exist. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110(c) (2021).
F. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Lastly, in the alternative, Mother claims that the termination order must be reversed, arguing that she received ineffective assistance of counsel at the termination hearing. Specifically, Mother argues that (1) her trial counsel failed to point out well-established law that required the court to consider the likelihood of future neglect, (2) trial counsel's performance was prejudicially deficient in that she failed to move to dismiss petitioner's claim under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(2) in light of a "glaring lack of evidence", and (3) that trial counsel failed to object to certain aspects of Grandmother's testimony. However, Mother's arguments are misplaced.
To prevail upon a claim that counsel's assistance was ineffective, a parent must show that: (1) counsel's performance was deficient and (2) the deficient performance was so serious as to deprive the parent of a fair hearing. The client must show that counsel's conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that had counsel not made the alleged error in question, even if it was an unreasonable error, there is a reasonable probability there would have been a different result in the proceedings. The burden to show that counsel's performance fell short of the required standard is a heavy one for the client to bear.In re C.B., 245 N.C.App. 197, 213-14, 783 S.E.2d 206, 217 (2016) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Furthermore, this Court has held that "alleged deficiencies did not deprive the respondent of a fair hearing when the respondent's counsel vigorously and zealously represented her, was familiar with her ability to aid in her own defense, as well as the idiosyncrasies of her personality, and the record contained overwhelming evidence supporting termination." In re Dj. L., 184 N.C.App. 76, 86, 646 S.E.2d 134, 141 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
In the present matter, counsel represented Mother in both the DSS hearing as well as the termination of parental rights proceeding. Prior to the hearing at issue in this matter, counsel attempted to reach out to Mother and maternal grandmother to inquire about the matter but could not get in contact with either of them. Despite not hearing from Mother, counsel attended the hearing and advocated on Mother's behalf. She cross-examined Grandmother about Mother's contact with the visitation center and argued to the trial court that Mother's failure to contact may not have been willful due to the pandemic and the visitation center closing.
More notably, as established above, petitioners presented sufficient evidence at the hearing for the trial court to find that at least one ground existed to terminate Mother's parental rights. Thus, even if trial counsel had objected to the portions of Grandmother's testimony regarding Mother's contact with the visitation center, there was still overwhelming evidence that she withheld her presence, her love, her care, and the opportunity to display filial affection to Henry since February 2020. See In re B.C.B., 374 N.C. at 35, 839 S.E.2d at 752 (citation omitted). Here, the record does not support Mother's argument that her trial counsel's performance was deficient such that she was deprived of a fair hearing. Accordingly, Mother was not denied effective assistance of counsel at the hearing for termination of parental rights.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court's order terminating Mother's parental rights is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
Judges ZACHARY and GORE concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).