ORDERED that the order is reversed, on the law, without costs or disbursements.The failure of the Family Court to personally serve the appellant with the order to show cause upon initiation of the contempt proceeding was a jurisdictional defect (seeMatter of Howard T.P. v. Maria B., 237 A.D.2d 443, 654 N.Y.S.2d 419 ; Matter of Minter, 132 A.D.2d 701, 518 N.Y.S.2d 181 ). Accordingly, we reverse the order.

Although the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination applies to Family Court proceedings ( see, Matter of Gladys H., 235 A.D.2d 841, 842; see generally, Matter of Ashley M., 235 A.D.2d 858), it may be properly asserted only where a direct answer by the witness confronts him or her with a substantial and real danger of criminal prosecution ( see, Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 53; Flushing Natl. Bank v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 135 A.D.2d 486, 487). Here, in light of the program's therapeutic setting and particularly in view of CPLR 4507 and 4508 N.Y.C.P.L.R., we conclude that respondent had no grounds for claiming the subject privilege as he did not have a reasonable fear of criminal prosecution if he admitted his transgressions ( see generally, Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 369-375; Matter of Ashley M., supra; compare, Matter of Howard T. P. v. Maria B., 237 A.D.2d 443). The Law Guardian has advised us that respondent has completed serving his six-month jail term.