Accordingly, the Court will address the applicability of both. See McDaniel v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 987 F.2d 298, 304 n. 19 (5th Cir. 1993) (noting that while "[s]eparate trials will usually result in one judgment, . . . severed claims become entirely independent actions to be tried, and judgment entered thereon, independently.") (quoting 9 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil ยง2387 (1971); Fed. Life Ins. Co. (Mut.). v First Fin. Group of Tex., Inc., 3 B.R. 75, 76 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (noting that Plaintiff's Motion under Rule 42 is actually seeking severance under Rule 21 because "Plaintiff's sole basis for urging its motion is to avoid any delay or prejudice resulting from the automatic stay."). --------
Such a result would certainly undermine the spirit and intent of Chapter 13 as contemplated by Congress: to allow a superdischarge to debtors who seek a fresh start by dealing honestly and fairly with their creditors. See, House Report No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) and Senate Report No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), U.S. Code Cong. Admin.News 1978, p. 5787; In re Hurd, 4 B.R. 551 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Mich., 1980); In re Howard, 3 B.R. 75, 5 B.C.D. 1375 (Bkrtcy.S.D.CA. 1980). De minimis repayment plans, as proposed here, "must be strictly scrutinized for good faith because of the discharge provisions which Chapter 13 relief affords."
" Id. at 340, 5 BCD at 1287. See also In re Powell, 2 B.R. 314, 5 BCD 1233 (Bkrtcy E.D.Va. 1980); In re Campbell, 3 B.R. 57, 5 BCD 1365 (Bkrtcy S.D.Cal. 1980); In re Howard, 3 B.R. 75, 5 BCD 1375 (Bkrtcy S.D.Cal. 1980). Given the legislative history accompanying the 1978 amendments, the prior caselaw, and the recent cases interpreting the good faith requirement of ยง 1325(a)(3), this Court concurs with the bankruptcy court that a Chapter 13 plan must provide for substantial payments to unsecured creditors.
1980); In re Sadler, 3 B.R. 536 (E.D.Ark. 1980). Courts have also observed that the upper limits of a debtor's effort is defined by the "feasibility" requirement of 11 U.S.C. ยง 1325(a)(6). In re Goodavage, 41 B.R. 742 (Bankr.E.D.Va. 1984); In re Perskin, 9 B.R. 626 (Bankr.N.D.Tex. 1981); In re Howard, 3 B.R. 75 (Bankr.S.D.Cal. 1980). Sections 1325(a)(4), (6) and (b) and 1322(c) fully circumscribe the "effort" that a debtor can or must make in a Chapter 13 case.
There is legislation now pending in Congress, H.R. 4786 and S. 2000, which addresses this question. Some courts have seized upon the concept of "good faith" and have refused confirmation of Chapter 13 plans on the basis that the proposed dividend was either not "substantial", In re Howard, 3 B.R. 75, 1 C.B.C.2d 633 (Bkrtcy. S.D. Cal. B.J. 1980); not "meaningful", In re Hurd, 4 B.R. 551, 2 C.B.C.2d 190 (Bkrtcy. W.D. Mich. B.J. 1980); not "substantial" and "meaningful", In re White, 4 B.R. 349, 2 C.B.C.2d 224 (Bkrtcy.
See In re Iacovoni, 2 B.R. 256 (Bkrtcy.D.Utah 1980); In re Murallo, 4 B.R. 666 (Bkrtcy.D.Conn. 1980); In re Marlow, 3 B.R. 305 (Bkrtcy.N.D.Ill. 1980); In re Bloom, 3 B.R. 467 (Bkrtcy.C.D.Cal. 1980); In re Cole, 3 B.R. 346 (Bkrtcy.S.D.W.Va. 1980); In re Howard, 3 B.R. 75 (Bkrtcy.S.D.Cal. 1980); In re Johnson, 5 B.R. 40 (Bkrtcy.S.D.Ohio 1980). The second inquiry is what Congress envisioned when it required that a plan be proposed in good faith.
For a complete summary of the condition of the case law defining "good faith," see Scher, supra, at 280-83. See also, In re Beaver, 2 B.R. 337, 340 (Bkrtcy.S.D.Cal. 1980) (meaningful payments); In re Curtis, 2 B.R. 43, 45 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Mo. 1979) ("at least 10% of take home pay"); In re Iacovoni, 2 B.R. 256 (Bkrtcy.D.Utah 1980) ("meaningful payments but less than best efforts"); In re Campbell, 3 B.R. 57, 59-60 (Bkrtcy.S.D.Cal. 1980) ("substantial payment depending on the facts of the case"); In re Howard, 3 B.R. 75, 77 (Bkrtcy.S.D.Cal. 1980) ("substantial payment"). To the extent that legislative history aids interpretation, this Court believes that it supports the conclusion that "good faith" is not quantifiable. The more direct and unequivocal statements strongly suggest that Congress intended the only floor under ยง 1325(a) to be that set forth in ยง 1325(a)(4): the liquidation value of the debtor's nonexempt assets.
Therefore, it is the court's duty "to fashion the meaning of that term." In re Howard, 5 B.C.D. 1375, 3 B.R. 75 (Bkrtcy.D.Conn. 1980). This court is of the opinion that the major purpose of the court's discretion under ยง 1325 to scrutinize a Chapter 13 plan prior to confirmation, is to prevent debtor abuse of Chapter 13, id., and to insure that the distinction between Chapter 7 and Chapter 13, as well as the basic and underlying purpose of Chapter 13, is maintained.
See In re Iacovoni, 2 B.R. 256, 5 BCD 1270 (Bkrtcy.D.Utah 1980); In re Murallo, 4 B.R. 666, 6 BCD 478 (Bkrtcy.D.Conn. 1980); In re Marlow, 3 B.R. 305, 6 BCD 77 (Bkrtcy.N.D.Ill. 1980); In re Bloom, 3 B.R. 467, 6 BCD 141 (Bkrtcy.C.D.Cal. 1980); In re Cole, 3 B.R. 346, 6 BCD 216 (Bkrtcy.S.D.W.Va. 1980); In re Howard, 3 B.R. 75, 5 BCD 1375 (Bkrtcy.S.D.Cal. 1980); In re Johnson, 5 B.R. 40, 6 BCD 277 (Bkrtcy.S.D.Ohio 1980)." In re Yee, supra, 7 B.R. at 757.
. . . [P]lans proposing minimal payments to unsecured creditors in satisfaction of Section 1325(a)(4) must be strictly scrutinized for good faith because of the discharge provisions which Chapter 13 relief affords. As Bankruptcy Judge Katz stated In re George S. and Paengkaeo Howard [ 3 B.R. 75 (Bkrtcy.)], "A review of the legislative history of Chapter 13 leads to the conclusion that the drafters did not intend the liberal provisions of Chapter 13 to be used as a disguised Chapter 7 Liquidation.